E 03/10/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-220

REC: GRIER B H
NRC

ORG: SCHNEIDER R R
NIAGARA MOHAWK PWR

DOCDATE: 02/24/78
DATE RCVD: 03/07/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO

COPIES RECEIVED
LTR 0 ENCL 1

SUBJECT:
LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-220/78-06) ON 01/27/78 CONCERNING PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TEST IC-75 FOUND A TRIP SETPOINT OF 22.5 INCHES WATER ON ONE VACUUM SWITCH IN THE VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM FROM THE PRESSURE SUPPRESSION CHAMBER TO THE RX BLDG (68-12B).

PLANT NAME: NINE MILE PT - UNIT 1

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: DL

********** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS **********

INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF CLEAR**W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL: REG FILE**W/ENCL
I & E**W/2 ENCL
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO**W/ENCL
NOVAK/CHECK**W/ENCL
KNIGHT**W/ENCL
HANAUER**W/ENCL
EISENHUT**W/ENCL
SHAO**W/ENCL
KREGER/J. COLLINS**W/ENCL
K SEYFRIT/IE**W/ENCL
NRC PDR**W/ENCL
MIPC**W/3 ENCL
HOUSTON**W/ENCL
GRIMES**W/ENCL
BUTLER**W/ENCL
TEDESCO**W/ENCL
BAER**W/ENCL
VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL
ROSA**W/ENCL

EXTERNAL: LPDR'S
OSWEGO, NY**W/ENCL
TIC**W/ENCL
NSIC**W/ENCL
ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45
SIZE: 1P+1P

CONTROL NBR: 780680044

********** THE END **********



NMP-0124

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

February 24, 1978



Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

RE: Docket No. 50-220

Dear Mr. Grier:

In accordance with Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit #1 Technical Specifications, we hereby submit Licensee Event Report LER 78-06, which is in violation of Section 3.3.6.F of the Technical Specifications.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-0161, dated July 1977.

Very truly yours,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY R.R. SCHNEIDER

R.R. Schneider
Vice President -
Electric Production

mtm
Attachments (3)

xc: Director, Office of I&E (30 copies)
Director, Office of MIPC (3 copies)

NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N Y N M P 1 | (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 | (4) | | (5)

LICENSEE CODE (9–14); LICENSE NUMBER (15–25); LICENSE TYPE (26–30); CAT (57–58)

CON'T 0 1 REPORT SOURCE | L | (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 | (7) | 0 1 2 7 7 8 | (8) | 0 2 2 4 7 8 | (9)

DOCKET NUMBER (61–68); EVENT DATE (69–74); REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During steady state operation, performance of surveillance test IC-75
0 3 found a trip setpoint of 22.5 inches water on one vacuum switch in the
0 4 vacuum relief system from the pressure suppression chamber to the Rx
0 5 Building (68-12B). T.S. 3.3.6.F requires a setpoint less than or equal
0 6 to 0.5 psig (13.85 inches water). This condition resulted in minimal
0 7 safety implications. A redundant switch was available to initiate
0 8 operation of the vacuum relief valve.

0 9	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	S A (11)	E (12)	E (13)	I N S T R U (14)	S (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
7 8	—	0 0 6	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	N (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	M 2 3 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the failure was instrument drift in a mercoid model CP4122
1 1 vacuum switch. Trip setpoint was reset to 6.8 inches water. Current
1 2 surveillance testing schedules are adequate to ensure early detection
1 3 of future instrument drifts.
1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E (28)	0 9 6 (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance Testing

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
	N (44)	NA

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Dennis MacVittie PHONE: 315-343-2110 ext. 1558

GPO

NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: N Y N M P 1 (2)	LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4)	CAT: (5)		
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 (7)	EVENT DATE: 0 1 2 7 7 8 (8)	REPORT DATE: 0 2 2 4 7 8 (9)		

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During steady state operation, performance of surveillance test IC-75
0 3 found a trip setpoint of 22.5 inches water on one vacuum switch in the
0 4 vacuum relief system from the pressure suppression chamber to the Rx
0 5 Building (68-12B). T.S. 3.3.6.F requires a setpoint less than or equal
0 6 to 0.5 psig (13.85 inches water). This condition resulted in minimal
0 7 safety implications. A redundant switch was available to initiate
0 8 operation of the vacuum relief valve.

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S A (11)	E (12)	E (13)	I N S T R U (14)	S (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 8	—	0 0 6	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	N (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	M 2 3 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of the failure was instrument drift in a mercoid model CP4122
1 1 vacuum switch. Trip setpoint was reset to 6.8 inches water. Current
1 2 surveillance testing schedules are adequate to ensure early detection
1 3 of future instrument drifts.
1 4

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	0 9 6 (29)	NA	B (31)	Surveillance Testing

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
2 0	N	NA

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER Dennis MacVittie PHONE: 315-343-2110 ext. 1558

GPO

CENTRAL FILES

TELECOPY MESSAGE

TO: 215-337-1150 FROM: 315-343-2110 DATE/TIME 2/21/78 - 1610
Telephone Number Telephone Number

TO:
Director of Regulatory Operation
USNRC Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

From: Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Unit #1
P.O. Box #32
Lycoming, New York 13093

SUBJECT: PROMPT REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
DOCKET NO. 50-220 LICENSE NO. DPR-63
ASSIGNED LER NO. 78-09

EVENT DATE: 780221 REPORT DATE: 780221

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

SEE ATTACHED.

COMPONENTS INVOLVED: TIP machine shear valve squib devices

CAUSE AND REMEDIAL ACTION: Instftution of modiffcation in squib circuit per GE revision.

FACILITY STATUS: % THERMAL MW 1840

c) Routine Startup		g) Shutdown	
d) Routine Shutdown		h) Refueling	
e) Steady State Oper	X	i) Other	
f) Load Change		j) Not Applicable	

A written follow-up report will be sent within two weeks.

TELECOPY TO B.H. GRIER FROM T.J. PERKINS DATE 2/21/78
NAME NAME

9

ATTACHMENT TO LER 78-09

Event Description:

During routine station operation with the TIP detectors withdrawn, replacement explosive charges in the TIP system shear valves were replcaed with new charges. Following replacement, it was found that the ohmmeter continuity test for acceptable electric contact was unsatisfactory. The normal TIP tube isolation system was operable at this time.

It was found that the actual electrical connections to the explosive charges were not as described in the maintenance procedure. The shear valves would not have operated to isolate the TIP guide tube with the TIP inserted. Electrical connections will be checked and tested to assure that the explosive valves will operate as described in the operating procedures. Station records, including the maintenance procedures, will be corrected to reflect the correct wiring connections. An end-to-end demonstration of the explosive shear valves will be performed with the explosive charge removed from the system. Corrective action will be completed before the TIP system is again used.

The explosive operated TIP shear isolation valves are a back-up system to be used for isolation of the TIP tubes in the event it is not possible to withdraw the detector so the normal automatic isolation system may function.