

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER

INCIDENT REPORT

TO:

N.C. Moseley

FROM: Florida Power & Light Co.
Miami, Florida
A.D. Schmidt

DATE OF DOCUMENT

4-5-76

DATE RECEIVED

4-15-76

☐ LETTER☐ NOTORIZED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED

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30

DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following.....

ENCLOSURE

Reportable Occurrence # 76-4 Licensee Event
Report on 3-5-76, Concerning the Containment
Vacuum Relief Valve Opening.....

(30 Cys. Received - No original)

ACKNOWLEDGED

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: St. Lucie # 1

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

ENVIRO

SAB 4-19-76

BRANCH CHIEF:

Ziemann

W/3 CYS FOR ACTION

LIC. ASST:

Diggs

W/ CYS

ACRS 16 CYS HOLDING/SENT TO LA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE

NRC PDR

I & E (2)

MIPC (3)

SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO

HOUSTON

NOVAK/CHECK

GRIMES/SCHWENCER

CASE

E. WILLIAMS

HANAUER

TEDESCO/MACCARY

EISENHUT

BAER

SHAO

VOLLMER/BUNCH

KREGER/J. COLLINS

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: St. Pierce, Florida

TIC

NSIC

CONTROL NUMBER

3813

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
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April 5, 1976

PRN-LI-76-70

Regulatory

File Cy4



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, N. W., Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-4
ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
DATE OF OCCURRENCE: MARCH 5, 1976

BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30-day notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

JRB
for A. D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

MAS/cpc

Attachment

cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and
Program Control (3)

3813



RECEIVED



CONTROL BLOCK: 1 5

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME: 01 F L S L S 1 14
 LICENSE NUMBER: 00-000000-00 25
 LICENSE TYPE: 41111 30
 EVENT TYPE: 03 32

01 CONT 57 58
 REPORT TYPE: L 59
 REPORT SOURCE: L 60
 DOCKET NUMBER: 050-0335 68
 EVENT DATE: 030576 69
 REPORT DATE: 040576 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During initial core loading, a containment purge fan was started and containment pressure
 03 became subatmospheric causing a Containment Vacuum Relief Valve to open. This was in
 04 conflict with the wording of Technical Specification 3.9.4 which requires that, during
 05 refueling operations, there be no direct access from containment to the outside
 06 atmosphere which is incapable of automatic isolation. In order to protect the

SYSTEM CODE: S D 10
 CAUSE CODE: F 11
 COMPONENT CODE: Z Z Z Z Z Z 17
 PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: Z 43
 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z999 47
 VIOLATION: N 48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Specification 3.9.4 does not consider the unique function of the Containment Vacuum
 09 Relief Valves. Even though containment integrity is not exactly as described in the
 10 specification when one of these valves opens, it should be noted that the valves and

11 FACILITY STATUS: B 9
 % POWER: 000 10
 OTHER STATUS: NA 13
 METHOD OF DISCOVERY: a 45
 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: NA 46
 12 FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z 9
 CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z 10
 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA 44
 LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA 45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

13 NUMBER: 000 11
 TYPE: Z 12
 DESCRIPTION: NA 13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

14 NUMBER: 000 11
 DESCRIPTION: NA 12

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

16 TYPE: Z 10
 DESCRIPTION: NA

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 See Page Two for continuation of Event and Cause descriptions.

19

NAME: M. A. Schoppman

PHONE: 305/552-3779

Event Description (continued)

containment structure from excessive vacuum during all modes of operation, the Containment Vacuum Relief Valves, by design, do not receive a Containment Isolation Signal (CIS). They do close again when containment pressure approaches atmospheric, however, they are not capable of being closed automatically by CIS. The immediate corrective action was to suspend core loading until the valves were closed. Loss of containment integrity under the conditions of Technical Specification 3.9.4 occurred on one previous occasion and was described in Reportable Occurrence 335-76-1. (335-76-4).

Cause Description (continued)

their associated check valves do close automatically when containment pressure approaches atmospheric. Thus, actuation of the relief valves for the purpose of performing their design function (protection of the containment from excessive vacuum) does not violate the concept of containment integrity because there is no outflow of air from containment to the outside atmosphere through the relief valves.

Followup action will be to contact the appropriate office of the NRC for clarification of Technical Specification 3.9.4.