



NOV 27 1989

L-89-415

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

RE: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Response to Generic Letter 89-21

NRC Generic Letter 89-21, "Request for Information Concerning Status of Implementation of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) Requirements", issued October 19, 1989, requested the status of implementation of USIs for which a final technical resolution has been achieved and which are applicable to our facility. A table of specific USIs was included, with a guide for updating the status of those USIs applicable to Florida Power & Light (FPL). A response was requested within 30 days of receipt of the generic letter, which was received by FPL on October 27, 1989.

FPL has completed a document search of our files for each applicable USI and the results are provided in the attached Enclosure 1 which was provided with Generic Letter 89-21. If any additional information is required on this matter, please contact us.

Yours very truly,

K. N. Harris
Vice President
Turkey Point Plant Nuclear

Attachments

KNH/TCG/rh

cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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PDR ADOCK 05000250
PDC

ENCLOSURE 1UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES FOR WHICH A FINAL TECHNICAL RESOLUTION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED

<u>USI/MPA NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REF. DOCUMENT</u>	<u>APPLICABILITY</u>	<u>STATUS/DATE*</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A-1	Water Hammer	SECY 84-119 NUREG-0927, Rev. 1 NUREG-0993, Rev. 1 NUREG-0737 Item I.A.2.3 SRP revisions	A11	NC	
A-2/ MPA D-10	Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary Coolant Systems	NUREG-0609 GL 84-04, GDC-4	PWR	C (11/88)	See Note 1 (Attached)
A-3	Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Integrity	NUREG-0844 SECY 86-97 SECY 88-272 GL 85-02 (No requirements)	W-PWR	C (10/85)	See Note 2
A-4	CE Steam Generator Tube Integrity	NUREG-0844, SECY 86-97 SECY 88-272 GL 85-02 (No requirements)	CE-PWR	NA	
A-5	B&W Steam Generator Tube Integrity	NUREG-0844, SECY 86-97 SECY 88-272 GL 85-02 (No Requirements)	B&W-PWR	NA	
E A-6	Mark I Containment Short-Term Program	NUREG-0408	Mark I-BWR	NA	

* C - COMPLETE
NC - NO CHANGES NECESSARY
NA - NOT APPLICABLE
I - INCOMPLETE
E - EVALUATING ACTIONS REQUIRED

<u>USI/MPA NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REF. DOCUMENT</u>	<u>APPLICABILITY</u>	<u>STATUS/DATE*</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A-7/ D-01	Mark I Long-Term Program	NUREG-0661 NUREG-0661 Suppl. 1 GL 79-57	Mark I-BWR	NA	
A-8	Mark II Containment Pool Dynamic Loads	NUREG-0808 NUREG-0487, Suppl. 1/2 NUREG-0802 SRP 6.2.1.1C GDC 16	Mark II-BWR	NA	
A-9	Anticipated Transients Without Scram	NUREG-0460, Vol. 4 10 CFR 50.62	All	1 (6/91) *	Note 3
A-10/ MPA B-25	BWR Feedwater Nozzle Cracking	NUREG-0619 Letter from DG Eisenhower dated 11/13/80 GL 81-11	BWR	NA	
A-11	Reactor Vessel Material Toughness	NUREG-0744, Rev. 1 10 CFR 50.60/ 82-26	All	1 (Awaiting Test Results)	Note 4
A-12	Fracture Toughness of Steam Generator and Reactor Coolant Pump Supports	NUREG-0577, Rev. 1 SRP Revision 5.3.4	PWR	NC	
A-17..	Systems Interactions	Ltr: DeYoung to licensees - 9/72 NUREG-1174, NUREG- 1229, NUREG/CR-3922, NUREG/CR-4261, NUREG/ CR-4470, GL 89-18 (No requirements)	All	C (9/89)	Note 5
A-24/ MPA B-60	Qualification of Class 1E Safety-Related Equipment	NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 SRP 3.11 10 CFR 50.49 GL 82-09, GL 84-24 GL 85-15	All	C (1/89)	Note 6

*October 1989
Integrated
Schedule

<u>USI/MPA NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REF. DOCUMENT</u>	<u>APPLICABILITY</u>	<u>STATUS/DATE*</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A-26/ MPA B-04	Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection	DOR Letters to Licensees 8/76 NUREG-0224 NUREG-0371 SRP 5.2 GL 88-11	PWR	C (12/82)	Note 7 "
A-31	Residual Heat Removal Shutdown Requirements	NUREG-0606 RG 1.113, RG 1.139 SRP 5.4.7	All OLs After 01/79.	NA	
A-36/ C-10, C-15	Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel	NUREG-0612 SRP 9.1.5 GL 81-07, GL 83-42, GL 85-11 Letter from DG Eisenhut dated 12/22/80	All	I (1/91)*	Note 8
A-39	Determination of SRV Pool Dynamic Loads and Pressure Transients	NUREG-0802 NUREGs-0763,0783,0802 NUREG-0661 SRP 6.2.1.1.C	BWR	NA	
A-40	Seismic Design Criteria	SRP Revisions, NUREG/ CR-4776, NUREG/CR-0054, NUREG/CR-3480, NUREG/ CR-1582, NUREG/CR-1161, NUREG-1233, NUREG-4776 NUREG/CR-3805 NUREG/CR-5347 NUREG/CR-3509	All	NC	
A-42/ MPA B-05	Pipe Cracks in Boiling Water Reactors	NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 NUREG-0313, Rev. 2 GL 81-03, GL 88-01	BWR	NA	

* October 1989 Integrated
Schedule

<u>USI/MPA NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REF. DOCUMENT</u>	<u>APPLICABILITY</u>	<u>STATUS/DATE*</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
A-43	Containment Emergency Sump Performance	NUREG-0510, NUREG-0869, Rev. 1 NUREG-0897, R.G.1.82 (Rev. 0), SRP 6.2.2 GL 85-22 No Requirements	All	NC	
A-44	Station Blackout	RG 1.155 NUREG-1032 NUREG-1109 10 CFR 50.63	All	I (6/91)	Note 9
A-45	Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Requirements	SECY 88-260 NUREG-1289 NUREG/CR-5230 SECY 88-260 (No requirements)	All	I (6/91)	Note 10
A-46	Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants	NUREG-1030 NUREG-1211/ GL 87-02, GL 87-03	All	I (Awaiting NRC Approval)	Note 11
A-47	Safety Implication of Control Systems	NUREG-1217, NUREG- 1218 GL 89-19	All	E (3/20/90)	
A-48	Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment	10 CFR 50.44 SECY 89-122	All, except PWRs with large dry containments	NA	
A-49	Pressurized Thermal Shock	RGs 1.154, 1.99 SECY 82-465 SECY 83-288 SECY 81-687 10 CFR 50.61/ GL 88-11	PWR	C (3/87)	Note 12

NOTES

1. Ref. NRC Letter from Gordon E. Edison to W. F. Conway, dated November 28, 1988.
2. Ref. NUREG 0933, Rev. 1 and FPL Letter L-85-398 to the NRC dated October 16, 1985.
3. Ref. NRC Letter from Gordon E. Edison to W. F. Conway, dated May 19, 1988. (Installation of ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry will be performed per the Integrated Schedule).
4. Ref. FPL Letter L-89-190 to the NRC dated June 16, 1989. (Incorporates recent industry developments including new analytical techniques, the progress made by the Working Groups and the additional material data to be provided by the Babcock & Wilcox Owner's Group into the characterization of the Turkey Point vessel fracture toughness. Schedule dependent on receipt of test results from B & W Owner's Group).
5. Ref. Generic Letter 89-18, issued September 6, 1989. (Remaining issues to be addressed under other programs, e.g., GL 88-20 on Individual Plant Examinations).
6. Ref. NRC letter from Alan R. Herdt to W. F. Conway, dated January 6, 1989, which accepted the FPL "EQ" program.
7. Ref. NRC letter from Daniel G. McDonald to Dr. Robert E. Uhrig, dated December 23, 1982.
8. Ref. NRC letter from Daniel G. McDonald to Dr. Robert E. Uhrig dated November 1, 1983. Also, FPL letter L-83-146 to the NRC dated March 15, 1983. (Installation of a separate load cell on the reactor head lift rig will be performed per the Integrated Schedule).
9. Ref. FPL letter L-89-144 to the NRC dated April 17, 1989. (FPL has scheduled implementation of all Station blackout modifications including development of necessary procedures to coincide with the EPS Enhancement Project per the Integrated Schedule).
10. Ref. FPL Letter 89-389 to the NRC dated October 31, 1989 (Individual Plant Examination Required by GL 88-20 will resolve issue).
11. Ref. FPL Letter 89-352 to the NRC dated October 2, 1989. (Implementation program still under development).
12. Ref. NRC Letter from Daniel G. McDonald to C. O. Woody dated March 11, 1987.

Enclosure 2

COMPLETED DATA SHEETS
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES
TURKEY POINT

PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250
PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT Jai Rajan
USI NO. A-2 TITLE Asymmetric Blowdown Loads in RCS
MPA NO. D-10 TAC NOS. None

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in January 1981 with the publication of NUREG-0609, "Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary Systems."

In October 1975, the NRC notified each operating PWR licensee of a potential safety problem concerning the fact that asymmetric LOCA loads had not been considered in the design of any PWR piping system. In June 1976 the NRC informed each PWR licensee that it was required to reassess the reactor vessel support design of its facility. The staff expanded the scope of the problem in January 1978 with a request for additional information to all PWR licensees. NUREG-0609 provided guidance for these analyses. For operating PWRs, Multi-Plant Action (MPA) Item D-10 was established by NRC's Division of Licensing for implementation purposes.

During the course of the work on USI A-2, it was demonstrated that there were only a very limited number of break locations which could give rise to significant loads. Subsequently, after substantial new technical work, it was demonstrated that pipes would leak before break and that new fracture mechanics techniques for the analyzing of piping failures assured adequate protection against failures in primary system piping in PWRs (Generic Letter 84-04). This was reflected in a revision of General Design Criteria (GDC)-4 (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50) published in the Federal Register in final form on April 11, 1986, and in a subsequent revision to GDC-4 published in the Federal Register on July 23, 1986. In addition, it has also been satisfactorily demonstrated in the course of the A-2 effort that there is a very low likelihood of simultaneous pipe loading with both LOCA and safety shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads. Therefore, the last revision of GDC-4 represented the final technical action of NRC regarding the issue of asymmetric blowdown loads issue in PWRs primary coolant main loop piping.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

In a letter dated 11-1-88 FPL documented the applicability of "leak-before-break" to Turkey Point. In GL 84-04 NRC provided an SER for Westinghouse plants, provided certain conditions were met, one of which is applicable to Turkey Point. That condition requires an adequate leak detection system. The leakage detection requirement is implemented as Tech Spec 3.1.3. The NRC reviewed the licensee's response to GL 88-05 (Boric Acid Corrosion), which required procedures for locating small leaks. The NRC also reviewed the capability following the conoseal leak. Since Turkey Point is bounded by the Westinghouse analysis and has adequate leak detection, dynamic effects of RCS pipe break need not be designed for. Based on an evaluation received from NRR's materials branch dated 11-10-88, Memo from C. Y. Cheng to Gordon E. Edison, a letter dated 11-12-88 was sent to the licensee formally closing MPA D-10.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-2

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Generic Letter "Evaluation of Primary Systems for Asymmetric LOCA Loads"		01/20/78
Task Action Plan A-2, "Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary Coolant System," NUREG-0371 Task Action Plans for Generic Activities		11/78
"Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary Systems," NUREG-0609 US NRC NRR		01/81
GDC-4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Basis"		
GL 84-04, "Safety Evaluation of Westinghouse Topical Reports Dealing With Elimination of Postulated Pipe Breaks in PWR Primary Main Loops."		

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter from Conway (FPL) to U.S. NRC	8811080057	11-1-88
Letter from Edison (NRC) to Conway (FPL)	8901090146	11-28-88
Letter from Edison (NRC) to Conway (FPL)	8903210051	3-10-89

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Insp. Report # 50-251/87-16	8706169909	5-15-87

PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250

PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT J. Mauck

USI NO. A-9 TITLE ATWS per 10 CFR 50.62

MPA NO. A-020 TAC NOS. M59153

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in June 1984 with the publication of a final rule (10 CFR 50.62) to require improvements in plants to reduce the likelihood of failure of the reactor protection system (RPS) to shut down the reactor following anticipated transients and to mitigate the consequences of an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event.

The rule includes the following design-related requirements: 50.62(C)(1), diverse and independent auxiliary feedwater initiation and turbine trip for all PWRs; 50.62(C)(2), diverse scram systems for CE and B&W reactors; 50.62(C)(3) alternate rod injection (ARI) for BWRs; 50.62(C)(4); standby liquid control system (SLCS) for BWRs; and 50.62(C)(5), automatic trip of recirculation pumps under conditions indicative of an ATWS for BWRs. Information requirements and an implementation schedule are also specified.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

In a letter to NRC dated 7-15-87 and supplemented 11-19-87, FPL provided a detailed response to the rule. This response relied on WOG report WCAP-10858. The NRC staff had reviewed and approved WCAP-10858-P-A on 7-7-86. In a letter dated 5-19-88, Edison (NRC) to Conway (FPL), NRC approved Rev. 1 of WCAP-10858-P-A, and also approved the FPL design subject to: (1) certain human factor reviews, (2) satisfactory completion of isolation device qualification testing, and (3) possible Tech Specs (NRC staff still considering the need for TS). The design approval was based on an SER from Newberry (NRR, ICSB) to Berkow (NRR) dated 3-30-88. Installation of the AMSAC equipment is scheduled to be completed during the dual unit outage (which is scheduled to begin early in 1991) for both Turkey Point Units and is being tracked in the FPL Integrated Schedule, which is a part of the license.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-9

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
NUREG-0460, and Supplements, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram for Light Water Reactors"		03/80
Federal Register Notice 49 FR 26045 (10 CFR 50.62)		06/26/84

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, FPL to NRC	8702330020	7-15-87
Letter, FPL to NRC	8711240199	11-19-87
Letter, NRC (Edison) to FPL (Conway)	8806030191	5-19-88

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250

PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT B. Elliott

USI NO. A-11 TITLE Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness

MPA NO. A-007 TAC NOS. 68249

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in October 1982 with the publication of NUREG-0744, "Pressure Vessel Material Fracture Toughness." NUREG-0744 was issued by Generic Letter 82-26 and provided only a methodology to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G. No licensee response to Generic Letter 82-26 was required.

Because of the remote possibility that nuclear reactor pressure vessels designed to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code would fail, the design of nuclear facilities does not provide protection against reactor vessel failure. Prevention of reactor vessel failure depends primarily on maintaining the reactor vessel material fracture toughness at levels that will resist brittle fracture during plant operation. At service times and operating conditions typical of current operating plants, reactor vessel fracture toughness properties provide adequate margins of safety against vessel failure; however, as plants accumulate more and more service time, neutron irradiation reduces the material fracture toughness and initial safety margins.

Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that the Charpy upper shelf energy throughout the life of the vessel be no less than 50 ft-lb unless it is demonstrated that lower values will provide margins of safety against failure equivalent to those provided by Appendix G of the ASME code. USI A-11 was initiated to address the staff's concern that some vessels were projected to have beltline materials with Charpy upper shelf energy less than 50 ft-lb.

NUREG-0744 provides a method for evaluating reactor vessel materials when their Charpy upper shelf energy is predicted to fall below 50 ft-lb. Plants will use the prescribed method when analysis of irradiation damage predicts that the charpy upper shelf energy is below 50 ft-lb.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

In an internal memo from Shao to Murley, dated 9-24-87, it was documented that Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 were believed to have a USE less than 50 ft-lb. This had been recognized several years earlier by FPL in a letter dated 2-3-83 (Uhrig to Eisenhut). FPL submitted fracture toughness analyses of beltline welds, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, in letters dated 5-3-84 (Williams to Eisenhut, Proprietary), and 3-25-86 (Woody to Thompson, Proprietary). NRC transmitted safety evaluations dated 10-30-87 and 5-31-88 indicating additional information was needed. FPL responded in letters dated 5-4-88 and 1-31-89 (Conway to NRC) and 6-16-89 (Woody to NRC) which indicated adequate margin of safety for continued operation and described plans for further tests and analyses. In an internal memo dated 5-4-89 (Shao to Varga), the NRC Division of Engineering and Systems Technology provided a safety evaluation justifying continued operation with USE less than 50 ft-lb.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-11

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
NUREG-0744, Revision 1, "Pressure Vessel Material Fracture Toughness"		10/82
Generic Letter 82-26, "Pressure Vessel Material Fracture Toughness"		11/12/82

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Uhrig (FPL) to Eisenhut (NRC)	8302070305	2-3-83
Williams (FPL) to Eisenhut to Thompson (NRC)	8405090058	5-3-84
Woody (FPL) to Thompson (NRC)	8603310205	3-25-86
McDonald (NRC) to Woody (FPL)	8711050220	10-30-87
Edison (NRC) to Conway (FPL)	8806070211	5-31-88
Conway (FPL) to NRC	8805160014	5-4-89
Conway (FPL) to NRC	8902070160	1-31-89
Woody to NRC	8906210029	6-16-89
Shao to Murley		9-24-87
Shao to Varga		5-4-89

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250

PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT D. Thatcher

USI NO. A-17 TITLE Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants

MPA NO. TAC NOS. None

ISSUES SUMMARY:

Generic Letter (GL) 89-18, dated September 6, 1989, was sent to all power reactor licensees and constitutes the resolution of USI A-17. The generic letter did not require any licensee actions.

GL 89-18 had two enclosures which (a) outlined the bases for the resolution of USI A-17, and (b) provided five general lessons learned from the review of the overall systems interaction issue. The staff anticipated that licensees would review this information in other programs, such as the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. Specifically, the staff expected that insights concerning water intrusion and flooding from internal sources, as described in the appendix to NUREG-1174, would be considered in the IPE program. Also considered in the resolution of this USI was the expectation that licensees would continue to review information on events at operating nuclear power plants in accordance with the requirements of TMI Task Action Plan Item I.C.5 (NUREG-0737).

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

In letters dated 11-6-72, 11-17-72, 1-5-73, 1-7-75, 8-18-75, 3-6-79, the licensee provided information regarding systems interactions and particularly water intrusion and internal flooding. These letters were in response to NRC concerns and evaluations documented in letters dated 9-26-72 and 12-5-74. In a letter dated 9-4-79 the NRC staff issued a safety evaluation which concluded that a sufficient level of protection is provided from flooding of equipment important to safety-related systems, and that no further action was required by the licensee.

REFERENCES:

Plant name
A-17

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Generic Letter 89-18		09/06/89
NUREG-1174 "Evaluation of Systems Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants"		May 1989
NUREG-1229 "Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of USI A-17"		August 1989
NUREG/CR-3922 "Survey and Evaluation of System Interaction Events and Sources"		January 1985
NUREG/CR-4261 "Assessment of System Interaction Experience in Nuclear Power Plants"		June 1986
NUREG/CR-4470 "Survey and Evaluation of Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Supply Events"		August 1986
Letter, DeYoung (NRC) to Coughlin (FPL)		9-26-72

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Coughlin (FPL) to DeYoung (NRC)		11-6-72
Letter, Schmidt (FPL) to O'Leary (NRC)		11-17-72
Letter, Coughlin (FPL) to DeYoung (NRC)		1-5-73
Letter, Uhrig (FPL) to Lear (NRC)		1-7-75
Letter, Uhrig (FPL) to Lear (NRC)		8-18-75
Telecopy, Whittier (FPL) to Grotenhuis (NRC)		3-6-79
Letter, Schwencer (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL)		9-4-79

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOC NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250
PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT P. Shemanski
USI NO. A-24 TITLE Qualification of Class 1E Equipment
MPA NO. B-60 TAC NOS. None

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in July 1981 with the publication of NUREG-0588, Revision 1, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment." Part I of the report is the original NUREG-0588 that was issued for comment; that report, in conjunction with the Division of Operating Reactor (DOR) Guidelines, was endorsed by a Commission Memorandum and Order as the interim position on this subject until "final" positions were established in rule making. On January 21, 1983 the Commission amended 10 CFR 50.49 (the rule), effective February 22, 1983, to codify existing qualification methods in national standards, regulatory guides, and certain NRC publications, including NUREG-0588.

The rule is based on the DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588. These provide guidance on (a) how to establish environmental service conditions, (b) how to select methods which are considered appropriate for qualifying the equipment in different areas of the plant, and (c) such other areas as margin, aging, and documentation. NUREG-0588 does not address all areas of qualification; it does supplement, in selected areas, the provisions of the 1971 and 1974 versions of IEEE Standard 323. The rule recognizes previous qualification efforts completed as a result of Commission Memorandum and Order CLI-80-21 and also reflects different versions IEEE 323, dependent on the date of the construction permit Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Therefore, plant-specific requirements may vary in accordance with the rule.

In summary, the resolution of A-24 is embodied in 10 CFR 50.49. A measure of whether each licensee has implemented the resolution of A-24 may therefore be found in the determination of compliance with 10 CFR 50.49. This was addressed by 72 SERs for operating plants issued shortly after publication of the rule and subsequently in operating license reviews pursuant to Standard Review Plan Section 3.11. This was further addressed by the first-round environmental qualification inspections conducted by the NRC.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

On 5-21-81 the NRC staff issued an SER based on FPL submittals dated 6-2-80, 7-3-80, 10-31-80, and 2-27-81. On 12-13-82 another NRC staff SER was issued based on licensee submittals dated 8-27-81, 9-14-81, 2-9-82, and 3-24-82. FPL provided additional information on 9-24-82, 2-1-83 and 7-12-84. In the 7-12-84 submittal the licensee indicated that they believed they had resolved all issues. The NRC staff SER dated 10-25-84 documented compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 and acceptable proposed resolution of deficiencies. The staff inspected implementation in three IR's (87-08, 88-27, and 88-38). FPL responded to a Notice of Violation in a letter from Conway (FPL) to NRC dated 3-9-88. The latest verification was provided in IR 88-38 dated 1-6-89.

REFERENCES:Plant Name
A-241. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
DOR "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors"		
NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment"		12/79
Commission Memorandum and Order, CLI-80-21, on DOR Guidelines and NUREG-0588		05/23/80
NUREG-0588, Revision 1		07/81
10 CFR 50.49 (48 FR 2730-2733)		01/21/83
Standard and Review Plan 3.11, Environmental Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment		07/81

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Williams (FPL) to to Denton (NRC)	8407170439	7-12-84
Letter, Varga (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL)	8304060619	3-29-83
Letter, Varga (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL)	8212290534	12-13-82
Letter, Varga (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL)	8106010421	5-21-81
Orders for Modification, Varga (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL)	8011110522	10-24-80
Conway (FPL) to NRC	8803140225	3-9-88
Letter, Varga (NRC) to FPL	8411090058	10-25-88

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
IR # 50-250,251/87-08	8707240211	7-21-87
IR # 50-250,251/88-27	8811030126	10-26-88
IR # 50-250,251/88-38	8901130088	1-6-89

PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250

PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT Chu Liang

USI NO. A-26 TITLE Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection

MPA NO. B-04 TAC NOS. _____

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in September 1978 with the publication of NUREG-0224, "Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection for PWRs," and Standard Review Plan Section 5.2. The licensees of all operating PWRs were requested to provide an overpressure prevention system that could be used whenever the plants were in startup or shutdown conditions. The issue affected all operating and future plants, and the staff established MPA B-04 for implementing the solution at operating PWRs.

Since 1972, there have been numerous reported incidents of pressure transients in PWRs where technical specification pressure and temperature limits have been exceeded. The majority of these events occurred while the reactors were in a solid-water condition during startup or shutdown and at relatively low reactor vessel temperatures. Since the reactor vessels have less toughness at lower temperatures, they are more susceptible to brittle fracture under these conditions than at normal operating temperatures. In light of the frequency of the reported transients and the associated potential for vessel damage, the NRC staff concluded that measures should be taken to minimize the number of future transients and reduce their severity.

Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and its Impact on Plant Operations," was published July 12, 1988. This generic letter provides guidance regarding review of pressure-temperature limits and indicates that licensees may have to revise low-temperature-overpressure protection setpoints.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

On 3-14-80 the NRC staff issued Amendments No. 55 and 47 to Units 3 and 4. The SER in those amendments found that the proposed Turkey Point Overpressure Mitigation System (OMS) and the proposed Tech Specs were acceptable. These design mods had been proposed by FPL in letters dated 12-11-78 and 10-18-77, as well as a series of submittals referenced in the NRC SER in Amendments 55 & 47. In Amendments 134 and 128, dated 1-10-89, the staff reviewed the affect of new P/T limits on the OMS and found it acceptable.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-26

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
NUREG-0224 - "Reactor Vessel Pressure Transient Protection for PWRs."		9/78
NRC Letters to Licensees Informing Licensees of Staff Concerns Regarding Overpressure Low-Temperature Conditions in PWRs		August 1976
Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations"		7/12/88
Standard Review Plan Section 5.2		

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Uhrig (FPL) to Lear (NRC)		10-18-77
Letter, Uhrig (FPL) to Lear (NRC)		12-11-78
Letter, Schwencer (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL) transmitting Amendments 55 and 47.	8004240251	3-14-80
Letter, McDonald (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL) (Corrected SER)	8301060527	12-23-82
Letter, Edison (NRC) to Conway (FPL)	8901190137	1-10-89

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250
PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT J. Wermiel
USI NO. A-36 TITLE Control of Heavy Loads, Phases I & II
MPA NO. C-10, C-15 TAC NOS. None

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in July 1980 with the publication of NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," and Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 9.1.5. The staff established MPAs C-10 and C-15 for the implementation of Phases I and II, respectively, of the resolution of this issue at operating plants.

In nuclear power plants, heavy loads may be handled in several plant areas. If these loads were to drop in certain locations in the plant, they may impact spent fuel, fuel in the core, or equipment that may be required to achieve safe shutdown and continue decay heat removal. USI A-36 was established to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating plants, and to recommend necessary changes to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads. The guidelines proposed in NUREG-0612 include definition of safe load paths, use of load handling procedures, training of crane operators, guidelines on slings and special lifting devices, periodic inspection and maintenance for the crane, as well as various alternatives.

By Generic Letters dated December 22, 1980, and February 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07), all utilities were requested to evaluate their plants against the guidance of NUREG-0612 and to provide their submittals in two parts: Phase I (six month response) and Phase II (nine month response). Phase I responses were to address Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 which covered the following areas:

1. Definition of safe load paths
2. Development of load handling procedures
3. Periodic inspection and testing of cranes
4. Qualifications, training and specified conduct of operators
5. Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6.6.
6. Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9
7. Design of cranes to ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70

Phase II responses were to address Sections 5.1.2 thru 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 which covered the need for electrical interlocks/mechanical stops, or alternatively, single-failure-proof cranes or load drop analyses in the spent fuel pool area (PWR), containment building (PWR), reactor building (BWR), other areas and the specific guidelines for single-failure-proof handling systems.

As stated in Generic Letter 85-11, "Completion of Phase II of 'Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants' - NUREG-0612," all licensees have completed the requirement to perform a review and submit a Phase I and a Phase II report. Based on the improvements in heavy loads handling obtained from implementation of NUREG-0612 (Phase I), further action was not required to reduce the risks associated with the handling of heavy loads. Therefore, a detailed Phase II review of heavy loads was not necessary and Phase II was considered completed.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

The NRC staff issued an SER dated 11-1-83 which concluded that Control of Heavy Loads, Phase I, was acceptable. This was based on submittals from FPL dated 3-15-83, 8-15-83, and 10-7-83 which described details of load handling equipment and operations. The licensee has implemented all modifications agreed to with the staff, except the installation of a separate load cell for the head lift rig. That action is included in the Integrated Schedule and is currently scheduled to be implemented in an outage which is scheduled to start 1/31/91.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-36

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut, NRC, to all licensees, applicants for OLs and holders of CPs transmitting NUREG-0612 and staff positions		12/22/80
Generic Letter 85-11, Hugh L. Thompson, NRC, to all licensees for Operating Reactors, "Completion of Phase II of 'Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants' NUREG-0612"		06/28/85

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
NRC to FPL	8303040267	2/22/83
FPL (Uhrig) to NRC	8303170504	3/15/83
FPL (Uhrig) to NRC	8308190381	8/15/83
FPL (Uhrig) to NRC	8310180381	10/7/83
McDonald (NRC) to Uhrig (FPL)	8311290358	11/1/83

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250
PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT P. Gill
USI NO. A-44 TITLE Station Blackout
MPA NO. A-022 TAC NOS. 68618

ISSUES SUMMARY:

This USI was resolved in June 1988 with the publication of a new rule (10 CFR 50.63) and Regulatory Guide 1.155.

Station blackout means the loss of offsite ac power to the essential and nonessential electrical buses concurrent with turbine trip and the unavailability of the redundant onsite emergency ac power systems. WASH-1400 showed that station blackout could be an important risk contributor, and operating experience has indicated that the reliability of ac power systems might be less than originally anticipated. For these reasons station blackout was designated as a USI in 1980. A proposed rule was published for comment on March 21, 1986. A final rule, 10 CFR 50.63, was published on June 21, 1988 and became effective on July 21, 1988. Regulatory Guide 1.155 was issued at the same time as the rule and references an industry guidance document, NUMARC-8700. In order to comply with the A-44 resolution, licensees will be required to:

- maintain onsite emergency ac power supply reliability above a minimum level
- develop procedures and training for recovery from a station blackout
- determine the duration of a station blackout that the plant should be able to withstand
- use an alternate qualified ac power source, if available, to cope with a station blackout
- evaluate the plant's actual capability to withstand and recover from a station blackout
- backfit hardware modifications if necessary to improve coping ability

Section 50.63(c)(1) of the rule required each licensee to submit a response including the results of a coping analysis within 270 days from issuance of an operating license or the effective date of the rule, whichever is later.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

On April 17, 1989 in a letter from Conway to NRC, FPL responded to the requirements of the new rule (10 CFR 50.63). In October, 1989 the NRC staff audited FPL's analytical basis for their planned modifications. The NRC had not issued an SER as of 12-15-89, but anticipates issuing an SER by 3/31/90. The implementation date on A-44 is expected to be not later than 3/31/92, based on the estimate for staff completion of the plant-specific SER and allowing up to 2 years for the licensee to complete implementation.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-44

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
10 CFR 50.63, "Loss of All Alternating Current Power"		06/21/88
Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout"		08/88

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Conway (FPL) to NRC	8904250001	4-17-89

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250

PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT P. Y. Chen

USI NO. A-46 TITLE Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants

MPA NO. B-105 TAC NOS. 68303

ISSUES SUMMARY:

USI A-46 was resolved with the issuance of GL 87-02 on February 19, 1987, which endorsed the approach of using the seismic and test experience data proposed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). This approach was endorsed by the Senior Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP) and approved by the NRC staff.

The scope of the review was narrowed to equipment required to bring each affected plant to hot shutdown and maintain it there for a minimum of 72 hours. The review includes a walkthrough of each plant which is required to inspect equipment. Evaluation of equipment will include: (a) adequacy of equipment anchorage; (b) functional capability of essential relays; (c) outliers and deficiencies (i.e., equipment with non-standard configurations); and (d) seismic systems interaction.

As an outgrowth of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), the need was identified for reassessing design criteria and methods for the seismic qualification of mechanical equipment and electrical equipment. Therefore, the seismic qualification of the equipment in operating plants must be reassessed to ensure the ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition when subject to a seismic event. The objective of this issue was to establish an explicit set of guidelines that could be used to judge the adequacy of the seismic qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment at operating plants in lieu of attempting to backfit current design criteria for new plants.

Generic Letter 87-02 with associated guidance, required all affected utilities to evaluate the seismic adequacy of their plants. The specific requirements and approach for implementation are being developed jointly by SQUG and the staff on a generic basis before individual member utilities proceed with plant-specific implementation.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

The Turkey Point licensee (FPL) is not a member of SQUG. A separate approach to GL 87-02 has been taken by FPL. In letters dated 5/15/87, 10/1/87, and 2/1/88 FPL has responded to GL 87-02. The licensee and the NRC staff appear to have a fundamental disagreement over the importance of the probability and intensity of seismicity in the Turkey Point area. An appeal meeting was held on 6/2/88, and the staff agreed to consider a scaled-back program of equipment walkdowns and reviews. Such a program was submitted by FPL on 8/4/88. In a letter dated 8/4/89 the NRC staff agreed to the FPL program subject to a number of conditions. FPL responded to the staff on 10/2/89 and committed to a supplemental response by 12/15/89. Walkdowns would begin during an outage no earlier than mid '90.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-46

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Generic Letter 87-02, "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electric Equipment in Operating Reactors"		02/19/87
NUREG-1211, "Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues A-46..."		02/87
NUREG-1030, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants, Unresolved Safety Issue A-46"		02/87

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Woody (FPL) to NRC	8705210604	5-15-87
Letter, Woody (FPL) to NRC	8710070004	10-1-87
Letter, Woody (FPL) to NRC	8802050097	2-1-88
Summary of Meeting	8807050455	6-16-88
Letter, Edison and Norris (NRC) to Woody (FPL)	8908140423	8-4-89

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-46

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Generic Letter 87-02, "Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electric Equipment in Operating Reactors"		02/19/87
NUREG-1211, "Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues A-46..."		02/87
NUREG-1030, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants, Unresolved Safety Issue A-46"		02/87

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Woody (FPL) to NRC	8705210604	5-15-87
Letter, Woody (FPL) to NRC	8710070004	10-1-87
Letter, Woody (FPL) to NRC	8802050097	2-1-88
Summary of Meeting	8807050455	6-16-88
Letter, Edison and Norris (NRC) to Woody (FPL)	8908140423	8-4-89

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250
PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT J. Mauck
USI NO. A-47 TITLE Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR
Nuclear Power Plants
MPA NO. _____ TAC NOS. None

ISSUES SUMMARY:

USI A-47 was resolved September 20, 1989, with the publication of Generic Letter (GL) 88-19.

The generic letter states:

"The staff has concluded that all PWR plants should provide automatic steam generator overfill protection, all BWR plants should provide automatic reactor vessel overfill protection, and that plant procedures and technical specifications for all plants should include provisions to verify periodically the operability of the overfill protection and to assure that automatic overfill protection is available to mitigate main feedwater overfeed events during reactor power operation. Also, the system design and setpoints should be selected with the objective of minimizing inadvertent trips of the main feedwater system during plant startup, normal operation, and protection system surveillance. The Technical Specifications recommendations are consistent with the criteria and the risk considerations of the Commission Interim Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvement. In addition, the staff recommends that all BWR recipients reassess and modify, if needed, their operating procedures and operator training to assure that the operators can mitigate reactor vessel overfill events that may occur via the condensate booster pumps during reduced system pressure operation."

Also, page 2 of the generic letter provides for additional actions for CE and B&W plants. The generic letter provides amplifying guidance for licensees.

The generic letter requires that licensees provide NRC with their schedule and commitments within 180 days of the letter's date. The implementation schedule for actions on which commitments are made should be prior to startup after the first refueling outage, but no later than the second refueling outage, beginning 9 months after receipt of the letter.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

The licensee plans to respond to GL 88-19 by March, 1990 as required.

REFERENCES:

Plant name
A-47

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Generic Letter 89-19 "Request for Action Related to Resolution of USI A-47"		09/20/89
NUREG-1217 "Evaluation of Safety Implications of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants"		June 1989
NUREG-1218 "Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of USI A-47"		July 1989

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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PLANT Turkey Point 3 DOCKET NO(S). 50-250
PROJECT MANAGER Gordon Edison TECHNICAL CONTACT B. Elliott
USI NO. A-49 TITLE Pressurized Thermal Shock
MPA NO. A-021 TAC NOS. 59992

ISSUES SUMMARY:

The final rule (10 CFR 50.61) on pressurized thermal shock (PTS) was approved by the Commission in July 1985. Regulatory Guide 1.154, "Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for PWRs," was later published in February 1987. Thus, this issue was resolved and new requirements were established, applicable to PWRs only. The rule required that each operating reactor meet the screening criteria provided in the rule or provide supplemental analysis to demonstrate that PTS is not a concern for the facility.

Neutron irradiation of reactor pressure vessel weld and plate materials decreases the fracture toughness of the materials. The fracture toughness sensitivity to radiation-induced change is increased by the presence of certain materials such as copper. Decreased fracture toughness makes it more likely that, if a severe overcooling event occurs followed by or concurrent with high vessel pressure, and if a small crack is present on the vessel's inner surface, that crack could grow to a size that might threaten vessel integrity.

Severe pressurized overcooling events are improbable since they require multiple failures and improper operator performance. However, certain precursor events have happened that could have potentially threatened vessel integrity if additional failures had occurred and/or if the vessel had been more highly irradiated. Therefore, the possibility of vessel failure due to a severe pressurized overcooling event cannot be ruled out.

IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS SUMMARY (PLANT SPECIFIC):

In letters dated 1-23-86, 6-5-86, and 7-22-86, the licensee responded to the new PTS rule (10 CFR 50.61) for Units 3 & 4, and stated that their analyses and measurements showed they met requirements. The NRC staff issued an SER dated 3-11-87 which described NRC's independent calculations which confirmed that the licensee met the requirements.

REFERENCES:

Plant Name
A-49

1. REQUIREMENT DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
10 CFR 50.61, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Requirements"		7/85
Reg. Guide 1.154, "Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for PWRs"		1/89
SECY 82-465, "Pressurized Thermal Shock"		11/23/82
SECY 83-288, "Proposed Pressurized Thermal Shock Rule"		07/15/83
Regulatory Guide 1.154 "Format and Content of Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurized Water Reactors"		02/87
Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its Impact on Plant Operations"		7/12/88

2. IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Letter, Woody (FPL) to Thompson (NRC)	8601290065	1-23-86
Letter, Woody (FPL) to Thompson (NRC)	8606100358	6-5-86
Letter, Woody (FPL) to McDonald (NRC)	8607280057	7-22-86
Letter, McDonald (NRC) to Woody (FPL)	8703190152	3-11-87

3. VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUDOCS NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>
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02/07/90

LISTING OF INCOMPLETE USI DATA
FOR INPUT FROM PROJECT MANAGERS

ISSUE NUMBER	ISSUE DESCRIPTIVE NAME	IMPLEMENT DATE	IMPLEMENT STATUS	LICENSEE COMMENT	STAFF COMMENT
** PLANT NAME: TURKEY POINT 3					
A-01	WATER HAMMER	/ /	NC		
A-02	ASYMMETRIC BLOWDOWN LOADS ON REACTOR PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEMS	/ /	NC		LEAK BEFORE BREAK
A-03	WESTINGHOUSE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY	/ /	NC		INFO ONLY
A-04	CE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY	/ /	N/A		CE PLANTS ONLY
A-05	B&W STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY	/ /	N/A		B&W PLANTS ONLY
A-06	MARK I SHORT-TERM PROGRAM	/ /	N/A		MK I BWR ONLY
A-07	MARK I LONG-TERM PROGRAM	/ /	N/A		MK I BWR ONLY
A-08	MARK II CONTAINMENT POOL DYNAMIC LOADS - LONG-TERM PROGRAM	/ /	N/A		MK II BWR ONLY
A-09	ATWS	12/31/91	I		
A-10	BWR FEEDWATER NOZZLE CRACKING	/ /	N/A		BWR ONLY
A-11	REACTOR VESSEL MATERIALS TOUGHNESS	12/31/92	I	< 50 FT-LB	NO CRITERIA
A-12	FRACTURE TOUGHNESS OF STEAM GENERATOR AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SUPPORTS	/ /	N/A		CP AFTER 83 ONLY
A-17	SYSTEMS INTERACTION	/ /	NC		NO REQUIREMENTS
A-24	QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT	07/12/84	C		
A-26	REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE TRANSIENT PROTECTION	03/14/80	C		LTOPS
A-31	RHR SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS	/ /	N/A		NEW PLANTS ONLY. SRP.
A-36	CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS NEAR SPENT FUEL	12/31/91	I	LOAD CELL	
A-39	DETERMINATION OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVE POOL DYNAMIC LOADS AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS	/ /	N/A		BWR ONLY
A-40	SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA - SHORT-TERM PROGRAM	/ /	NC		NOT SQUG
A-42	PIPE CRACKS IN BOILING WATER REACTORS	/ /	N/A		BWR ONLY
A-43	CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PERFORMANCE	/ /	NC		INFO ONLY
A-44	STATION BLACKOUT	03/31/92	I	DB ADDITION	SER 3/31/90
A-45	SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS	/ /	NC		SUBSUMED BY SEVERE ACC
A-46	SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN OPERATING PLANTS	12/31/91	I		REQ UNDER DEVEL
A-47	SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS	03/20/90	E		NEW REQUIREMENTS
A-48	HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES AND EFFECTS OF HYDROGEN BURNS ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT	/ /	N/A		N/A DRY CONTAIN
A-49	PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK	07/22/86	C		