



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

December 21, 2017

Mr. David B. Hamilton
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Reg Affairs-A210
10 Center Road, P.O. Box 97
Perry, OH 44081-0097

**SUBJECT: PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 — NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000440/2017007**

Dear Mr. Hamilton:

On November 17, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (Perry). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed at an exit meeting on November 17, 2017 with with Mr. F. Payne and other members of your staff.

The inspectors examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that the Corrective Action Program (CAP) at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, was generally effective in identifying, evaluating and correcting issues. Your program had a low threshold for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. A risk based approach was used to determine the significance of the issues and priority for issue evaluation and resolution. Corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. Operating experience was entered into the CAP when appropriate and evaluated according to procedure. The use of operating experience was integrated into daily activities and found to be effective in preventing similar issues at the plant. In addition, self-assessments and audits were conducted at appropriate frequencies with sufficient depth for all departments based on the documents the team reviewed. The assessments were thorough and effective in identifying site performance deficiencies, programmatic concerns, and improvement opportunities. On the basis of the interviews conducted, the inspectors did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Your staff was aware of and generally familiar with the CAP and other station processes, including the Employee Concerns Program, through which concerns could be raised. The team determined that your station's performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified an issue that was evaluated under the security significance determination process as having very low security significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. Because you have initiated corrective actions to address the issue, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2a of the Enforcement Policy. Since this issue is security-related, the NCV is described in a separate Official-Use-Only inspection report (05000440/2017410).

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Billy Dickson, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-440
License No. NPF-58

Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000440/2017007

cc: Distribution via LISTSERV®

Letter to David B. Hamilton from Billy Dickson dated December 21, 2017

SUBJECT: PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 — NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-440
License Nos: NPF-58

Report No: 05000440/2017007

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

Location: Perry, OH

Dates: October 30 through November 17, 2017

Team Leader: R. Ng, Project Engineer

Inspectors: J. Nance, Resident Inspector
M. Domke, Reactor Inspector
J. Park, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: B. Dickson, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report 05000440/2017007; 10/30/2017–11/17/2017; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Identification and Resolution of Problems.

This report covers a 3-week period of announced routine baseline inspection. This inspection was performed by three region-based inspectors and the resident inspector at Perry. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG–1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," dated July 2016.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

On the basis of the samples selected for review, the team concluded that the Corrective Action Program (CAP) at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, was generally effective in identifying, evaluating and correcting issues. The program had a low threshold for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. A risk based approach was used to determine the significance of the issues and priority for issue evaluation and resolution. Corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance. Operating experience was entered into the CAP when appropriate and evaluated according to procedure. The use of operating experience was integrated into daily activities and found to be effective in preventing similar issues at the plant. In addition, self-assessments and audits were conducted at appropriate frequencies with sufficient depth for all departments based on the documents the team reviewed. The assessments were thorough and effective in identifying site performance deficiencies, programmatic concerns, and improvement opportunities. On the basis of the interviews conducted, the inspectors did not identify any impediment to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Your staff was aware of and generally familiar with the CAP and other station processes, including the Employee Concerns Program, through which concerns could be raised. The team determined that your station's performance in each of these areas supported nuclear safety.

Although implementation of the CAP was determined to be effective overall, the inspectors identified several issues that represented potential weakness of the program.

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

This inspection constituted one biennial sample of Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures and processes that described the CAP at Perry to ensure, in part, that the requirements of Title 10 *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," were met. The inspectors observed and evaluated the effectiveness of meetings related to the CAP, such as the Management Review Committee meetings, the Corrective Action Review Board and the Maintenance Notification Screening meetings. Selected licensee personnel were interviewed to assess their understanding of and their involvement in the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed selected condition reports (CR) across all seven Reactor Oversight Process cornerstones to determine if problems were being properly identified and entered into the licensee's CAP. The majority of the risk-informed samples of CRs reviewed were issued since the last NRC biennial PI&R inspection completed in August of 2015. The inspectors also reviewed selected issues that were more than five years old.

The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization and evaluation of the issues and examined the assigned corrective actions. This review encompassed the full range of safety significance and evaluation classes, including root cause evaluations, apparent cause evaluations, common cause evaluations and trending analysis. The inspectors assessed the scope and depth of the licensee's evaluations. For issues that were characterized as significant conditions adverse to quality, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's corrective actions to prevent recurrence and for issues that were less significant, the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions to determine if they were implemented in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.

The inspectors performed a 5-year review of the safety-related 125-volt direct current (DC) system based on input from the resident staff. Two divisions of the DC system provides required DC power to associated loads needed for safe shutdown of the plant. Its batteries and chargers are sized to provide DC power under Loss of Cooling Accident conditions in the operating unit coincident with the continuous load of the other unit (not built). A third division of DC power provides a continuous and independent 125-volt DC source of control and motive power for high pressure core spray (HPCS) system logic, HPCS diesel generator control and protection and all Division 3 related 125-volt DC control. The primary purpose of this review was to determine whether the licensee was monitoring and addressing performance issues of

the 125-Volt DC system. The inspectors performed walkdowns, as needed, to verify the resolution of selected issues.

A 5-year review of the HPCS system was also undertaken to assess the licensee staff's efforts in monitoring system performance. This system is part of the emergency core cooling system and its failure could adversely affect plan's ability to mitigate an accident. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee staff was properly monitoring and evaluating the performance of the system through effective implementation of station monitoring program, such as the system health report. The inspectors performed walkdowns, as needed, to verify the resolution of selected issues.

The inspectors examined the results of self-assessments of the CAP completed during the review period. The results of the self-assessments were compared to self-revealed and NRC-identified findings. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective actions associated with previously identified NCVs and findings to determine whether the station properly evaluated and resolved those issues. The inspectors also performed walkdowns, as necessary, to verify the resolution of the selected issues.

b. Assessment

(1) Identification of Issues

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that Perry was generally effective in identifying issues at a low threshold and entering them into the CAP. The inspectors determined that problems were normally identified and captured in a complete and accurate manner in the CAP. The station was appropriately screening issues from both NRC and industry operating experience at an appropriate level and entering them into the CAP when applicable to the station. The inspectors also noted that deficiencies were identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by licensee personnel. These deficiencies were subsequently entered into the CAP for resolution.

The inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low level issues to prevent larger issues from developing. The licensee used the CAP to document instances where previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.

The inspectors conducted a 5-year review of the HPCS system through documentation reviews, system walkdown, and interviews. The inspectors walked down the Division III HPCS diesel room and discussed various CRs like over-torqued studs for mounted rectifier on the diesel generator, diesel overspeed trips, and high vibrations of the diesel alternating current soakback pump with the associated system engineer. The inspectors observed HPCS diesel room equipment condition and verified HPCS system performance relative to documented Maintenance Rule status and actions. The inspectors confirmed that known issues were documented in the corrective action program and the licensee had taken or planned corrective actions to address the issues. The inspectors did not observe any licensee performance deficiencies in this area.

i) Observations

Change in Condition Report Generation

During this biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, the team identified a decline in CR generation in 2016. Prior to 2016, the number of CR generated was in the order of about 5700 per year. In 2016, the total number of CR generated was about 3800. This represented a 33 percent drop from 2015.

The licensee utilizes the Notification system through which deficient conditions are reported and work is requested. The team also noticed a corresponding change in the number of notification the licensee generated. Notifications are generally divided into two categories: Nuclear Maintenance Notification and General Activity Tracking Notification. A Nuclear Maintenance Notification is used to report deficient conditions and request work in the field, whereas a General Activity Tracking Notification is used to request other actions, such as engineering evaluation request or document change request. The issues identified in the Notification system are prioritized according to the level of urgency and significance of component/work. The Notification system is not completely part of the CAP but is utilized as a driving force to accomplish actions to support resolution of issues identified through the CAP. Any deficient condition that is a condition adverse to quality should have a CR written and linked to the notification.

The licensee had recognized this change and written a number of CRs for this issue in 2016 and early 2017. The licensee attributed the cause of the decline partially to CAP process changes that resulted in a new baseline plateau as well as improvement in plant operation. Although the licensee's evaluation was inconclusive to the root cause of the decline, a number of actions were taken by the licensee to educate its staff on the new CAP process. The licensee continued to monitor the generation rates and would interfere when necessary.

Based on the samples we reviewed during this inspection, both low and high safety significance issues were in the CAP. No issue was identified in the Notification system. Through interviews with the licensee's staff, the inspectors concluded that the staff were willing to bring up safety issue and write CRs. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that this declining trend had not affected plant operations but the licensee needs to be cognizant of this trend before it affects the problem identification process.

ii) Findings

No findings were identified.

(2) Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that the licensee was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified issue, including an appropriate consideration of risk. In particular, the inspectors observed that while the majority of issues identified were at a low level of significance, those issues and issues of more significance were assigned a review and action level appropriate for the identified condition and in accordance with governing procedures. Issues were being appropriately screened by the originating departments, the Management Review Board, and Operations Shift Management for

items potentially impacting equipment operability. Evaluations in apparent cause and root cause reports reviewed by the inspectors were effective in resolving the underlying issues.

The inspectors determined that the Management Review Committee meetings, the Corrective Action Review Board and the Maintenance Notification Screening meetings were generally thorough and maintained a high standard for evaluation quality. Members of the committees were engaged and discussed selected issues in sufficient detail as well as challenged each other regarding their conclusions and recommendations.

The inspectors determined that the licensee evaluated equipment functionality requirements adequately after a degraded or non-conforming condition was identified. In general, appropriate actions were assigned to correct the degraded or non-conforming condition.

i) Observations

Failure to Perform Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Pad Radiation Surveys

During the review of the radiation protection related CRs, the inspectors noted instances of missing independent spent fuel storage installation pad (ISFSI) radiation survey. The missing surveys were previously identified by an audit performed by Fleet Oversight in March 2017. This issue was entered into their CAP and the CR documented that the site could not locate a number of quarterly survey records. Specifically, two records in 2015 and two in 2016 could not be located. Corrective actions included evaluating the use of the work order process to track the periodic survey activity. However, the licensee determined that tracking via the work order process was not needed and the current method was adequate. The CR was subsequently closed with no change implemented for tracking the performance of ISFSI pad survey.

As a result, the inspectors requested the survey results for 2017 and identified that the licensee failed to perform the survey for the second quarter. The inspectors determined that this issue was of minor significance because the subsequent survey performed in July 2017 during the third quarter showed that there were no adverse changes in radiological conditions in the area and that there were no indications to suggest that the dose limits as required by the NRC regulation were exceeded. The inspectors determined that this was a minor violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the licensee's failure to perform ISFSI Pad radiation survey in accordance with established procedure for control of radioactivity. Because of its minor safety significance, this issue was not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as CR 2017-11375, "2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: RP Did Not Perform the 2017 Second Quarter Survey for ISFSI Pad In Accordance With HPI-D0006, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Radiation Survey," dated November 13, 2017, and initiated corrective actions to address the issue.

ii) Findings

No findings were identified.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that the licensee was generally effective in addressing identified issues and the assigned corrective actions were generally appropriate. The licensee implemented corrective actions in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance, including an appropriate consideration of risk.

Problems identified using root or apparent cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with the CAP procedural and regulatory requirements. Corrective actions designed to prevent recurrence were generally comprehensive, thorough, and timely. The inspectors sampled corrective action assignments for selected NRC documented violations and determined that actions assigned were generally effective and timely.

The inspectors reviewed open corrective work orders, open corrective action items, and recent system health reports for the DC system. The Unit 1 Division 1 and 2 Battery Rooms and Division 2 Battery Charger Room were walked down with the DC system engineer. The inspectors found the system to be in overall good health with a reasonable number of open corrective work orders and corrective action items. A sample of issues identified in the system health reports were reviewed and found to have interim compensatory measures and corrective actions to address them. The inspectors did not find any discrepancies between the conditions represented by the open work orders, corrective action documents, and system health reports and the actual conditions. The inspectors concluded that the licensee staff were properly monitoring the performance of the system and taking actions necessary for improvements as well as deficiencies.

i) Observations

None.

ii) Findings

A security related finding and an associated non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors. The finding is documented in the NRC Inspection Report 05000440/2017410.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the facility's Operating Experience (OE) program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the OE program implementing procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, reviewed licensee evaluations of OE issues and events and reviewed selected assessment of the OE performance indicators. The objective of the review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively integrating OE into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were appropriate, whether the licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental

assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE, were identified and implemented in an effective and timely manner.

b. Assessment

Overall, the inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at evaluating industry OE for relevance to the facility. The inspectors observed that operating experience was discussed as part of the daily and pre-job briefings. Industry operating experience was disseminated across plant departments for their review and use, if needed. Specific equipment related issues were distributed to appropriate engineers for evaluating and screening into the CAP. The inspectors also verified that the use of OE in formal CAP products such as root cause evaluations and apparent cause evaluations was appropriate and adequately considered.

Operating experience that was applicable to the facility was appropriately evaluated and actions were implemented or are being implemented to address any issues that resulted from the evaluations. These operating experience evaluations included NRC generic communications, significant industry issues, Part 21's, and General Electric Services Information Letters. Generally, OE that was applicable to Perry was thoroughly evaluated and actions were implemented in a timely manner to address any issues that resulted from the evaluations.

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that operating experience was effectively utilized at the station. No significant issues were identified during the inspectors' review of selected licensee operating experience evaluations.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected self-assessments and Fleet Oversight audits, as well as the schedule of past and future assessments. The inspectors evaluated whether these audits and self-assessments were effectively managed, adequately covered the subject areas, and properly captured identified issues in the CAP. In addition, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel regarding the implementation of the audit and self-assessment programs.

b. Assessment

Based on the results of the inspection, the inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and self-critical. They were effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The inspectors concluded that these audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area. Selected licensee programs audited by Fleet Oversight were found to be satisfactorily implemented, with a few isolated examples of deficiencies that have been appropriately prioritized and addressed through their CAP process. In many cases, these self-assessments and audits had identified

numerous issues that were not previously recognized by the station. The inspectors also determined that findings from the CAP self-assessment were consistent with the inspectors' assessment.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's safety conscious work environment (SCWE) through the reviews of the facility's Employee Concerns Program (ECP) implementing procedures, discussions with the coordinator of the ECP, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of CRs. The inspectors also reviewed the results from the safety culture assessment and safety conscious work environment survey conducted in 2016.

The inspectors held scheduled interviews with 20 onsite staff members. They included individual contributors and supervisors from both licensee and contractor organization. During the interview, the inspectors assessed their willingness to raise nuclear safety issues. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed other personnel informally to ascertain their views on the effectiveness of the CAP and their willingness and freedom to raise issues.

The individuals in the scheduled interviews were randomly selected to provide a distribution across various departments at the site. In addition to assessing individuals' willingness to raise nuclear safety issues, the interviews also included discussion on any changes in the plant environment over the last 12 months. Items discussed included:

- knowledge and understanding of the CAP;
- effectiveness and efficiency of the CAP;
- willingness to use the CAP; and
- knowledge and understanding of ECP.

The inspectors also discussed the functioning of the ECP with the program coordinator; reviewed program logs from 2015 through 2017; and reviewed selected case files to identify any emergent issues or potential trends.

b. Assessment

The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern regarding the licensee's SCWE. Information obtained during the interviews indicated that an environment was established where licensee personnel felt free to raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation. Licensee personnel were generally aware of and familiar with the CAP and other processes, including the ECP and the NRC's allegation process, through which concerns could be raised. In addition, a review of the types of issues in the ECP indicated that the licensee staff members were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify issues. The inspectors did not observe and were not provided any examples where there was retaliation for the raising of nuclear safety issues. Documents provided

to the inspectors regarding surveys and monitoring of the safety culture and SCWE generally supported the conclusions from the interviews.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting

On November 17, 2017, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. F. Payne and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

F. Payne, Plant General Manager
J. Archer, Manager – Security
B. Blair, Manager – Operations
S. Benedict, Manager – Chemistry
P. Boissoneault, Manager – Training
K. Clark, Manager – Maintenance
M. DeStefano, Manager – Fleet Oversight
B. Huck, Manager – Outage Management
D. Mauck, Manager – Work Management
G. Mizenko, Manager – Supply Chain
R. O'Connor, Manager – Emergency Preparedness
J. Oelbracht, Manager – Radiation Protection
D. Reeves, Director – Site Engineering
D. Saltz, Director – Performance Improvement

NRC

B. Dickson, Branch Chief

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Open

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

Condition Reports

CR G202-2002-00704	Latent Issues, ESW Design Pressure May Not Meet ASME Code Requirements	03/11/02
CR G202-2003-03047	MOV Stem Lubrication Issues	05/08/03
CR G202-2009-56933	Past SVI-G33T9131 Performance Potential Issues	04/08/09
CR G202-2009-65972	ESW Pump B Tripped	10/15/09
CR G202-2010-74904	During SVI-E12T0146 Performance, Operations Received Unexpected Annunciators	04/06/10
CR 2011-06433	Perry Siren Performance Indicator Negative Trend	12/06/11
CR 2012-07433	ECP Addressing an Adverse Condition Not Racked by a CA	05/08/12
CR 2013-01011	Inverter 1R14S0004 was Found on Its Alternate Source and with the Fail Light On Following Reactor Scram	01/22/13
CR 2013-01599	Darker Than Normal Oil Color HPCS Diesel Air Compressor	02/01/13
CR 2013-03384	High Pressure Core Spray Pump Performance	03/07/13
CR 2013-05234	PY1C14 Fuel Defect Found in Fuel Bundle 13P749 rod H2	04/05/13
CR 2014-10704	Potential to Cause Secondary Fire Due to Unfused DC Circuits (LER 2014-003)	06/19/14
CR 2014-11366	A Security Officer Self-Declared that he Inadvertently Introduced a Loaded Pistol Magazine into the Protected Area	07/07/14
CR 2014-16769	Reactor Scram 11/7/2014 at 0847 Due to Lowering Reactor Water Level	11/07/14
CR 2014-17924	Violation of Building Codes on West Side of Unit 2 Turbine Building	12/04/14
CR 2014-18329	Condition Report Not Written When Degraded Condition on 1N22F420C was Identified	12/15/14
CR 2014-18563	Fire Safety Inspection of Unit 2 Supplemental Staff Structures	12/19/14
CR 2015- 05679	ANS Siren A1 Removed from Service Due to Test Failure	04/23/15
CR 2015-01009	Review of BWRVIP Reports Not Captured in CR's per TAI-0507	01/23/15
CR 2015-03424	Perry Unit 2 does not meet Ohio Building Codes, NFPA Fire and Life Safety Codes	03/16/15
CR 2015-03543	Ultrasonic Thickness Testing Inspection Results of Emergency Closed Cooling Heat Exchanger B	03/17/15

CR 2015-03990	Preliminary -1N62C0002B Eddy Current Examination Indications of Severe Degradation	03/25/15
CR 2015-04652	Magnetic Particle Examination Pre-Freeze Seal was Performed with a Coating Present on the Piping which Does Not Meet Procedure NQI-0942	04/04/15
CR 2015-06829	Record Copy of Order 200548898 Missing Pages	05/12/15
CR 2015-07039	Reactor Water Cleanup Pump (RWCU) Seal Leaks – Recurring Issue	05/15/15
CR 2015-07391	2015 Pre-NRC Fire Protection Assessment – Efforts to Resolve Fire Protection Program Issues Have Not Resulted in Acceptable Results	05/22/15
CR 2015-07693	NEIL 2015 Property Loss Control Inspection – NEIL Recommendations	05/29/15
CR 2015-08390	External Communications During E-Plan Drill Caused Public Concern	06/18/15
CR 2015-09807	DIV 2 DG Potential Non-conforming Condition Based on Exceeding Design Environmental Temperature Limits in the DIV 2 DG Room During the Last Performance of SVI-R43-T1318.	07/20/15
CR 2015-09852	Unsecured Safeguard Cabinet	07/21/15
CR 2015-10435	Notification of Potential Part 21 Concerning Namco Limit Switches (Event Number 51280)	08/04/15
CR 2015-10764	Part 21 Report –Ferraz Shawmut/Mersen Fuses, P/N: AJT25 and AJT60	08/12/15
CR 2015-11444	MS-C-15-08-03: Hot Spot Evaluation Discrepancies	08/31/15
CR 2015-11634	MS-C-15-08-03: Air Sample Records Not Complete	09/03/15
CR 2015-11635	MS-C-15-08-03: Personnel Contamination Survey Documentation Issues	09/03/15
CR 2015-13620	SPM-906 Fails Source Check	10/09/15
CR 2015-14489	2015 NRC Fire Protection Inspection – MSO Documentation Incomplete Regarding Postulated RCIC Failure Due to Control Room Fire	10/23/15
CR 2015-14615	2015 NRC Fire Protection Inspection – Documentation Issues with Calculations SSC-001 and SSC-009, PNPP Safe Shutdown Capabilities Calculations	10/26/15
CR 2015-14659	Part 21 from GE on Corrosion and Surrounding Optical Isolator “Fisheye” Lenses	10/27/15
CR 2015-15089	Received HPCS and RCIC Suction Swap During RHR B Recovery	11/04/15
CR 2015-16207	2015 NRC Cyber Security Inspection – Potential Violation: PMMD Laptop Storage	12/02/15
CR 2015-16224	2015 NRC Cyber Security Inspection – Keyboard Video Mouse (KVM) Devices between Defensive Strategy Levels Lack Adequate Analysis	12/02/15
CR 2015-16548	NRC NOV: Radiation Protection Manager Qualifications	12/09/15

CR 2015-16711	Surveillance SVI-D17-T8003 Not Performed	12/13/15
CR 2015-16791	Extent of Condition Review Identifies Additional Containment Isolation Valves Are Not Tested in the Accident Direction	12/15/15
CR 2015-17012	Housekeeping – Unit 2 Turbine Deck Covered in Bird Feces	12/18/15
CR 2016-00289	PA-PY-15-02, Declining Performance for Emergency Response Sirens	01/08/16
CR 2016-00325	LPRM BEDS Can Identified	01/08/16
CR 2016-00356	Unexpected Rod Withdrawal Block Received During SVI-C11-T1003B (Control Rod 22-19)	01/09/16
CR 2016-00467	Routine Annual RP Survey	01/12/16
CR 2016-00506	Modification of PMI-0030 to Reference Potential Degradation of Three Motor Operated Valves	01/13/16
CR 2016-02048	Loss of EH11 Divisional Bus Results in a Loss of Shutdown Cooling	02/11/16
CR 2016-02613	Stop Work Authority Issued During Trouble Shoot / Survey of 1N25F0060A	02/24/16
CR 2016-03683	Reactor Water Sample Valve Operability Surveillance Could Not Be Performed as Scheduled	03/21/16
CR 2016-03835	Part 21 Notification for Ferraz Shawmut OT15 Fuses	03/24/16
CR 2016-03864	ERO Drill: Objective F13 Not Met – RMT Controller Data	03/24/16
CR 2016-06093	PA-PY-16-02: Avoidable, Elevated Core Damage Frequency (CDF) results in YELLOW PRA risk	04/29/16
CR 2016-06218	Found Contamination in a Clean Area	05/02/16
CR 2016-06547	Leakage Detected During ISI-E22-T1201-3	05/09/16
CR 2016-06758	HPCS Diesel Overspeed Trip Occurred Slightly Low	05/14/16
CR 2016-07188	Fire Extinguisher Pressure Gauge in Unacceptable Range	05/27/16
CR 2016-07572	NRC ID: No Evidence of an Independent Verification of Release Rate Calculations for a Liquid Radwaste Discharge Done with the Liquid Radwaste Effluent Monitor Inoperable	02/01/16
CR 2016-07639	May 2016 CR Generation Rate 40% Lower Than 6-month Average	06/10/16
CR 2016-07763	PA-PY-16-03: Developing trend – Some Adverse Conditions Are Not Being Documented in the Corrective Action Program	06/15/16
CR 2016-09189	Target Rock Solenoid Valve 10 CFR 21 Report for Defect of Soft-Seated Solenoid Operated Valve Components	07/26/16
CR 2016-09746	2016 NRC FLEX Inspection: PM Development for FLEX Communications System	08/10/16
CR 2016-10695	Validation of CR Generation Rate	09/09/16
CR 2016-11864	NRC ID: Underdrain Manhole Covers Changed to Grating vs Watertight Covers	10/04/16
CR 2016-12106	High Pressure Core Spray Emergency Service Water Flow in the ALERT LOW range	10/10/16

CR 2016-13290	Fire Protection Compensatory Measures Require Modification	11/10/16
CR 2016-13514	MIDAS Problems Encountered During 11/17/16 Table Top Drill	11/17/16
CR 2016-13553	NRC Observation and Comments During Airborne Control and Occupational Dose Inspection	11/18/16
CR 2017-00276	Two Annual Surveys Required by NOP-OP-4801 "Control of X-Ray and Radiation Generating Analytical Equipment" Missed	01/09/17
CR 2017-00911	Condition Report Generation Rate Has Steadily Decreased in 2016	01/27/17
CR 2017-01459	Unit 2 TB Rollup Door Installed in 2015 without Engineering Evaluation for Configuration Control	02/09/17
CR 2017-02957	Vessel Technician Wore PAPR Three Times Without Being Qualified	03/16/17
CR 2017-02975	MS-C-17-03-30: Unable to Locate Four Quarterly ISFSI Pad Surveys	03/16/17
CR 2017-03070	EOP-3 Entry Due to High RHR A Sump Level	03/18/17
CR 2017-04246	Elevated Conductivities Seen in RWCU Influent and Effluent Sample Points	04/14/17
CR 2017-04333	NRC Identified: Door SB-015 between Control Complex 599' and Service Building 603' Will Not Close and Latch on Its Own Due to Pressure Differential	04/18/17
CR 2017-04384	Emergency Service Water (ESW) "C" Pump Flow in Alert Range per SVI-P45T2003	04/19/17
CR 2017-04728	Unplanned LCO, AEGTS A Not Maintaining Proper Pressure	04/27/17
CR 2017-04930	Five Cells with Low Voltage Identified for the Unit 1 BOP B Battery	05/01/17
CR 2017-05540	Broken Wire Strands Found on Motor Lead T3	05/15/17
CR 2017-05601	Unexpected RCIC Pump Suction Pressure Alarm During High Pressure Core Spray Pump Start for Fill and Vent	05/16/17
CR 2017-05646	Roll-Up Condition Report to Document Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) Project Findings from 1R16	05/17/17
CR 2017-05686	Performance of Lower Containment Airlock Surveillances Delayed Due to Conflict with Ongoing Work on the Upper Containment Airlock	04/21/16
CR 2017-06838	EP NRC Inspection Observations	06/22/17
CR 2017-06915	2017 Pre-NRC PI&R Assessment: Various Program and Administrative Error's Identified with MR Functional Failure Implementation	06/26/17
CR 2017-07569	Unplanned Impairments for Unit 2 Penetration Seals	07/19/17
CR 2017-07673	Yellow Risk to Generation Activity Not Released Unit 1 Division 1 Battery Capacity Test Per Work Implementation Schedule	07/23/17
CR 2017-08353	REMP Changes not Reflected in ODCM	08/11/17

CR 2017-08582	Extent of Condition for Emergency Service Water B Through Wall Pinhole Piping Leaks	08/18/17
CR 2017-08602	Prompt Operability Determination on Pinhole Leak Could Not be Assured	08/19/17
CR 2017-08736	Localized Wall Thinning Identified in ESW A Loop Piping	08/23/17
CR 2017-09095	Evaluate Perry Anticipated Transient Without Scram Strategy for Lowering Reactor Power	09/02/17
CR 2017-09598	Control Room Atmosphere D17K770 in Flow Fault Alarm	09/18/17
CR 2017-09733	Oil Leak (<1 dpm) from Div. 3 Diesel Generator AC Soakback Pump Discharge Pressure Switch Isolation Valve (1E22F0583) Fitting	09/21/17
CR 2017-10740	Unit 2 Turbine Building and Turbine Track Bay October Housekeeping Inspection	10/25/17
CR 2017-10944	PY Site Protection Section Exceeded their Monthly Dose Allotment for October 2017	11/01/17

Apparent Cause Evaluation

CR 2015-09852	Unsecured Safeguard Cabinet	07/21/15
CR 2016-01063	Reactor SCRAM on RPV Level 8 – SCRAM No 1-16-01	04/08/16
CR 2016-01530	Aux Bldg Ventilation Supply Damper Closed Tripping Off Aux Bldg. Supply Fans	02/01/16
CR 2016-05906	PA-PY-16-02: Elevation of Fleet Oversight Concerns with Maintenance Performance	04/26/16
CR 2016-08737	NRC ID: Control Complex 638 Elevation Fire Barrier Wall Non-Compliance	08/23/17
CR 2016-13541	MS-C-16-11-24: FINDING: Perry Emergency Plan is Not In Compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix E for Training Descriptions	11/18/16
CR 2017-00911	NRC ID: Control Complex 638 Elevation Fire Barrier Wall Non-Compliance	01/27/17
CR 2017-01051	Deficiencies with Temporary Structure	01/31/17
CR 2017-01714	NRC ID: Security Baseline Inspection – NRC Identified Inadequate Vehicle Search	02/16/17
CR 2017-01731	Declining Human Performance Trend Identified (Site Protection)	02/16/17
CR 2017-04728	Unplanned LCO, AEGTS 'A' Not Maintaining Proper Pressure	04/27/17
CR 2017-04945	Reactor Recirculation Pump A Failed to Downshift to Slow Speed	05/02/17
CR 2017-05379	Long-Term Increasing Trend of Reactor Water Conductivity as Measured at RWCU Influent Sample Point	05/11/17
CR 2017-05573	Radiation Protection Periodic Barrier/Barricade Surveillance Performed by Unqualified Personnel	06/17/17
CR 2017-05605	MS-C-17-05-31, Finding: Fire Protection Barrier Issues	05/16/17

CR 2017-05741	MS-C-17-05-31, Deficiencies Observed During Unannounced Fire Drill Performed on May 18, 2017	05/19/17
CR 2017-05808	Trend Review – Missed Fire protection and Loss of Safety Function Requirements	05/21/17
CR 2017-06004	MS-C-17-05-31, Finding: Fire Doors Not Inspected	05/25/17
CR 2017-06169	MS-C-17-05-31, Finding: Current Tracking Mechanism for Fire Brigade Drill Frequency Regulatory Requirements is Not Effective	06/01/17
CR 2017-06171	MS-C-17-05-31, Finding: Failure to Identify and Correct Documented Performance Issues in Fire Brigade Drills	06/01/17
CR 2017-06188	Three Pieces of Security Equipment Do Not Meet Regulatory Requirement	06/01/17
CR 2017-08450	Annulus Low Differential Pressure Alarms During Fan Shift	08/15/17

Common Cause Evaluation

CR 2016-05000	Troubleshooting of LFMG 2A Breaker Found Contact 52 LCS Intermittent	05/03/17
CR 2016-05118	Recent Events at Perry Should be Reviewed for Common Cause or Other Aggregate Review	04/12/16
CR 2017-02690	1R16 Trending: Potential Trend in Lifting and Rigging Practices	04/07/17

Audit, Assessment and Self-Assessments

BN-SN-2017-0511	Perry 2017 Pre-NRC Inspection on Problem Identification & Resolution	06/29/17
CR 2016-13541	MS-C-16-11-24: Finding: Perry Emergency Plan is Not in Compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix E for Training Descriptions	11/18/16
MS-C-17-03-30	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)	03/31/17
SA-BN-2016-0225	Effectiveness Review of Maintenance & Technical 2015 Comprehensive Self-Assessment	11/30/16
SA-BN-2016-0225	Effectiveness Review of Maintenance & Technical 2015 Comprehensive Self-Assessment	11/30/16
SA-BN-2017-0407	Monitoring and Control Self-Assessment to Support ER-2016-01063-1	01/27/17
SA-BN-2017-0511	Pre-NRC Inspection on Problem Identification & Resolution	06/29/17
SA-BN-2017-0519	Maintenance and Technical Training Programs Comprehensive Self-Assessment	08/24/17
SA-BN-2017-0525	Snapshot Self-Assessment for 2017 NEIL Fire Inspection	05/04/17
SA-BN-2017-0606	2017 Site Protection Semi Annual Safety Assessment	07/05/17
SA-BN-2017-0620	Assessment of Anchor Darling Double Disc Valves at Perry	07/10/17

SA-BN-2017-0628	Overview of the HRHV Weld Process in PY 1R16	07/06/17
SA-BN-2017-0656	Conduct an Assessment to Measure the Effectiveness of the Critical Maintenance Process	07/30/17
SN-SA-2015-0641	Pre-NRC Inspection on Access Control / Performance Indicator Verification	09/15/15

Miscellaneous

Corrective Action Review Board Meeting Package	11/16/17
ECP #14-0771-001, SJAЕ 2 nd Stage Outlet Valve Installation	04/06/17
Engineering Change Package Design Report, B33 Reactor Recirculation Loop System Loop Modifications	Revision 1
Liquid Penetrant Examination Report	12/01/90
Liquid Penetrant Examination Report	03/31/92
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document: System S99 – Structures Including Doors and Barriers	Revision 0
Management review Board (MRB) Meeting Package	Various Dates
Nuclear Maintenance Screening Committee Meeting Package	Various Dates
OPS Nonconformance Report	Revision 1
Perry Plant Health Committee Agenda	07/17/17
Perry Plant Health Committee Minutes	07/17/17
Perry Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey	November 2016
Perry Safety Culture Assessment	December 2016
Perry System Health Report B33 –Reactor Recirculation	Q1-2017
Reactor Recirculation Valve Flow Control System, Reactor Bldg.	Revision L
Semi-Annual System Health Report: R42-DC Systems	2016-2
SJAЕ Welding Proficiency Weld for Field Welds Requiring UT	03/14/17
Technical Assignment File, Double Root Valves	Revision 1
Temporary Shielding Authorization SA 17-009	09/07/17
Temporary Shielding Authorization SA 17-011	10/25/17

Calc P54-30	Fire Hazard Assessment for Unit 2 Abandonment	06/17/02
Drawing 259-0206-00002	Metal Clad Switchgear	Revision D
Drawing D-264-024	Electrical Cable Tray Layout Unit 2 Turbine Building – West – 606’ 8”	Revision D
Drawing D-264-025	Electrical Cable Tray Layout Unit 2 Turbine Building – West – 606’ 8”	Revision C
Drawing D-264-035	Electrical Cable Tray Layout Unit 2 Turbine Building – West – 624’ 6”	Revision D
Drawing D-264-036	Electrical Cable Tray Layout Unit 2 Turbine Building – Laydown Area EL. 620’ 8”	Revision D
Drawing D-264-075	Electrical Cable Tray Layout Unit 2 Condensate Demineralizer Area – West – 593’ 6”	Revision E
ECP 17-0063-001	Replacement Cover for Underdrain Manholes	Revision 0
LER 2016-001	Drywell Leakage, Level 8 Automatic SCRAM, and APRM Loss of Safety Function	Revision 0
LER 2016-002	Manual Reactor SCRAM Due to Spurious Opening of Safety Relief Valves	Revision 0
LER 2016-003	Loss of Safety Related Electrical Bus Results in a Loss of Shutdown Cooling	Revision 1
LER 2016-004	Loss of Safety Function Due to Two Inoperable Standby Liquid Control Subsystems	Revision 0
LER 2017-001	Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 11-003, Revision 3	Revision 0
LER 2017-002	Loss of Safety Function Due to Main Turbine Bypass Valve Opening	Revision 0
LER 2017-003	Annulus Exhaust Gas Treatment System Loss of Safety Function	Revision 0
Notification 601081661	Generate RP Work Order for Annual X-Ray	01/09/17
Notification 601096668	Evaluate Further Actions Need to Track	03/31/17
Order 200625492	PY-SVI-B33T2001, Reactor Water Sample Valve Operability Test	03/31/16
Order 200661023	PY-SVI-P53T6305, Lower Primary Containment Air Lock (Penetration P305), In Between the Seals Test	04/25/16
Order 200661041	PY-SVI-P53T6312, Upper Primary Containment Air Lock (Penetration P312), In Between the Seals Test	04/25/16
Order 200722356	PY-SVI-R42T5202, Div 1 Weekly 125V Battery Voltage and Category A Limits Check	10/16/17
PY-2015-0162	Training Request: Use of NA’s in Procedures and also Branches Out to Other Procedures	11/14/15
PY-2015-0171	Training Request: Reinforcement of Standards	11/14/15
PY-2015-0172	Training Request: Procedure Referencing and Branching	11/14/15
PY-2016-0353	Training Request: Plant Status Control During RHR System Operation	05/20/16

Survey PY-M-20170106-5	Annual Task Cal, X-Ray Machine, Oxford ED2000, Chemistry	01/06/17
Survey PYM-20170323-27	Hot Spot Identification Record – Hot Spot #17-02	03/22/17
Survey PYM-20170401-12	Hot Spot Identification Record – Hot Spot #17-01	04/01/17
Survey PY-M-20170724-5	VSDS Standard Map Survey Report, ISFSI Task Cal	07/24/17
WO 200727772	UT Exam ESW 14"Elbow Downstream of Vlv 1P450541B	09/05/17

Operating Experience

OE-2015-0354-5	RIS 15-06, Tornado Missile Protection	06/17/15
OE-2015-0355-3	RIS 05-20, Rev 2, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, "Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety"	06/17/15
OE-2015-0427-5	OE316162R20150723 2A Reactor Feed Pump Impeller Missing Pieces	01/15/16
OE-2015-0556-5	OE316962R20150930 Flow Accelerated Corrosion Discovered in Reactor Water Cleanup System Piping	03/25/16
OE-2015-0557-3	IN 15-09, Mechanical Dynamic Restraint (Snubber) Lubricant Degradation Not Identified Due to Insufficient Service Life Monitoring	10/01/15
OE-2015-0663-3	IN 15-12, Unaccounted for Error Terms Associated With the Irradiation Testing and Environmental Qualification of Important-To-Safety Components	11/24/15
OE-2015-0685-3	RIS 15-15, Information Regarding a Specific Exemption in the Requirements for the Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material	12/08/15
OE-2015-0687-5	OE316923R20151208 Software Produces Abnormal Fuel Bundle Orientation	04/14/16
OE-2015-0696-1	IN 15-13, Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure Events	12/17/15
OE-2016-0002-1	RIS 15-17, Review and Submission of Updates to Final Safety Analysis Reports, Emergency Preparedness Documents and Fire Protection Documents	01/05/16
OE-2016-0028-1	IN 16-02, Improper Seating of Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsules	01/22/16
OE-2016-0081-1	IN 1-01, Recent Issues Related to the Commercial Grade Dedication of Allen Bradley 700-RTC Relays	02/23/16
OE-2016-0144-5	OE320210R20160404 Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Degradation Leads to Planned Maintenance Shutdown	10/19/16
OE-2016-0182-3	IN 16-05, Operating Experience Regarding Complications from a Loss of Instrument Air	04/29/16
OE-2016-0213-5	IER L4-16-14, Consequential Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Events	10/04/16
OE-2016-0215-5	RIS 16-07, Containment Shell or Liner Moisture Barrier Inspection	05/13/16

OE-2016-0297-1	IN 16-07, Operating Experience Regarding Impacts on Site Electrical Power Distribution from Inadequate Oversight of Contractor Activities	06/22/16
OE-2016-0298	IN 16-08, Inadequate Work Practices Resulting in Faulted Circuit Breaker Connections	06/22/16
OE-2016-0353-1	IN 2016-09, Recent Issues Identified When Using Reverse Engineering Techniques in the Procurement of Safety-Related Components	07/28/16
OE-2016-0383-1	IN 2016-11, Potential for material Handling Events to Cause Internal Flooding	08/16/16
OE-2016-0586-1	OE322437R20161116 (Updated) New Feedwater Heater Loss of Stability During Transport	05/11/17
OE-2017-0237-1	OE324280R20170502 Failure to Control Access to a Locked High Radiation Area	09/29/17
OE-2017-0418-1	IN 1704, High Energy Arcing Faults in Electrical Equipment Containing Aluminum	08/23/17
OE-2017-0561-1	IN 1706, Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System	11/04/17

Procedures

FPI-A-C01	Fire Protection Program Control Processes (Hot Work Permits, Transient Combustible Permits, Impairment Permits, and Fire Watches)	Revision 15
FTI-D0006	Preparation of Fuel Movement Checklist	Revision 19
GEN-MNT-0002	Generation Rigging and Lifting Manual	Revision 2
HPI-D0006	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Radiation Survey	Revision 0
IOI-3	Power Changes	Revision 59
NOBP-CC-5701	Fleet Welding	Revision 4
NOBP-LP-2003	Employee Concerns Program	Revision 4
NOBP-LP-2008	FENOC Corrective Action Review Board	Revision 21
NOBP-LP-2011	FENOC Cause Analysis	Revision 21
NOBP-LP-2013	Safety Conscious Work Environment Review Team	Revision 2
NOBP-LP-2501	Safety Culture Assessment	Revision 19
NOBP-LP-2502	Safety Culture Monitoring	Revision 13
NOPL-LP-2003	Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)	Revision 2
NOP-LP-1105	Security Organization and Personnel Duties	Revision 2
NOP-LP-1202	Vehicle and Material Access Control	Revision 10

NOP-LP-2001	Corrective Action Program	Revision 42
NOP-OP-1012	Material Readiness and Housekeeping Inspection Program	Revision 9
NOP-SS-8001	FENOC Activity Tracking	Revision 3
NOP-WM-1003	Nuclear Maintenance Notification Initiation And Screening	Revision 12
NOP-WM-5003	Rigging, Lifting and Load Handling	Revision 6
NORM-ER-3463	Horizontal Pump Repair Guide	Revision 0
PAP-0204	Housekeeping/Cleanliness Control Program	Revision 28
PAP-0606	Condition Reports and Immediate Notifications	Revision 6
PAP-0911	Control room Envelope Integrity and Tornado Depressurization Barrier Impairment	Revision 6
RPI-0122	Temporary Shielding Program	Revision 11
SOI-C34	Feedwater Control System	Revision 35
SOI-E12	Residual Heat Removal System	Revision 70
SOI-E21	Low Pressure Core Spray System	Revision 31

Root Cause Evaluations

CR 1991-00078	During Power Reduction In Response to Drywell Unidentified Leakage the "A" Recirc Pump Failed to Downshift Slow Speed.	04/01/91
CR 2013-09255	Perry Unidentified Leakage Inspection Results 6/15/2013 Vent Valve	06/15/13
CR 2016-01071	Reactor Recirc Loop A Pump Discharge Valve Vent Line Leakage	01/24/16
CR 2016-01866	Manual Reactor SCRAM Based on Suppression Pool Temperature of 95 Degree F due to Open SRVs SCRAM 1-16-02	03/15/16

Issue Reports Generated As a Result of the NRC Inspection

CR 2017-10971	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: Unit 2 Buildings Identified as Not Meeting Housekeeping Standards	11/01/17
CR 2017-10967	NRC Inspector Questioned Dose Rates Reported on a Security Officer's Access Report	11/01/17
CR 2017-11041	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: Form GEN-MNT-0002-01 Not Placed into Filenet on Effective Date	11/03/17
CR 2017-11042	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: Team Identified Potential Issue with Unit 2 Facilities	11/03/17
CR 2017-11106	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: Unit 2 Turbine Building / Heater Bay Inconsistent with fire Hazards Analysis	11/06/17

CR 2017-11375	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: RP Did Not Perform the 2017 Second Quarter Survey for ISFSI Pad in Accordance with HPI-D0006, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Radiation Survey	11/13/17
CR 2017-11403	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: S99 Bases Document Incomplete in Maintenance Rule Database	11/14/17
CR 2017-11433	NRC ID: Unit 2 Turbine Building Transient Combustible Storage Unsat	11/15/17
CR 2017-11463	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: The Effectiveness Review for CR 2015-07391 DevonWay Form and Attached Analysis Do Not Align with Each Other	11/16/17
CR 2017-11479	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: Failure to Follow PYBP-SPS-0008 Section 4.6, Excepted Material Storage	11/16/17
CR 2017-11789	2017 NRC PI&R Inspection: Violation of 10 CFR73.55(b)(10) for Failure to Prevent Recurrence Within the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Relating to the Control of Exempt Material	11/29/17

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CR	Condition Report
DC	Direct Current
ECP	Employee Concern Program
HPCS	High Pressure Core Spray
ISFSI	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OE	Operating Experience
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PI&R	Problem Identification and Resolution
SCWE	Safety Conscious Work Environment