NRC FORM 195 (2-76)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NUMBER 50-237

FILE NUMBER INCIDENT REPORT

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

TO:

Mr. James G. Keppler

FROM:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Morris, Illinois
B. B. Stephenson

DATE OF DOCUMENT 4/29/77

DATE RECEIVED 5/23/77

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PROP

INPUT FORM

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DESCRIPTION

DO NOT REMOVE

PLANT NAME: (1-P)

Dresden Unit No. 2

RJL

ACKNOWLEDGED

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-237/1977-14) on 4/2/77 concerning control rod drive H-8 being found to uncouple & overtravel when withdrawn to position 48.....

(2-P)

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

BRANCH CHIEF:	ZIEMANN
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ACRS 16 CYS ~~HOLDING~~/SENT	15 CAT B

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VOLLMER/BUNCH	
KREGER/J. COLLINS	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: MORRIS ILL	
TIC:	
NSIC:	

CONTROL NUMBER

771430043

Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

H. Lanham

BBS Ltr. # 77-378

April 29, 1977



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence report number 50-237/1977-14. This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/skm

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	ILDRS2	00–00000–00	4 1 1 1 1	03
(7–8)	(9–14)	(15–25)	(26–30)	(31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CONT		L	L	05000–0237	040277	042977
(7–8)	(57–58)	(59)	(60)	(61–68)	(69–74)	(75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During routine start-up operations, control rod drive (CRD) H-8 was found to uncouple
03 and overtravel when withdrawn to position 48. All CRD's were subsequently inserted
04 to position 00 and verified to be fully inserted by computer. CRD H-8 was then
05 withdrawn to position 48 and checked for overtravel four separate times. Each over-
06 travel check proved satsifactory, and the drive was determined to be recoupled and
(continued)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	RB	E	CRDRVE	N	G080	N
(7–8)	(9–10)	(11)	(12–17)	(43)	(44–47)	(48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Symptom and performance evaluations indicate that a loosened inner filter in the CRD
09 may potentially cause the blade and drive to uncouple at the fully withdrawn position.
10 Loosening of the filter may have resulted from a combination of improper installation
(continued)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	C	000	NA	A	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–12)	(13–44)	(45)	(46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	NA	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10)	(11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12)	(13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000	NA
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	NA
(7–8)	(9)	(10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 NA

19

NAME: Robert Herbert PHONE: Ext. 265

GPO 881-667

EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued)

operable. Normal start-up operations were resumed. (50-237/1977-14)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (continued)

and latching spring fatigue. It has been determined that a loosened filter cannot exert sufficient pressure to uncouple the blade except when the drive is fully withdrawn to position 48; upon insertion, the blade and drive automatically recouple. Because the potential for uncoupling the blade exists only when the drive is fully withdrawn, the safety implications of this event are minimal.

As a precautionary measure, an operating order has been issued to ensure that a coupling check is performed whenever drive H-8 is withdrawn to position 48. During the next Unit-2 refueling outage, CRD H-8 will be disassembled and inspected. If another primary cause of failure is determined at that time, a supplemental report will be submitted. Control rod drive/blade uncoupling incidents have occurred several times in the past.