NRC FORM 195
(2-76)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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DOCKET NUMBER: 50-335

FILE NUMBER: INCIDENT REPORT

TO:
N.C. Moseley

FROM:
Flordia Power & Light Co.
Miami, Flordia
A.D. Schmidt

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 4-5-76

DATE RECEIVED: 4-15-76

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DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following.......

PLANT NAME: St. Lucie # 1

ENCLOSURE

Reportable Occurrence # 76-4 Licensee Event Report on 3-5-76, Concerning the Containment Vacuum Relief Valve Opening.......

(30 Cys. Received - No original)

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY — FOR ACTION/INFORMATION — ENVIRO — SAB 4-19-76

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NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

P.O. BOX 3100 MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKETED
USNRC
APR 15 1976
Mail Section
Docket Clerk

April 5, 1976

PRN-LI-76-70

Regulatory File Cy.

RECEIVED
APR 15 1976
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Section

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-4
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: MARCH 5, 1976

BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

J R Beiser
for A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/cpc

Attachment

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and
Program Control (3)

3813

HELPING BUILD FLORIDA

CONTROL BLOCK: ☐☐☐☐☐☐

[PL[illegible]E PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

01	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
	F L S L S 1	0 0 – 0 0 0 0 0 – 0 0	4 1 1 1 1	0 3

01 CONT	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
		L	L	0 5 0 – 0 3 3 5	0 3 0 5 7 6	0 4 0 5 7 6

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During initial core loading, a containment purge fan was started and containment pressure

03 became subatmospheric causing a Containment Vacuum Relief Valve to open. This was in

04 conflict with the wording of Technical Specification 3.9.4 which requires that, during

05 refueling operations, there be no direct access from containment to the outside

06 atmosphere which is incapable of automatic isolation. In order to protect the

07	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
	S D	F	Z Z Z Z Z Z	Z	Z 9 9 9	N

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Specification 3.9.4 does not consider the unique function of the Containment Vacuum

09 Relief Valves. Even though containment integrity is not exactly as described in the

10 specification when one of these valves opens, it should be noted that the valves and

11	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
	B	0 0 0	NA	a	NA

12	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

13	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

14	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
	0 0 0	NA

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

16	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 See Page Two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.

19

NAME: M. A. Schoppman PHONE: 305/552-3779

Event Description (continued)

containment structure from excessive vacuum during all modes of operation, the Containment Vacuum Relief Valves, by design, do not receive a Containment Isolation Signal (CIS). They do close again when containment pressure approaches atmospheric, however, they are not capable of being closed automatically by CIS. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading until the valves were closed. Loss of containment integrity under the conditions of Technical Specification 3.9.4 occurred on one previous occasion and was described in Reportable Occurrence 335-76-1. (335-76-4).

Cause Description (continued)

their associated check valves do close automatically when containment pressure approaches atmospheric. Thus, actuation of the relief valves for the purpose of performing their design function (protection of the containment from excessive vacuum) does not violate the concept of containment integrity because there is no outflow of air from containment to the outside atmosphere through the relief valves.

Followup action will be to contact the appropriate office of the NRC for clarification of Technical Specification 3.9.4.