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 PLUNKETT, T.F. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
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SUBJECT: Provides update on items completed at plant during
 941003-1114 cycle 15 refueling outage. Summarizes regulatory
 activities & items of regulatory interest, for which action
 taken during refueling outage.

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
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L-94-293

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4
Docket No. 50-251
Activities Completed During Cycle 15 Refueling Outage

The purpose of this letter is to provide an update to the NRC on items completed by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) at Turkey Point Unit 4 during the Cycle 15 refueling outage.

FPL conducted a refueling outage of Turkey Point Unit 4 from October 3, 1994, until November 14, 1994. Regulatory activities, and items of regulatory interest, for which action was taken during this refueling outage are summarized in the attached.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Plunkett
Vice President
Turkey Point Plant

TEP/oih


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cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey
Point Plant

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
**ACTIVITIES COMPLETED DURING TURKEY POINT UNIT 4 CYCLE 15
REFUELING OUTAGE**

**Generic Letter 89-10: Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing
and Surveillance**

On June 28, 1989, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," which requested licensees to establish a program to ensure that limit switch settings for safety-related motor operated valves (MOV's) were selected, set, and maintained properly. By USNRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-250/93-25 and 50-251/93-25, dated November 18, 1993, the NRC documented the results of their inspection performed at the Turkey Point Plant to examine the implementation of the Turkey Point MOV program in response to GL 89-10.

The NRC inspection included the review of Turkey Point's evaluation in response to Limitorque's Potential 10 CFR Part 21 condition, "Reliance 3 Phase L. C. Actuator Motors (Starting Torque at Elevated Temperatures)," dated May 13, 1993. Turkey Point's evaluation assessed the impact of derating AC motor output torque and concluded that all affected MOV's were capable of functioning under design basis conditions but identified MOV-3-6386 and MOV-4-6386 as having a small margin. FPL committed to performing modifications to improve actuator torque capability to these two MOV's. The required modifications to improve actuator torque capability for MOV-3-6386 and MOV-4-6386 were completed during the Unit 3 Cycle 14 and Unit 4 cycle 15 refueling outages.

During the inspection, the NRC identified an industry concern regarding the proper operation of MOV's equipped with electric brake assemblies at degraded voltage conditions. By letter L-94-60, dated March 29, 1994, FPL informed the NRC that MOV's equipped with motor brakes which perform an active safety related function were verified to have greater than 90 percent of rated voltage available during starting. Therefore, sufficient voltage will be available to operate the motor brakes under degraded voltage conditions. In addition, FPL informed the NRC that the motor brakes for nine Turkey Point Unit 4 MOV's would be disabled during the Turkey Point Unit 4, Cycle 15 refueling outage. Disabling of the motor brakes for the Turkey Point Unit 4 MOV's identified in letter L-94-60 was completed during the Turkey Point Unit 4, Cycle 15 refueling outage.




Intake Structure

By letter L-93-153, dated June 22, 1993, FPL provided the staff with a status update of the six year plan developed in December 1990 to ensure that the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Intake Structure can perform its function under all design basis conditions including seismic events for the duration of the remaining plant life. The plan included the installation of reinforcing beams under the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump support beams, various modifications to features above the deck that will significantly reduce the rate of intrusion of chloride ions into the ICW pump supports beams, and performance of regular inspections of the bays, including visual inspection of the bay walls. In addition, letter L-93-153 indicated that FPL would implement a procedure for inspection and testing of the walls to confirm their structural integrity for the duration of the remaining plant life.

As indicated in previous correspondence, all modifications to features above the deck had been completed, and reinforcing beams had been installed under 2 of 4 deck support beams in Unit 4, and 3 of 4 deck support beams in Unit 3 (all Safety Related Unit 3 bays). During the Unit 4 cycle 15 refueling outage, a steel reinforcement beam was installed under the deck beam supporting Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump 4A located within circulating water pump (CWP) bay 4A2. This completes the installation of steel reinforcement beams in all Unit 4 bays supporting Safety Related equipment. An inspection was also performed on the deck support beam within bay 4A1 which supports a screen wash pump as well as a CWP (Non-Nuclear Safety equipment). No new cracking or expansion of existing cracks were observed. This beam will be reinforced during the Unit 4 cycle 16 refueling outage, thus completing all reinforcing beam work on Unit 4. Inspections of the thrust beams for the 4A1 and 4A2 were also performed and no significant increase in degradation was found.

Implementation of the procedure to test and inspect the bay walls was completed during the Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage. Wall inspections and tests were completed on intake bay 3B2, which is considered representative of all bays. The visual inspections of the concrete surfaces and exposed reinforcement revealed no significant corrosion. The test results indicated that, although the potential for reinforcement corrosion exists, no immediate actions are required to structurally rehabilitate or protect the bay walls. During the Unit 4, Cycle 15 refueling outage, visual inspections were completed on the surfaces of the walls within bays 4A1 and 4A2 with no significant degradation found.

During the Unit 3 cycle 15 and Unit 4 cycle 16 refueling outages, reinforcing beams will be installed under the deck of bays 3B2



and 4A1, respectively. This will complete all reinforcing work on the Intake Structure. Additional testing will be completed on the bay wall reinforcement to determine the potential onset and rate of corrosion, currently very low, and determine if additional actions will be required to assure acceptable performance of the structure until the end of plant licensed life.


INPO SOER 83-5 : DC Relay Component Replacement

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 83-5, "DC Power System Failures", dated May 27, 1983, alerted licensees to potential problems with vital DC power supply failures due to internal component failures. In response to INPO SOER 83-5, design and analysis recommendations, DC control power transfer contactors in the Turkey Point Unit 4 4160 switchgear 4A and 4B were identified as having underrated DC coils; the maximum coil voltage rating is less than the maximum voltage which occurs on the 125 volt DC system during battery equalization charging (138V DC). Plant Change/Modification (PC/M) 93-082 was designed to remove the existing components and install new components with DC coil voltage ratings which envelope the 125V DC system voltage range (100-138V). PC/M 93-082 was implemented during the Unit 4, Cycle 15 refueling outage.

NRC Information Notice (IN) 94-33, Capacitor Failures in Westinghouse Eagle-21 Plant Protection Systems

On April 8, 1994, a 10 CFR Part 21 notification was issued by Zion involving failures of components in the Westinghouse Eagle-21 plant protection system. In response to the Zion 10 CFR Part 21 notification, Turkey Point determined that, although the power distribution panels installed in the Turkey Point Eagle-21 system did contain the time delay relays referenced in the Zion 10 CFR Part 21 notification, a failure of this type would not prevent the Reactor Protection System (RPS) from functioning. On May 9, 1994, the NRC issued Information Notice 94-33, "Capacitor Failures in Westinghouse Eagle-21 Plant Protection Systems." In response to IN 94-33, Turkey Point developed an action plan that included the shipment of a spare power distribution panel to Westinghouse for modification, the monitoring of the Turkey Point Eagle-21 system for similar problems, and the modification of all six instrument racks if any rack experienced this condition.

Turkey Point Unit 4 experienced an Eagle-21 system power distribution panel failure on August 11, 1994, and Turkey Point Unit 3 experienced a similar failure on August 31, 1994. As a



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result of the power distribution panel failures experienced, Turkey Point revised its action plan to include modification of all six instrument racks, the training rack, and the spare rack. Modification and installation of the Eagle-21 system power distribution panels for Unit 4 was completed during the Turkey Point Unit 4 Cycle 15 refueling outage.

NRC Information Notice (IN) 93-37: Eyebolts with Indeterminate Properties Installed in Limitorque Valve Operator Housing Covers

NRC IN 93-37, "Eyebolts With Indeterminate Properties Installed in Limitorque Valve Operator Housing Covers," dated May 19, 1993, was issued to alert addressees to problems that could result from eyebolts with indeterminate properties installed in Limitorque valve operator housing covers. In response to IN 93-97, FPL conducted walkdowns at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 and identified several motor operated valves (MOV's) which had eyebolts installed in the housing covers in place of housing cover bolts. Replacement of the eyebolts installed in the MOV housing covers was completed during the Unit 3 Cycle 14 and Unit 4 Cycle 15 refueling outages. This completes Turkey Point's activities with respect to IN 93-37.

