

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01		V A S P S 2												0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0												4 1 1 1				57		CAT		58	
		LICENSEE CODE												LICENSE NUMBER												LICENSE TYPE									

CON'T

01		L												0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1												0 8 1 6 8 0				09		12		80	
		REPORT SOURCE												DOCKET NUMBER												EVENT DATE									

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

Unit #2 was critical at 0% power. Operating personnel were pressurizing the accumulator tanks. After pressurization, the level indicator for 'B' SI accumulator indicated a high level of 61%, exceeding the T.S. maximum of 58.3%. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.3.A.2 and is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). The redundant accumulators were available, therefore the safety and health of the public were not affected.

0	6	
0	7	
0	8	

SYSTEM CODE 0 9		CAUSE CODE S H		CAUSE SUBCODE X		COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z						COMP. SUBCODE Z		VALVE SUBCODE Z	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17		EVENT YEAR 8 0		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. —		OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 5		REPORT TYPE /		REVISION NO. 0 3		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER —	
23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION Z		EFFECT ON PLANT A		SHUTDOWN METHOD A		HOURS 0 0 0 4		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z	
39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION Z		EFFECT ON PLANT A		SHUTDOWN METHOD A		HOURS 0 0 0 4		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z	
55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION Z		EFFECT ON PLANT A		SHUTDOWN METHOD A		HOURS 0 0 0 4		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

Water was drained from the tank to get the level within the Technical Specifications.

Subsequent to this event, it was determined that condensation in the dry reference leg and high pressure from the nitrogen feed line caused the instrument to read high. The reference leg has been drained and the nitrogen pressure re-routed to reduce instrument shock from the high pressure line.

1	4											80								
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS			(30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY				DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION				(32)	80		
1	5	B	(28)	0	0	0	(29)	NA	B	(31)	Operator observation							(32)	80	
ACTIVITY		CONTENT			RELEASED			OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			(35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE				(36)	80
1	6	Z	(33)	Z	(34)	NA						NA							(36)	80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES		NUMBER			TYPE			DESCRIPTION			(39)								80	
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA			(39)								80	
PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER			DESCRIPTION			(41)								80				
1	8	0	0	0	(40)	NA										(41)	80			
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		TYPE			DESCRIPTION			(43)								80				
1	9	Z	(42)	NA														(43)	80	
PUBLICITY		ISSUED			DESCRIPTION			(45)								80				
2	0	N	(44)	NA														(45)	80	

8009220 40.2

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

NRC USE ONLY

SPD 917-926

ATTACHMENT 1
SURREY POWER STATION, UNIT 2
DOCKET NO: 50-281
REPORT NO: 80-015/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 08-16-80

TITLE OF REPORT: HIGH LEVEL ON ACCUMULATOR TANK 2-SI-TK-B

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

Unit No. 2 was at critical at 0% power conducting low power physics testing. The operator was pressurizing the accumulator tanks during startup testing. The indicated level of accumulator 2-SI-TK-B increased when the tank was pressurized. After pressurization, the level indicators showed a level of 61%, exceeding the Technical Specifications maximum level outlined in 3.3.A.2 of 58.3%. After four hours, the level was still higher than the T.S. level, requiring that a reactor shutdown be initiated. Two minutes later, the level was within the T.S. limit and the reactor was brought back to critical status. This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specifications 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

Two accumulators were operable at all times during the event. This is the minimum number assumed by the safety analysis. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The higher reading was caused by condensation in the dry reference legs. In addition, the reference leg piping taps directly into the nitrogen feed line, causing fluctuations in the level indication.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to drain water from the accumulator tank to lower the level.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The reference legs were drained of condensation. The valve from the nitrogen feed line was closed and the valve on the upper level tap on the tank was opened to reduce the effects of nitrogen charging by allowing the large accumulator nitrogen volume to act as a cushion.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

None required.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

There are no generic implications.