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SUBJECT: Provides update to NRC on items completed re util cycle 14
refueling outage.

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TITLE: Bulletin Response 89-02 re Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Bolting

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AUG 05 1994

L-94-148

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3
Docket No. 50-250
Activities Completed During Cycle 14 Refueling Outage

The purpose of this letter is to provide an update to the NRC on items completed by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) at Turkey Point Unit 3 during the Cycle 14 refueling outage.

FPL conducted a refueling outage of Turkey Point Unit 3 from April 4, 1994, until May 19, 1994. Regulatory activities, and items of regulatory interest, for which action was taken during this refueling outage are summarized in the attached.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Plunkett
Vice President
Turkey Point Plant

TFP/oih

Attachment

cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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ACTIVITIES COMPLETED DURING TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 CYCLE 14
REFUELING OUTAGE

NRC Bulletin 89-02; Stress Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness
Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor
Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar
Design

NRC Bulletin 89-02, "Stress Corrosion Cracking of High-Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Design", dated July 19, 1989, requested licensees to identify, disassemble, and inspect certain types of swing check valves which may contain Type 410 stainless steel bolting material. The NRC requested that, if the Type 410 stainless steel bolting material is of sufficiently high hardness that it is susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, or has failed, appropriate action be taken.

FPL, by letter L-90-195, dated June 8, 1990, reported the results of its review identifying check valves within the scope of NRC Bulletin 89-02 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. In the June 8, 1990, letter, FPL also discussed the scope and status of its activities with respect to the bulletin for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. In that same letter, FPL committed to take action, in accordance with the guidance of the bulletin, for the check valves identified for Turkey Point Unit 3, during the Cycles 13 and 14 refueling outages.

FPL completed the disassembly, inspection, and bolt replacement of two model S350W Anchor Darling swing check valves on the Residual Heat Removal to Safety Injection cold leg line during the Turkey Point Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage. This completes FPL's activities with respect to NRC Bulletin 89-02 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.

Turbine Runback Selector Switch

FPL evaluated the turbine runback function and determined that the turbine runback function on a dropped rod is not required for reactor protection and affects plant availability. By letter L-93-40, FPL informed the NRC that elimination of the Turbine Runback Selector Switch and the turbine runback function on a dropped rod for Turkey Point Unit 3 would be implemented during the Unit 3 Cycle 14 refueling outage.

The elimination of the turbine runback function on a dropped rod for Turkey Point Unit 3 was implemented as Plant Change/Modification (PC/M) 93-005 during the Unit 3 Cycle 14 refueling outage.

Generic Letter 89-10: Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance

On June 28, 1989, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, "Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance," which requested licensees to establish a program to ensure that limit switch settings for safety-related motor operated valves (MOV's) were selected, set, and maintained properly. By USNRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-250/93-25 and 50-251/93-25, dated November 18, 1993, the NRC documented the results of their inspection performed at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant to examine the implementation of the Turkey Point MOV program in response to GL 89-10. During the inspection, the NRC identified an industry concern regarding the proper operation of MOV's equipped with electric brake assemblies at degraded voltage conditions. By letter L-94-60, dated March 29, 1994, FPL informed the NRC that MOV's equipped with motor brakes which perform an active safety related function were verified to have greater than 90 percent of rated voltage available during starting. Therefore, sufficient voltage will be available to operate the motor brakes under degraded voltage conditions. In addition, FPL informed the NRC that the motor brakes for nine Turkey Point Unit 3 MOV's would be disabled during the Turkey Point Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage.

Disabling of the motor brakes for the Turkey Point Unit 3 MOV's identified in letter L-94-60 was completed during the Turkey Point Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage.

Structural Integrity of Intake Walls

By letter L-93-153, dated June 22, 1993, FPL provided the staff a status update of the six year plan developed in December 1990 to ensure that the Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 intake structure can perform its function under all design basis conditions including seismic events for the duration of the remaining plant life. The plan includes the installation of reinforcing beams under the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) pump support beams, various modifications to features above the deck that will significantly reduce the rate of intrusion of chloride ions into the ICW pump support beams, and performance of regular inspections of the bays, including visual inspection of the bay walls.

Letter L-93-153 specified that all modifications to reduce chloride ion intrusion had been completed, and 2 out of 4 bays in each unit had received deck beam reinforcement. By letter L-93-153, FPL committed to the completion of the deck beam reinforcement for the remaining 2 bays during the upcoming refueling outages. During the Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage, a third reinforcing beam was installed thus completing the

reinforcement of all deck beams in bays supporting safety related ICW pumps. An inspection of the remaining Unit 3 intake bay, which supports non-safety related equipment, revealed minor degradation which was repaired during the outage. This bay is scheduled for reinforcement during the Unit 3, Cycle 15 outage, thus completing all reinforcing work on the Unit 3 portion of the structure.

In addition, by letter L-93-153, FPL committed to the implementation of an inspection procedure to perform additional inspection and testing of the intake bay walls in order to confirm that their structural integrity will not be compromised for the duration of the remaining plant life. Implementation of this procedure was completed during the Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage. Wall inspections and tests on intake bay 3B2, which is considered representative of all bays, were completed. The visual inspections of the concrete surfaces and exposed reinforcement revealed no significant corrosion at that time. The test results showed that, although the potential for reinforcement corrosion exists, no immediate actions are required to structurally rehabilitate or protect the bay walls. FPL is considering additional non-destructive tests in the future in order to determine the rate of reinforcement corrosion, currently very low, and determine if additional actions are required in the future to assure acceptable performance of the structure until the end of plant licensed life.

INPO SOER 83-5 : DC Relay Component Replacement

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 83-5, "DC Power System Failures", dated May 27, 1983, alerted licensees to potential problems with vital DC power supplies failures due to internal component failures. In response to INPO SOER 83-5, design and analysis recommendations, DC transfer contactors in the Turkey Point Unit 3 4160 switchgear 3A and 3B were identified as having underrated DC coils; the maximum coil voltage rating is less than the maximum voltage which occurs on the 125 volt DC system during battery equalization charging (138V DC). PC/M 93-082 was designed to remove the existing components and install new components with DC coil voltage ratings which envelope the 125V DC system voltage range (100-138V). PC/M 93-082 was implemented during the Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage. Replacement of DC relay components for Turkey Point Unit 4 is scheduled for implementation during upcoming Turkey Point Unit 4, Cycle 15 refueling outage, currently scheduled for October 1994.

L-94-148
Attachment
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NRC Information Notice No. 88-24 : Failures of Air-Operated
Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems

NRC Information Notice (IN) 88-24, "Failures of Air-Operated Valves Affecting Safety-Related Systems," alerted licensees to potential problems with air-operated valves in safety-related systems that could ultimately affect safety system component reliability. In response to NRC IN 88-24, twenty solenoid valves were identified for replacement for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. Replacement of the nine valves identified for replacement on Unit 3 was completed during the Unit 3, Cycle 14 refueling outage. This completes FPL's activities with respect to NRC Information Notice No. 88-24 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.