NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Field	Entry
01 LICENSEE CODE (9–14) (2)	V A S P S 1
LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
LICENSE TYPE (26–30) (4)	4 1 1 1 1
CAT (57–58) (5)	
CON'T 01 REPORT SOURCE (60) (6)	L
DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0
EVENT DATE (69–74) (8)	0 6 2 1 7 9
REPORT DATE (75–80) (9)	0 8 1 0 7 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 On 6/21/79 Westinghouse notified VEPCO of a non-conservatism in the accident analysis.
03 Specifically, the increase in steam generator reference leg temperature resultant
04 from a rise in containment temperature was not properly accounted for. Consequently,
05 safeguards actuation may be delayed after a high energy line break. This event is
06 reportable as per Technical Specifications 6.6.2.a.8.
07
08

09	Entry
SYSTEM CODE (9–10) (11)	C H
CAUSE CODE (11) (12)	B
CAUSE SUBCODE (12) (13)	A
COMPONENT CODE (13–18) (14)	I N S T R U
COMP. SUBCODE (19) (15)	T
VALVE SUBCODE (20) (16)	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR (21–22)	(23)	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. (24–26)	(27)	OCCURRENCE CODE (28–29)	REPORT TYPE (30)	(31)	REVISION NO. (32)
7 9	—	0 2 2	/	0 1	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN (33) (18)	FUTURE ACTION (34) (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (35) (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (36) (21)	HOURS (37–40) (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (41) (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (42) (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (43) (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (44–47) (26)
X	X	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	N	W 1 2 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The event was caused by a deficiency in the accident analysis. Immediate corrective
11 action has been completed and long term action is being evaluated by Westinghouse and
12 VEPCO. Westinghouse has submitted a 10 CFR 21 report.
13
14

Field	Entry
15 FACILITY STATUS (9) (28)	G
% POWER (10–12) (29)	0 0 0
OTHER STATUS (13–44) (30)	U-1 Cold S/D
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (45) (31)	D
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (46–80) (32)	NSSS Notification
16 ACTIVITY RELEASED (9) (33)	Z
CONTENT OF RELEASE (10) (34)	Z
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (11–44) (35)	NA
LOCATION OF RELEASE (45–80) (36)	NA
17 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (9–11) (37)	0 0 0
TYPE (12) (38)	Z
DESCRIPTION (13–80) (39)	NA
18 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (9–11) (40)	0 0 0
DESCRIPTION (12–80) (41)	NA
19 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE (9) (42)	Z
DESCRIPTION (10–80)	NA
20 PUBLICITY ISSUED (9) (44)	N
DESCRIPTION (10–68) (45)	NA
NRC USE ONLY (69–80)	

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GPO 917-926

UPDATE REPORT

Attachment, page 1 of 2
Surry Power Station, Unit 1
Docket No: 50-280
Report No: 79-022/01X-1
Event Date: 06/21/79

Title of Report: Non-Conservatism in Accident Analysis

1. Description of Event:

On 6/21/79, Westinghouse notified VEPCO of a non-conservatism in the analysis. Specifically, the potential increase in the steam generator reference leg resultant from a rise in containment temperature was not properly accounted for in the analysis. The increased reference leg water temperature will result in a decrease of the water column density which gives an apparent increase in steam generator level. This event is reportable as per Technical Specifications 6.6.2.a.8.

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:

This potential level bias could result in delayed protection signals which are based on low-low steam generator water level. Backup signals were available from the Overtemperature Delta T, pressurizer pressure, containment pressure and safety injection systems.

3. Cause:

This event was caused by the identification of a deficiency in the accident analysis for High Energy Line Break.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Westinghouse prepared and submitted a 10 CFR 21 Review report. Westinghouse and VEPCO are evaluating corrective action at this time.

As a result of this evaluation, it has been determined that an increase of ten percent (10%) in the low-low steam generator level trip setpoint would compensate for the temperature effect on the reference leg.

Technical Specification 2.3.A.3.b directs that the low low steam generator level trip be set at $\geq$ 5% of narrow range instrument span. The trip setpoint has been increased by the recommended 10% plus 2% for instrument error on Unit 1. Technical Specifications will not need to be changed at the present time. Pending an alternative long term solution, 15% will be used as the minimum allowable safety instrument setting.

Title of Report: Non-Conservatism in Accident Analysis

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Several possible long term corrective actions are under evaluation. Once these studies are completed, they will be analyzed and if one is determined viable, it will be implemented. If changes to Technical Specifications are required, they will be made at that time.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

The proposed corrective actions will prevent recurrence.

7. Generic Implications:

This error may be generic to Westinghouse PWR's.