NRC FORM 366 (7-77) U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T	Field	Value
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	N Y N M P 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 3 0 3 8 0
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 3 2 0 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 SEE ATTACHED SHEET

Field	Value
SYSTEM CODE (11)	C D
CAUSE CODE (12)	E
CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	D
COMPONENT CODE (14)	V A L V O P
COMP. SUBCODE (15)	J
VALVE SUBCODE (16)	D
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17) — EVENT YEAR	8 0
SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	0 0 7
OCCURRENCE CODE	0 3
REPORT TYPE	L
REVISION NO.	0
ACTION TAKEN (18)	B
FUTURE ACTION (19)	G
EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	Z
SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	Z
HOURS (22)	0 0 0 0
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	Y
NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	Y
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	L
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)	N 4 1 7

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Disassembly of the pilot valves revealed that rust buildup had occurred
1 1 in the pilot shuttle. The rust was probably from the instrument air sys-
1 2 tem. At present, a new instrument air system is being installed which
1 3 should eliminate the moisture problem. Procedures are also being changed
1 4 to require cleaning & inspection of the pilot shuttle valve internals.

Field	Value
1 5 FACILITY STATUS (28)	D
% POWER (29)	0 0 0
OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	OPERATOR OBSERVATION
1 6 ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	0 0 0
TYPE (38)	Z
DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	0 0 0
DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	A
DESCRIPTION (43)	NA
2 0 PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	N
DESCRIPTION (45)	NA

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER ______ PHONE ______

8003310 281

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLY CONSEQUENCES

While shut down for maintenance, attempts to close both air operated outside main steam isolation valves failed. Technicians disconnected the bleed off line to the air operator of one MSIV and jarred the pilot shuttle valve. At this time the MSIV closed. Without any changes, a second attempt was made to close the other MSIV. The attempt succeeded. Subsequent testing revealed that both valves opened and closed properly. The event occurred with the reactor mode switch in "refuel" at zero power. As a result, the consequences were insignificant.

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