

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT**

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	V	A	S	P	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5			
7	8	LICENSEE CODE						14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT	58		59

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0	1	REPORT SOURCE										DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE										REPORT DATE									
7	8	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80																			
		L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	8	0	7	1	0	0	3	7	9	8	1	0	1	7	7	9	9															

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 With both units at cold shutdown, the ongoing review in response to IE Bulletin No.

79-14, indicated that three (3) RTD bypass lines and one (1) Safety Injection line.

0 4 | showed stresses in excess of the allowable limits.

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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE

0 9 C A B C P I P E X X A Z

(17) **REPORT/RO NUMBER** **EVENT YEAR** **SEQUENCE REPORT NO:** **OCCURRENCE CODE** **REPORT TYPE** **REVISION NO.**  
 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 7 9 — 0 2 7 / 0 1 T — 0

ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS				ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER				
F	18	F	19	C	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	A	25	5	4	2	0	26
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 A detailed analysis was initiated and modifications are being made as necessary.

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1	3	
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1	4	
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1 5		FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
7	8	9	G	28	10	0	0	0	29	13	44	NA
										45	31	C
											46	Inspection

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 Z 33 Z 34 NA

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) NA				

PERSONNEL INJURIES		DESCRIPTION	
NUMBER			
18	000	40	NA

		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
		TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	9	Z	(42) NA	

PUBLICITY		DESCRIPTION (45)		7910230 461		NRC USE ONLY	
2	0	N (44)	NA				

NRC USE ONLY

7910230 461

PHONE: 804-357-3184

NAME OF PREPARER W. L. Stewart

Attachment (Page 1 of 1)  
Surry Power Station, Unit 1  
Docket No: 50-280  
Report No: 79-027/01T-0  
Event Date: 10/3/79

Title of Event: Excess Stress in RTD Bypass and Safety Injection Lines

1. Description of Event:

With both units at cold shutdown, the ongoing review in response to IE Bulletin No. 79-14, indicated that three (3) RTD bypass lines and (1) Safety Injection line showed stresses in excess of the allowable limits.

The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.A.9.

2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems:

The review indicated that the subject as-built safety-related piping lines would yield stresses in excess of allowable in the event of a seismic event. Since the unit was at cold shutdown, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. Cause:

A comparison was made of the field verified piping line configuration against the presently available design documents. This comparison indicated that the subject piping line supports are not installed in accordance with the presently available design documents.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Upon the discovery of the piping line support discrepancies, a detailed analysis was initiated and modifications are being made as necessary.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

The modifications will be made prior to the unit startup and no further action is deemed necessary.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

The ongoing review will continue in response to I.E. Bulletin No. 79-14. If during this review any modifications are identified, they will be evaluated under the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

7. Generic Implications:

Since IE Bulletin No. 79-14 covers the seismic analysis of all safety-related piping systems in the plant, there are no generic implications associated with this event.