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 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 RHODE, G.K. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 CARLSON, R.T. Region 1, Philadelphia, Reactor Construction & Engineering

SUBJECT: Revised deficiency report, initially submitted 800805.
 Sentence wording in Section II, "Subsequent Finding &
 Corrective Action," has been changed.


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	EQUIP QUAL BR 11	1	1	HYD/GEO BR 22	1	1
	I&E 09	1	1	LIC QUAL BR 12	1	1
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	OELD 21	1	1	PROG/TST REV 13	1	1
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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

December 16, 1980

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
Attention: Mr. R. T. Carlson
Reactor Construction and Engineering
Support Branch
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Carlson:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Per discussions with your staff, Niagara Mohawk is correcting its 10 CFR 50.55(e) final report of August 5, 1980 regarding the environmental seismic qualification of certain electrical equipment to be used at Nine Mile Point Unit 2. The last sentence under Section II. Subsequent Findings and Correction Action of the report should have read: "Since a failure analyses shows that an electrical short circuit or open circuit in the instrument cannot damage the power source, no additional qualification is required." A copy of the revised report is attached for your record.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

Gerald K. Rhode

Vice President

System Project Management

PEF:ja

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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FINAL REPORT

Potential Reportable 50.55(e) Deficiency Involving

Qualification of Electrical Equipment

I. Description of the Deficiency

During an audit of our nuclear steam supply system Vendor conducted the week of March 26, 1980, no evidence (lack of documentation) was found to indicate that the three electrical instruments indicated below were adequately qualified:

<u>Instrument</u>	<u>MPL No.</u>	<u>Qualification Lacking</u>
Conductivity Element	E12-N001	Environmental and Seismic
Level Transmitter	E12-N008	Environmental and Seismic
Rosemount Model 1151DP Differential Pressure Transmitter	E12-N058	Environmental Test Incomplete

II. Subsequent Findings and Corrective Action

As indicated in our interim report dated May 12, 1980 for the Rosemount Model 1151DP differential pressure transmitter, an additional search of the qualification records following the audit located the qualification documentation in another record file. To prevent the recurrence of being unable to retrieve documentation in a timely manner, the nuclear steam supply system Vendor's Quality Assurance Program is being modified to cross-reference qualification records and vendor-supplied documentation.

Regarding conductivity element E12-N001 and level transmitter E12-N008, it has been determined that no corrective action is required. These instruments are considered to be passive and are not required to function either during or after a design basis accident. Since a failure analysis shows that an electrical short circuit or open circuit in the instrument cannot damage the power source, no additional qualification is required.

III. Analysis of the Safety Implications

The electrical instruments have been shown to be adequately qualified to satisfy their intended design function. Therefore, this condition could not have adversely affected the safety of operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2 at any time throughout its expected lifetime.

