

ATTACHMENT 3

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Marked-up Technical Specifications Pages,

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### LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS


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THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE  
SOURCE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INVESTIGATION.  
THE SOURCE HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE INFORMATION IS TO BE  
USED FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE INVESTIGATION.

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### LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

#### GROUP HEIGHT

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All full length (shutdown and control) rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within  $\pm 12$  steps (Analog Rod Position Indication) of the group step counter demand position within one hour after rod motion.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\*

#### ACTION:

- a. With one or more full length rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- b. With more than one full length rod inoperable or misaligned from the group step counter demand position by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (Analog Rod Position Indication), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.
- c. With one full length rod inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a, above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand position by more than  $\pm 12$  steps (Analog Rod Position Indication), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within one hour either:
  1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or
  2. The remainder of the rods in the bank with the inoperable rod are aligned to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of ~~Figure 3.1-2~~; the THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or
  3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

Specification 3.1.3.6

\*See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

[illegible]

(b) S. E. ...

## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

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3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion ~~as shown in Figure 3.1-2.~~ **INSERT (1) - HERE**

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1\* and 2\* \*\*

#### ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2 either:

- a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or
- b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within two hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position ~~using the above figures~~ or **INSERT (1) - HERE**
- c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours, except during time intervals when the Rod Insertion Limit Monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

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\*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.


\*\*With  $K_{eff}$  greater than or equal to 1.0



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~~FIGURE 3.1-2~~

~~ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER  
THREE LOOP OPERATION~~

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## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_Q(Z)$

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2  $F_Q^L(Z)$  shall be limited by the following relationships:

$$F_Q^M(Z) \leq \frac{[F_Q]^L}{P} \times [K(Z)] \text{ for } P > 0.5$$

$$F_Q^M(Z) \leq \frac{[F_Q]^L}{0.5} \times [K(Z)] \text{ for } P \leq 0.5$$

where:  $[F_Q]^L = 2.32$  limit

$$P = \frac{\text{Thermal Power}}{\text{Rated Thermal Power}},$$

$[F_Q]^M$  = The Measured Value, and

~~$K(Z)$  is the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given core height location.~~

INSERT (2) - HERE


APPLICABILITY: MODE 1

ACTION:

With the measured value of  $F_Q^M(Z)$  exceeding its limit:


- Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1%  $F_Q^M(Z)$  exceeds  $F_Q^L(Z)$  within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower Delta-T Trip Setpoints (value of  $K_4$ ) have been reduced at least 1% for each 1%  $F_Q^M(Z)$  exceeds the  $F_Q^L(Z)$ ; and.
- Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced power limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided  $F_Q^M(Z)$  is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

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~~FIGURE 3.2-2~~  
 ~~$K(z) - \text{NORMALIZED } F_Q(z)$  AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT~~



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## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2) The following action shall be taken:

- a) Comply with the requirements of Specification 3.2.2 for  $F_Q^M(Z)$  exceeding its limit by the percent calculated above.

#### 4.2.2.2 MIDS

Operation is permitted at power above  $P_T$  where  $P_T$  equals the ratio of  $[F_Q]^L$  divided by  $[F_Q]^P$  if the following Augmented Surveillance (Movable Incore Detection System, MIDS) requirements are satisfied:

- a. The axial power distribution shall be measured by MIDS when required such that the limit of  $[F_Q]^L/P$  times Figure 3.2.2 is not exceeded.  $K(Z)$   
 $F_j(Z)$  is the normalized axial power distribution from thimble  $j$  at core elevation  $(Z)$ .
  1. If  $F_j(Z)$  exceeds  $[F_j(Z)]_s^*$  as defined in the bases by  $\leq 4\%$ , immediately reduce thermal power one percent for every percent by which  $[F_j(Z)]_s$  is exceeded.
  2. If  $F_j(Z)$  exceeds  $[F_j(Z)]_s$  by  $> 4\%$  immediately reduce thermal power below  $P_T$ . Corrective action to reduce  $F_j(Z)$  below the limit will permit return to thermal power not to exceed current  $P_L^{**}$  as defined in the bases.
- b.  $F_j(Z)$  shall be determined to be within limits by using MIDS to monitor the thimbles required per Specification 4.2.2.2.c at the following frequencies.
  1. At least once every 24 hours; and
  2. Immediately following and as a minimum at 2, 4 and 8 hours following the events listed below and every 24 hours thereafter.
    - 1) Raising the thermal power above  $P_T$ , or
    - 2) Movement of control-bank D more than an accumulated total of 15 steps in any one direction.
- c. MIDS shall be operable when the thermal power exceeds  $P_T$  with:
  1. At least two thimbles available for which  $\bar{R}_j$  and  $j$  as defined in the bases have been determined.

$*[F_j(Z)]_s$  is the alarm setpoint for MIDS.

$**P_L$  is reactor thermal power expressed as a fraction of the Rated Thermal Power that is used to calculate  $[F_j(Z)]_s$ .



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## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

c) After 24 hours have elapsed, take a full core flux map to determine  $F_Q^M(Z)$  unless a valid full core flux map was taken within the time period specified in 4.2.2.1d.

d) Calculate  $P_{BL}$  per 4.2.2.3b.

b. Base Load operation is permitted provided:

1. THERMAL POWER is maintained between  $P_T$  and  $P_{BL}$  or between  $P_T$  and 100% (whichever is most limiting).
2. AFD (Delta-I) is maintained within a  $\pm 2\%$  or  $\pm 3\%$  target band.
3. Full core flux maps are taken at least once per 31 effective Full Power Days.

$P_{BL}$  and  $P_T$  are defined as:

$$P_{BL} = \frac{[F_Q]^L \times K(Z)}{F_Q^M(Z) \times W(Z)_{BL} \times 1.09}$$

$$P_T = [F_Q]^L / [F_Q]^P$$

where:  $F_Q^M(Z)$  is the measured  $F_Q(Z)$  with no allowance for manufacturing tolerances or measurement uncertainty. For the purpose of this Specification  $[F_Q^M(Z)]$  shall be obtained between elevations bounded by 10% and 90% of the active core height.  $[F_Q]^L$  is the  $F_Q$  limit.

$K(Z)$  is given in Figure 3.2-2.  $W(Z)_{BL}$  is the cycle dependent function that accounts for limited power distribution transients encountered during base load operation.

The function is given in the Peaking Factor Limit Report as per Specification 6.9.1.6. The 9% uncertainty factor accounts for manufacturing tolerance, measurement error, rod bow and any burnup and power dependent peaking factor increases.

- c. During Base Load operation, if the THERMAL POWER is decreased below  $P_T$ , then the conditions of 4.2.2.3.a shall be satisfied before re-entering Base Load operation.
- d. If any of the conditions of 4.2.2.3b are not maintained, reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to  $P_T$ , or, within 15 minutes initiate the Augmented Surveillance (MIDS) requirements of 4.2.2.2.

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CORE  
OPERATING  
LIMITS  
REPORT

**SECRET**

PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT (Continued)

Factor Limit Report, the Peaking Factor Limit Report shall be provided to the NRC Document Control desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and the Resident Inspector within 30 days of their implementation, unless otherwise approved by the Commission.

The analytical methods used to generate the Peaking Factor limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC. If changes to these methods are deemed necessary they will be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and submitted to the NRC for review and approval prior to their use if the change is determined to involve an unreviewed safety question or if such a change would require amendment of previously submitted documentation.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.7 Core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) before each reload cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle ~~for the Axial Flux Difference (AFD) Limits~~. The analytical methods used to determine the AFD limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

1. WCAP-10216-P-A, "RELAXATION OF CONSTANT AXIAL OFFSET CONTROL  $F_Q$  SURVEILLANCE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION," June 1983.
2. WCAP-8385, "POWER DISTRIBUTION CONTROL AND LOAD FOLLOWING PROCEDURES - TOPICAL REPORT," September 1974.

The AFD limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits of the safety analyses are met. The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and the Resident Inspector, within 30 days after their implementation unless otherwise approved by the Commission.

SPECIAL REPORTS

INSERT (3) - HERE

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC within the time period specified for each report as stated in the Specifications within Sections 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0.

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 In addition to the applicable record retention requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for at least 5 years:

- a. Records and logs of unit operation covering time interval at each power level;
- b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair, and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety;

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specified in the Rod Bank Insertion Limits curve, defined in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

INSERT 2

K(Z) for a given core height, is specified in the K(Z) curve, defined in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

INSERT 3

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT

6.9.1.7 (INSERT THE FOLLOWING)

The analytical methods used to determine the K(Z) curve shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

1. WCAP-9220-P-A, Rev. 1, "Westinghouse ECCS Evaluation Model-1981 Version," February 1982.
2. WCAP-9561-P-A, ADD. 3, Rev. 1, "BART A-1: A Computer Code for the Best Estimate Analysis of Reflood Transients - Special Report: Thimble Modeling W ECCS Evaluation Model."

The analytical methods used to determine the Rod Bank Insertion Limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC in:

1. WCAP-9272-P-A, "Westinghouse Reload Safety Evaluation Methodology," July 1985.

The AFD, K(Z), and Rod Bank Insertion Limits shall be determined such that all applicable limits of the safety analyses are met. The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance, for each reload cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional Administrator and the Resident Inspector, unless otherwise approved by the Commission.

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## REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

### BASES

#### BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The charging pumps are demonstrated to be OPERABLE by testing as required by Section XI of the ASME code or by specific surveillance requirements in the specification. These requirements are adequate to determine OPERABILITY because no safety analysis assumption relating to the charging pump performance is more restrictive than these acceptance criteria for the pumps.

The boron concentration of the RWST in conjunction with manual addition of borax ensures that the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA will be basic. The basic solution minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The temperature requirements for the RWST are based on the containment integrity and large break LOCA analysis assumptions.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

The OPERABILITY requirement of 55°F and corresponding surveillance intervals associated with the boric acid tank system ensures that the solubility of the boron solution will be maintained. The temperature limit of 55°F includes a 5°F margin over the 50°F solubility limit of 3.5 wt.% boric acid. Portable instrumentation may be used to measure the temperature of the rooms containing boric acid sources and flow paths.

(\*)One channel of heat tracing is sufficient to maintain the specified temperature limit. Since one channel of heat tracing is sufficient to maintain the specified temperature, operation with one channel out-of-service is permitted for a period of 30 days provided additional temperature surveillance is performed.

#### 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits continue. OPERABLE condition for the analog rod position indicators is defined as being capable of indicating rod position to within  $\pm 12$  steps of the demand counter position. For the Shutdown Banks and Control Banks A and B, the Position Indication requirement is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and 30 steps withdrawn inclusive, and between 200 and ~~228~~ steps withdrawn inclusive. This permits the operator to verify that the control rods in these banks are either fully withdrawn or fully inserted, the normal operating modes for these banks. Knowledge of these bank positions in these two areas satisfies all accident analysis assumptions concerning their position. For Control Banks C and D, the Position Indication requirement is defined as the group demand counter indicated position between 0 and ~~228~~ steps withdrawn inclusive.

(\*)This is no longer applicable once boric acid tanks inventory and boric acid source and flow path inventories have been diluted to less than or equal to 3.5 weight percent (wt%).



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## POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

### BASES

#### HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

- b)  $P_L$  is reactor thermal power expressed as a fraction of 1.
- c)  $K(Z)$  is the reduction in the  $F_0$  limit as a function of core elevation  $(Z)$  as ~~determined from Figure 3.2-2~~ **specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.**
- d)  $[F_j(Z)]_s$  is the alarm setpoint for MIDS.
- e)  $R_j$ , for thimble  $j$ , is determined from  $n=6$  incore flux maps covering the full configuration of permissible rod patterns at the thermal power limit of  $P_T$ .

$$\bar{R}_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n R_{ij}}{n}$$

where

$$R_{ij} = \frac{F_{Q_i} \text{ meas.}}{[F_{ij}(Z)] \text{ max}}$$

and  $F_{ij}(Z)$  is the normalized axial distribution at elevation  $Z$  from thimble  $j$  in map  $i$  which has a measure peaking factor without uncertainties or densification allowance of  $F_{Q_i} \text{ meas.}$

- f)  $\sigma_j$  is the standard deviation, expressed as a fraction or percentage of  $\bar{R}_j$ , and is derived from  $n$  flux maps and the relationship below, or 0.02 (2%), whichever is greater.

$$\sigma_j = \left[ \frac{\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^n (R_{ij} - \bar{R}_j)^2}{\bar{R}_j} \right]^{1/2}$$

- g) The factor 1.03 reduction in the kw/ft limit is the engineering uncertainty factor.
- h) The factors  $(1 + \sigma_j)$  and 1.07 represent the margin between  $(F_j(Z))_L$  limit and the MIDS alarm setpoint  $[F_j(Z)]_s$ . Since  $(1 + \sigma_j)$  is bounded by a lower limit of 1.02, there is at least a 9% reduction of the alarm setpoint. Operations are permitted in excess of the operational limit  $\leq 4\%$  while making power adjustment on a percent for percent basis.

OPERATING LIMITS REPORT  
Specified in the form