

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 V A S P S 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 7 0 3 0 6 7 9 8 0 4 0 3 7 9 9
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

0 2 During Refueling shutdown, while performing Pt-39.2 (Snubber Functional Test), nine-
0 3 teen of the first thirty snubbers failed to meet the acceptance criteria stipulated
0 4 in the PT. This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.20 and is reportable in
0 5 accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). The snubbers failed such that unconstrained pipe
0 6 motion would still have been prevented in the event of a severe transient or earthquake
0 7 There are no consequences and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

0 8 9 80

0 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT COMP. VALVE
CODE CODE SUBCODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
Z Z 11 E 12 B 13 S U P P O R T 14 D 15 Z 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
7 9 0 1 0 3 L 0

ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT
TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD NO. SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
D 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 Y 24 A 25 I 2 0 7 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

1 0 During all previous functional tests, the snubbers tested as acceptable were not read-
1 1 justed to optimum design conditions prior to reinstallation. This, in combination with
1 2 setting drifts, caused the snubbers to fail in the conservative direction. Those
1 3 snubbers that failed were either readjusted, repaired or replaced.

1 4 9 80

1 5 FACILITY STATUS H 28 0 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 Routine Test 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION NA 39
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION NA 41
7 8 9 10 11 12 80

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION NA 43
7 8 9 10 80

2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION NA 45
7 8 9 10 80

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NRC USE ONLY

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Surry Power Station, Unit 2
Docket No.: 50-281
Report No.: 79-010/03L-0
Event Date: 03/06/79

Inoperable Snubbers

1. Description of Event:

During Refueling shutdown, while performing PT-39.2 (Snubber Functional Test), nineteen of the first thirty snubbers failed to meet the acceptance criteria stipulated in the procedure. This is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences of Event:

Snubbers are installed to limit or prevent pipe movement during a seismic event. The mechanism for performing this function is through a lockup and bleed system in the snubber valve block. The failures experienced have resulted from lockup and bleed rates falling below the minimum levels stipulated in the acceptance criteria. However, since these rates are in the conservative direction, the snubbers would still perform their intended function. Therefore, there are no consequences from this event and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause of Event:

During all previous functional tests, the snubbers tested as acceptable were not readjusted to optimum design conditions prior to reinstallation in the system. This, in combination with setting drifts, has caused the snubbers to fail in the conservative direction.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

The snubbers that failed were reset to design conditions. Those that could not be reset were repaired or replaced.

5. Future Corrective Actions:

In light of data supplied by snubber manufacturers, Vepco, in conjunction with Stone & Webster, is reevaluating the existing acceptance criteria for possible excessive conservatism. Based on this evaluation, the PT will be modified accordingly.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Due to high failure rate, all snubbers in Unit 2 will be tested. Upon completion of testing, a supplemental report will be submitted.

7. Generic Implications:

Generic concern to Unit 1 snubbers is being evaluated.