

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T

0	1
7	8

REPORT SOURCE

6	0	5	0	0	0	2	8	0	7	0	6	2	1	7	9	8	0	7	0	5	7	9	9
60	61							68	69						74	75							80
DOCKET NUMBER										EVENT DATE						REPORT DATE							

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 9
7 8

SYSTEM CODE
C H 11
9 10

CAUSE CODE
B 12
11

CAUSE SUBCODE
A 13
12

COMPONENT CODE
I N S T R U 14
13 18

COMP. SUBCODE
T 15
19

VALVE SUBCODE
Z 16
20

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7	8	9											80	
FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS (30)			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)		
1	5	G (28)	0	0	0 (29)	U-1 S/D, U-2 Defueled D (31)			NSSS Notification					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	(37) Z (38) NA	(39)			

8	9	11	12	80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY				(43)
TYPE		DESCRIPTION		
1	9	Z	(42)	NA
7907090380				

7	8	9	10											80		
PUBLICITY																
ISSUED			DESCRIPTION			NRC USE ONLY										
2	0	N	44	NA	45											
7	8	9	10											68	69	80

PHONE: 804-357-3184

Surry Power Station, Unit 1
Docket No: 50-280
Report No: 79-022/01T-0
Event Date: 06-21-79

Attachment Page 1 of 1

Title of Report: Non-Conservatism in Accident Analysis

1. Description of Event:

On 6-21-79, Westinghouse notified VEPCO of a non-conservatism in the accident analysis. Specifically, the potential increase in the steam generator reference leg temperature resultant from a rise in containment temperature was not properly accounted for in the analysis. The increased reference leg water temperature will result in a decrease of the water column density which gives an apparent increase in steam generator level. This event is reportable as per Technical Specifications 6.6.2.a.8.

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:

This potential level bias could result in delayed protection signals which are based on Low-Low steam generator water level. Backup signals were available from the Overtemperature Delta T, pressurizer pressure, containment pressure and safety injection systems. Therefore, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. Cause:

This event was caused by the identification of a deficiency in the accident analysis for High Energy Line Break.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The corrective action is being evaluated by Westinghouse and VEPCO. Westinghouse has prepared and submitted a 10 CFR 21 review. Any required corrective action will be completed prior to returning either unit to service.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

Unknown at this time.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Unknown at this time.

7. Generic Implications:

This error may be generic to Westinghouse PWR's.