

PUBLIC SUBMISSION

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Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities

Comment On: NRC-2017-0211-0001

Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities; Request for Comment on Draft NUREG

Document: NRC-2017-0211-DRAFT-0013

Comment on FR Doc # 2017-24734

Submitter Information

Name: SHARON D. BRIMER

Address:

24701 RAYMOND WAY, SPC 220

LAKE FOREST, CA, 92630

Email: sbrimer@gmail.com

(12)

11/15/2017

82 FR 52944

General Comment

See attached file(s)

I oppose the current plan to store spent fuel at San Onofre. Please see attachment it was written by another party but expresses my concerns.

Attachments

2019-01-02

SUNSI Review Complete

Template = ADM - 013

E-RIDS= ADM-03

Add= Jeremy Smith (jass)

Date: January 2, 2018

Comments to NRC Docket ID NRC-2017-0211, NUREG-2215

NRC Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities Draft, November 2017

<https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1731/ML17310A693.pdf>

The NRC cannot meet its mission to “ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment” if it continues to allow thin-wall welded canisters they admit are vulnerable to cracks, that cannot be fully inspected (inside or out), and cannot be repaired, maintained and monitored to prevent (not just detect) radiological leaks. There is no adequate or proven detailed plan required to address major radiological leaks, or to address on-site replacement of containers. Seismic requirements for partial cracks is not addressed. See below webpage for details on the Holtec UMAX System planned for San Onofre and why this is an example of a system with major problems that should not be approved.

<https://sanonofresafety.org/holtec-hi-storm-umax-nuclear-waste-dry-storage-system/>

Each canister contains about as much or more lethal Cesium-137 as released from the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, yet the NRC knows the boron metal in the canisters will not prevent the fuel from going critical if exposed to non-borated water from through wall cracks (in storage or transport).

NUREG-2215 states it requires “conservative assumptions”, “inspections”, and admits to many “unknowns”. NUREG-2215 is not “conservative”, does not require adequate “inspections”, and does not resolve the many “unknowns” that would be eliminated if the NRC mandated and enforced critical safety requirements to inspect, monitor, maintain and repair (both inside and out) to PREVENT leaks.

Proven dry storage technology exists that meets critical basic safety requirements we expect in a car. Does the NRC consider thin-wall canisters “conservative assumptions” compared to thick-wall casks? If so, why? Why does the NRC allow containers that do not meet these basic critical safety requirements?

Respectfully,

Donna Gilmore, SanOnofreSafety.org
donnagilmore@gmail.com 949-204-7794

Basic Safety Requirements	Thin-wall canisters	Thick-wall casks
Thick walls	No. Only 1/2 to 5/8 th of an inch	Yes. 10 to 19.75 inches
Won't crack.	No	Yes
Ability to inspect inside & out, maintain, repair (fuel baskets, other parts)	No	Yes
Monitor to fix problems <i>before</i> leaks	No	Yes
ASME <i>container</i> certification	No	Yes
Defense in depth (redundancy)	No	Yes
Stored in concrete building	No	Yes
Gamma & neutron protection	Requires vented concrete overpack	Yes
Transportable	No transport with cracks. 10 CFR § 71.85	Yes
Proven technology	No. Conditions unknown. Most in use less than 15 yrs, a few 30 yrs.	Yes. Inspected and used over 40 years