

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9307280116 DOC.DATE: 93/07/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 GOLDBERG,J.H. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Informs of change in commitment from 860526 response to
 notice of violation & proposed imposition of civil penalty.
 Util determined that corrective action 4 resulted in some
 equipment failures.

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 TITLE: Enforcement Action Non-2.790-Licensee Response

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FPL

JUL 21 1993

L-93-172

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Change in Commitment

Purpose

The purpose of this letter is to inform the NRC of a change in commitment being instituted by Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.

Background

By letter L-86-215, dated May 28, 1986, FPL responded to a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (EA 86-38). Enforcement Action EA 86-38 was issued because of a potential for personnel overexposure to ionizing radiation from the moveable incore detector system. In letter L-86-215, FPL discussed five corrective actions which had been initiated to prevent recurrence of the violation. Corrective action number 4 was:

The Flux Mapper system power supply is tagged out to the Health Physics Supervisor.

FPL has determined that corrective action number 4 has resulted in some equipment failures.

Discussion

In accordance with corrective action number 4 from FPL letter L-86-215, the power supply to the flux mapper system had been controlled by deenergizing and tagging out the control console circuit breaker when the system was not in use. As intended in responding to the violation, tagging out the power supply was performed to preclude unplanned personnel exposures from flux mapper system movable incore detectors during containment entries.

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PDR ADDCK 05000250
Q PDR

DET 1/0

Plant procedure, "Containment Entries when Containment Integrity is Established" (0-ADM-009), requires that the flux mapper system be verified to be deenergized prior to personnel entry of containment. Entry with the flux mapper energized must be approved by the Health Physics Operations Supervisor and the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. In addition, the movable incore detectors are required to be verified to be located in either the containment sump, in storage, or in a location approved by the Health Physics Operations Supervisor prior to personnel entry.

Root cause determinations addressing recent plant events have revealed that the practice of deenergizing and the subsequent repowering of the flux mapper system occasionally causes spurious actuation of the five path drive motors immediately upon reenergizing the circuit breaker. This phenomena has been determined to be a "relay race" taking place in the control circuit. Because of the relay race, the detector insertion interlock intended to preclude five path motor operation when a detector is inserted is overridden. The resulting motor operation with a detector inserted causes both drive motor and drive cable damage.

Current Status

Alternate administrative controls are currently in place to preclude personnel exposure and flux mapper system component damage. These controls are discussed below.

In order to prevent the flux mapper control system relay race and the potential resultant system component damage, the circuit breaker supplying power to the flux mapper system remains in the "ON" position. In order to preclude personnel exposure, the flux mapper system "Auto/Manual" switch is tagged out to the manual position and the "Insert/Withdrawal" switch is tagged out in the "OFF" position. With no personnel in containment, removal of these tags to allow incore detector movement requires approval of the Nuclear Plant Supervisor. With personnel in containment, removal of these tags to allow incore detector movement will require the permission of both the Nuclear Plant Supervisor and the Health Physics Operations Supervisor per plant procedure 0-ADM-009.

Conclusion

The above discussed administrative controls will preclude unnecessary personnel exposures from the flux mapper system movable incore detectors during containment entries, prevent flux mapper drive motor and drive cable damage, and continue to meet the intent of the original commitment.

L-93-172

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Should there be any questions regarding this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



J. H. Goldberg
President
Nuclear Division

JHG/ejw

cc: S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey
Point Plant

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FPL

Florida Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

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PDR ADOCK 05000250
Q PDR

an FPL Group company

SENT 1/0

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Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. H. Goldberg".

J. H. Goldberg
President
Nuclear Division

JHG/ejw

cc: S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey
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