

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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 V A S P S 2 (2) 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) 4 1 1 1 1 (4) (5)
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0	1
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 REPORT SOURCE L (6) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 (7) 0 8 1 9 8 0 (8) 0 9 0 2 8 0 (9)
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

(0 2) With the Unit at 12% power it was discovered that the steam flow transmitters

(0 3) (FI-474,475,484,485,494, and 495) were isolated, this is contrary to T.S.-3.7.B and is

(0 4) reportable per T.S.-6.2.a.(2). The other protection features which would have provided

(0 5) protection against this accident were operable. Therefore, the health and safety of

(0 6) the public were not affected.

(0 7)

0	8
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 7 8 9 80

0	9
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 SYSTEM CODE I D (11) CAUSE CODE A (12) CAUSE SUBCODE X (13) COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U (14) COMP. SUBCODE T (15) VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17

 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR 8 0 (21) 22 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) 36 HOURS 0 0 0 0 (22) 37 40 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) 41 44 NPR-4 FORM SUB. N (24) 42 45 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A (25) 43 46 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R 3 7 0 (26) 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

(1 0) The transmitters had been isolated during the Containment Integrated Leak Rate test

(1 1) (Type A testing). The transmitters were inadvertantly left in this condition until

(1 2) discovered during the startup.

(1 3)

(1 4)

1	5
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 FACILITY STATUS C (28) 7 8 9 % POWER 0 1 2 (29) 10 12 OTHER STATUS NA (30) 13 44 METHOD OF DISCOVERY A (31) 45 46 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Operational Event (32) 80

1	6
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 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE Z (33) 7 8 9 Z (34) 10 11 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA (35) 12 44 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA (36) 45 80

1	7
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 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 (37) 7 8 9 TYPE Z (38) 10 11 DESCRIPTION NA (39) 12 13 80

1	8
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 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 (40) 7 8 9 DESCRIPTION NA (41) 10 11 80

1	9
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 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z (42) 7 8 9 DESCRIPTION NA (43) 10 11 80

2	0
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 PUBLICITY ISSUED N (44) 7 8 9 DESCRIPTION NA (45) 10 11 80

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER 8009080366 J. L. Wilson

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1 (PAGE 1 OF 2)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-011/01T-0
EVENT DATE: 08-19-80

TITLE OF EVENT: ISOLATION OF STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTERS

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

With the unit at 12% power, it was discovered that the steam flow transmitter (FI-474, 475, 484, 485, 494, and 495) were isolated. This is contrary to T.S. 3.7.B and is reportable per T.S. 6.2.a.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

With these transmitters isolated, there was no steam line flow indication or high steam flow protection signal. High steam flow would initiate a safety injection in coincidence with low steam line pressure or low primary coolant temperature if a main steam line break occurred downstream of the non-return valves and trip valves. The other independent protection features which would have provided protection against this accident were operable. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The transmitters had been isolated during the Containment Integrated Leak Rate test (Type A testing). The transmitters were inadvertently left in this condition until discovered during the startup.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate action was to place all the associated bistables in the trip mode.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Instrument Technicians placed the transmitters back in service and the Instrument Supervisors will review the protection instrumentation prior to startup.

6. FUTURE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Following the Unit No. 1 steam generator replacement outage, all safeguards instrumentation will be verified for proper valve lineup subsequent to the Type A test and prior to unit startup.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None