

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NRR:9708050281 DOC.DATE: 97/07/31 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
MOVEY,R.J. Florida Power & Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
REYES, Region 2 (Post 820201)

SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 970625 ltr re violations noted in insp repts
50-250/97-05 & 50-251/97-05. Corrective actions: distributed
Critique Rept to Emergency Response Organization members,
revised 0-EPIP-20132 & distributed Info Bulletin.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE35D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
TITLE: Emergency Preparedness-Appraisal/Confirmatory Action Ltr/Exercise Rep

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD2-3 PD	1 1	CROTEAU,R	1 1
INTERNAL:	<u>FILE CENTER</u>	1 1	NRR/DISP/PIPB	1 1
	NRR/DRPM/PERB	1 1	OE DIR	1 1
	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	NOAC	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1

C
A
T
E
G
O
R
Y

1

D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK,
ROOM OWFN 5D-5 (EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM
DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 9 ENCL 9





JUL 31 1997

L-97-188

10 CFR 50 Appendix E

Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Atlanta Federal Center
61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30323


Dear Mr. Reyes:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Inspection Report 97-05 Exercise Weakness: Failure to Perform a Prompt Damage
Assessment of Safety-related Equipment

Inspection Report 97-05 dated June 25, 1997, documented an exercise weakness associated with the evaluated exercise conducted on May 13, 1997. This letter forwards Florida Power & Light Company's (FPL's) response to the identified weakness.

Should there be any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,


R. J. Hovey
Vice President
Turkey Point Plant

CLM

Enclosure

Attachment

cc: T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
K. P. Barr, Chief, Plant Support Branch, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II, USNRC
Document Control Desk, USNRC, Washington, D.C.

9708050281 970731
PDR ADOCK 05000250
G PDR





RESPONSE TO EXERCISE WEAKNESS

FINDING

"An issue was identified that focused on the ability of the emergency organization and resources to assess an emergency condition and respond appropriately. The issue was the delayed assessment of the safety-related equipment that may have been affected by the simulated fire."

"The inspectors identified the above issue as an Exercise Weakness. Although in this series of events there were no consequences from the delayed assessment, the failure to perform a timely assessment of damage to safety-related equipment while the unit was operating was considered a finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan."

RESPONSE TO FINDING

FPL offers the following clarifications on the finding. The initial damage assessment was performed satisfactorily by the fire brigade team, whose members included licensed operators. The Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump had been stopped and satisfactorily restarted in the presence of the fire brigade team. Continued plant operation was not dependent on the operation of the 3A ICW pump. The engineering damage assessment team was not required, but was requested to augment the Fire Brigade and the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The engineering team was intended to perform a more thorough examination of the ICW pump. The attached exercise time line (Attachment 1), as developed from licensee documentation, indicates that the initial official request for the engineering assessment team was made at 10:05 a.m. As stated in the inspection report, that team was debriefed at 11:11 a.m., only 1 hour, 6 minutes after the first official request. Although the time compression inherent in an exercise scenario results in "aggressive pursuit" of information, FPL believes that a thorough follow-up examination and assessment of the ICW system would be expected to take this length of time. Therefore FPL believes that, although the general handling of engineering assessment teams can be improved, our level of preparedness did not preclude effective implementation of the emergency plan.



The following Corrective Actions have been or will be implemented in response to the Exercise weakness:

1. The Critique Report has been distributed to all Emergency Response Organization members.
2. O-EPIP-20132 has been revised to eliminate the need for the Team Request Form. The Team Tracking Copyboard in the TSC has been modified to encompass all aspects of the Team Request Form. The form has been eliminated to reduce paperwork necessary for, and expedite the processing of, teams.
3. An Information Bulletin has been distributed to appropriate individuals detailing the use of plant personnel for damage assessment, quality control verifications, etc., and reiterating that radiological briefings should be commensurate with radiological conditions in the plant.
4. The upcoming quarterly drill will place emphasis on the dispatch of OSC teams.

0915 Fire brigade dispatched (Control Room controller)

0923 3A ICW pump start (lead exercise controller) Fire Brigade team had assessed the pump and OK'd start

0925 Alert declared (TSC Ops Mgr)

0935 Alert notification

0945 Communications with TSC established (OSC Supv)
3A & 3B ICW running

0947 Offsite support arrived, fire under control but not out (CR controller)

0948 TSC operational (TSC Ops Mgr)

0950 Fire is out (TSC Ops Mgr)
OSC Operational (OSC Supv)

1000 Established Team 1 as fire brigade (OSC HP Supv)

1005 ICW damage assessment team requested by EC (no initial record)

1025 Request to dispatch damage assess. team to intake (OSC Supv)

1030 Team 6 ICW damage assess. team in OSC (OSC Supv)

NOTES FOR TEAM 6 DELAYS

1. Engineers were not designated players and not part of the Emergency Response Organization - they had to be located, informed of their participation in the drill, and instructed to report to the OSC.
2. Engineers were not familiar with the OSC since they do not respond to the OSC.
3. Engineers had to be instructed on the alternate path to the intake due to potential radiation exposure on the normal route.

1111 Team 6 back in (OSC Supv)

