NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (9–14) (2)	V A S P S 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (26–30) (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (57–58) (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (60) (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0
	EVENT DATE (69–74) (8)	0 9 2 3 8 0
	REPORT DATE (75–80) (9)	1 0 2 3 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With refueling in progress, the radiation monitoring sampling pumps, 1-SW-P-5C and D
0 3 were found to be inoperable. These pumps are required for post accident radiation
0 4 monitoring of the service water from the recirculation spray heat exchangers. This is
0 5 reportable as PerT.S. 6.6.2.b(4). Other monitors and/or methods were available for the
0 6 detection and identification of a leaking heat exchanger. Therefore the health and
0 7 safety of the public were not affected.
0 8

Line	Field	Value
0 9	SYSTEM CODE (9–10) (11)	X X
	CAUSE CODE (11) (12)	E
	CAUSE SUBCODE (12) (13)	X
	COMPONENT CODE (13–18) (14)	P U M P X X
	COMP. SUBCODE (19) (15)	B
	VALVE SUBCODE (20) (16)	Z
(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR (21–22)	8 0
	(23)	—
	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. (24–26)	0 6 8
	(27)	/
	OCCURRENCE CODE (28–29)	0 3
	REPORT TYPE (30)	L
	(31)	—
	REVISION NO. (32)	0
	ACTION TAKEN (33) (18)	A
	FUTURE ACTION (34) (19)	Z
	EFFECT ON PLANT (35) (20)	Z
	SHUTDOWN METHOD (36) (21)	Z
	HOURS (37–40) (22)	0 0 0 0
	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (41) (23)	Y
	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (42) (24)	N
	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (43) (25)	A
	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (44–47) (26)	T 0 7 5

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The pump impeller and seals were found to be corroded preventing the shafts from
1 1 rotationg. All four pumps will be removed, inspected, and tested prior to Unit
1 2 startup.
1 3
1 4

Line	Field	Value
1 5	FACILITY STATUS (9) (28)	X
	% POWER (10–12) (29)	0 0 0
	OTHER STATUS (13–44) (30)	S/G Replacement
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (45) (31)	A
	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (46–80) (32)	Operator Observation
1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (9) (33)	Z
	CONTENT OF RELEASE (10) (34)	Z
	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (11–44) (35)	N/A
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (45–80) (36)	N/A
1 7	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (9–11) (37)	0 0 0
	TYPE (12) (38)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (13–80) (39)	N/A
1 8	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (9–11) (40)	0 0 0
	DESCRIPTION (12–80) (41)	N/A
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE (9) (42)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (10–80)	N/A
2 0	PUBLICITY ISSUED (9) (44)	N
	DESCRIPTION (10–68) (45)	N/A
	NRC USE ONLY (69–80)	

8010280565

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-3184

GPO 917-926

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 80-068/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 09-24-80

TITLE OF EVENT: 1-SW-P-5C-&D FAILURE

1. Description of Event:

On 9-23-80, with refuling in progress, a service water flush of the Recirculation Spray heat exchangers was being conducted. The RSHX radiation monitoring sample pumps (1-SW-P-5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D) were manually started. 1-SW-P-5C & 5D were found to be inoperable. Initial investigation revealed that 1-SW-P-5D was drawing locked rotor current and that the motor overload heaters for 1-SW-P-5C had been removed. The overload heaters were replaced. 1-SW-P-5C subsequently drew locked rotor current.

This reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(4).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment:

The Recirc Spray Service Water Radiation Monitoring system, of which these pumps are part, performs two functions 1) detection of outleakage of RS fluid to the service water system 2) identification of the leaking RS heat exchanger. The RS service water system discharges to the circulating water discharge tunnel. The discharge tunnel radiation monitor will also detect outleakage. The FSAR assumes only 2 of 4 RS subsystems to be operable, thereby allowing the isolation of RS subsystems (one at a time) to identify the leaking heat exchanger. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Occurance:

The pump seals and impeller were found to be corroded thereby preventing the pump shaft from rotating.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Since the unit was defueled, the immediate corrective action was to issue a maintenance request for the repair of the pumps.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Pump 5C and 5D will be repaired and tested prior to the startup of this unit. In addition, pumps 5A and 5B will be inspected and retested.

6. Action taken to Prevent Recurrance:

The Recirc Spray Service Water Radiation Monitoring sample pumps will be flow tested and preventative maintenance will be performed each refueling outage.

7. Generic Implications:

None

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	V A S P S 2 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
	LICENSEE CODE (9–14)	LICENSE NUMBER (15–25)	LICENSE TYPE (26–30)	CAT (57–58)

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7)	0 9 2 4 8 0 (8)	1 0 2 3 8 0 (9)
	(60)	DOCKET NUMBER (61–68)	EVENT DATE (69–74)	REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 With the Unit at full power the charging pump service water pump, 2-SW-P-10A, would
0 3 not develop the proper discharge head. Pump 2-SW-P-10B was operable and supplied
0 4 the required cooling water. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not
0 5 affected. This event is contrary to T.S.-3.3.A.8.b. and is reportable per T.S.-
0 6 6.6.2.b.(2).
0 7
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	W A (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	P U M P X X (14)	B (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 0	—	0 1 8	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	I 0 7 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The pump would not develop the proper head because of build up of material that had
1 1 been entrained in the suction side of the pump. The pump was inspected, cleaned,
1 2 tested.
1 3
1 4

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Operational Event

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

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PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson PHONE: (804) 357-3184

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ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-018/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 09-24-80

TITLE OF EVENT 2-SW-P-10A MALFUNCTION

1. Description of Event:

With the unit at full power, the charging pump service water pumps, 2-SW-P-10A, would not develop the proper discharge pressure. This contrary to T.S.-3.3.A.8.b. and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences of Occurrence:

The charging pump service water pumps supply cooling water to the charging pump intermediate seal and lube oil coolers. The "B" pump was operable. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Occurrence:

The reduced capacity of 2-SW-P-10A was caused by the accumulation of sediments and suspended material in the suction side of the pump.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to inspect and clean the pump suction strainer. This action was followed by submitting an MR to have the pump inspected and repaired if necessary.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The subsequent corrective action was to disassemble, inspect, and clean the pump. The pump was subsequently verified operable.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional actions deemed necessary

7. Generic Implications:

None