

# ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

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ACCESSION NBR: 9002230044 DOC. DATE: 90/02/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250  
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SUBJECT: LER 90-002-00: on 900118, post-maint test not performed to establish operability of phase A CIV.

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	NRR/DST/SPLB8D1		1	1		NRR/DST/SRXB 8E		1	1
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EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS, S		4	4		L ST LOBBY WARD		1	1
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P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

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L-90-55  
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3.  
Docket No. 50-250  
Reportable Event: 90-02  
Date of Event: January 18, 1990  
Post-Maintenance Test Not Performed to Establish  
Operability of a Phase A Containment Isolation Valve  
After Adjusting the Valve Stem Packing Due  
to Personnel Error

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

K. N. Harris  
Vice President  
Turkey Point Plant Nuclear

KNH/DRP/DWH/rat

cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II,  
USNRC  
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

9002230044 900214  
PDR ADCK 05000250  
S PIC

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 5 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3	
TITLE (4) Post-Maintenance Test Not Performed to Establish Operability Of A Phase A Containment Isolation Valve After Adjusting The Valve Stem Packing Due To Personnel Error																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES N/A					DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0							
0 1	1 8	9 0	9 0	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	1 4	9 0						0 5 0 0 0							
OPERATING MODE (9) 1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																			
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 1 0		20.402(b)				20.406(e)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)							
		20.406(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(e)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iii)				50.36(e)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
		20.406(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)											
		20.406(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)											
		20.406(a)(1)(vi)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)											
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME David R. Powell, Regulation and Compliance Supervisor										TELEPHONE NUMBER 3 0 5 2 4 6 1 - 6 5 5 1 9											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- Turer	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR							
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0830, on January 19, 1990, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) discovered that post-maintenance testing had not been performed on Phase A containment isolation valve CV-3-6275B (Steam Generator B blowdown). The adjustment of valve stem packing is maintenance that could affect valve performance parameters. Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3 requires Phase A containment isolation valves to be operable in Modes 1 through 4. With a Phase A containment isolation valve inoperable, compensatory measures must be taken within 4 hours to avoid a unit shutdown required by TS. Valve stem packing adjustments were made to CV-3-6275B at approximately 0900 on January 18, 1990. Failure to perform post-maintenance testing on CV-3-6275B after valve stem packing adjustments is due to cognitive error by non-licensed utility personnel. Mechanical Maintenance did not ensure that valve CV-3-6275B was cycled to verify its operability as required by the Plant Work Order. At approximately 0910 on January 19, 1990, CV-3-6275B was demonstrated to be operable. Maintenance Department personnel involved in this event have been counseled.

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	9 0	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

At approximately 0830, on January 19, 1990, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power, the Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) discovered that post-maintenance testing had not been performed on Phase A containment isolation valve (EIIS: JM, Component:ISV) CV-3-6275B (Steam Generator B blowdown).

At 0530, on January 18, 1990, the Mechanical Maintenance Foreman brought several Plant Work Order (PWO) packages to the Nuclear Watch Engineer (NWE) for permission to work. These PWOs were planned to be worked on the Day Shift. One of the PWOs was for adjusting the valve stem packing on valve CV-3-6275B. The importance of testing the valve and the Technical Specification 3.3.3 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) that would be entered if the valve failed the post-maintenance test was discussed with the Mechanical Maintenance Foreman.

On the Day Shift, after both Operations and Maintenance shift turnovers were completed, a Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) was provided to assist Maintenance in working several PWOs which involved valve stem packing adjustments. At approximately 0800, the Mechanical Maintenance Journeyman and the NPO went to valve CV-3-6275B to adjust the valve stem packing. When the Journeyman attempted to adjust the valve stem packing, he discovered that he did not have the correct size wrench. The Journeyman left the work area, returned to the work area with the correct size wrench, and adjusted valve CV-3-6275B stem packing. A NPO was not present to coordinate exercising of the valve after adjustment of the valve stem packing to ensure valve operability as required by the PWO.

The Mechanical Maintenance Foreman responsible for reviewing PWOs failed to recognize that post-maintenance testing on valve CV-3-6275B had not been performed. At approximately 0830, on January 19, 1990, the PWO package was brought to the Control Room for review. During this review, the NWE identified the missed post-maintenance testing on valve CV-3-6275B. The Plant Supervisor-Nuclear (PSN), Assistant Plant Supervisor-Nuclear (APSN), and the Unit 3 Reactor Control Operator (RCO) were notified. At approximately 0910, on January 19, 1990, valve CV-3-6275B was satisfactorily tested and demonstrated to be operable.

Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3 requires Phase A containment isolation valves, Phase B containment isolation valves, and containment ventilation isolation valves to be operable in Modes 1 through 4. The adjustment of valve stem packing is maintenance that could affect valve performance parameters. To meet the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Action Statement requirements of TS 3.3.3, containment isolation valves must be demonstrated to be operable within 4 hours of adjusting the valve stem packing.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The cause of the failure to perform post-maintenance testing on valve CV-3-6275B was cognitive error by non-licensed utility personnel. The PWO work instruct-



## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		9	0	0	0	3
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	9	0	0	0	3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ions were not followed by the Mechanical Maintenance Journeyman. Valve CV-3-6275B was not cycled after adjusting the valve stem packing to verify operability as required by the PWO.

Maintenance review of the PWO work package failed to identify that post-maintenance testing had not been performed on valve CV-3-6275B after adjusting the valve stem packing.

### ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

At approximately 0910, on January 19, 1990, valve CV-3-6275B was tested and demonstrated to be operable. Testing verified that valve CV-3-6275B was capable of performing its intended safety function to close on a Phase A containment isolation signal within the allowable time.

### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Mechanical Maintenance personnel involved in this event have been counseled on their responsibilities for strict adherence to work instructions contained in PWO packages and for ensuring satisfactory completion of post-maintenance testing.
2. The checklist used by Maintenance Department PWO work planners has been revised. PWOs involving Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) will contain a step requiring a Foreman or Field Supervisor to verify that the job task is under a clearance order or that an individual from the Operations Department is present.

### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A similar occurrence was reported in Licensee Event Report LER 50-250/86-024.



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