NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	V A S P S 1 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
7	8	9 LICENSEE CODE 14	15 LICENSE NUMBER 25	26 LICENSE TYPE 30	57 CAT 58

CON'T

0	1	REPORT SOURCE L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 (7)	0 9 2 7 7 8 (8)	1 0 1 7 7 8 (9)
7	8	60	61 DOCKET NUMBER 68	69 EVENT DATE 74	75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During periodic testing, Channel II Pressurizer Pressure (Protection) P-456 failed

0 3 high. This is contrary to Technical Specifications 3.7.B, because the required

0 4 degree of redundancy was not maintained. This event is reportable as per Technical

0 5 Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

0 6

0 7

0 8

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	I B (11)	E (12)	E (13)	I N S T R U (14)	X (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
7 8	—	0 2 9	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	F 1 2 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This event was caused by the failure of the Oscillator amplifier module of the transmitter.

1 1 Channel II Pressurizer Pressure and Channel II Overtemperature Delta T were placed in

1 2 trip to provide the required degree of redundancy. The oscillator amplifier was

1 3 replaced, tested and Channel II was returned to service.

1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	NA

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	NA	

7810200118

NAME OF PREPARER T. L. Baucom PHONE: (804) 357-3184

GPO 917-926

Surry Power Station
Docket No: 50-280
Report No: 78-029/03L-0
Event Date: 9-27-78
Failure of Pressurizer Pressure Channel

1. Description of Event:

During periodic testing of Pressurizer Pressure (Protection) instrumentation, PI-456 (Channel II) failed high. The channel had just been tested and removed from the test position when the failure occurred. The High Pressure Reactor Trip Ch. II signal was received.

2. Probable Consequences:

The pressurizer pressureindicator signal feeds the following units: High Pressurizer Pressure Reactor Trip, Low Pressurizer Pressure Reactor Trip, Low Pressure Safety Injection and Overtemperature-Delta T instrumentation. Technical Specifications require a minimum of two (2) operable channels with a degree of redundancy of one (1) for each of these channels. Because the pressure indicator failed high, the minimum degree of redundancy was not retained in the Low Pressurizer Pressure Reactor Trip, Low Pressure Safety Injection, and the Overtemperature Delta T Setpoint instrumentation. This is contrary to Technical Specifications 3.7.B.

3. Cause:

The event was caused by the failure of the Oscillator amplifier module of the pressure transmitter.

4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Immediate corrective action taken was to place the Pressurizer Pressure (Protection) Channel II and the Overtemperature Delta T Channel II in the trip mode. This gave all affected systems the required degree of redundancy. The module was replaced, tested, and the channels returned to normal mode. Because the necessary actions were taken to maintain the required instrument operating conditions, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

No further corrective action will be required.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

This failure is considered a random event, therefore no further action will be taken.

7. Generic Implications:

None. This is considered to be a random failure.