

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 V A S P S 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 1 0 1 3 8 0 8 1 1 0 4 8 0 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the unit at 100% power, PT-27B indicated a low amp reading on circuit 6A, boric
0 3 acid to the blender, panel 10. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.2.B.5 and is
0 4 reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2). The redundant circuit of heat tape was operating,
0 5 therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.
0 6
0 7
0 8

0 9 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
P C 11 A 12 E 13 H E A T E R 14 Z 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 0 23 0 3 0 26 27 0 3 28 29 30 L 31 32 0
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
C 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 40 Y 23 N 24 L 25 T 1 8 5 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The heat tracing tape failed due to mechanical damage sustained from erecting
1 1 scaffolding to accomodate installation of pipe supports in the area. The failed tape
1 2 was replaced.
1 3
1 4

1 5 FACILITY STATUS 28 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS 30 NA METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 R Discovery Description 32 Routine Test
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT 33 Z 34 Z 35 NA AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 36 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE 37 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 37 0 38 Z 39 NA DESCRIPTION 40 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 40 0 41 NA DESCRIPTION 42 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE 43 Z 44 NA DESCRIPTION 45 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 N 46 NA
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-030/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 10-13-80

TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING SYSTEM FAILURE

1. Description of Event:

With the unit at 100% power, PT-27B indicated a low amp reading on circuit 6A on panel 10, boric acid to the blender. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.2.B.5 and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences of Occurrence:

The heat tracing system is designed to maintain the boric acid at a temperature above which solidification could occur. The redundant circuit of heat tracing was functioning, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Occurrence:

The heat tracing failed due to mechanical damage sustained from individuals in the area. Erecting scaffolding to accomodate installation of pipe supports.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to verify redundant circuit operable.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The subsequent corrective action was, to replace the affected heat tape and prove operability.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Construction personnel have been formally advised on the importance of safety related heat tracing and the dire consequences associated with damaging it. In addition, a person has been assigned to provide interface between the station staff and construction personnel to aid them in avoiding problems of this nature.

7. Generic Implications:

None