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ACCESSION NBR: 9211040013 DOC. DATE: 92/11/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 92-010-00: on 921002, containment ventilation isolation
 & control room ventilation isolation occurred due to
 spurious signal. New R11/R12 skid being installed for Unit 3
 & will be tested for sensitivity. W/921030 ltr.

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L-92-295
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3
Docket No. 50-250
Reportable Event: 92-010-00
Containment Ventilation Isolation and Control Room
Ventilation Isolation Due to a Spurious Signal

The attached Licensee Event Report 250-92-010-00 is being provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv).

If there are any questions please contact us.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Plunkett
Vice President
Turkey Point Nuclear

TFP/JEK/jk

enclosure

cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II,
USNRC
Ross C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey
Point Plant

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) TURKEY POINT UNIT 3												DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000250		PAGE (3) 1 OF 3	
TITLE (4) Containment Ventilation Isolation and Control Room Ventilation Isolation Due to a Spurious Signal															
EVENT DATE (5)				LER NUMBER (6)			RPT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INV. (8)					
MON	DAY	YR		YR	SEQ #	R#	MON	DAY	YR		NAME		DOCKET # (5)		
10	02	92		92	010	00	11	02	92						
OPERATING MOOE (2)			6	<u>10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (iv)</u>											
POWER LEVEL (10)			0												
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)															
James E. Knorr, Regulation and Compliance Specialist												TELEPHONE NUMBER			
												305-246-6757			
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)															
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	NPRDS					
X															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	
YES	(if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)								NO						
S									X						
<p>ABSTRACT (16) On October 2, 1992, at 1345 EDT, while Unit 3 was in Mode 6, a spurious actuation signal caused a containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation. Only two sources of an engineered safety features actuation signal could result in only containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation. Manual actuation and a containment gaseous and particulate radiation monitor (R11/R12) skid high radiation signal are the two signal sources. There was no reason to suspect a manual actuation. There is also no evidence of a high radiation signal or that both trains of the actuation signal failed simultaneously. Inspection of the common internal wiring in the cabinets did not reveal any loose or intermittent connections.</p> <p>Work in progress in the area of the R11/R12 skid, included grinding and welding appears to have caused a spurious actuation signal.</p> <p>A new R11/R12 skid is being installed for Unit 3 and will be tested for sensitivity to welding in the area. If welding sensitivity is noted during testing, other corrective actions will be evaluated and implemented if appropriate.</p>															

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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I. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On October 2, 1992, at 1345 EDT, while Unit 3 was in Mode 6, a containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation occurred. A spurious actuation signal appears to have caused the engineered safety features actuation signal.

Only two sources of an engineered safety features actuation signal exist which would result in only containment ventilation isolation and control room ventilation isolation; the manual push buttons on the control room control board, and a high level signal on the gaseous and particulate radiation monitors (R11/R12) for the containment atmosphere.

II. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

As stated above there are only two sources of an actuation signal which could activate these engineered safety features. There was no reason to suspect a manual actuation. There is also no evidence that both trains of the actuation signal failed simultaneously. Inspection of the common internal wiring in the cabinets did not reveal any loose or intermittent connections.

Work was progressing in the area including grinding and welding. R11/R12 is a pulse counter which by its nature is sensitive to electrical noise. Electric welding generates noise not only from the arc but also from inductance of the welding leads which carry irregular current during the welding process.

Therefore the most probable root cause of the engineered safety feature actuation is welding in the immediate vicinity of the R11/R12 detectors.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

The containment ventilation isolation actuation signal is designed to isolate containment atmosphere from the outside environment by closure of those penetrations of the containment building which communicate between the inside and outside of the containment building. The control room ventilation isolation signal is designed to isolate the control room from the outside atmosphere to protect the control room personnel from the effects of a radiological release which could occur in the highly unlikely event of a containment building barrier failure. This high radiation ventilation isolation signal is generated when there is an indication of high radioactivity in the containment atmosphere. Since the signal in this case was spurious and no actual high radiation condition existed, no compromise to the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public occurred due to the isolation of the containment ventilation or the control room ventilation systems.

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IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. A new R11/R12 skid is being installed for Unit 3 and will be tested for sensitivity to welder operation by evaluating the effect of welder activity, in the immediate area of the skid, on control room indication or spurious signal generation.
2. If welding sensitivity is noted during testing, other corrective actions will be evaluated and implemented if appropriate. This testing will be completed prior to November 30, 1992, and appropriate corrective actions will be completed prior to December 30, 1992.
3. A sign will be installed in the area of the R11/R12 skid prior to November 30, 1992, to warn of potential spurious signals generated by welding in the area .
4. The welding permit procedure, 0-ADM-046, Control of Welding Special Processes, will be revised prior to December 30, 1992, to include a warning about the potential for spurious signal generation during welding processes near electronic equipment.
5. Radio frequency interference was evaluated by testing the new R11/R12 skid with portable radios keyed nearby and was found to not produce any spurious high radiation signal generation.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None.