

C08/14/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-220

REC: GRIER B H
NRC

ORG: LEMPGES T E
NIAGARA MOHAWK PWR

DOCDATE: 01/13/78
DATE RCVD: 04/14/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO

COPIES RECEIVED

SUBJECT:

LTR 1 ENCL 1

FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-220/78-001) ON 01/04/78 CONCERNING
DELTA TEMPERATURE OF THE DISCHARGE WATER EXCEEDED ENVIRON TECH SPEC 2.1.5,
DUE TO FAILURE OF GATE C, CIRCULATING WATER DISCHARGE GATE TO DISCHARGE
TUNNEL TO CLOSE PROPERLY...W/ATT.

PLANT NAME: NINE MILE PT - UNIT 1

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: M

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

LER (BACKFIT)
(DISTRIBUTION CODE M007)

INTERNAL: REG FILE**W/ENCL
1 & E**W/2 ENCL

NRC PDR**W/ENCL

EXTERNAL: LPDR'S
OSWEGO, NY**W/ENCL
TERA**W/ENCL LIZ CARTER
ACRS CAT B**W/O ENCL

Enviro 1

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 6 ENCL 6
SIZE: 1P+1P+2P

CONTROL NBR: 782190011

***** THE END *****

ccp



REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

NMP-0109

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

January 13, 1978

Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

RE: Docket No. 50-220

Dear Mr. Grier:

In accordance with Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit #1 Technical Specifications, we hereby submit Licensee Event Report LER 78-01, which is in violation of Section 2.1.5 of the Environmental Technical Specifications.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-0161, dated July 1977.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges
General Superintendent -
Nuclear Generation
for R.R. Schneider
Vice President -
Electric Production

.mtm


Attachments
(2 enclosures)

xc: Director, Office of NRR (17 copies)

782190011

M007
5/1

4/14/78
1978 REC-3
FBI 11 34
RECEIVED DISTRIBUTION
SERVICES UNIT
DISPATCH
15 YRC



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

09		SYSTEM CODE H F		11	CAUSE CODE E		12	CAUSE SUBCODE X		13	COMPONENT CODE X X X X X X X					14	COMP. SUBCODE Z		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16	
7	8	9	10		11			12			13					18	19		20				
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 7 8		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 1		24	25	26	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 4		28	29	REPORT TYPE T		30	REVISION NO. 0		32	
ACTION TAKEN Z		18	FUTURE ACTION X		19	EFFECT ON PLANT Z		20	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		21	HOURS 0 0 0 0		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		23	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		24	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z		25
33						35							37					42					
38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

7		8		9								30		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)						80			
FACILITY STATUS		% POWER						OTHER STATUS						(30)		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)							
1	5	E	(28)	0	8	6	(29)	NA					A	(31)	Reverse Flow Operations										
7		8		9		10		11		12		13		44		45		46		80					

7	8	9	10											80												
PUBLICITY												NRC USE ONLY														
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION																								
2	0	N	44	NA																						
7	8	9	10											68	69											80

PHONE: 315-343-2110 1552



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

January 13, 1978

Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 78-01/04 T-0
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit #1

Dear Mr. Grier:

Section 2.1.5 of the Environmental Technical Specifications requires that the Δ Temperature of our discharge water to the lake not exceed 50°F two hours after flow reversal and thereafter. Contrary to this, on January 4, 1978, the 50°F ΔT was exceeded by values of 0.5°F to 2.6°F during the period two through six hours after flow reversal.

On January 3, 1978 at 2305 hours, the flow of the circulating water was reversed to correct icing in the intake tunnel. Operating Procedure, N1-OP-19, Circulating Water System, was used for this operation and followed without exception.

However, Gate "C", the circulating water discharge gate to the discharge tunnel, failed to close completely. This gate is normally open, suspended over the discharge tunnel. The driving force for closing the gate is solely the weight of the gate. High flow forcing the gate against its guide is a possible cause of this failure.

As a result of this failure to close completely, small amounts of warm discharge water were allowed to mix with the cold intake water raising the temperature of the water at the inlet to the condenser. This, in turn, was heated in the condenser and discharged to the lake at a greater ΔT than allowed.

The following ΔT 's were recorded:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>LAKE T (°F)</u>	<u>DISCHARGE T (°F)</u>	<u>ΔT (°F)</u>
2300	32	97.0	65
2400	32	90.0	58
0100	32	82.8	50.8*
0200	32	82.5	50.5*
0300	32	83.9	51.9*
0400	32	83.8	51.8*
0500	32	84.6	52.6*

* Violation of E.T.S. 2.1.5

Flow was returned to normal at 0525 hours, on January 4, 1978.

This incident is considered to have minimal impact due to the short time of duration and the small ΔT's above specifications. The failure of gate "C" to close completely will be investigated during the next refueling outage.

Sincerely,



Thomas E. Lempges
General Superintendent
Nuclear Generation
for R.R. Schneider
Vice President -
Electric Production

mtm

