(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0 1] [N Y N M P 1] (2) [0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0] (3) [4 1 1 1 1] (4) [ ] (5)
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
[0 1] REPORT SOURCE [L] (6) [0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0] (7) [0 8 2 7 8 0] (8) [0 9 0 9 8 0] (9)
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0 2] SEE ATTACHED

[0 3]

[0 4]

[0 5]

[0 6]

[0 7]

[0 8]
7 8 9 80

[0 9] SYSTEM CODE [X X] (11) CAUSE CODE [B] (12) CAUSE SUBCODE [C] (13) COMPONENT CODE [P E N E T R] (14) COMP. SUBCODE [C] (15) VALVE SUBCODE [Z] (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER-RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR [8 0] 21 22 — 23 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0 1 9] 24 26 / 27 OCCURRENCE CODE [0 4] 29 29 REPORT TYPE [T] 30 — 31 REVISION NO. [0] 32

ACTION TAKEN [B] (18) FUTURE ACTION [H] (19) EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] (21) HOURS [0 0 0 0] (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [N] (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [N] (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [L] (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [P 1 1 0] (26)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1 0] SEE ATTACHED

[1 1]

[1 2]

[1 3]

[1 4]
7 8 9 80

[1 5] FACILITY STATUS [E] (28) % POWER [0 9 9] (29) OTHER STATUS (30) [N/A] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [C] (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) [STATION NRC INSPECTION]
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 60

[1 6] ACTIVITY RELEASED [Z] (33) CONTENT OF RELEASE [Z] (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) [N/A] LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) [N/A]
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

[1 7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0 0 0] (37) TYPE [Z] (38) DESCRIPTION (39) [N/A]
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

[1 8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0 0 0] (40) DESCRIPTION (41) [N/A]
7 8 9 11 12 80

[1 9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] (42) DESCRIPTION (43) [N/A]
7 8 9 10 80

[2 0] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N] (44) DESCRIPTION (45) [N/A]
7 8 9 10 68 69 80

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NRC USE ONLY

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During normal operation an NRC inspector observed light shining through an apparent gap under the outer door of the Reactor building track bay. Immediate investigation by station management and the Inspector revealed that the removable bottom door seals had not properly been installed after the last closure of the door. At the time, the inner door of the track bay was open; thus, secondary containment integrity was dependent upon the outer door. However, since the reactor was at steady state operation during this time period, there was no apparent effect on the environment.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

In order to ensure secondary containment integrity, the inner track bay door was promptly closed and action was initiated to properly install the outer door seals. Failure to properly install the seals was a procedural violation, and thus the procedure was subsequently reviewed with the personnel involved with the incident as well as with other persons who may have cause for its use in the future.