

January 20, 2018

Docket No. 52-048

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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**SUBJECT:** NuScale Power, LLC Submittal of Technical Report TR-0716-50439, "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program," Revision 1

**REFERENCES:**

1. Letter from NuScale Power, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Submittal of Technical Reports Supporting the NuScale Design Certification Application," dated December 30, 2016 (ML17005A112)
2. NuScale Technical Report, "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program," Revision 0, TR-0716-50439, dated December 2016 (ML17005A122)
3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Request for Additional Information No. 194, (eRAI No. 8884)," dated August 19, 2017 (ML17231A006)
4. Letter from NuScale Power, LLC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Response to NRC Request for Additional Information No. 194 (eRAI No. 8884) on the NuScale Design Certification Application," dated October 18, 2017 (ML 17291B310)

In a letter dated December 30, 2016 (Reference 1), NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) submitted the technical report titled "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program," Revision 0 (Reference 2). In a letter dated August 19, 2017 (Reference 3), the NRC Staff provided Request for Additional Information (RAI) No. 194 regarding the subject technical report. NuScale submitted responses to the NRC RAI in a letter dated October 18, 2017 (Reference 4).

The purpose of this letter is to provide Revision 1 of the Technical Report TR-0716-50439 incorporating changes that resulted from the RAI responses in Reference 4. Additional edits have also been made to reflect the inclusion of seismic Belleville washers in the NuScale Power Module design, and general updates to address NRC audit review comments. Changes are summarized with revision bars in the margin.

Enclosure 1 is the proprietary version of the report titled "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program" Revision 1. Enclosure 2 is the nonproprietary version of the report titled "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program" Revision 1. NuScale requests that the proprietary Enclosure 1 be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.390. The enclosed affidavit (Enclosure 3) supports this request.

This letter and its enclosures make no regulatory commitments and no revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

Please feel free to contact Jennie Wike at (541) 360-0539 or at [jwike@nuscalepower.com](mailto:jwike@nuscalepower.com) if you have any questions.

Sincerely,



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- Enclosure 1: "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program," TR-0716-50439-P,  
Revision 1, proprietary version  
Enclosure 2: "NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program," TR-0716-50439-NP,  
Revision 1, nonproprietary version  
Enclosure 3: Affidavit of Thomas A. Berman, AF-0118-57989

**Enclosure 1:**

“NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program,” TR-0716-50439-P Revision 1, proprietary version

**Enclosure 2:**

“NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program,” TR-0716-50439-NP, Revision 1,  
nonproprietary version



# **NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program Technical Report**

January 2018

Revision 1

Docket: 52-048

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## **Abstract**

This report describes the Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program (CVAP) for the NuScale Power Module (NPM) that verifies the structural integrity of the internals for flow induced vibration. The CVAP conforms to the guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.20 (Reference 8.1.1). The content of this licensing technical report provides additional information to substantiate the statements made in the NuScale Design Control Document, thereby facilitating a comprehensive review by the NRC of the NPM design.

## Executive Summary

A Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program (CVAP) for the NuScale Power Module (NPM) is established in accordance with the NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.20 (Reference 8.1.1).

The CVAP ensures that the structural components of the NPM exposed to fluid flow are precluded from the detrimental effects of flow induced vibration (FIV).

The NPM represents a unique design in its size, arrangement, and operating conditions, although its technology is based on well-proven light water reactor designs with long operational experience. Accordingly, the first operational NPM is classified as a prototype in accordance with RG 1.20. After the first NPM is qualified as a valid prototype, subsequent NPMs will be classified as non-prototype Category I.

Given its prototype classification, the NuScale CVAP addresses the applicable criteria of RG 1.20, Section 2.

The NPM differs from other light water reactor designs in that it is a small modular reactor that is an integral, self-contained, movable nuclear steam supply system that can be installed individually or in a series of up to 12 units at a power station. The NPM design is passive, with primary coolant driven by natural circulation flow. Natural circulation flow velocities are very low, thereby decreasing the propensity for detrimental FIV effects. The CVAP establishes the scope of analyses, testing, and inspections required to ensure that components of the NPM are not subject to unacceptable vibratory degradation. When completed, the NuScale CVAP provides the requisite assurance that the NPM components are not subject to detrimental FIV.

## **1.0 Introduction**

### **1.1 Purpose and Scope**

This report describes the CVAP for the NPM to verify the structural integrity of the components to FIV. The CVAP conforms to the guidance of NRC RG 1.20 (Reference 8.1.1). This program is required for all new nuclear power plants. The CVAP includes the collection of analysis, testing, and inspection that demonstrates a sufficient margin of safety and structural integrity against the detrimental effects of FIV for components in the NPM.

In defining the scope of the CVAP, the NRC references the definition of reactor core support and internal structures inside the reactor vessel provided by the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NG, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (Reference 8.1.2). The NuScale reactor vessel internals (RVI), including the steam generator (SG) tube supports, are designed to Subsection NG. Components that make up the primary and secondary coolant pressure boundaries of the NPM are designed to Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB and are included in the scope of the CVAP, because they are exposed to primary and secondary coolant flows.

Based on the integral design of the NuScale NPM, the SG components are located within the fluid volume of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), along with the RVI and the pressurizer. Likewise, RG 1.20 includes references to evaluation of steam dryers, steam system components, and SG internal components as part of a CVAP. Regulatory Guide 1.20 does not discuss the need to evaluate the vibration characteristics of the fuel components, which include both the fuel bundles and the control rod assemblies (CRAs). Based on these considerations, there are three focus areas within the NPM that are included within the scope of the CVAP: reactor vessel internals, steam generators, and piping.

To finalize the CVAP, two additional technical reports are developed and provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The first report contains the measurement program details for each prototype test, including test operating conditions, test durations, instrument types and locations, applicable testing hold points, and pre-test predictions of the expected and allowable experimental results, considering bias errors and random uncertainties. The second report provides the post-test evaluation of the testing completed to support the measurement program. In the second report, the differences between the expected and measured experimental results are either resolved or confirmed to be in the analytically-predicted allowable ranges. The second report also documents the inspection program results.



## 1.2 Abbreviations

Table 1-1 Abbreviations

Term	Definition
AR	acoustic resonance
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CFD	computational fluid dynamics
CNTS	containment system
CNV	containment vessel
CRA	control rod assembly
CRAGT	control rod assembly guide tube
CRD	control rod drive
CVAP	Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program
CVCS	chemical and volume control system
DHRS	decay heat removal system
FEI	fluid elastic instability
F/G	flutter/gallop
FIV	flow-induced vibration
ICIGT	in-core instrument guide tube
LFI	leakage flow instability
MSIV	main steam isolation valve
NPM	NuScale Power Module
PSD	power spectral density
PWR	pressurized water reactor
RCS	reactor coolant system
RG	Regulatory Guide
RMS	root mean square
RPV	reactor pressure vessel
RRV	reactor recirculation valve
RVI	reactor vessel internals
RXC	reactor core
SG	steam generator
SGS	steam generator system
TB	turbulent buffeting
TH	thermal-hydraulic
VS	vortex shedding

Table 1-2 Definitions

Term	Definition
Acoustic resonance	A phenomenon where an acoustic wave is generated at a frequency that coincides with the natural frequency of a confining structure.
Initial startup testing	Testing conducted on the prototype after fuel loading.
Fluid elastic instability	Instability that arises when, during one vibration cycle, the energy absorbed from the fluid exceeds the energy dissipated by damping. This phenomenon is associated with arrays of closely packed circular cylinders.
Flutter/gallop	The phenomenon in which drag and lift forces due to fluid flow act on a bluff body with a non-circular cross section. If the bluff body vibrates, the draft and lift forces change due to the change in flow angle, which can increase the vibration amplitude. In this phenomenon, the amount of energy dissipated by damping is less than the energy imparted on the structure by the fluid flow.
Leakage flow instability	A condition in which fluid flow through a thin space with at least one flexible structural boundary results in vibration of the flexible boundary due to the negative fluid damping becoming larger than the total fluid damping.
Factory testing	Testing conducted at a manufacturer's or vendor's facility any time during assembly of the relevant portions of the NPM.
Prototype	A configuration of RVI that, because of its arrangement, design, size, or operating conditions, represents a unique design for which no valid example exists.
Prototype testing	Testing that is used to validate analysis inputs, methods, and margins of safety for components susceptible to FIV phenomena. This testing consists of separate effects, factory, and initial startup testing. Testing is required to be performed using a full-scale, prototypic arrangement of the region of interest. Separate effects testing is performed at a test facility. Factory testing is performed on an NPM at a manufacturer's or vendor's facility. Initial startup testing is performed on the first NPM after fuel loading.
Safety margin	For strongly-coupled FIV mechanisms, the percentage difference between the analytically predicted value and the acceptance criteria that represents the predicted onset of the mechanism for a component. For turbulent buffeting, safety margins are evaluated for the analytically-predicted fatigue against the limits that are acceptable over the component design life.
Separate effects testing	Testing performed on a prototypic portion of the NPM in a test facility.
Turbulent buffeting	A weak coupling between a structure and the random pressure fluctuations induced by turbulent flow. The effects of low amplitude structural vibrations induced from turbulence are evaluated to assess impact and fatigue.
Valid prototype	A configuration of RVI that has successfully completed a comprehensive vibration assessment program for prototype RVI and has experienced no adverse in-service vibration phenomena.
Vortex shedding	A phenomenon due to flow separation on the surface of a bluff body located in the flow field, leading to the shedding of vortices at locations of flow separation. Due to interaction between the vortices, time varying forces are generated that act on the body.

## 2.0 NuScale Power Module Design Overview for Flow Induced Vibration

The NPM is an integral, self-contained, movable nuclear steam supply system. It can be used individually at a power facility to generate 50 MWe or installed in a series of up to 12 NPMs to generate up to 600 MWe. The NPM includes various hydraulic systems, components, and structures that are relevant to the CVAP. These include the containment system (CNTS), the reactor coolant system (RCS), the control rod drive system, the reactor core (RXC), the steam generator system (SGS), the in-core instrumentation system, the decay heat removal system (DHRS), and the emergency core cooling system. The NPM includes the containment vessel (CNV) and an integral RPV, which includes the pressurizer and the SGs, and is located inside the CNV. During normal operation, the NPM is located in an operating bay in the Reactor Building (RXB) and is partially immersed in the reactor pool.

Figure 2-1 depicts the NPMs located in respective operating bays. The major NPM components are depicted in Figure 2-2 and described in the following subsections.




Figure 2-1 NuScale Power Modules located in respective operating bays




Figure 2-2 NuScale Power Module general arrangement

## 2.1 Primary Coolant Flow Conditions

The RCS is a passive system driven by natural circulation flow that relies on interfacing active systems for operational control. During operation at power, the reactor coolant flows upward through the RXC where it removes heat from the fuel assemblies. The heated reactor coolant exits the RXC and continues to flow upward through the central riser (composed of the lower and upper riser assemblies). At the top of the upper riser, the flow is turned by the pressurizer baffle plate to flow downward through the annular space between the upper riser and the RPV. This annular space between the upper riser and the RPV contains the SG helical tube bundles. As the reactor coolant flows downward across the SG helical tube bundles, it transfers heat to the secondary side coolant. The colder reactor coolant leaving the SG helical tube bundles continues to flow downward through the annular space between the core barrel and the RPV. As flow passes the bottom of the core barrel, the flow is turned upward by the RPV lower head and flow diverter, and is returned to the RXC. The motive force for the reactor coolant flow during operation at power is natural convection, driven by the difference in coolant density between the hot coolant leaving the RXC and the colder coolant leaving the SGs, and the elevation difference between the RXC (heat source) and the SGs (heat sink).

The NPM reactor coolant flow has the following operational characteristics:

- Given that there are no RCS pumps, primary coolant flow is by natural circulation. Flow is limited by thermal driving head, with no pump overspeed conditions, no excess flow in transients, and no modulating pressure excitation due to vane passing frequencies.
- Primary and secondary flows are mostly axial, with no RPV hot and cold leg nozzles impinging flow on the core support assembly. The low-velocity axial flows result in low turbulent sources for FIV.
- Primary single-phase flow is on the outside of the SG tubes with low velocity. Flow velocity is approximately an order of magnitude less than pressurized water reactor (PWR) designs with secondary-side two-phase flow on the inside of tubes.

A schematic of the primary coolant flow path is shown in Figure 2-3. Table 2-1 summarizes the NuScale reactor coolant flows in relation to other PWR applications. In the SG tube region, only a simplified depiction of the flow is provided. The primary-side flow occurs in the downward direction, across the columns of helical SG tubes. The secondary-side flow travels in the upward direction inside the helical SG tubes.




Figure 2-3 NuScale Power Module primary and secondary flow schematic

Table 2-1 Pressurized water reactor flow velocity comparison

Design <sup>(Note 1)</sup>	Average Velocity (ft/s)				Maximum Design Flow Rate (lb <sub>m</sub> /s)	Primary Coolant Loop Transit Time (seconds)
	Steam Generator Gap	Downcomer	Core	Upper Internals Cross Flow		
NuScale	1.2	1.7	3.6	1.5	1,456	60.8
EPR		24	16	30	55,000	9.9
AP1000		19	16	40	34,800	10.3
US-APWR		23	14	30	54,092	12.6
SONGS	18	-	-	-	-	-

Notes to Table 2-1: (1) Velocities, maximum design flow rates, and loop transit times for the ERP, US-APWR and AP1000 PWR designs are per References 8.1.6, 8.1.7, 8.1.8, and 8.1.9.

(2) SONGS steam generator gap velocity is per Reference 8.1.10.

Within the NPM, the RCS water level is normally maintained in the pressurizer region above the elevation of the pressurizer heaters. The water in the pressurizer region is heated by the pressurizer heaters to a temperature greater than the temperature of the coolant leaving the RXC, in order to maintain a saturated water-steam interface in the pressurizer region.

## 2.2 Secondary Coolant Flow Conditions

Under normal operation, the feedwater is pumped to the SG through the SGS feedwater piping. The feedwater flows into the feedwater plenum and is distributed to the SG helical tubing. At the entrance to each tube, an SG tube flow restrictor restricts the secondary side flow to provide flow stability. The subcooled feedwater is heated to superheated steam in the SG helical tubes. The flow from the tubes combines in the steam plenums and exits the plenums at the steam supply nozzles. The SGS steam piping then supplies steam to the CNTS steam lines. Secondary flow is controlled as a function of reactor power and the highest flow rates occur at full-power conditions. The steam piping velocity at full-power operating conditions is below 150 feet per second.

The DHRS connects to the CNTS steam piping outside of containment and the SGS feedwater piping inside containment. Upon DHRS actuation, a two-phase natural circulation loop is established. Heat transfer through the SG tubes causes liquid water to boil, rise, and travel up the steam piping. The steam is redirected to the DHRS steam piping and then to the condenser due to the closed main steam isolation valve (MSIV) and open DHRS actuation valves. Heat transfer to the reactor pool water through the condenser tubes causes the steam to condense. The liquid returns to the SG by gravity through the DHRS condensate line. The flow rate through the loop is restricted by an orifice in the DHRS steam piping.

## 2.3 Component Screening for Flow-Induced Vibration

Table 2-2 provides a summary of the NPM components that meet the FIV screening criteria and are classified as susceptible to FIV.

The following subsections discuss in more detail the components that are screened for FIV and the components that are found to be susceptible to FIV based on the screening criteria. Components that are classified as susceptible to FIV require analysis, measurement, and inspection to meet the intent of the CVAP. Flow-induced vibration mechanisms and screening criteria, which are derived from References 8.1.3 and 8.1.4, are summarized in Table 2-3.

Table 2-2 NuScale Power Module components screened for susceptibility to flow induced vibration mechanisms

NPM Region or Category	Component	Section Number
Components exposed to secondary coolant flow	Steam piping, nozzle, MSIVs	2.3.1.1
	SG steam plenum <sup>Note 1</sup>	2.3.1.2
	DHRS steam piping	2.3.1.3
	DHRS condensate piping	2.3.1.3
	Helical SG tubing <sup>Note 1</sup>	2.3.1.4
	SG tube inlet flow restrictors	2.3.1.5
SG tube supports exposed to primary coolant flow	SG tube support bars	2.3.2.1
	SG lower tube support cantilevers	2.3.2.2
Upper riser assembly exposed to primary coolant flow	Upper riser section	2.3.3.1
	Riser section slip joint	2.3.3.2
	In-core instrument guide tube (ICIGT)	2.3.3.3
	Control rod drive (CRD) shaft	2.3.3.4
	CRD shaft support	2.3.3.5
	Upper riser hanger brace	2.3.3.6
Lower riser assembly exposed to primary coolant flow	Lower riser section	2.3.4.1
	Control rod assembly guide tube (CRAGT) assembly	2.3.4.2
	CRAGT support plate	2.3.4.3
	Upper core plate	2.3.4.4
Core support assembly exposed to primary coolant flow	Core barrel	2.3.5.1
	Upper support block	2.3.5.2
	Core support block	2.3.5.3
	Belleville spring	2.3.5.4
	Reflector block	2.3.5.5
	Lower core plate	2.3.5.6
	Fuel pin interface	2.3.5.7
Other RVI exposed to primary coolant flow	Pressurizer spray RVI	2.3.6.1
	Chemical and volume control system (CVCS) injection RVI	2.3.6.2
	Flow diverter	2.3.6.3
	Thermowells <sup>Note 2</sup>	2.3.6.4
	Component and instrument ports	2.3.6.5

Notes to Table 2-2:

1. Component is exposed to primary and secondary coolant flow.
2. Thermowells also evaluated in NPM piping exposed to secondary coolant flow.



Table 2-3 Flow-induced vibration screening criteria

Phenomenon	Screening Criteria
Fluid elastic instability (FEI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>array of cylinders (minimum one row), i.e., geometry</li> <li>array pitch/diameter &lt; 2.0; array must sufficiently confine fluid to allow feedback between adjacent cylinders</li> </ul>
Vortex shedding (VS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>bluff body (or edge of a cavity in line with flow) , i.e., geometry</li> <li>subject to cross-flow</li> <li>absence of downstream structures to disrupt vortices</li> </ul>
Turbulent buffeting (TB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>subject to turbulent flow (axial, cross-flow or combination)</li> <li>component interface that is in load path of one or more components subject to turbulent flow</li> </ul>
Acoustic resonance (AR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>suitable geometry to generate an AR, typically a hollow or cavity</li> <li>single phase environment within hollow/cavity</li> </ul>
Leakage flow instability (LFI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>narrow annular flow path exists, i.e., geometry</li> <li>flexible structure in annulus, bounded by fixed surface</li> <li>annular flow path is diverging (restriction at inlet to annulus) or parallel</li> <li>flow conditions to generate sufficient flow velocity and pressure differential through annular flow path</li> </ul>
Galloping/flutter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>non-circular cross section, i.e., geometry</li> <li>aspect ratio (length/width) in prevailing direction of flow is less than 4.0 (for tall rectangular structure) and less than 2.0 (for low, long rectangular structure)</li> </ul>

### 2.3.1 Components Exposed to Secondary Flow

The components exposed to secondary flow are contained in the SGS and DHRS. The SGS transfers heat from the reactor coolant to produce superheated steam, while providing a leak-tight pressure boundary between the primary reactor coolant and the secondary-side coolant. Additionally, the SGS removes residual and decay heat from the RXC in conjunction with the DHRS following DHRS actuation.

The SGS consists of two independent, but intertwined, SGs. Each SG has a pair of feedwater plenums and a pair of steam plenums. The SGs are once-through helical coils with primary-side reactor coolant outside the tubes and secondary-side fluid inside the tubes. On the secondary side, preheated feedwater enters the SGS feedwater piping from the SGS feedwater lines and then enters the SGs through the feedwater supply nozzles and feed plenums. Feedwater flows up the helical tubes where it is heated, boiled, superheated, and exits the SGs through the steam plenums and main steam supply nozzles to the SGS steam lines. The SGS steam piping then supplies steam to

the CNTS steam lines. The components exposed to secondary-side flow that screen for FIV are identified in the following subsections.

#### **2.3.1.1 Steam Piping, Plenum Exit Nozzle, and Main Steam Isolation Valve**

The SGS piping includes the steam piping inside containment (see Figure 2-4). The SGS steam lines initiate at the steam supply nozzle safe ends on the steam plenums and terminate inside the CNV at the CNV penetration nozzle safe ends. Outside the CNV, the steam lines are termed CNTS steam piping through the MSIV to the NPM disconnect flange. The CNTS steam lines are connected to the DHRS.

These components meet the screening criteria for AR. Vortices can potentially form off the leading edges of transitions within these components. Similar shedding could potentially occur due to shedding off the main steam valve bodies. When shedding frequencies become close or equal to the acoustic frequencies of the downstream piping and valve or nozzle bodies, AR can occur. No other FIV phenomena are credible for these regions.




Figure 2-4 Steam piping downstream of steam nozzles

### 2.3.1.2 Steam Plenum

As shown in Figure 2-5, the SG steam plenums are located above the SG tube bundle and the pressurizer baffle plate. The plenum tube sheet region provides the termination point for the helical SG tubes and the plenum provides the flow path from the SG tubes to the steam nozzle located on the outside of the RPV.

The plenum itself is most comparable to a chamber composed of the primary head and SG tube sheet in a conventional recirculating SG, as it is effectively an independent pressure vessel chamber. Although the outside of the plenum is subject to pressurizer coolant flow, based on the size and thickness of the plenum and low pressurizer flow rates, no significant FIV response is plausible. The steam plenum is a bluff body; however, based on the SG tubes connecting on the downstream side, VS would be disrupted. Based on lack of any potential leakage flow paths and roughly cylindrical geometry, leakage flow and galloping/flutter are excluded. The sole potential FIV phenomenon to which the steam plenums could potentially be subject is internal AR.




Figure 2-5 Steam plenum region

### 2.3.1.3 Decay Heat Removal System Steam and Condensate Piping

During normal operation, the DHRS is not used, and the DHRS actuation valves are closed. During off-normal operations, the SGS may function in conjunction with the DHRS to remove decay heat and bring the RCS to a safe shutdown temperature. Upon DHRS actuation, the SGS receives feedwater from the DHRS condensate lines. Steam generated by the SGs is routed to the CNTS steam lines as during normal operations. Figure 2-6 illustrates the DHRS piping from the actuation valves at the CNTS main steam lines to the SGS feedwater tee inside containment.

The DHRS steam and condensate lines represent branch lines in which there is normally no flow during operation. Acoustic resonance is possible for these lines. Within the DHRS condenser, AR in the header assemblies is unlikely to be a concern as the transmitted pressure waves will lose energy as they pass through the series of 1-in. tee junctions (at the condenser tube entrances and exits), eliminating the potential for AR. No other FIV phenomena are credible for these regions.




Figure 2-6 Decay heat removal system lines 1 and 2 from actuation valves to steam generator system feedwater tee

### 2.3.1.4 Helical Steam Generator Tubing

The SG has two independent helical coil tube bundles. The helical SG tubes span the distance between the feedwater and steam plenums shown in Figure 2-7. The two tube bundles are coiled in opposite directions as shown in Figure 2-7. Each tube bundle is composed of 21 columns of tubes and the tubes from each plenum are intertwined or “stacked” on top of each other (the alternation of tubes from one plenum to another is shown in Figure 2-7 as alternating colors). Each bundle has two feedwater plenums at the bottom and two steam plenums at the top (eight plenums total). The SG tubes have an outside diameter of 0.625 in. and a nominal wall thickness of 0.050 in.

Secondary-feed flow enters the tubes at the feed plenums and boils producing superheated steam internally along the length of the tubes. As such, the random pressure fluctuations associated with boiling inside the tubes provides a secondary source of turbulent energy to the tubes in addition to the turbulent forces due to reactor coolant cross flow outside the tubes.

Like typical U-tube or straight-tube bundles, the potential for FEI of the tube bundle exists. Vortex shedding is assumed to be possible for all span locations where there are no tubes directly downstream. Vortex shedding from SG tubes has not been demonstrated to occur in tests of closely-packed tube arrays since the presence of tubes directly downstream disrupts coherent vortex formation; however, the VS mechanism is considered for the SG tubes for completeness. Vibration due to incoherent vortices may exist for the interior SG tubes. These vibrations are accounted for in the turbulent buffeting loads. Based on the tube geometry and the lack of leakage flow paths, leakage and galloping/flutter are excluded.




Figure 2-7 Helical steam generator tube bundle

### 2.3.1.5 Steam Generator Tube Inlet Flow Restrictors

Each individual SG tube requires an inlet flow restriction device for the purpose of flow stability. Figure 2-8 provides a representation of the flow restrictor concept. The flow restrictor fits into the tube inlet and is designed to provide flow stability by restricting the volume of the secondary-side flow through the tube. The flow restriction is created by a series of narrow annular gaps between the restrictor and the tube inner diameter. To hold the flow restrictors in position, mounting hardware (plate) is required within the feed plenum. The plate is removable and held in place with fasteners. The flow restrictors are attached to this mounting plate. The flow restrictors and mounting hardware are anchored at a series of points with individual fasteners rather than with extended seams (e.g., welds). Based on the narrow annular gaps between the SG tube and the flow restrictor and the relatively large pressure loss in this region, the flow restrictor is susceptible to leakage flow induced vibration. The mounting plate is stiffer than the flow restrictor and provides larger flow area. Therefore, leakage flow induced vibration is not a concern for the mounting plate. Similarly, the turbulent buffeting vibrations of the flow restrictor will bound those of the mounting plate due to the increased stiffness and reduced convective velocity of the mounting plate compared to the flow restrictor.




Figure 2-8 Tube inlet flow restrictor and mounting plate



## 2.3.2 Steam Generator Tube Supports

The SG steam and feedwater plenums are integral parts of the RPV. The SG helical tubing is provided with support bars and cantilever support members, which are welded to the RPV inner wall. In addition to considering these supports in the evaluation of the helical tubing for FIV, the supports themselves are assessed to ensure the designs are acceptable to prevent detrimental FIV.

### 2.3.2.1 Steam Generator Tube Support Bars

Tube support bars, shown in Figure 2-9 and Figure 2-10, span the full height of the helical tube bundle and are anchored at the attachment of the upper tube support bar to the bottom of the integral steam plenum. Based on their form (effectively a solid bar), the tube support bars are not subject to leakage flow or AR. Additionally, based on the confinement of the bars within the tube bundle, where the tortuous flow path creates turbulence, formation of coherent vortices will not occur. The axial alignment of the tube support bars provides an aspect ratio greater than 4.0 and an angle of attack of effectively 0.0 thus precluding galloping and flutter.




Figure 2-9 Steam generator support design showing support bar tabs




Figure 2-10 Steam generator tube support bar assembly (shown in a horizontal installation)

Figure 2-10 shows the SG tube supports interface with the SG tubes. Clearances are provided between the tube and tube support plate tabs and between the tube and backing strip. Other clearances in the tube support assembly include the top support bracket to upper tube support bar clearance, the bottom support bracket to lower tube support clearance, and the middle support tab to backing strip clearance. The remainder of the tube support assembly contains welded connections. The tube to tube support plate tab clearances are provided for manufacturability of the tube supports and for ease of assembly of the steam generator as a whole. The bracket to tube support bar clearances are provided so that the brackets fit over the support bars during steam generator assembly. The bottom support bracket has a clearance to the lower tube support cantilever to allow for thermal expansion of the steam generator assembly. The middle of the three columns of tabs on the tube support plate extends between the backing strips on the adjacent support bar assembly. This clearance allows adjacent support bar assemblies to support each other in the circumferential direction.




Figure 2-11 Steam generator tube to tube support interface

### 2.3.2.2 Steam Generator Lower Tube Support Cantilevers

Figure 2-12 shows the lower tube support cantilevers. The upper tube support bar is welded to the RPV and the integral pressurizer baffle. The lower tube support cantilevers are welded to the RPV shell below the SG tube bundle. Individual tube support bars are not joined to the tube support cantilevers. Below the tube bundle vortex, shedding from the cantilevers and turbulent buffeting is possible. Based on its form (solid bar) and an aspect ratio of about 3.5 as a low, long rectangle, it is not subject to leakage flow, AR, or plunge galloping. Torsional gallop should be evaluated. The angle of attack for flow impacting the support cantilevers is likely close to 0.0, which would exclude flutter; however, flow velocities in this region have not yet been rigorously developed. Due to the overall support structure stiffness, flutter is most likely excluded; however, analysis is performed to substantiate this conclusion.




Figure 2-12 Lower tube support cantilevers with inner steam generator columns removed for clarity

### 2.3.3 Upper Riser Assembly

The upper riser assembly includes the upper riser section slip joint, the upper riser section, a series of supports for the CRD shafts and ICI GTs, and the upper riser hanger assembly. The portions of the upper riser assembly that screen for FIV are identified in the following subsections.

#### 2.3.3.1 Upper Riser Section

The upper riser section is shown in Figure 2-13. The upper riser section is supported by the upper riser hanger in the vertical direction. Horizontally, it is primarily supported by the SG tube support bars in the radial direction. The upper riser section itself is an open

cylinder. Fluid enters the upper riser section at the transition and turns 180 degrees over the upper edge of the riser.

The upper riser section is susceptible to parallel flow TB due to the upward flow inside the riser and the downward flow on the riser exterior. The upper riser section is not susceptible to FEI, AR, gallop, or flutter as it is an open cylinder. The upper riser section directs the fluid flow and does not cross the flow path, precluding it from a VS susceptibility. Therefore, FIV due to mechanisms other than TB are not credible for the upper riser section.




Figure 2-13 Upper riser section with characteristic flow direction noted

### 2.3.3.2 Riser Section Slip Joint

A friction fit joint is located at the junction between the upper riser assembly and the lower riser assembly as shown in Figure 2-14. {{

}}<sup>2(a),(c),ECI</sup>. This region does not screen for LFI because of the very small pressure difference between the hot and cold legs of the primary coolant loop due to the natural circulation primary coolant flow. The slip joint itself is not susceptible to FEI, AR, gallop, or flutter as it is an open cylinder. The slip joint directs the fluid flow and does not cross the flow path, precluding it from VS susceptibility. The portions of the slip joint in contact with the hot and cold legs are susceptible to TB based on the flow conditions.




Figure 2-14 Riser section slip joint

### 2.3.3.3 In-core Instrument Guide Tube

The ICIQTs extend from the upper RPV head to the top of the fuel assemblies. The ICIQTs interface with the pressurizer baffle plate, CRD shaft supports, lower riser assembly support, upper core plate, and the in-core instruments. These interfaces provide lateral support while allowing small vertical displacements to accommodate differential thermal expansion movement.

On the interior of the ICIQTs reside the in-core instruments that are routed through the pressure boundary at the RPV head and down into the core. The clearance between the ICIQT and the CRD shaft support is negligible compared to the riser flow area. Additionally, due to the very low pressure differential across the supports, it is not credible that significant flow through this annulus will develop to create leakage flow instability.

During steady state operation, there is negligible pressure difference between the riser outlet and the pressurizer. Due to the momentum of the flow as it exits the riser, it is possible that some flow will pass through the annular flow regions between the ICIQT and CRD shaft and the pressurizer baffle plate. This flow is expected to be very low, based on the low driving force.

The geometry of the ICIQTs is constructed in a manner that they are not susceptible to FEI, acoustic resonance, gallop, or flutter. Although small gaps exist between the ICIQT and the supports, the pressure drop and flow in these gaps is negligible under all operating conditions; therefore, LFI is not credible. The ICIQTs are exposed to turbulent flow and are susceptible to TB. Above the upper riser section and below the pressurizer baffle plate, the ICIQTs are subject to crossflow; therefore, VS is also applicable for this component.

### 2.3.3.4 Control Rod Drive Shaft

The CRD shafts pass through the CRD shaft supports as they are routed to the fuel assemblies. The CRD shaft support openings are one of the CRD shaft alignment features and the clearance between the two components is small. Similar to the ICIQT, although the clearance between the component and support is small, the pressure drop and velocity are sufficiently low that LFI is not credible. Above the uppermost CRD shaft support, the fluid changes direction as it turns to the SG tube region. The CRD shaft becomes a bluff body with respect to the flow direction and is susceptible to VS in this region. Using the screening criteria, this interface is not susceptible to the FIV phenomena other than VS and TB.

### 2.3.3.5 Control Rod Drive Shaft Support

The CRD shaft support is attached to the upper riser section and is normal to the flow direction, as shown in Figure 2-15. As the primary fluid moves around the support beams, VS and TB may occur. Using the screening criteria, this component is not susceptible to the other FIV mechanisms.




Figure 2-15 Control rod drive shaft, in-core instrument guide tube, and supports



### 2.3.3.6 Upper Riser Hanger Brace

As shown in Figure 2-16, the upper riser hanger assembly connects the upper riser section to the pressurizer baffle plate. Fasteners are used to attach the hanger ring to the baffle plate, such that there is no flow past or above this part. However, similar to the ICIGT and CRD shaft, the upper riser hanger braces experience cross flow as the hot leg fluid turns from the upper riser into the SG region. Based on this, the upper riser hanger braces are susceptible to TB and VS. No other FIV mechanisms are credible for this region.




Figure 2-16 Upper riser hanger assembly

### 2.3.4 Lower Riser Assembly

The lower riser assembly includes the lower riser section, the upper core plate, CRA guide tubes, CRA guide tube support plate, and CRD shaft supports. The portions of the lower riser assembly that screen for FIV are identified in the following subsections.

#### 2.3.4.1 Lower Riser Section

The lower riser section is the cylindrical section in the lower riser assembly, as shown in Figure 2-17. This section transfers the loads from the slip joint and the guide tube support plate to the lower core plate. It also separates the up-flowing fluid above the core from the down-flowing fluid in the downcomer. The lower riser section is susceptible

to TB due to parallel flow and vortices generated by the feed plenums. The open cylindrical shape precludes the lower riser section from being susceptible to FEI, AR, leakage flow, gallop, or flutter. The lower riser section is not susceptible to VS because no part of the component is opposing the flow path. Therefore, the lower riser section is only susceptible to TB.




Figure 2-17 Lower riser assembly

#### 2.3.4.2 Control Rod Assembly Guide Tube Assembly

The CRAGT supports the CRAs at varying amounts of control rod insertion, as shown in Figure 2-18. The CRAGT assembly includes four CRA cards, the CRA lower flange, the CRA guide tube, and the CRA alignment cone. The CRA cards, lower flange, and alignment cone are welded to the CRAGT guide tube to form the CRAGT assembly. The CRAGT assemblies are supported by the upper core plate and the guide tube support plate (Section 2.3.4.3).

The CRAGT components have many sharp edges to cause VS and TB. The CRAGT assembly is not susceptible to leakage flow because there is not an annular flow path with a flexible boundary. Using the screening criteria, the CRAGT is not susceptible to the FIV phenomena, other than VS and TB.




Figure 2-18 Control rod assembly guide tube assembly

### 2.3.4.3 Control Rod Assembly Guide Tube Support Plate

The CRAST support plates are located above the CRAST assembly, as depicted in Figure 2-17. Similar to the CRAST assembly, the support plate is subject to turbulent flow and also represents a bluff body subject to cross flow. Therefore, TB and VS are applicable mechanisms. Other mechanisms are not considered credible.

### 2.3.4.4 Upper Core Plate

The upper core plate functions in conjunction with the core support assembly to align and support the reactor core system. The upper core plate is welded to the bottom of the lower riser, as depicted in Figure 2-17. Four lock plate assemblies align the lower riser assembly with the core support structure and secure the two assemblies together. The upper core plate is subject to turbulent flow and also represents a bluff body subject to cross flow. Therefore, TB and VS are applicable mechanisms. Other mechanisms are not considered credible.

### 2.3.5 Core Support Assembly

The core support assembly includes the core barrel, upper support blocks, lower core plate, fuel pin interface, reflector blocks, lock plate assembly, lower core support lock inserts, upper and lower Belleville springs and the RPV surveillance specimen capsule holder and capsules. All surveillance specimens are not shown in Figure 2-19, but consist of four capsule holders attached to the outer surface of the core barrel at the mid

height of the core support assembly. While many of the components are exposed to turbulent flow and some are exposed to cross flow, vibration of these components or components in the load path are not expected based on the component weights and stiffness. Based on this, representative components in the core support assembly are screened for susceptibility to FIV.




Figure 2-19 Core support assembly

### 2.3.5.1 Core Barrel

The core barrel is a large cylinder designed to carry the core support loads and separate the down-flowing fluid from the fuel, as denoted in Figure 2-19. The core barrel is susceptible to TB using the screening criteria. Using the screening criteria, the core barrel is not susceptible to the other FIV phenomena.

### 2.3.5.2 Upper Support Block

The upper support block is attached to the core barrel and opposes the fluid as it travels through the downcomer, as shown in Figure 2-19. This block is susceptible to VS and TB phenomena. Using the screening criteria, the upper support block is not susceptible to the other FIV phenomena.

### 2.3.5.3 Core Support Block

The core support blocks are located in the downcomer. This feature transfers the dead weight and accident loads from the lower core plate to the lower head of the RPV, as denoted in Figure 2-24. This block opposes the fluid flowing through the downcomer into the lower plenum and is susceptible to VS and TB phenomena. Using the screening criteria, the core support block is not susceptible to the other FIV.

### 2.3.5.4 Belleville Spring

The Belleville springs, shown in Figure 2-20, transfer the dead weight, seismic and accident loads from the lower core plate to the lower head of the RPV. Each core support block location contains two Belleville springs to adequately support the core during seismic events. The smaller Belleville spring is located between the retaining nut and the lower core plate. The larger Belleville spring is located under the lower core plate within the core support block. The Belleville springs do not experience any cross flow since they are contained above and within the core support block (i.e. no downstream flow path). Although there will be some small clearance flow paths between the washers that make up the Belleville springs, there is not expected to be appreciable flow through these gaps because the center of the Belleville springs is an annular cavity with minimal to no outflow and thus there is minimal to no pressure drop possible across the Belleville washers. Further, the inside of the springs contain either a retaining pin (lower spring) or the core support block pin (upper spring) which will impede flow into the cavity. Based on these considerations, leakage flow is not judged to be possible in this region. The Belleville springs do experience parallel flow and are therefore susceptible to turbulent buffeting. Belleville springs are not susceptible to the other FIV phenomena.




Figure 2-20 Core support block and Belleville spring

#### 2.3.5.5 Reflector Block

The reflector blocks are aligned by pins and stacked on the lower core plate inside the core barrel, as denoted in Figure 2-19. Primary coolant flows through small channels in the reflector and the inner surface of the reflector is subject to turbulent core flow. The only mechanism applicable to this component is TB. Other mechanisms are not credible due to the flow conditions and component geometry.

#### 2.3.5.6 Lower Core Plate

The lower core plate is located below the fuel assemblies, as depicted in Figure 2-19. The lower core plate is subject to turbulent flow and also represents a bluff body subject to cross flow. Therefore, TB and VS are applicable mechanisms. Other mechanisms are not considered credible. Similar to the upper core plate, the lower core plate is significantly thicker and stiffer than the CRAGT support plate and experience similar flow velocities; therefore, the response of the lower core plate to these mechanisms is expected to be bounded.

#### 2.3.5.7 Fuel Pin Interface

The fuel top and bottom nozzles interface with fuel pins that are installed in the upper and lower core plates, as shown in Figure 2-21. This interface is a location for impact primarily driven by the TB of the fuel assembly. The fuel pin is not directly subject to other FIV mechanisms based on component geometry and flow conditions.




Figure 2-21 Typical fuel nozzle-to-fuel pin interface

### 2.3.6 Other Reactor Vessel Internals

There are other design features located in the primary and secondary coolant flow paths that require FIV screening. These consist of instrumentation and system connections that support interfacing systems. For the NPM design, the majority of the RPV connections are located in the steam space of the pressurizer. This region is always steam and is not exposed to high average flow rates, even under transient and accident conditions, due to the very large cross sectional area on the region. Therefore, for the majority of the instrument and interfacing system connections in the NPM design, degradation due to FIV is not credible. The instrumentation and system connections that screen for FIV are identified in the following subsections.

#### 2.3.6.1 Pressurizer Spray Reactor Vessel Internals

The pressurizer spray lines and nozzles are attached to a nozzle in the upper RPV head and extend downward into the steam region of the pressurizer (Figure 2-22). Fluid is pumped through these components to provide the pressurizer spray. These lines are susceptible to TB as there is a large pressure loss across the nozzle and flow rates through the spray line piping are turbulent when spray flow is used. Using the screening criteria, the pressurizer spray lines and nozzles are not susceptible to the other FIV mechanisms.




Figure 2-22 Pressurizer spray reactor vessel internals

#### 2.3.6.2 Chemical and Volume Control System Injection Reactor Vessel Internals

The CVCS inlet line is routed from a flange in the RPV wall into the downcomer (Figure 2-23). The line continues through the upper riser section into the up-flowing region above the core. The line is susceptible to VS and TB in both regions. Using the screening criteria, the CVCS injection RVI is not susceptible to other FIV phenomena.






Figure 2-23 Chemical and volume control system injection reactor vessel internals

### 2.3.6.3 Flow Diverter

A flow diverter is attached to the RPV bottom head under the core support assembly (Figure 2-24). This flow diverter smooths the turning of the reactor coolant flow from the downward flow outside the core barrel to upward flow through the fuel assemblies. The flow diverter reduces flow turbulence and recirculation, and minimizes flow-related pressure loss in this region. Because flow in this region is turbulent, the flow diverter is susceptible to TB. Other FIV mechanisms are not applicable to this component.




Figure 2-24 Flow diverter

#### 2.3.6.4 Thermowells

Within the primary coolant flow path, RCS temperature instruments are installed in thermowells located at the entrance to the SG tubes and in the downcomer. Thermowells are welded to the RPV. Thermowells are also used to measure temperature in secondary side piping. In locations where they are used, thermowells extend into the flow path and are exposed to turbulent cross-flow conditions. Therefore, they are susceptible to VS and TB. Other FIV mechanisms are not applicable to these components.

#### 2.3.6.5 Component and Instrument Ports

Acoustic resonances due to the generation of vortices at closed branch lines are evaluated. Penetrations that create a hollow cavity and that are located in regions with adjacent flow are susceptible to AR. Cavities form acoustic standing waves which may be excited due to the presence of vortex shedding in the vicinity. Due to the integral design of the NPM, the RPV contains very few penetrations along the primary coolant flow path. For the NPM design, the only components that meet this criterion are the primary coolant flow sensors and RRVs, which are both located in the downcomer. Due to the flow conditions and geometry in these regions, no FIV mechanisms other than AR are credible for component and instrument ports.

### 2.4 Regulatory Requirements

Consistent with RG 1.20, Section 2, the prototype CVAP for the NPM is composed of three sub-programs. The program includes

- a vibration and stress analysis program
- a vibration measurement program
- an inspection program

The analysis program uses theoretical analysis to predict the natural frequencies, mode shapes, and structural responses of the NPM components to various sources of flow excitations.

The measurement program consists of prototype testing that is used to validate the analysis program inputs, results, and margins of safety. Prototype testing consists of separate effects, factory, and initial startup tests. The measurement program verifies the structural integrity of the NPM components. If discrepancies are identified between the analysis and the measurement programs, reconciliation is performed.

The inspection program consists of inspections of the applicable NPM components before and after initial startup testing in order to confirm that the vibratory behavior of the susceptible components is acceptable. Inspection is generally performed outside the NPM, but if the components are not separable, then an in situ inspection process can be specified. Inspections consist of visual examinations.

To finalize the CVAP, two additional technical reports are developed. The first report contains the measurement program details for each prototype test, including test operating conditions, test durations, instrument types and locations, applicable testing hold points, and pre-test predictions of the expected and allowable experimental results, considering bias errors and random uncertainties. The second report provides the post-test evaluation of the testing completed to support the measurement program. In this report, the differences between the expected and measured experimental results are dispositioned and all results are confirmed to be in the analytically predicted allowable ranges. The second report also documents the inspection program results.

## 2.5 Classification of NuScale Power Module

Regulatory Guide 1.20 provides guidance to verify the structural integrity of the NPM internals susceptible to FIV. The verification measures depend upon the classification of the internals.

The NPM represents a unique design in its size, arrangement, and operating conditions, although its technology is based on well-proven light water reactor designs with long operational experience. Accordingly, the first operational NPM is classified as a prototype in accordance with RG 1.20. After the first NPM is qualified as a valid prototype, subsequent NPMs will be classified as non-prototype Category I.

Given its prototype classification, the NuScale CVAP addresses the applicable criteria of RG 1.20, Section 2.

### 3.0 Vibration Analysis Program

The analysis program begins with a list of FIV phenomena and a list of components that could be subjected to these phenomena. Screening criteria for each FIV phenomena are developed from literature, References 8.1.3 and 8.1.4, as discussed in Section 2.3.

Due to the very low primary coolant flow rates and passive safety designs, many regions of the NPM are not susceptible to FIV and do not meet FIV screening criteria. For example, the annular region between the outside of the RPV and the inside of the CNV is similar in geometry to the core barrel and reactor vessel of conventional PWRs, which is a location typically susceptible to FIV. For the NuScale design, this region only contains liquid when the NPM is filled with reactor pool water in preparation for refueling, and during accident scenarios when primary or secondary coolant condenses on the CNV wall and accumulates in the annular space. In both of these scenarios, the bulk flow rates in the annular region are laminar and eventually settle into static, pool conditions. Therefore, while this region appears similar to a region that would typically screen for FIV in conventional reactor designs, FIV is not a concern in this region for the NuScale design.

For NPM components or structures that meet the screening criteria for a phenomenon, analysis is performed to confirm whether the structure or component is susceptible to the FIV phenomena. For the NPM components that are evaluated for TB, the response of these structures, in terms of vibrational amplitude and stress, to this source of flow excitation is determined.

There are six FIV phenomena that are evaluated for NPM components:

- fluid elastic instability
- vortex shedding
- turbulent buffeting
- acoustic resonance
- leakage flow instability
- flutter and gallop (F/G)

The analysis program provides methodologies to analyze the screened components for each type of FIV mechanism. This analysis work can be divided into two categories:

- developing FIV inputs that are common to each of the analyses or components
- developing specific analyses to determine the susceptibility and response of the components to the various sources of flow excitation

For all phenomena with the exception of TB, the FIV mechanisms are characteristic of a strong fluid-structure coupling system. The NPM components are designed so there is a sufficient margin of safety to the potential onset of these FIV phenomena. Turbulent buffeting occurs when a component is subject to turbulent flow, which is the dominant

flow condition of the primary and secondary coolant. For TB, the fluid-structure coupling is weak and results in low amplitudes of vibration. Provided the impact stresses and fatigue usage are not detrimental to the component or structure over the design life, the acceptance criteria for this source of flow excitation are met.

Per Section 2.2 of RG 1.20, the purpose of the measurement program is:

*“... to verify the structural integrity of the reactor internals, determine the margin of safety associated with steady-state and anticipated transient conditions for normal operation, and confirm the results of the vibration analysis.”*

The results of the measurement program are used to validate FIV analysis inputs, results and the margins of safety. Due to the first of a kind NPM design, component screening analysis errs on the side of including potentially susceptible components, even when they could be excluded based on engineering judgment or precedent. This is a conservative engineering approach that minimizes the risk of failing to analyze a significant component. Compared to the existing PWR and boiling water reactor designs, the natural circulation design of the NPM is inherently less susceptible to FIV due to the lower primary coolant velocities. Based on these two factors, FIV analysis results demonstrate that many components have very large margins of safety. The margin of safety is the means by which structural integrity is assured. Therefore, when a margin of safety is sufficiently large, validation by testing is not necessary.

The following subsections provide an overview of the analysis program. The scope of the measurement program is determined based on the results of the analysis program. This report also identifies the prototype components that require inspection before and after the measurement program. Because the measurement program focuses on the limiting components, inspection is used to confirm the assumptions regarding which components are limiting. For the components that are instrumented to support the measurement program, inspection provides a secondary confirmation to the FIV performance and integrity of these structures.

The applicability of the FIV phenomena to various components in the NPM is summarized in Table 3-1 and the components are identified in Figure 3-1. In this table, the triangle symbol indicates that a component meets the screening criteria for the FIV mechanism and requires evaluation in the analysis program. Dashes indicate that the mechanism is not credible for the component. The locations of the components are discussed in detail in Section 2.3.

Table 3-1 NuScale Power Module components and their susceptibility to flow-induced vibration mechanisms

NPM Component Category	Component	FEI	VS	TB	AR	LFI	F/G
Components exposed to secondary side flow	Steam piping, nozzle, MSIVs	-	-	-	▲	-	-
	SG steam plenum <sup>Note 1</sup>	-	-	-	▲	-	-
	DHRS steam piping	-	-	-	▲	-	-
	DHRS condensate piping	-	-	-	▲	-	-
	Helical SG tubing <sup>Note 1</sup>	▲	▲	▲	-	-	-
	SG tube inlet flow restrictors	-	-	▲	-	▲	-
SG tube supports	SG tube support bars	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	SG lower tube support cantilevers	-	▲	▲	-	-	▲
Upper riser assembly	Upper riser section	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	Riser section slip joint	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	ICIGT	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	CRD shaft	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	CRD shaft support	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	Hanger brace	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
Other RVI	Pressurizer spray RVI	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	CVCS injection RVI	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	RRV port	-	-	-	▲	-	-
	Thermowells <sup>Note 2</sup>	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	Instrument ports	-	-	-	▲	-	-
	Flow diverter	-	-	▲	-	-	-
Core support assembly	Core barrel	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	Upper support block	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	Fuel pin interface	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	Core support block	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	Reflector	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	Belleville spring	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	Lower core plate	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
Lower riser assembly	Lower riser section	-	-	▲	-	-	-
	CRAGT support plate	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	CRAGT assembly	-	▲	▲	-	-	-
	Upper core plate	-	▲	▲	-	-	-

Note(s) for Table 3-1:

1. Component is exposed to primary and secondary coolant flow.
2. Thermowells also evaluated in NPM piping exposed to secondary coolant flow.




Figure 3-1 NuScale Power Module components and regions that meet flow-induced vibration screening criteria

### 3.1 Analysis Program Inputs

For components that screen for FIV, analysis is performed to determine component susceptibility. The general criterion used to determine if testing is required to verify an analytical input, method, or result is the calculated margin of safety.

The margin of safety is the means by which structural integrity against FIV degradation is assured. For strongly-coupled FIV mechanisms, the percentage difference between the analytically predicted value and the acceptance criteria that represents the predicted onset of the mechanism for a component is the margin of safety. For TB, safety margins are evaluated for the analytically predicted fatigue against the limits that are acceptable over the component design life.

Due to the low primary coolant flow rates in the NuScale design, the safety margin for most mechanisms and components is greater than 100 percent. For safety margins of these magnitudes, uncertainty and error in the inputs and other analytical simplifications can be tolerated without impacting the acceptability of the safety margin. There are few NPM components that are determined to have less than a 100 percent margin of safety. To ensure that testing is performed to validate a sufficient breadth of the analysis program, a safety margin of 100 percent is specified as the limit below which analytical inputs, methods, and safety margins are validated. It is typical that the differences between analytical and tested results are within 20 percent, so the recommended threshold for requiring testing is considered highly bounding.

The following sections discuss the analysis program inputs, many of which are common among the different FIV analyses, as identified in Table 3-2. Analysis program methods and results are provided in Section 3.2.

Table 3-2 Selected common inputs for flow-induced vibration analysis

Phenomena	Structural Natural Frequency ( $f_n$ ) Section 3.1.1	Structural Mode Shape ( $\varphi$ ) Section 3.1.1	Flow Velocity (U) Section 3.1.2	Damping Ratio ( $\zeta$ ) Section 3.1.3
FEI	▲	▲	▲	▲
VS	▲	▲ Note(1)	▲	▲ Note(1)
TB	▲	▲	▲	▲
AR	-	-	▲	-
LFI	-	-	-	-
F/G	▲	-	▲	-

Note(s) for Table 3-2:

1. Mode shape and damping ratio are used in the SG tube and ICIGT VS evaluations. These inputs are not required for VS evaluation of other components.



### 3.1.1 Structural Natural Frequency and Mode Shapes

The natural frequencies and mode shapes of the structures are required for FEI, VS, TB and F/G analyses. Using the finite element analysis software ANSYS (Reference 8.1.11), complex shapes, such as a helical SG tube with transition bends can be modeled. Once appropriate finite element models are created, developing physically accurate boundary conditions, such as the interface between the tubes and tube supports or the hydrodynamic interaction between a structure and the surrounding fluid, require sensitivity studies and potentially confirmatory testing. Based on these considerations, the two analytical focus areas in the FIV structural model development are the definition of boundary conditions and modeling of hydrodynamic mass effects. For inputs where these two items have greater uncertainty and the uncertainty has a significant effect on the margin of safety, verification of frequency and mode shape results by testing is specified.

Boundary conditions for geometries where small gaps may exist, such as between a SG tube and tube support, may increase uncertainties. These clearances may lead to non-linear behavior and the assumptions used in establishing the boundary conditions at these locations may affect structural frequencies. A tube support may be “inactive” if a sufficiently large clearance exists between the tube and the tube support, such as could occur due to misalignment during manufacturing or if off-nominal tolerances exist in the supports. At locations where there is the potential for an inactive support condition, the frequency and mode shape evaluation accounts for the limiting expected support arrangement in order to determine bounding structural frequencies and mode shapes.

The effect of the surrounding fluid (e.g., hydrodynamic mass) also affects structural frequencies. Typically, simplified “lumped mass” approaches are employed to account for the effect of surrounding fluid on structural frequencies; the mass of the surrounding fluid is included in determining a total mass of the structure for analytical purposes. For some NPM regions, ANSYS fluid-structure analyses using acoustic elements can be used to characterize hydrodynamic mass effects.

In general, analytical models consider the normal design conditions and do not consider all possible uncertainties and biases, such as those associated with manufacturing tolerance and material property allowable ranges. Where possible, values are selected to provide bounding frequency and mode shape results. For TB analysis, the natural frequencies and mode shapes have a smaller effect on the results due to the relatively weak coupling of the fluid and structure and the broad frequency spectrum that is analyzed. With regards to FEI and VS, the frequencies (and for the SG tubes and ICIGT, mode shapes) have a higher importance for accurately predicting the margin of safety.

Table 3-3 identifies if the analytical inputs require verification, which is based on the safety margin identified in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3, and the testing that will be performed to provide the required analytical input verification.

If a margin of safety greater than 100 percent is determined, it is not necessary to verify the component frequencies and mode shapes by testing. For some components,

verification is not required for each mechanism due to differences in the safety margins. For example, the ICIGT frequencies require verification to validate the VS analysis inputs, but validation of this input for the TB analysis is not required. However, if the test data is available for a component, it is used for post-test evaluation of all mechanisms for that component, to the extent practical.

Table 3-3 Structural natural frequencies and mode shapes input summary

Component	Analysis Category	Safety Margin
Helical SG tubing	FEI <sup>Note(2)</sup>	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
	TB	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
	VS <sup>Note(1), (3)</sup>	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
ICIGT	VS <sup>Note(1)</sup>	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
	TB	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
CRD shaft	VS	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
	TB	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>

Note(s) for Table 3-3:

1. Mode shape and damping ratio are used in the SG tube and ICIGT VS evaluations. These inputs are not required for VS evaluation of other components.
2. FEI safety margin is reported for the limiting SG tube column (column 21), assuming active support and heavy tube conditions.
3. VS safety margin is reported for the limiting SG tube column (column 1), assuming active support and light tube conditions.

### 3.1.2 Flow Velocity

#### 3.1.2.1 Steady State Velocity Analysis

Appropriate representation of the flow conditions is essential to performing the analysis of all FIV phenomena. The flow velocities in the axial/parallel and crossflow directions relative to the normal axes of each component are needed as analytical inputs. Due to the importance of generating appropriate flow rates, RCS and secondary-flow rates for the various regions of the NPM are determined and verified using three different analytical methods: hand calculation, thermal-hydraulic (TH) analysis, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis. Additionally, separate effects tests have been performed to validate the significant inputs in the TH modeling, such as core and SG form losses and SG performance, which is a significant contributor to the natural circulation buoyant force. The TH analysis provides validated maximum design flow rate results based on testing. The CFD average flow velocities (Reference 8.1.12) and hand calculations provide additional assurance of the validated flow rates. Maximum design flow rates (or higher) are used in all FIV evaluations. Maximum design flow represents the highest expected primary coolant flow rate used in design and safety analyses and is the licensing basis flow rate; operation above this flow rate is not permitted without evaluation against safety analysis limits.

For most FIV mechanisms, the free-stream velocity is the required input. Free-stream velocity is the incident velocity before it impacts a susceptible target. However, in the FIV analyses it is typically assumed to be the flow velocity as it passes the target or constriction. The flow area upstream of the constriction is larger than the flow area associated with the constriction; therefore, the average free-stream velocity is lower than the average velocity at the target. While there may be local variations in the free-stream velocity, it is not credible that these variations would occur uniformly at the target face at a velocity higher than the average velocity through the constricted area.

For components where it is bounding to maximize the convective velocity, the TB analyses are performed using the maximum CFD flow rates calculated at a region. While these flow rates are not specifically validated, they significantly bound the average constriction flow velocities, which bound the average free-stream flow velocities; and therefore do not require analytical or experimental validation.

### 3.1.2.2 Transient Velocity Analysis

Transient analysis is performed to determine pressures, temperatures, flow velocities, and static quality for the various NPM regions to support ASME stress analysis. The NPM typically operates at steady-state, full-power conditions. At lower reactor power levels, natural circulation flow decreases due to the lower heat addition from the core. Based on a review of time-history analyses, there are no normal operating transient responses that result in higher flow rates than are achieved at maximum design full-power conditions. Normal operating transients, such as load following, ramp decreases in reactor power, and reactor trips, result in decreases in flow velocities relative to full-power operating conditions due to the lower heat addition from the core. For conservatism, flow velocities 5% or greater than the maximum design flow value should be used for all FIV mechanisms except for turbulent buffeting. For turbulent buffeting, maximum design flow velocities are acceptable.

### 3.1.2.3 Velocities Used in Flow-Induced Vibration Analysis

To determine the crossflow velocities for components subject to a combination of crossflow and axial flow, since bounding estimates of cross flow velocities can be assumed while still showing acceptable FIV performance, it can be conservatively assumed that the crossflow on any component is equal to the calculated total flow velocity for that component. This method overestimates the forcing function of the vibration. Based on the low reactor coolant flow rate for the NuScale design, this approach is a conservative estimate that produces acceptable margin.

Table 3-4 identifies the velocities that are used in the FIV analyses and which flow rate analysis derives them. Bounding flow conditions are used in all analyses. Testing to validate the velocities is not necessary because these FIV inputs have already been validated with separate effects testing, and one or more analytical method and bounding maximum design flow velocities are used.

Table 3-4 Flow conditions input summary

Analysis Category	Assumed Conditions	Analysis Method
FEI	Maximum design flow – average velocity	CFD <sup>Note 1</sup>
VS	Maximum design flow – average velocity	CFD <sup>Note 1</sup>
	Design flow at 102% – average velocity assuming low SG superheat performance	TH <sup>Note 4</sup>
AR	Maximum design flow – average velocity	CFD
	Design flow at 102% – average velocity assuming low SG superheat performance	TH <sup>Note 4</sup>
F/G	Maximum design flow – average velocity	CFD
LFI	None <sup>Note 2</sup>	None
TB	Maximum design flow – average or maximum velocity <sup>Note 3</sup>	CFD

Note(s) for Table 3-4:

1. For the VS and FEI analysis of the SG tubes, CFD flow rate is modified to represent velocity in the minimum flow area.
2. LFI confirmation is by prototype testing only.
3. Either average or maximum velocities are chosen for each component in TB analysis based on achieving the most bounding convective velocity for the purpose of impact and fatigue evaluations.
4. For the evaluation of AR and VS mechanisms for components exposed to secondary coolant flows, the TH flow is used. CFD analysis is not performed to characterize secondary side flow.

Table 3-5 lists representative average velocities based on CFD analysis at the maximum design flow. The analysis categories and components that use the CFD results are identified in Table 3-4.

Table 3-5 Maximum design flow velocities based on CFD

Flow Region	Average Velocity (in/s)
Around/Through CRAGTs	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
CRAGT Support	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
Bottom of Conic Riser Transition	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
CRD Shaft Support	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
Upper Riser	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
Flow Over the Top of the Upper Riser	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
Top of Conic Downcomer Transition	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
Bottom of Conic Downcomer Transition	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>
Downcomer, around Core Barrel	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>

### 3.1.3 Damping Ratios

Damping can be created from various sources, such as material, fluid viscosity, or structural interactions. Damping reduces a structural response. The damping ratios for structures have historically been determined through testing. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Appendix N-1300 (Reference 8.1.2) provides recommendations for damping ratios of SG tubes.

- Analysis for FEI of SG tubes: damping due to viscous effects of the primary fluid is not credited. Damping created by other sources (material and structural interaction) is expected to be 1.5 percent based on the guidance in Paragraph N-1331.3 of Appendix N. The damping ratio has a significant influence on the stability ratio that is compared to the acceptance criteria, which represents the margin to the onset of FEI for the SG tubes. Additionally, RG 1.20 states that any attempt to specify structural damping coefficients greater than 1 percent for frequencies greater than seismic frequencies should be supported by experimental measurements. Therefore, prototype testing is required to confirm that the damping ratio of 1.5% that is credited in the FEI analysis for the SG tube is appropriate.
- Analysis for VS of SG tubes: a damping ratio of 1.5 percent is used, consistent with the damping ratio used for FEI analysis. Prototype testing is required to confirm the damping ratio of 1.5% that is credited in the VS analysis for the SG tube is appropriate.
- Analysis for TB and vortex shedding of ICI GT: a damping ratio of 0.5 percent is used for the SG Alloy 690 tubes and the stainless steel type 304 ICI GT and 0.3 percent is used for all other RVI stainless steel structures. These damping ratios are representative of hysteresis (material damping) and are less than 1%. They conservatively neglect damping due to structural interactions and viscosity. Compared with the FEI and VS analyses, a smaller damping ratio is assumed for the SG tubes because lower amplitudes of vibration with less tube-to-tube support interactions are expected with this source of flow excitation. This guidance is consistent with Appendix N-1300. Because the damping values used in TB and vortex shedding analysis of the ICI GTs are based only on material damping and are less than 1%, they are considered to be sufficiently bounding. It is not credible that this input could have a non-conservative effect on the calculated margin of safety. Therefore, testing is not required to verify the damping values used in TB analyses or VS analysis of the ICI GT.
- Analysis for LFI: because there are no industry-accepted practices for analytically predicting LFI, analysis is not recommended and a damping value is not provided.

As summarized in Table 3-6, the only damping values that require verification are the SG tube damping values used in the VS and FEI analyses. The basis for verifying these analytical inputs is the margin of safety, as identified in Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3.

Table 3-6 Damping ratios input summary

Component	Analysis Category	Safety Margin	Damping Value Used	Verification Method and Testing Phase	Test
Helical SG tubing	FEI	$\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$	0.015	Separate Effects	SG FIV (Section 4.1.2)
	VS	$\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$			

### 3.2 Analysis Program Methods and Results

#### 3.2.1 Fluid Elastic Instability

The helical SG tubing is the only component that is susceptible to FEI.

Fluid elastic instability is a phenomenon that has no vibration effects on tubing unless a critical threshold velocity of crossflow is exceeded. The analysis for FEI is performed by calculating a critical velocity and a mode shape-weighted mean-pitch velocity for each mode. The velocities are compared to determine the stability ratio of the tube.

An FEI analysis of the inner and outer SG tubes is performed as these tube locations provide bounding frequencies and mode shapes. The pitch velocities are computed using the crossflow component of the primary flow normal to the tube and the translational mode shapes per Equation 82 of N-1331.2 of Reference 8.1.2, recognizing that mode shapes for the lower frequencies are dominated by axial and torsional motions. Bounding Connor's equation values are used to provide conservative values for the critical velocity (i.e., lowest velocity). Additionally, a second correlation for the critical velocity that was developed with flow tests of helical tube geometries performed by Chen (Reference 8.1.13), is evaluated. This correlation considers a unique set of FIV inputs (Connors' constant, damping ratio, and exponential terms) to demonstrate that a reasonable critical velocity is determined with this set of FIV inputs and correlations, as well as those recommend by Appendix N-1330 of the ASME code.

The FEI analysis results show the maximum reduced pitch velocity, a dimensionless number determined for comparison against the critical velocity, is  $\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$  for the outer column and  $\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$  for the inner column. The reduced pitch velocity is higher for Column 21 because of the longer spans of tubing between supports and the correspondingly lower natural frequencies. For both columns, the minimum reduced critical velocity is  $\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$ .

The acceptability of the SG tubing to FEI is determined by computation of the maximum stability ratio, which is the reduced effective pitch velocity divided by the reduced critical velocity. With stability ratio less than 1.0, the tube bundle is analytically predicted to be stable.

Even for the most limiting SG tube location, margin to the FEI acceptance criteria and the predicted onset of FEI is provided. However, due to the prototype classification of the design, the significant analysis inputs and margin of safety are verified by testing

because the margin of safety is less than 100 percent. Items to verify are summarized in Table 3-7.

Table 3-7 Fluid elastic instability results summary

Component	Safety Margin	Items to Verify for FEI	Verification Method and Testing Phase	Test
Helical SG tubing	$\{\{ \} \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$	Frequencies, mode shapes, damping, vibration amplitude	Separate effects	SG FIV (Section 4.1.2)

### 3.2.2 Vortex Shedding

The VS analysis consists of determining component structural natural frequencies and determining the minimum component characteristic dimension that is necessary to avoid the generation of vortices at the fundamental frequency. The inherent assumption with this method is that the crossflow velocity is uniform and over the full length of the structure. Subsection N-1324.1 of Reference 8.1.2 provides four different design methods to prevent the lock-in conditions associated with VS. These are discussed in the paragraphs below as methods (a) through (d). Method (a) is the simplest method and is used for the majority of the components evaluated for VS lock-in.

Based on Method (a) of subsection N-1324, VS lock-in is avoided if the characteristic dimension of the component is greater than the free-stream velocity divided by the component fundamental frequency. Over 100 percent margin is demonstrated for the SG tube support cantilever, CVCS injection RVI, CRAGT support plate, CRD shaft support, CRAGTs, thermowells, hanger brace, upper support block, core support block and upper and lower core plates.

The CRD shaft is not susceptible to flow excitation created by VS lock-in conditions as demonstrated by method (d) of Paragraph N-1324. This method requires 30 percent separation between the structural resonance frequency and the VS frequency. The CRD shaft provides a  $\{\{ \} \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$  of safety accounting for the required 30 percent separation.

Lastly, the SG tubes and ICI GTs are shown to avoid VS lock-in using a combination of methods (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Paragraph N-1324. The first 50 modes of these components are evaluated considering heavy and light cases, inactive support conditions, and for the SG tubes the inner and outermost SG tube columns are evaluated. For most modes, more than one acceptance criterion is met.

The FIV inputs and analysis in Reference 8.1.2 are based on conservative assumptions and industry-accepted methods for estimating VS lock-in conditions. For components with greater than 100 percent margin, testing is not required to verify analysis inputs or results. As summarized in Table 3-8, testing to verify the FIV input for the SG tubes, CRD shaft and ICI GT is required.

Based on the predicted safety margins, significantly higher flow velocities are required to verify the onset of the VS source of flow excitation. The NPM design will not be licensed

to operate at flow conditions that are sufficient to verify the onset of the VS source of flow excitation. Therefore, measurement of the vibration amplitudes for these components will only provide a binary indication that this source of flow excitation is not active and will not quantify the margin of safety. To confirm the margin of safety, the fundamental frequency of the components is verified by testing because this is the most significant analysis input. Natural frequencies, mode shapes, and damping are verified to validate the margin of safety against VS for the SG tubes. The items to verify are summarized in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8 Vortex shedding results summary

Component	Safety Margin	Items to Verify for VS	Verification Method and Testing Phase	Test
Helical SG tubing <sup>Note 1</sup>	$\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$	Frequencies, mode shapes, damping vibration amplitude	Separate effects	SG FIV (Section 4.1.2)
CRD shaft	$\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$	Fundamental frequency	Factory	In-air testing (Section 4.2.1)
ICIGT	$\{\{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$	Fundamental frequency	Factory	In-air testing (Section 4.2.1)

Note(s) for Table 3-8:

1. The margin of safety reported in this table for the SG tubes and ICIGT are calculated considering damping; therefore, these values are not linearly proportional to the crossflow velocity or the VS frequency. The reported safety margin is with respect to the analytical acceptance criterion.



### 3.2.3 Turbulent Buffeting

Although the random vibration due to TB is of much smaller amplitude than that experienced in FEI or VS, it is important because it exists whenever there is turbulent flow over a susceptible component.

Turbulent buffeting vibration can be induced in parallel flow, axial flow, or crossflow. Turbulence-induced vibration occurs due to a fluctuating pressure in the flow. The fluctuating pressure is quantified by a forcing function, which is characterized by its power spectral density (PSD) and correlation function. Three significant parameters are needed to characterize the PSD and correlation function: convective velocity, correlation length, and the PSD.

The convective velocity as implemented in the coherence function, describes the phase relationship of the forcing function at two different points on the surface of the structure. From a physical standpoint, the convective velocity is the velocity at which eddies are swept downstream, thus causing a phase shift in the fluctuating pressure between two points. Based on literature review, convective velocity can be a maximum of the free-stream velocity and a minimum of 0.5 times the free-stream velocity for parallel or axial flow. The limiting convective velocity within the range is selected when evaluating the coherence function.

The correlation length is equivalent to the scale of the largest turbulent eddy, which is a measure of the longest distance over which the velocity at two points of the flow field is correlated. For each component, the flow is characterized as parallel, cross, or axial, and the characteristic length is determined. A bounding correlation length range is determined based on literature review. Similar to the convective velocity, the range of correlation lengths is evaluated to ensure a bounding value is selected for each component forcing function.

The PSD is determined to support characterization of the forcing function. The PSD as applied to flow-induced turbulent response refers to the energy distribution of a variable as a function of frequency. Many components can be approximated as cylinders in cross flow or annular flow. For these idealized arrangements, bounding PSDs based on literature are used. Table 3-9 summarizes the PSD types that are applied to components susceptible to TB. The overall analytical uncertainty for the SG tubes is judged to be the highest relative to other susceptible components; therefore, prototype testing is performed to verify the adequacy of the PSDs used for the SG tubes.

In the TB evaluations, the vibration amplitude is not calculated for components with a first mode frequency greater than 200 Hz because vibration amplitudes are insignificant with high structural frequencies. Vibration amplitude is also not determined for components that based on flexibility and flow conditions can be shown to be bounded by the analyzed components. Therefore, no PSD is specified in Table 3-9 for certain components identified as susceptible to TB in Table 3-1.

Table 3-9 Turbulent buffeting power spectral density inputs used in analysis

Flow Type and Component Shape	Applicable Components	Literature PSD Used
Parallel flow over isolated cylinder	{{	Equation 3-2
Tube bundle cross-flow		Equation 3-3
Bounding annular flow		Equation 3-1
	$\}}^{2(a),(c),ECI}$	

Note(s) for Table 3-9:

1. Testing is performed to verify that the pressure PSD due to internal two-phase flow is sufficiently bounded by the pressure PSD for single-phase flow to justify use of the single-phase pressure PSD used in the analysis.

Equation 3-1 is from Reference 8.1.3. It provides a PSD for components with annular and axial flow velocities. It is applied to some components that experience crossflow, and this simplification is bounding based on the frequencies and characteristic lengths of the analyzed components. Due to the relatively low flow velocities, the reduced frequency for some components is larger than five. For those cases, the PSD is evaluated with a reduced frequency of five to provide bounding results.

$$G_p(f) = \rho^2 v_f^3 R_h 0.155 e^{-3.0F}, 0 < F < 1$$

Equation 3-1

$$G_p(f) = \rho^2 v_f^3 R_h 0.027 e^{-1.26F}, 1 < F < 5$$

where:

$G_p(f)$	=	PSD of the turbulent pressure as a function of modal frequency (psi <sup>2</sup> /Hz),
$\rho$	=	Fluid density (lbf-s <sup>2</sup> /in <sup>4</sup> ),
$v_f$	=	Free-stream velocity (in/s),
$R_h$	=	Hydraulic radius (in), and
$F$	=	Reduced frequency (-).

The test data from Chen (Reference 8.1.13) is used to characterize a PSD for axial flow over tubes. The relationship is applicable to low Strouhal numbers.

$$G_p(f) = 0.000002720 \rho^2 v_f^3 2R_h S^{-0.25}, 0 < S \leq 5$$

Equation 3-2

$$G_p(f) = 0.0002275 \rho^2 v_f^3 2R_h S^{-3}, 5 < S \leq 10$$

where:

$G_p(f)$	=	PSD of the turbulent pressure as a function of modal frequency (psi <sup>2</sup> /Hz),
$\rho$	=	Fluid density (lbf-s <sup>2</sup> /in <sup>4</sup> ),
$v_f$	=	Free stream velocity (in/s),
$R_h$	=	Hydraulic radius (in), and
$S$	=	Strouhal number (-).

Lastly, a PSD to represent crossflow over a tube bundle geometry is specified in Equation 3-3. This equation is from Reference 8.1.3 and is expected to provide bounding results for the frequency range, flow velocities, and SG tube diameter of the NuScale SG tube bundle. As mentioned previously, this assumption is verified by testing.

$$G_p(f) = 0.01, F < 0.1$$

$$G_p(f) = 0.2, 0.1 \leq F \leq 0.4$$

Equation 3-3

$$G_p(f) = 5.3 \times 10^{-4} F^{-3.5}, F > 0.4$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned} G_p(f) &= \text{PSD of the turbulent pressure as a function of modal} \\ &\quad \text{frequency (psi}^2\text{/Hz) and} \\ F &= \text{Reduced frequency (-).} \end{aligned}$$

The structural response due to the turbulence is calculated using the inputs that have been discussed. Equations to determine the root mean square (RMS) response are assigned based on the direction of the flow and the dimension of the structure. Using the RMS response, degradation mechanisms associated with impact and fatigue are evaluated. Components with less than one inch of separation are evaluated for impact. Components with fundamental frequencies less than 200 Hz and those whose response cannot be bounded by nearby components exposed to similar turbulent conditions are evaluated for fatigue.

The acceptance criterion for a component remaining separated from an adjacent component is that the clearance is greater than  $5\sigma$  RMS deflection. For components that do not meet the criterion, the surface stress is calculated and an impact fatigue assessment is performed. In addition to the impact fatigue, TB can cause fatigue due to vibration stresses. However, due to the very low vibration amplitudes and alternating stresses, the vibration stresses do not result in fatigue usage for any component susceptible to TB. Out of the components analyzed for TB, four components are shown to impact their adjacent supports and are discussed below.

Impact between the SG tubes and SG tube support is predicted to occur, and the fatigue usage due to vibration and impact is calculated to be  $\{ \{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI} \}$  which provides a margin of safety of  $\{ \{ \}^{2(b),(c),ECI} \}$ . This result demonstrates adequate SG tube performance for the component design life, subject to verification testing of analytical inputs and safety margin as identified in Table 3-10.

Impact between the ICI GT and the CRD shaft supports, between the CRD shaft and CRD shaft supports, and between the CRA GT and the guide tube support is predicted to occur. For all three impact pairs, the results show that the RMS vibrations do not result in fatigue usage due to the displacements themselves or due to impact. These results are due to the very low alternating stresses generated from the TB, which can be primarily attributed to the low-flow velocities.

Table 3-10 provides an overview of the analysis results and required testing.

Table 3-10 Turbulent buffeting results summary

Component	Contact Occurs?	Fatigue Margin (%) <sup>Note 1</sup>	Items to Verify	Verification Method and Testing Phase	Test
SG helical tubing	yes	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>	Frequencies mode shapes vibration amplitude	Separate effects	SG FIV (Section 4.1.2)
ICIGT	Yes	100	N/A	N/A	N/A
CRD shaft	Yes	100	N/A	N/A	N/A

Note(s) for Table 3-10:

1. Safety margin is reported based on the margin to the allowable fatigue usage based on the predicted fatigue usage due to vibration and/or impact.

### 3.2.4 Acoustic Resonance

Acoustic resonance is evaluated for the steam plenums and nozzles, main steam isolation valves, SGS piping, CNTS piping, DHRS piping, and at valve and instruments ports. It was determined that AR is not possible at the steam plenums and nozzles. The flow through these nozzles prevents the formation of shear waves and AR in these cavities. The MSIVs are an unlikely source of pressure fluctuations associated with AR because the MSIVs are directly mounted on the steam piping with no standpipe. The only locations that flow excitation due to AR may be possible are at the branch lines and cavities at the following locations:

- the closed side branches from the CNTS steam tee to the DHRS actuation valves
- the closed side branches from the SGS feedwater tee to the DHRS condenser
- RCS instrument and valve ports

Sources of AR developed inside the tubes due to density wave oscillation (DWO) is precluded by the design of the SG tube inlet orifices. If DWO were not precluded, DWO acoustic waves would not be expected to affect the steam plenum or piping because frequencies are less than 0.5 Hz, which is well below the component and piping AR frequencies.

Acoustic resonances due to the generation of shear waves at closed branch lines are evaluated with the following methodology. To determine if there is a concern for AR, the piping locations where this source of flow excitation is possible are identified and the Strouhal number is calculated for each location. To determine the margin to AR, the calculated Strouhal number is compared to the range of Strouhal numbers that could lead to the onset of AR. A Strouhal number between 0.35 and 0.62 could lead to the onset of AR.

The Strouhal number for the DHRS steam and condensate lines provide approximately {{ }}<sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup> and more than 100 percent margin, respectively to the upper

bound of the Strouhal number range for susceptibility to AR. More than 100 percent margin is also demonstrated for the RRV cavity and instrument cavities in the RCS downcomer region. Testing is required to confirm that AR does not occur in the DHRS steam piping. Results and testing information are summarized in Table 3-11.

Table 3-11 Acoustic resonance results summary

Component	Safety Margin	Items to Verify	Verification Method and Testing Phase	Test
DHRS steam piping	{{ }} <sup>2(b),(c),ECI</sup>	Vibration amplitude	Initial startup testing	Flow testing (Section 4.3)

### 3.2.5 Leakage Flow Instability

Due to the sensitivity of LFI to flow and geometry conditions, there are no accepted analytical methods and acceptance criteria available to predict a critical velocity for the onset of LFI. For NPM components that meet the screening criteria for LFI, testing is required to determine susceptibility to LFI.

The major parameters that have been shown to lead to LFI are large pressure differences across small annular gaps, component flexibility, and small diffusion angles. Due to the natural circulation design of the NPM, most regions are not susceptible to LFI because pressure differences across these interfaces are very small under all operating conditions. One exception to this is on the secondary coolant side at the entrance to the SG tubes, where a flow restrictor upstream of each SG tube is provided. The SG tube flow restrictor is designed to provide flow stability by restricting the volume of secondary side flow through the tube. The flow restriction is created by narrow annular gaps between the flow restrictor and the tube inner diameter. A separate effects test is performed to validate that LFI is not a concern for the SG tube flow restrictor, per Table 3-12.

Table 3-12 Leakage flow instability results summary

Component	Safety Margin	Items to Verify	Verification Method and Testing Phase	Test
SG tube inlet flow restrictors	Need to verify	Vibration amplitude	Separate effects testing	SG tube inlet flow restrictor test (Section 4.1.1)

### 3.2.6 Gallop and Flutter

The SG tube support cantilever is the only NPM structure that requires evaluation for flow excitation created by gallop and flutter.

Flow tests of rectangular cross sections have been performed to investigate the influence of the VS frequency and the response of the structure to torsional gallop considering both smooth and turbulent flow conditions. The results of the flow test summarized in Reference 8.1.5 are applicable to rectangular cross sections whose height-to-width ratio is between 0.2 and 5.0. For the SG cantilever support, this ratio is

$\{\{ \quad \}^{2(a),(c),ECI}$ , and the results of these flow tests are applicable. The testing predicts that the critical velocity to the onset of torsional galloping is 147 ft/sec which is much greater than the primary flow velocity in this region of approximately  $\{\{ \quad \}^{2(a),(c),ECI}$ . Further, the design of the SG lower tube support cantilever prevents plunge galloping from becoming a source of flow excitation because the cantilever has a sufficiently large height-to-width ratio.

Flutter is also precluded for the SG lower tube support cantilever. Because significant margin exists between the bending and torsional frequency of the SG lower tube support ( $\{\{ \quad \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}$ ), it is not possible for plunge gallop and torsional gallop to become coupled such that the SG lower tube support will experience flutter. Due to the large margins to the onset of these phenomena, no confirmatory testing is required to verify the flutter and gallop analyses.

## 4.0 Vibration Measurement Program

To validate the FIV inputs, analytical results, and the margins of safety determined in the analysis program, a combination of separate effects, factory, and initial startup testing are performed. Separate effects testing is performed on a prototypic portion of the design. Factory testing is performed on the NPM components prior to fuel loading, at any time during module construction when the testing can be assured to accomplish the objectives of the measurement program. Initial startup testing is performed under full-power normal operating conditions. The results of all three testing types are used to validate the prototype NPM design.

Compared with existing PWR and boiling water reactor designs, the NPM components are less susceptible to FIV due to the lower primary coolant flow velocities. Accordingly, analysis demonstrates that many of the NPM components exhibit a significant margin to the potential onset of the unstable type FIV. Additionally, many of the NPM components are of similar geometry (size, shape, and support) and exposed to similar flow conditions such that the test results for one component can be used to bound similar components. Based on these considerations, components with the lowest margin of safety are selected for the measurement program to validate FIV analysis inputs and results. The following criteria are used to determine if the susceptible component requires validation.

- Components with more than 100 percent margin to the onset of fluid elastic instability, vortex shedding, acoustic resonance and flutter, gallop do not require measurement validation.
- Components with less than 100 percent margin to the onset of fluid elastic instability, vortex shedding, acoustic resonance and flutter, gallop require validation by measurement.
- Predictive analyses of NPM components that are susceptible to LFI are not performed. To ensure this source of flow excitation is not active with the design, separate effects testing is performed to demonstrate an adequate margin of safety.
- For components susceptible to TB, components that experience fatigue usage due to alternating stresses caused by TB vibrations or due to impact with an adjacent support structure require validation by measurement.

For components with more than a 100 percent margin of safety, large errors in the inputs and errors associated with analytical simplifications can be tolerated without impacting the acceptability of the FIV margin. Further, conservative inputs and established analytical methods have been used to predict the margin of safety. Therefore, instrumentation and measurement of the response of these components is not warranted.

For components with less than a 100 percent margin of safety, prototype testing is performed. For fluid elastic instability, vortex shedding, and acoustic resonance, measuring the component vibration amplitude or dynamic pressure is expected to only provide a binary indication of component performance and may not allow for complete validation of the predicted analytical margin. When possible, testing is performed to



validate relevant input parameters because they can be quantitatively used to sufficiently validate predicted analytical margin.

For VS analysis of all components except the SG tubes and ICI GTs, the key input that requires validation is the fundamental frequency. For the SG tubes, the frequencies, mode shapes, and damping ratio are relevant inputs for both VS and FEI analyses that affect the predicted analytical margin and require validation. For the ICI GTs, the frequencies and mode shapes require validation, but since a conservatively low damping value is used (0.5%) validation of that input is not necessary. For components that undergo flow testing, the dynamic pressure measurement results can be used to demonstrate if there are spectral peaks in the PSD that could be attributed to vortex shedding, acoustic resonance, and leakage flow instability. Additionally, dynamic pressure fluctuations created by AR inside the piping system may be measured using strain gages mounted on the pipe wall to detect this source of flow excitation.

Because components susceptible to TB experience vibration when exposed to turbulent flow, it is possible to validate the TB analysis during natural circulation operating conditions. The analysis of the NPM components for TB currently considers PSDs that have been published in open literature and used by the industry. Based upon the computed response of the NPM components considering these FIV inputs, components with less than a 100 percent margin of safety are selected for instrumentation and testing to verify the FIV inputs and analysis results for TB.

Pre-test predictions for all prototype tests are performed to ensure that the overall experiment design, including test conditions, number and location of sensors, and sensor accuracy are sufficient to validate the analysis program. Pre-test predictions provide the expected test result ranges considering uncertainties due to operating conditions, manufacturing tolerances, instrument error, and other sources of experimental biases and uncertainties. Pre-test predictions demonstrate the range of acceptable experimental results that can be used to validate analysis inputs, results, and margins of safety. Post-test analysis verifies the results fall within the pre-test prediction acceptable range, and justifies technically relevant differences between the predicted and actual test results.

Section 2.2 of RG 1.20 suggests that steam, feedwater and condensate piping should be instrumented for vibration measurement during initial startup testing. With the exception of the DHRS steam piping, these components either do not screen for FIV or have been shown to have a margin of safety greater than 100 percent. Only components with less than 100 percent safety margin are tested in the prototype measurement program, consistent with the overall measurement program objectives of validating relevant analytical inputs, results, and margins of safety.

Table 4-1 summarizes the testing and inspections to be performed to verify the FIV analysis program for the prototype NPM. The testing scope addresses five components:

- DHRS steam piping: Testing to validate the AR safety margin is performed during initial startup testing. See Section 4.3 for additional details.

- SG helical tubing: Testing to validate the safety margin for fluid elastic instability, vortex shedding, and turbulent buffeting is performed as a separate effects test. See Section 4.1.2 for additional details.
- SG tube inlet flow restrictors: Testing to validate that LFI is precluded is performed in a separate effects test. See Section 4.1.1 for additional details.
- ICICT: Testing to validate safety margin for VS is performed as a factory test. See Section 4.2 for additional details.
- CRD shaft: Testing to validate safety margin for VS is performed as a factory test. See Section 4.2 for additional details.

Note that flow testing to provide an assessment of the CRAGT fingers and rodlets is performed to demonstrate acceptable vibration performance of components that are part of the reactor core system and are not within the scope of the CVAP. Testing results will be reviewed to ensure vibration levels are acceptable for the CRAGT; however, detailed validation testing of the CRAGT is not required due to the predicted safety margins of greater than 100%.

Table 4-1 Analysis program verification testing and inspections

NPM Component Category	Component	Susceptible Mechanisms	Mechanisms with less than 100% Safety Margin	Prototype Testing		
				Separate Effects	Factory	Initial Startup
Components exposed to secondary side flow	SGS piping, nozzle, MSIVs	AR	-	-	-	-
	SG steam plenum Note 2	AR	-	-	-	-
	DHRS steam piping	AR	AR	-	-	DHRS steam piping testing
	DHRS condensate piping	AR	-	-	-	-
	SG helical tubing Note 2	FEI, VS, TB	FEI, VS, TB	SG FIV testing	-	-
	SG tube inlet flow restrictors	LFI, TB	LFI	SG flow restrictor FIV testing	-	-
SG tube supports	SG tube support bars	TB Note 1	-	-	-	-
	SG lower tube support cantilevers	VS, TB, F/G Note 1	-	-	-	-
Upper riser assembly	Upper riser section	TB	-	-	-	-
	Riser section slip	TB	-	-	-	-

NPM Component Category	Component	Susceptible Mechanisms	Mechanisms with less than 100% Safety Margin	Prototype Testing		
				Separate Effects	Factory	Initial Startup
	joint					
	ICIGT	VS, TB <sup>Note 1</sup>	VS	-	CRD shaft and ICIGT in-air frequency testing	-
	CRD shaft	VS, TB <sup>Note 1</sup>	VS	-		-
	CRD shaft support	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	Hanger brace	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
Other RVI	PZR spray RVI	TB	-	-	-	-
	CVCS injection RVI	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	RRV port	AR	-	-	-	-
	Thermowells <sup>Note 3</sup>	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	Instrument ports	AR	-	-	-	-
	Flow diverter	TB	-	-	-	-
Core support assembly	Core barrel	TB	-	-	-	-
	Upper support block	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	Fuel pin interface	TB	-	-	-	-
	Core support block	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	Reflector	TB	-	-	-	-
	Belleville spring	TB	-	-	-	-
	Lower core plate	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
Lower riser assembly	Lower riser section	TB	-	-	-	-
	CRAGT support plate	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	CRAGT assembly	VS, TB	-	-	-	-
	Upper core plate	VS, TB	-	-	-	-

Note(s) for Table 4-1:

1. Mechanism does not require verification due to predicted safety margin; however, test results will be available due to other required testing and will be used to validate inputs, methods and safety margin to the extent practical.
2. Component is exposed to primary and secondary coolant flow.
3. Thermowells are located in the RCS and in NPM piping exposed to secondary coolant flow.

#### 4.1 Separate Effects Testing

Separate effects tests are planned for components that are judged to have the highest susceptibility to FIV based on the analysis program results. Performing separate effects testing, which is isolated full-scale mockup testing of the NPM components of interest, is advantageous because it provides the most accurate method to verify the FIV performance of these components before the prototype NPM is fabricated. This plan allows design changes prior to fabrication, if necessary. Separate effects testing for the

SG tube inlet flow restrictor and SG tube bundle are performed. A summary of the testing scope and objectives are summarized in the following sections. The specific test details, such as operating conditions, test durations, instrument types and locations, applicable testing hold points, and pre-test predictions of the expected and allowable experimental results, considering bias errors and random uncertainties, will be provided in the CVAP Measurement Program Report.

#### **4.1.1 Steam Generator Tube Inlet Flow Restrictor Test**

This separate effects test provides an assessment of the vibration performance of the SG tube inlet flow restrictors. The test results are used to verify acceptable performance against LFI. Although verification for TB is not required because impact is not predicted to occur, the testing results may be used to verify TB analysis inputs and methods for this component, to the extent practical.

Flow tests are performed at a range of flow rate conditions that cover limiting operating flow conditions. The tests are run at low temperature and pressure conditions. Corrections for these test conditions are performed analytically to demonstrate acceptable performance at full power operating conditions.

#### **4.1.2 Steam Generator Flow Induced Vibration Test**

The full-scale mockup of the SG tube bundle has five prototypic helical columns and supports. This separate effects test provides an assessment of the vibration performance of the SG tubes and tube supports to aid in demonstrating that FEI and VS are not active sources of flow excitation at the equivalent full-power normal operating conditions. The SG tube bundle testing may not achieve the TH conditions corresponding to the predicted onset of the FEI and VS phenomena. However, the testing will provide validation of analytical inputs such as frequency and mode shape. The damping ratio associated with the tube-to-tube support interaction with amplitudes of vibration equivalent to those at full-power normal operating conditions will also be determined with this test to allow the verification of this FIV input used in the analyses. The response of the tube bundle to flow excitation due to TB will be measured, as well as the primary-side flow PSD to verify this input and the analytical results for the tube.

The tests include in-air frequency measurements, in-water frequency measurements, and flow testing of the full-scale five column model.

The following simplifications are adapted into the design of the SG tube bundle mockup facility. While these represent deviations from full-power normal operating conditions, these differences are judged to either not affect the vibration results or corrections can be performed analytically to account for these differences.

- Because the objective of this test is to characterize FIV resulting from single-phase primary flow, testing with a fluid at room temperature is sufficient to define the modal frequencies, the damping ratio, and the PSDs. A correction to these FIV inputs to account for the effect of the fluid properties at a higher temperature is performed analytically.

- Tests are performed at low pressure. Pressure is expected to have an insignificant effect on tube frequencies and the other FIV inputs.
- The tests are performed using a tube bundle with five helical coil columns as compared to 21 columns in the NPM design. Five columns are chosen as a reasonable number of tubes to enable the fluid-structure interaction with adjacent tubes. Further, five columns of tubes are sufficient for the development of a representative level of turbulence in the primary fluid to characterize the PSD for the analysis of TB.
- Tests are run with air inside the tubes. The actual frequencies would be affected by the added mass and flow of water and steam within the tubes. This change in frequency can be predicted analytically.
- Secondary-side boiling inside the SG tubes may create a turbulent response of the tube; however, this forcing function is uncorrelated with the tube and a response to this source of excitation is not likely. Testing without a fluid that is boiling on the inner diameter of the tube will ensure the most accurate determination of the FIV inputs acting on the outer diameter of the tube (e.g., PSD and correlation length).
- The SG tubes are fabricated from Type 304 stainless steel in lieu of Alloy 690 material. Corrections to the damping ratio to account for differences associated with these material differences will be made to provide justification for the damping ratio that will be used in the FIV analyses.

In addition to the testing described above, flow testing results are required to validate the secondary-side PSD applied to the inside of the SG tubes in the TB evaluation. This is planned as a separate effects test included within the steam generator FIV testing scope; however, the specific testing details required to validate the secondary-side PSD are not identified in this section and are provided in the measurement program technical report.

## **4.2 Lead Unit Factory Testing**

During the factory testing phase, testing is performed to verify component natural frequencies. Due to the natural circulation design of the NPM, it is not possible to perform flow testing without using temporary systems to provide the required primary and secondary-flow conditions necessary to validate portions of the analysis program. Design and installation of temporary systems to achieve full-power flow conditions prior to initial startup testing is impractical. Because the NPM components are subjected to low velocities characteristic of natural circulation and there are large factors of safety for susceptible components, flow testing of NPM components is not performed prior to the initial startup test phase.

### **4.2.1 In-Air Component Frequency Testing**

In-air frequency tests are performed on the prototype NPM to determine the natural frequencies of the CRD shaft and the frequencies and mode shapes of the ICIGT. These parameters require verification in order to justify the margin obtained in the VS analysis. Because damping is not used in VS analysis of the CRD shaft, a damping value less

than 1% is used for the ICIGT, and hydrodynamic mass can be approximated analytically using accepted empirical correlations, it is acceptable to validate these parameters using in-air testing.

### 4.3 Lead Unit Initial Startup Testing

Initial startup testing is performed on the first NPM after the first fuel load. Due to the natural circulation design of the NPM, it is not possible to obtain the limiting TH conditions that are necessary to verify the FIV inputs and results until the NPM is operating near full-power conditions. Initial startup testing will be performed for a sufficient duration to ensure one million vibration cycles for the component with the lowest structural natural frequency. It is expected to take less than 2.5 days to obtain one million cycles of vibration. This is a conservative estimate because the lowest natural frequency of any component evaluated in the CVAP is approximately  $\{ \{$

$$\} \}^{2(b),(c),ECI}.$$

The initial startup test will be performed with online vibration monitoring of the DHRS steam piping. Testing of this piping section is performed in accordance with the requirements of Part 3 of ASME OM-2012, Division 2 (OM Standards). In the event that an unacceptable vibration response develops any time during initial startup testing, the test conditions will be adjusted to stop the vibration and the reason for the vibration anomaly will be investigated prior to continuing with the planned testing. Vibration amplitudes in the DHRS steam lines are measured to confirm the AR analysis results.

## 5.0 Vibration Inspection Program

Prior to and following initial startup testing, components are inspected for mechanical wear and signs of vibration-induced damage. Initial startup testing provides a sufficient duration for the limiting NPM component to experience a minimum of one million cycles of vibration. All components that are evaluated in the analysis program undergo inspection. For the components validated in the measurement program by testing, the inspection provides a secondary confirmation of the FIV integrity of the NPM components. For components that do not require testing due to large safety margins, the inspection confirms that the testing performed on more limiting components sufficiently bounds the performance of the non-tested components.

The components that are considered the most susceptible to FIV are examined in limiting and representative locations to demonstrate acceptable performance. For example, only limiting locations of the exterior to the SG helical tubing are inspected. Inspection is performed on all major load-bearing components, restraints, locking or bolting features, and contact surfaces, in accordance with the guidance of Section 2.3 of RG 1.20. The interior of the RPV is also inspected for loose parts in credible regions. Components may be removed and inspected outside the pressure vessel, but many NPM components cannot be removed from their installed locations. For those components or when practical, an in situ inspection is performed.

The NPM components are inspected following the guidelines and requirements provided in the 2013 edition of the ASME Section III, Paragraph NG-5111, Paragraph NB-5111 and using the methods defined in the ASME Section V, Article 9. The visual inspections are performed using "VT-1" and "VT-3", as defined by ASME Section XI, Subarticle IWB-2500, Tables IWB-2500-1 B-N-1, B-N-2 and B-N-3. The acceptance criteria for these nondestructive surface examinations are provided in Table 5-1 and will be used to inspect the surfaces and welds of the components identified for inspection. The examination methods are defined in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1 NuScale Power Module inspection plan

Parts Examined		Examination Method	Acceptance Criteria	Extent
CRD shaft CRAGT assembly CRD shaft support Upper riser section Lower riser section Core support block CRAGT support plate PZR spray RVI Hanger braces CVCS injection RVI Belleville springs	SG steam plenum and nozzle SGS piping MSIVs SG tube support bars SG tube inlet flow restrictors SG lower tube support cantilevers Helical SG tubing Lower core plate Upper core plate ICIGT Thermowells Instrument and RRV ports Lower fuel pin	Visual, VT-3	IWB-3520.2	Surface
Upper fuel pin Upper support block Core barrel DHRS steam piping DHRS condensate piping		Visual, VT-1	IWB-3520.1	Welds
Flow diverter and reflector		General visual	No evidence of loose parts	Surface



## **6.0 Measurement and Inspection Plan for Non-Prototype Category I NuScale Power Modules**

After the CVAP is completed for the first prototype, future NPMs meet the classification requirements of non-prototype Category I designs. There are no differences between NPMs other than allowable variations in manufacturing tolerances, which will be bounded by the validated safety margins for the prototype NPM.

Either a limited vibration measurement program or the prototype inspection program is performed to verify that the vibration analysis and inspection results are consistent with those observed in the prototype NPM. Similar to the approach taken for determining the scope of the prototype measurement program, the results of the prototype measurement and inspection programs will be used to inform the required measurement or inspection options for non-prototype Category I NPMs. To ensure that sufficiently bounding and relevant measurements and inspections for non-prototype Category I NPMs are specified, this topic will be assessed after the prototype measurement and inspection programs are completed in a separate CVAP report for non-prototype Category I NPMs.

## 7.0 Summary and Conclusions

To provide assurance that the NPM components will not experience adverse effects of FIV, NuScale has performed analysis of NPM components that are susceptible to various FIV mechanisms. The analysis is validated using separate effects, factory, and initial startup testing, and component inspections following initial startup testing. This report provides the technical justification for which analysis methods and inputs are required to be verified, and outlines the testing and inspections that will be performed to provide the verification data.

Analysis demonstrates that for all NPM components, FIV is either not predicted to occur or the effects of FIV are shown to be acceptable for the component design life. This result is attributed to the low flow velocities that are inherent in the natural circulation design of the NPM. For components having a safety margin greater than 100 percent for a particular FIV mechanism, testing is not performed. For components with less than 100 percent margin for a particular FIV mechanism, prototype testing is performed to validate key analytical inputs, results and safety margins.

Inspection is performed on all components that are susceptible to FIV. For components that are tested, the inspection provides a secondary confirmation to the FIV integrity of the NPM components. For components that do not require testing due to large safety margins, the inspection confirms that the testing performed on more limiting components sufficiently bounds the performance of the non-tested components.

To finalize the CVAP, two additional technical reports are developed and provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The first report contains the measurement program details for each prototype test, including test operating conditions, test durations, instrument types and locations, applicable testing hold points, and pre-test predictions of the expected and allowable experimental results, considering bias errors and random uncertainties. The second report provides the post-test evaluation of the testing completed to support the measurement program. In this report, the differences between the expected and measured experimental results are either resolved or confirmed to be in the analytically predicted allowable ranges. The second report also documents the inspection program results.

Either a limited vibration measurement program or the prototype inspection program is performed for the non-prototype Category I NPMs to verify the vibration analysis and inspection results are consistent with those observed in the prototype NPM. Similar to the approach taken for determining the scope of the prototype measurement program, the results of the prototype measurement and inspection programs will be used to inform the required measurement or inspection options for non-prototype Category I NPMs. To ensure that sufficiently bounding and relevant measurements and/or inspections for non-prototype Category I NPMs are specified, this topic will be assessed after the prototype measurement and inspection programs are completed in a separate CVAP report for non-prototype Category I NPMs.

This report outlines the scope of the CVAP measurement and inspection program that is used to validate the CVAP analysis program.

The analysis, measurement, and inspection programs specified in this report provide assurance that NPM components do not experience adverse effects of FIV during operation, in accordance with the guidance of RG 1.20.

## 8.0 Referenced Documents

- 8.1.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program for Reactor Internals during Preoperational and Initial Startup Testing,” Regulatory Guide 1.20, Revision 3, March 2007.
- 8.1.2 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, *Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code*, 2013 Edition, Section III, “Rules for Construction of Nuclear Facility Components,” with no addenda, New York, NY.
- 8.1.3 Au-Yang, M.K., “Flow-Induced Vibration of Power and Process Plant Components,” American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Press, New York, NY, 2001.
- 8.1.4 Blevins, R.D., *Flow-Induced Vibration*, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990, 2nd Edition.
- 8.1.5 Nakamura, Y. and Yoshimura, T., “Flutter and Vortex Excitation of Rectangular Prisms in Pure Torsion in Smooth and Turbulent Flows,” *Journal of Sound and Vibration*, (1982), Vol. 8, Pages 305 – 317.
- 8.1.6 Westinghouse Electric Company, “Advanced Passive 1000 (AP1000) Design Certification Document,” Revision 19, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 12, June 2011.
- 8.1.7 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, “Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor (APWR), Design Certification Document,” Revision 4, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 12, September 2013.
- 8.1.8 AREVA, “U.S. EPR Design Certification Document,” Revision 5, Chapter 5, Chapter 12, July 2013.
- 8.1.9 Electricite de France, “U.K. European Pressurized Reactor, Pre-Construction Safety Report,” Revision 6, Chapter 4, Reactor and Core Design, and Chapter 5, Reactor Coolant System and Associated Systems, October 2012.
- 8.1.10 Collins, Elmo E., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Peter Dietrich, Southern California Edison Company, July 18, 2012, Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12188A748.
- 8.1.11 ANSYS® Mechanical, Release 16.0, ANSYS, Inc., Canonsburg, PA 2015.
- 8.1.12 ANSYS® CFX, Release 15.0, ANSYS, Inc., Canonsburg, PA 2014.
- 8.1.13 Chen, S.S., “Flow-Induced Vibration of Circular Cylindrical Structures,” Report No. ANL-85-81, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL, 1985.

**Enclosure 3:**

Affidavit of Thomas A. Bergman, AF-0118-57989

## **NuScale Power, LLC**

### **AFFIDAVIT of Thomas A. Bergman**

I, Thomas A. Bergman, state as follows:

- (1) I am the Vice President of Regulatory Affairs of NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the information described in this Affidavit that NuScale seeks to have withheld from public disclosure, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of NuScale.
- (2) I am knowledgeable of the criteria and procedures used by NuScale in designating information as a trade secret, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information. This request to withhold information from public disclosure is driven by one or more of the following:
  - (a) The information requested to be withheld reveals distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) whose use by NuScale competitors, without a license from NuScale, would constitute a competitive economic disadvantage to NuScale.
  - (b) The information requested to be withheld consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), and the application of the data secures a competitive economic advantage, as described more fully in paragraph 3 of this Affidavit.
  - (c) Use by a competitor of the information requested to be withheld would reduce the competitor's expenditure of resources, or improve its competitive position, in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing of a similar product.
  - (d) The information requested to be withheld reveals cost or price information, production capabilities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of NuScale.
  - (e) The information requested to be withheld consists of patentable ideas.
- (3) Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to NuScale's competitive position and foreclose or reduce the availability of profit-making opportunities. The accompanying technical report reveals distinguishing aspects about the method by which NuScale develops its Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program Technical Report.

NuScale has performed significant research and evaluation to develop a basis for this method and has invested significant resources, including the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.


The precise financial value of the information is difficult to quantify, but it is a key element of the design basis for a NuScale plant and, therefore, has substantial value to NuScale.

If the information were disclosed to the public, NuScale's competitors would have access to the information without purchasing the right to use it or having been required to undertake a similar expenditure of resources. Such disclosure would constitute a misappropriation of NuScale's intellectual property, and would deprive NuScale of the opportunity to exercise its competitive advantage to seek an adequate return on its investment.

- (4) The information sought to be withheld is in the enclosed technical report entitled NuScale Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program Technical Report, Revision 1. The enclosure contains the designation "Proprietary" at the top of each page containing proprietary information. The information considered by NuScale to be proprietary is identified within double braces, "{{ }}" in the document.

- (5) The basis for proposing that the information be withheld is that NuScale treats the information as a trade secret, privileged, or as confidential commercial or financial information. NuScale relies upon the exemption from disclosure set forth in the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 USC § 552(b)(4), as well as exemptions applicable to the NRC under 10 CFR §§ 2.390(a)(4) and 9.17(a)(4).
- (6) Pursuant to the provisions set forth in 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(4), the following is provided for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld:
- (a) The information sought to be withheld is owned and has been held in confidence by NuScale.
  - (b) The information is of a sort customarily held in confidence by NuScale and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, consistently has been held in confidence by NuScale. The procedure for approval of external release of such information typically requires review by the staff manager, project manager, chief technology officer or other equivalent authority, or the manager of the cognizant marketing function (or his delegate), for technical content, competitive effect, and determination of the accuracy of the proprietary designation. Disclosures outside NuScale are limited to regulatory bodies, customers and potential customers and their agents, suppliers, licensees, and others with a legitimate need for the information, and then only in accordance with appropriate regulatory provisions or contractual agreements to maintain confidentiality.
  - (c) The information is being transmitted to and received by the NRC in confidence.
  - (d) No public disclosure of the information has been made, and it is not available in public sources. All disclosures to third parties, including any required transmittals to NRC, have been made, or must be made, pursuant to regulatory provisions or contractual agreements that provide for maintenance of the information in confidence.
  - (e) Public disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of NuScale, taking into account the value of the information to NuScale, the amount of effort and money expended by NuScale in developing the information, and the difficulty others would have in acquiring or duplicating the information. The information sought to be withheld is part of NuScale's technology that provides NuScale with a competitive advantage over other firms in the industry. NuScale has invested significant human and financial capital in developing this technology and NuScale believes it would be difficult for others to duplicate the technology without access to the information sought to be withheld.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 20, 2018.

  
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Thomas A. Bergman