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WOODY, C. A. Florida Power & Light Co.
RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
GRACE, J. N. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards summary of mgt on shift repts for wk starting 871123. Procedure 0-ADM-019, "Mgt on Shift" encl.

See Ltrs

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FPL

OCTOBER 0 2 1987

L-87-495

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

C. O. Woody
Executive Vice President

COW/SDF/cn
Attachment

cc: D. G. McDonald, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

MOS001





IE01

# MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

## WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: November 23, 1987



During this period, (November 23 through November 30, 1987), five persons were on shift: M.G. Altermatt, St. Lucie Plant Staff; G.M. Smith, Westinghouse Electric Corp.; J.C. Strong Jr., Turkey Point Maintenance Assistant Superintendent; W.R. Williams Jr., Turkey Point Maintenance Assistant Superintendent; and D.W. Haase, Turkey Point Safety Engineering Group Manager.

While on shift, these individuals reported on potential safety problems, questionable work practices, operating strengths, areas for improvement and general recommendations.

During this period no immediate safety problems were identified.

Ad ionally, six instances of questionable work practices were identified:

1) fire impairment tag had not been removed after completion of a job. The tag was immediately removed. Action to correct the root cause of the problem is underway; this problem was previously identified by a QA program corrective action request.

2) Some cables in the cable spreading room appeared to have inadequate protection and were missing sprayed-on fire proofing. This was immediately brought to Maintenance's attention. This condition is being evaluated and appropriate corrective actions will be taken.

3) Some housekeeping deficiencies and inadequate maintenance practices were noted in isolated areas behind the control room racks. Appropriate supervision was notified and corrective actions are underway.

4) During the break in run for a charging pump, the duration of the test was shortened by management discretion. The necessary signoffs for this allowable procedure were not made. The Plant Supervisor - Nuclear (PSN) corrected the problem.

5) During the monthly battery maintenance surveillance test, some confusion existed as to the "operability" of the battery. The root cause of the confusion stemmed from Turkey Point's Technical Specifications. As previously identified, the revised Technical Specifications are being processed in an expedited manner.

6) Two minor configuration discrepancies associated with the test connections on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) Nitrogen backup system were identified and immediately corrected prior to Unit 4 entering mode 3 (hot standby). The root cause of the item was identified and a letter directing resolution of this item was immediately issued.



ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

# MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

## WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: November 23, 1987



Areas for improvement were also identified during the week as follows:

1) Communications between all departments performing surveillance tests and the control room has improved but needs continuing emphasis.

2) Several cases where procedural changes would make the procedure more clear and easier to use where identified.

3) Communications between those performing maintenance in the control room and the RCO should be strengthened.

4) The use of overtime to accomplish required training should be minimized.

5) The use of the latest revision of reference material by all plant personnel should be assured.

6) The work controls associated with locks and seals need to be reviewed and clarified.

During this period, the 5 MOS observers on 16 occasions commented on "Strengths" observed on shift. This increasing number of positive comments are indicative of the growing effectiveness of FPL's MOS program.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-23-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Attended morning staff and conference call meetings.
- Observed the ongoing performance of test procedure (TP-402) "Accumulators 4A, 4B and 4C Leakage Testing".
- Made plant tour with on shift Plant Supervisor-Nuclear which included jobs in progress within the radiation controlled area and secondary systems.
- Thoroughly reviewed TP-402 bouncing valve manipulation requirements with plant drawings 5610-T-E-4510 Sheets 1 & 2 with related procedures needed for test.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Area(s) for improvement

- TP-402 provided no acceptance criteria or any indication when the test was to be suspended or had failed. The Operators had to make a decision as to when to terminate the test on MOV-4-865C when all indications had shown excessive leakage prior to reaching the required test pressure.

- Recommend that future test procedures provide more information or guidance as to when test has grossly failed or when suspension of the test is prudent.

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None formulated

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-23-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: Richard A. Wendle for — Date: 11-24-87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
JRO 11/24/87 PJB 11/24/87

FINAL PAGE

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/23-24/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift briefing (Peak).
2. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
3. Watch turnover Unit 4 Reactor Control Operator (RCO) (Peak to Nights).
4. Procedure 4-OP-041.4 OMS.
5. Procedure 4-OP-041.8 (through 5.2.7) Fill and Vent.
6. Conducted a plant tour of secondary systems (no discrepancies noted).
7. Procedure TP-402 Accumulator Leakage Testing.
8. End of shift briefing (Nights).

B. Immediate safety problems

None

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23-24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

1. Beginning of shift meeting (Nights) was excellent. A thorough briefing of Peak shift activities completed or in progress and a schedule of activities to be worked during Night shift was conducted. Priorities as far as work to be completed was set. Additionally, input was solicited from Operators concerning plant status as well as suggestions for the QIP program.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None at this time.

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23-24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None at this time.

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith _____ Date: 11-24-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: Richard L. Wenzle for _____ Date: 11-24-87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
11/24/87 11/24/87

FINAL PAGE

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23-24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/23-24/87

From: J. C. Strong Jr. Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night
*(MOS Observer)*

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Preparations for Fill and Vent.
2. End-of-Shift briefing.
3. 4-OP-41.4 Section 5.1 - OMS Test.
4. Shift turnover meeting.
5. Fill and Vent RCS System.
6. Inboard seal replacement on 3A SIS pump.
7. Filling and pressurizing Unit 4 accumulators.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

JCS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23-24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

Mid shift's ability to plan and execute their plan for their shift.

F. Area(s) for improvement

General information in regards to outage schedule as it relates to unit status.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

1. Provide an outage schedule status summary to the Control Room after the afternoon scheduling meeting.

2. Incorporate outage status as a part of general shift turnover.

Completed By: J. C. Strong Jr. Date: 11-24-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: Richard L Wende FOR Date: 11-24-87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/24/87 11/24/87

FINAL PAGE

JCS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/23-24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-24-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Attended morning staff meeting - Units 3 and 4 in Mode 5.
- Observed performance of 3-OSP-067.1 "Process Radiation Monitoring Operability Test" for radiation monitors R-3-12, R-3-14, R-3-17A, R-3-17B, R-3-18. No problems found.
- Observed unannounced fire drill on Unit 4 turbine front standard.
- Observed shift briefings.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

MGA/md
★/JWC/dj/sr/dj

11/24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

Response of the fire team and their conduct to the unannounced drill is commendable. It appears that the team is suitably trained to respond to any fire emergency that developes.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None observed

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-24-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] — Date: 11/25/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

[signature] 11/25/87

FINAL PAGE

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/24/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/24-25/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. 1 and 10 minute runs on the RCP's as part of the fill and vent procedure.
2. End of shift briefing (Peaks).
3. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
4. Tour of plant with PSN.
5. Fire Drill.
6. 4-OP-047 (CVCS) - run test on 4B charging pump.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/24-25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

Not applicable

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

Not applicable

F. Area(s) for improvement

See Recommendation

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

Recommend that the required condition for tripping RCP's listed in off-normal procedure 1108.1 should be listed in the precautions/limitations section of procedure OP-041.1 Reactor Coolant Pump. This would provide the necessary guidance to the Operator to ensure tripping RCP's if the conditions warrant during or right after starting the pumps.

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith — Date: 11-25-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] — Date: 11/25/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/25/87

FINAL PAGE

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/24-25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/24-25/87

From: J. C. Strong Jr. *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Fill and vent procedure.
2. 1 minute RCP runs.
3. 10 minute RCP runs.
4. End of shift briefing.
5. Shift turnover and shift briefing.
6. 3A battery discharge set up.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

Fire impairment tag was hung on November 12, by FPL Construction to remove Cable Spreading Room Halon system while installing a hanger by 3A battery charger. The clearance for the Halon system was removed when the job was done but the impairment tag was not cleared up.

D. Actions taken

Inform PSN and STA about the above impairment tag.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None observed this shift.

F. Area(s) for improvement

Teamwork between Maintenance disciplines and Operations.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

1. Structure shift meetings such that all items discussed are goal oriented towards putting the Units on line.
2. Ensure support is asked for when needed and given when it is requested.
3. The meeting would improve if more requests were made rather than just telling the work list.
4. The meeting needs someone to ask questions.

Completed By: J. C. Strong Jr. Date: 11-25-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L W Pearce Date: 11/25/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

JBD 11/25/87

FINAL PAGE

JCS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/24-25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-25-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Attended morning staff meeting - Units 3 and 4 in Mode 5.
- Observed shift briefings, very little activity planned today, support to Maintenance is priority.
- Observed Maintenance Procedure 0707.12 "Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers-Manual Trip Test" being performed.
- Observed the continued implementation and completion of test procedure (TP-402) "Accumulators 4A, 4B and 4C Leakage Testing".

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-25-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce — Date: 11/27/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
JP FHB 11/27/87

FINAL PAGE

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/25-26/87

From: Wallace R. Williams, Jr. *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Walked down Control Room, front and rear of vertical boards and behind racks were observed.
2. Went on Plant tour with NPS; this tour covered the Diesel Engines and Rooms, Intake Area, SCV-605 RHR Heat Exchanger bypass, Unit 3 R11/R12, Unit 4 R11/R12, Unit 4 North Penetration Room, Unit 3 South Penetration Room, Unit 3 Charging Pump Room, Boric Acid Tanks and Pump Room, $H_2$ and $N_2$ areas, and 3A SIS pump/motor. Also, I toured the Cable Spreading Room and 3&4 M/G Set rooms.
3. Observed 10:30 P.M. end of shift and 11:30 P.M. beginning of shift meetings. Also observed runs on A & B Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

1. South Wall Unit 4 Control Room in front of 4QR50, a broken coffee pot and various other items stored on a rollaway cart.
2. Behind Vertical Panel 4C10 observed disconnected wiring on terminal block TBB 51, 52, 53 & 54. Lugs are untaped and not tagged. Appears no one is working. Some wiring on Unit 3 is terminated. Also wiring on TBB 50 is cut.
3. The break-in run for 4B Charging Pump was terminated early by the day shift on 11/25/87. This took place without the authorization of specified individuals as required by 4-OP-047. The sign-off spaces were N/A'ed. Did not have verbatim compliance to procedure.
4. Unit 3 and Unit 4 R11/R12. Outside of cabinets dirty and paint pealing. Inside of cabinets greasy, dirty, and used as storage place.
5. Unit 3 South Penetration Room Breaker Cabinet 3B13 Pressurizer Backup Heater door cannot be opened enough to work on all the breakers due to interference from a conduit support. Looks like new support.

D. Actions taken

1. Notified NPS of cottee pot and miscellaneous storage.
2. Notified I&C of wiring on 4C10.
3. NPS addressing the 4B Charging Pump Break-in Run.
4. Operations turning in PWO for 3 and 4 R11/R12.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

Cleanliness of A & B Diesel Engines and Rooms. This is the first time I have seen that oil dry was not on the deck behind the Control Panel. This is true for both A & B.

During tour, Maintenance Supervisors/Foremen and Operators were in the field and knew the status of the equipment. Even those things that had just been found. Such as: SCV-605.

The new discharge gauges for the Standby Auxiliary Feed Pumps work very well.

F. Area(s) for improvement

1. Both A and B Diesel have four (4) outstanding PWO's on them, ranging in age from a few days 11/26/87 to six (6) months.

A Diesel

| Date | PWO | Description |
|---|---|---|
| 05/03/87 | 39416 | Counter |
| 10/28/87 | | Droop is zero (0) when indicator is 2.5 |
| 11/11/87 | 315976 | Filter handle |
| 11/18/87 | 30748 | Lube oil low level |

B Diesel

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 05/18/87 | 039396 | Temp. Gauge |
| 06/22/87 | 300864 | Temp. Gauge (different one) |
| 09/09/87 | 307356 | Run time meter |
| 11/20/87 | 318469 | Thermocouple |

2. Scheduling of overtime to do Red Badge training and cover vacancies.

3. The suction gauge movements for A & B Standby Auxiliary Feed Pumps oscillate quite violently when the pumps are running.

WRW/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25-26/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

1. Complete the open PWO's on A and B Diesels.
2. Handle Red Badge training for Operators during Requal, so people don't have to be scheduled for this training on overtime.

   Also, due to the shortage of licensed personal, schedule overtime several days in advance to cover known vacancies. This should be done by a central person. This will minimize last minute setups and reduce time spent by Watch Engineer to do this.
3. Change Standby Auxiliary Feed Pump Suction pressure gauges to A-type (with need range for suction) used for discharge pressure gauges.
4. Have backfit see if conduit support in #3 Penetration Room can be relocated to allow door to open.

Completed By: Wallace R. Williams, Jr. Date: 11-26-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce Date: 11/27/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
11/27/87

FINAL PAGE

WRW/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25-26/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/25-26/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift briefing (Peaks).
2. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
3. End of shift briefing (Nights).
4. Watch relief for Unit 4 RCO (Peaks/Nights).
5. Starting and test running of 3B standby feed pump.
6. Procedure 4-OPS-206.6 CVCS Monthly Valve Cycling.
7. Tour of primary and secondary Plant with NWE.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/25-26/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

1. Procedure 4-OP-047 CVCS-Charging and Letdown

The "break in" run for 4B charging pump was terminated 9 hours into the 12 hour run at the discretion of management. However, the PSN and Technical Department Supervisor did not sign the applicable signoffs as required by the procedure (the signature blocks were marked N/A instead). The 'break in run' was to be conducted at the discretion of the PSN and procedurally was not absolutely required. The minimum required number of charging pumps by procedure was maintained at all times (even excluding the 4B charging pump).

D. Actions taken

1. Procedure deficiency has been identified and procedure has been retained by PSN for corrective action.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith — Date: 11-26-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce — Date: 11/27/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
cjs 11/27/87

FINAL PAGE

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-26-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Attended morning staff meeting - Units 3 and 4 in Mode 5.
- Accompanied Outage Director on his rounds to verify maintenance activities and that attention was focused on Critical Path work including FCV 460, Letdown Isolation Valve, and 3A HHSI Pump.
- Reviewed the following:
  1. TP-405, "Removing Station Battery 3A from service for testing utilizing C bus battery",
  2. O-SME-003.2, "125 VDC Station Battery Monthly Maintenance",
  3. OTSC 5603 which changed battery float time from 72 hours to 24 hours.
  4. Letter #JPE-PTPO-87-2516 to J. A. Labarraque from D. A. Chaney-Engineering Project Manager, in which justification for OTSC 5603 was explained.
  5. Control Room Out of Service Log.
  6. Control Room Logs. For Technical Specification inconsistencies, none were found.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/26/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/26/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

The "Outage Director" position shows promise in overall coordination of Plant operation and Maintenance activities. He provides the PSN a wealth of information in the status of Plant maintenance activities and can fulfill requests by the PSN for more information such as pictures of damaged equipment for analysis, parts availability, etc.

F. Area(s) for improvement

The utilization of the Outage Director is not used to the full extent possible. It was explained to me that the position is sometimes filled haphazardly; such as. if the need arises, it is filled with an available body. If that body is needed back in his original department to head a critical job, he is pulled from the task of Outage "Coordinator" or Director and a vacancy exists for that period of time the critical job exists. Another body may be asked to fill the Outage Director job temporarily. He comes in cold and is unable to establish himself in the flow of activity immediately. A loss of coordination results.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

The Outage Director position should be established at the beginning of each outage, with 3 positions filled, one Director for each shift. The same 3 people should remain in the position the entire length of the outage to maintain continuity and extended knowledge of all activities necessary for a satisfactorily completed, on schedule outage duration.

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-26-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L W Pierce — Date: 11/27/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
DFB 11-27-87

FINAL PAGE

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/26/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/26-27/87

From: Wallace R. Williams, Jr. *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. NPS's and their shift personnel looking ahead to get ready for going on alternate RHR in case the work to repair valve 605 requires it.
2. Talked with Chief Electrician on the low P. I. for the 4C ICW motor.
3. Talked with Operations and PUP person on-shift about procedures, verbatim compliance, and the positive changes that are taking place.
4. Talked wth Mechanical people working in equipment hatch, Valve 455A, and 3A SIS alignment.
5. Toured Intake, Water Treatment Plant, #4-4160 Rooms, #3-4160 Rooms, #4-480 Load Center Rooms, #3-480 Load Center Rooms, #3B MCC Rooms, #4B MCC Rooms, #3 Turbine Building Mezzanine level, and #4A MCC area.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

WRW/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/26-27/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

In Unit 4 North Penetration Room Cable 4 IFCU5/T4I12 - 4 CO1/X2 appears not to be terminated correctly. The outer cable is cut back to allow working of the individual connections, but heat-shrink was only put on the actual connection area. Thus no outer protection for area cut back. Also, several cables laying out of trays and also flammable fire proofing gone from cables.

D. Actions taken

Notified I&C and Electrical Supervisor of Penetration Room Cables.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

1. Operations being proactive in getting ready for going on alternate RHR.
2. Actions of Chief Electrician to get heat on 4C ICW motor to increase P.I.
3. Actions of Mechanical Maintenance to identify and correct rust problems on #4 Containment Hatch and to inspect o-ring.
4. Actions of PUP that already had the procedure changes made for the RHR modification. Operations was pleased. The Log Sheets for the SNPO had to be OTSC'ed, this was done. And the permanent procedure change has already been written.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None observed

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

Evaluate all future Plant changes for impacts on operability and maintainability, due to all the equipment crowding from all the additions of the last few years.

Completed By: Wallace R. Williams, Jr. Date: 11-27-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce Date: 11/27/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
GJS 11/27/87

FINAL PAGE

WRW/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/26-27/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/26-27/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift briefing (Peaks).
2. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
3. End of shift briefing (Nights).
4. Performance of Procedure 4-OPS-059.1, SR Instrumentation Operational Test.
5. Run test of 4C CCW pump.
6. Performance of site Evacuation Alarm Test.
7. Tour of secondary plant.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

Not applicable

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

The PUP program "on-shift" support during nights was very good. The individual worked very closely with the shift to resolve several procedural conflicts encountered and was able to resolve the conflicts. He also solicited information and knowlege from the operating crew to aid in the modification of other procedures.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

Continue the "on-shift" PUP support program until the majority of procedural conflicts are resolved.

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith Date: 11-27-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce Date: 11/27/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*
GS 11/27/87

FINAL PAGE

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/26-27/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-27-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Attended morning staff meeting - Units 3 and 4 in Mode 5.
- Attended shift briefings.
- Observed and participated in lengthy discussions in verification and equipment requirements necessary for fill and vent of Unit 3 RCS.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/27/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

A clearance release was sent out to the Nuclear Operators to place 3A HHSI pump into service. The Nuclear Operator, in the act of valving in the pump, noticed a difference in the valve alignment request and what was normally seen by him in previous clearance releases on these safety related pumps. In affect, the release request placed all HHSI pumps on both Unit 3 and Unit 4 CCW systems. The Nuclear Operator called the Control Room to verify the requested alignment, which was, as a result, in error. The valve alignment request was corrected. According to the APSN, this is usually the case. If any questionable action is required by the non-licensed Operator in the field, they call to verify to ensure they understand the intent of the actions requested.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None observed

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-27-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] — Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/30/87 TMB 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/27/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/27-28/87

From: D. W. Haase *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Last portion of 4-OP-041.8, Filling and Venting the RCS.
2. Followed Control Room activities associated with 4-GOP-503.
3. Observed beginning of shift meeting.
4. Observed end of shift debriefing.
5. Observed troubleshooting activities associated with periodic decrease of thermal barrier $\Delta P$ to zero.
6. Observed activities concerning resolution of conflicts between 4-GOP-503 (also within) and the cold shutdown procedure, AP 0103.32.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

DWH/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/27-28/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

1. A condition was observed by the RCO where the RCP thermal barrier ΔP was decreasing to zero in ever increasing frequency. The RCO, with the aid of the APSN and the PSN, looked at all associated process parameters, utilized QSPDS, and quickly pinpointed the potential malfunctioning of HCV-121. Field observation was then done to verify that the valve was cycling. Action was initiated to have I&C check out the valve.

2. One of the shift objectives was to finish filling and venting the RCS and heat to 185°F and to start heating the pressurizer. Prior to energizing the pressurizer heaters a thorough review of 4-GOP-503 was performed. It was determined that energizing the heaters at this point prior to meeting all of the prerequisites for going above 200°F would violate the rules of procedure usage which dictates that the steps be done sequentially. Efforts were then directed towards making the appropriate procedure changes required for PNSC review. The discussion and interplay among the shift crew and support groups was appropriate and noteworthy.

F. Area(s) for improvement

1. When a procedure is required to be completed as a prerequisite to performing another step (or another procedure), a variety of definitions and interpretations exists as to what "completed" means. For example, the procedure may require that an attachment be completed. The RCO receives notification from the Field Operator that the attachment is completed and then, by the rules of procedure usage, can initial the procedure step. The rules of procedure usage procedures is not clear on whether or not the procedure is complete until the attachment is signed by the Field Operator or at the time the RCO is notified. A clear and consistent policy is needed.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

Clarify what constitutes a "completed" procedure for purposes described in F above.

Completed By: D. W. Haase Date: 11-28-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

[signature] 11/30/87 [signature] 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

DWH/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/27-28/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/27-28/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift briefing (Peaks).
2. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
3. 0-OPS-003.1 DC Distribution Panel Verification.
4. FIlling of Unit 4 S/G's with condensate transfer pump.
5. 4-OSP-067.1 Process Radiation Monitoring Operability Test.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/27-28/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

Not required

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

The Unit 4 RCO and APSN worked closely to properly diagnose an oscillating FCV 121 which was resulting in sporadic RCP labyrinth seal ΔP alarms. Proper diagnosis resulted in the I&C department correcting the source of the oscillation.

F. Area(s) for improvement

See G.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

Procedural guidance for what must be done to incorporate the latest procedural revision for a procedure which is in progress for a relatively long period of time, such as 4-GOP-503, should be instituted. Also, a mechanism should be incorporated to ensure for procedures such as 4-GOP-503 that are in progress for a long period of time, that when a step to verify a system lineup is initialed, that if changes to the system are made subsequent to the sign off, that the system is verified to be properly lined up.

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith — Date: 11-28-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] — Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

[signature] 11/30/87

[signature] 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/27-28/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-28-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Attended morning staff meeting.
2. Attended shift briefings.
3. Observed 4-OSP-041.7 "Reactor Coolant System Heatup and Cooldown Temperature Verification" in progress and verified acceptance criteria and logging requirements were maintained.
4. Observed preparations for Unit 4 RCS heatup and heatup evolutions to 160°F.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-28-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] — Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/30/87 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

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11/28/87

## ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/28-29/87

From: D. W. Haase *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift debriefings.
2. Beginning of shift meeting.
3. Clearance preparation for hanging tags for work on FCV-4-2817 positioner.
4. 4-OP-041.2, Pressurizer Operation, drawing the bubble.
5. Reviewed equipment out of service book for Unit 4.
6. Walked down Unit 4 portion of AFW and part of Unit 3.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

DWH/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28-29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

DWH/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28-29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Area(s) for improvement

Communications:

An I&C Specialist came into the Control Room and headed back to the racks saying to the RCO. "You know what I'm going to be working on." I suggested that he tell the RCO specifically what he was going to be doing and he did so. The RCO knew in general that he was going to be working on RCP seal leak off flows but not which one specifically. The C RCP was running at the time.

Procedure Usage:

Procedures are now being stamped (for about a month now) with a statement that the procedure may be affected by an OTSC. Verify information prior to use with a "Date verified" blank and an "Initials" blank. Some procedures were in use and the blanks were not filled with date and initials. Corrective action was taken to verify OTSC status and personnel were instructed on the requirement in the shift meetings.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

1. Communications

The need for being more specific when communicating as described in F above should be addressed in work group meetings in all departments that are involved in operations interfacing.

2. Procedure USsage.

A training brief should be issued to address the requirement to formally verify OTSC status prior to using a procedure. The procedures addressing procedure usage should also be revised to specifically delineate this requirement. (I could find no reference to or mention of this requirement in the procedures addressing procedure usage.)

Completed By: D. W. Haase — Date: 11-29-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: D. W. Haase — Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/30/87 PTS 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

DWH/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28-29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/28-29/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift briefing (Peaks).
2. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
3. Drawing of steam bubble in Unit 4 pressurizer and the draining of pressurizer level to normal band.
4. Unit 4 MSIV nitrogen backup acceptance (NOTE: test failed and bottles will have to be replaced, bottles did not meet minimum acceptance pressure).
5. Filling of Unit 4 RWST (Procedure 0-OP-046).
6. Filling of Unit 4 "A" accumulator, Procedure OP-064 (Section 7.6).
7. End of shift briefing (Nights).

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28-29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

Unit 4 RCO's displayed very good knowledge of system response during the formation of the pressurizer bubble. The evolution proceeded in a smooth controlled manner.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith Date: 11-29-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: [signature] Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

JHD 11/30/87 TMS 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

GMS/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/28-29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 6)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11-29-87

From: Michael G. Altermatt *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Attended morning outage meeting.
2. Attended shift briefing.
3. Observed preparations and final entry into Mode 4 on Unit 4.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 6)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

Sometime over this past week of November 23 thru November 29, 0-SME-003.2, "125 VDC Station Battery Monthly Maintenance" was performed on Station Battery 4B. Along with this surveillance, it was observed that at least three of the four station batteries were to be verified, or had been verified operable within the last month by performance of their monthly or annual periodic surveillance procedures.

A concern was expressed by the PSN when it was implied, at the Wednesday afternoon outage meeting, that 4B battery was "out-of-service due to specific gravity problems." Questions asked revealed no clear answers to the actual problem about the test. In fact, the PSN was unaware that the surveillance had previously taken place prior to this meeting. Checking with the APSN and RCO's revealed no indication that the Control Room had known of this particular surveillance being peformed. No entry in the RCO, APSN, and STA log books, or the out-of-service log book could be found to the contrary.

My continual observations throughout the next two days indicated that the Control Room SRO's were puzzled, wondering if the 4B battery was out-of-service and why they were not notified if, in fact, it did not pass the surveillance acceptance criteria. Repeated attempts to clarify the condition of the battery was hindered by a busy schedule, inability to find individuals that could explain the exact condition of the battery, and unclear answers from people they could contact. The ASPN was getting frustrated putting every reasonable effort he could into verifying the status of 4B battery. Again, at the outage meeting on Friday, the question arose about the 4B battery. The answer was, "It did not meet the full equalizing charge and electrolyte needed to be added". (see attachment Page 14B)

D. Actions taken

None

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 6)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices (continued)

It was observed about this time that a higher priority concern developed from this meeting with a resulting NCR No. 87-0254 and disposition being issued evaluating the failed acceptance criteria and final acceptablity of the test. The NCR identified three items whereby the 4B battery did not meet the acceptance criteria as specified in procedure 0-SME-003.2 but did meet Category A, Cateory B limits and the Category B allowable limits of the interim Technical Specification 4.8.2.1 and associated Table 4.8-2. The Control Room Operators were finally told, but not satisfied, that the 4B battery was operable by Friday afternoon. This information followed a previous out-of-service log entry of 4B battery because of the confusion and another out-of-service situation of the 3A battery, upon which an annual surveillance test was performed during the time in question.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 6)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Area(s) for improvement

1. There was a lack of communications between the Electrical Department and the Control Room. It appeared the Control Room was not notified that the test was going to be performed or if they were notified, information did not get passed to the following shifts and no log entries were made. It is very important that tests on safety related equipment be known by the licensed operators so that they remain cognizant of plant status and maintain required redundant equipment operable during testing. It is also their responsibility to pass onto relieving shifts the status of safety related equipment and that proper log entries be made.

   When discrepancies developed between the acceptance criteria and the surveillance results, the Control Room was not notified that a possible inoperability of the battery may have resulted from the data collected. The Electrical Department either failed to notify the Control Room or were unaware that a possible Technical Specification problem existed, whereas notification of the Control Room was unnecessary. The SRO has the knowledge and is the first readily available authority of the Technical Specifications with the ultimate responsibility to determine operability of his equipment. He should have been notified immediately of the inconsistent test results. Any deviation of test results as compared with acceptance criteria should be imparted to the Control Room at all times.

2. If the PSN had known the test results, judgement of the condition of the battery as to its inoperability would be very difficult. The acceptance criteria stated in procedure 0-SME-003.2 appears to be created from three separate sources. (A) The base Technical Specifications, (B) The Interim Technical Specifications, and (c) IEEE 450, 1980 edition. (See attached Page 15b)

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 5 of 6)

MOS DAILY REPORT

F. Area(s) for improvement (continued)

2. The engineering assessment of operability in NCR 87-02564 indicated that the test did not meet some of the IEEE 450 requirements, but did meet Technical Specification requirements. This makes it very difficult for the PSN to determine operability when procedure acceptance criteria is not obtained from a single reference. Interpretation is the rule. This should not be the case.

3. Being unaware of a possible inoperable 4B battery status, the Operators believed that they had all four station batteries operable and inservice. They removed 3A battery from service for its annual surveillance to be performed. Interim Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 requires as a minimum, three 125-volt D. C. buses each consisting of a battery bank with an associated full capacity charger be operable in Modes 5 and 6. Because of the lack of information, the limiting condition of operation could have been violated unknowingly with 2 of the 4 batteries inoperable if 4B battery was found to be inoperative.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 6 of 6)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

The "root" cause of the 4B battery situation and of many similar occurrences of this type that could arise periodically is the lack of one source document to base decisions on equipment operability, one Technical Specification for all disciplines to derive acceptance criteria, operational guidelines, and acceptable standards in plant operation and maintenance evoluations.

Efforts to obtain a single set of Technical Specifications for Turkey Point should be prioritized to its maximum extent.

Completed By: Michael G. Altermatt — Date: 11-29-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: L. W. Pearce — Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/30/87 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

MGA/md
★/JWG/dj/sr/dj

11/29/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/29-30/87

From: D. W. Haase *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. End of shift debriefings.
2. Beginning of shift meeting.
3. Observed followup by APSN on 4-OSP-075.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Path Verification.
4. Pertinent portions of 4-GOP-503, Prerequisites for heating above 350°F and the heatup to 380°F.
5. Section 6.1 of 4-OP-050 for shutdown of RHR.
6. I&C/OPS pre-job discussion of work to be done on blender controls.
7. Adjustment of AFW nitrogen backup system pressure regulators and completion of 4-OP-065.2, AFW and MSIV backup $N_2$ gas supply system.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

While observing follow-up action on the AFW flow path verification procedure, two configuration discrepancies were noted on the AFW nitrogen backup system. On Train I, a reducing assembly used to connect a test gauge was not removed and the isolation valve was thus not capped. The test gauge was used earlier in the shift. On Train II, a valve was found installed at the tee between valve 4-40-279 and pressure switch PS-4-2328.

D. Actions taken

The APSN was present when these discrepancies were found and initiated the following action:

1. Notified the PSN and put a hold on heatup above 350°F pending resolution of the discrepancies.
2. Notified I&C to initiate action to restore the system to its proper pre-test configuration..

I&C corrected the discrepancies by removing the reducer assembly on Train I and installing a cap and by removing the valve and associated tubing and installing a cap at the tee.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

The PSN and the APSN worked together on looking ahead to determine what prerequisites could be accomplished during the heat-up in preparation for the next mode change. A list was then prepared as an aid to this shift and the oncoming shift in planning their activities.

F. Area(s) for improvement

1. Reference Material Usage

Operating procedure 0-OP-046, CVCS-Boron concentration control was being used as reference material for repairs being made to the control system. It was out-of-date. More attention to detail has to be given to assuring that reference material is current.

2. Work Controls Associated with Seals and Locks:

More attention needs to be paid to specifying whether a valve is sealed closed, sealed open, locked closed with colored lock, locked open with colored lock, or locked open/closed with F series lock. (The same applies to locked open breakers.) The flow path verification for AFW found some lock wires not installed on some valves. To clear up on this procedure the wires were installed. The wires should have been installed as a part of releasing the clearance or completing valve manipulations.

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

1. Work control practices need to be reviewed for work involving temporary test connections such as those described in C above. The objective is to assure that controls are in place to give assurance that systems are returned to the proper configuration following testing.

2. Practices concerning the use of reference materials, specifically plant procedures and drawings, need to be reviewed to assure that current practices are effective in providing up-to-date reference material and if not, update these practices.

3. Controls need to be put in place that assure that lock wires get replaced and that the proper locks get installed following manipulations of valves and breakers for any reason. See Item 2 in F above.

Completed By: D. W. Haase — Date: 11-30-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: D. W. Haase — Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent-Nuclear*
PTD 11/30/87
JDB 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

DWH/md
★/JWC/dj/sr/dj

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO: J. W. Kappes

LOCATION: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

FROM: D. J. Tomaszewski

DATE: November 30, 1987

SUBJECT: MOS Procedure O-ADM-019, Dated 11/28/87 PWOs 6986, 6196, 7655, 6105, 7802, 7803, 7774, Maintenance Instruction 75-014

COPIES TO: file

The referenced Management on Shift daily report listed under questionable work practices two discrepancies:

1) On train I a reducing assembly was installed to facilitate testing requested by Ops earlier in the shift, and had not been removed, and the isolation valve capped. The reducer was later removed and line capped per PWO 7774 on the Mid Shift, at Ops request.

2) On train II, a Whitey valve was found between valve 4-40-279 and PS-4-2328, apparently utilized to check the pressure switch setpoint during calibrations. The valve was also removed per PWO 7774.

Both these discrepancies were in conflict with appropriate plant drawings.

As stated before, the reducer was utilized to assist operations for N2 backup system testing, and had been installed earlier that day. The Whitey valve, however, was not installed that day, and no documentation is available to explain how it appeared in the field. Discussions were held with both specialists who assisted Ops with the test and trouble tickets on 11/29/87; they did not install the valve.

As the reducing assembly was installed under an 'Assist Ops' PWO, no specific signoffs or independent verifications are required for installations or removal of test equipment. It will be future policy of the I&C Department to perform Operations Assistance on safety systems under separate PWOs with specific work instructions. This will include alterations of tubing/piping runs by the installation of fittings, test tees, gauges, etc.

The procedure that governs the calibration, MI-75-014 is not specific regarding means to vent pressure or simulate pressure for the pressure switch setpoint check. It does, however, state to remove test equipment prior to returning to service. Apparently during past performance of the MI-75-014, the valve was left in the system. A letter reinforcing the importance of returning a system to proper configuration will be issued to the I&C Department.

D. J. Tomaszewski
I&C Supervisor - Nuclear

DJT/JGK:pap

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 1 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 11/29-30/87

From: Gregg M. Smith *(MOS Observer)* Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

1. Beginning of shift briefing (Nights).
2. Commencement of steaming S/G's and feeding with "A" SGFP and feed regulating bypass valves.
3. Performance of 4-OSP-059.2 Intermediate Range NIS Analog Channel Operational Test.
4. Observed portions of 4-OSP-206.6 ECCS Monthly Valve Cycling Procedure.
5. End of shift briefing (Nights).

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

GMS/md
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11/29-30/87

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 2 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 3 of 4)

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Strengths

The operating crew worked hard to ensure work required to allow Unit 4 to continue to heatup towards normal operating temperature and pressure was completed in an expeditious but safe manner.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

ENCLOSURE 1
(Page 4 of 4)

## MOS DAILY REPORT

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Gregg M. Smith _____ Date: 11-30-87
*MOS Observer*

Reviewed By: _____ Date: 11/30/87
*Operations Superintendent- Nuclear*

11/30/87 11/30/87

FINAL PAGE

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11/29-30/87

# Management-on-Shift (MOS)
## ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| AEO | Auxiliary Equipment Operator |
| AFW | Auxiliary Feedwater |
| ANPO | Assistant Nuclear Plant Operator |
| APSN | Assistant Plant Supervisor Nuclear |
| ASP | Administrative Site Procedure |
| CCW | Component Cooling Water |
| CP | Charging Pump |
| CVCS | Chemical Volume Control System |
| DG | Diesel Generator |
| DC | Direct Current |
| ΔP or DP | Differential Pressure |
| ECCS | Emergency Core Cooling System |
| EDG | Emergency Diesel Generator |
| ERT | Event Response Team |
| EW | East-West |
| FCV | Flow Control Valve |
| FPL | Florida Power and Light Company |
| FSAR | Final Safety Analysis Report |
| GEMS | Generating Equipment Management Systems |
| GPM | Gallons Per Minute |
| HCV | Hand Control Valve |
| HHSI | High Head Safety Injection |
| HX | Heat Exchanger |
| IAW | In Accordance With |
| ICW | Intake Cooling Water |
| ICWP | Intake Cooling Water Pump |
| IST | Inservice Testing |
| LCV | Level Control Valve |
| MCC | Motor Control Center |
| MSIV | Main Steam Isolation Valve |
| MOS | Management on Shift |
| MOV | Motor Operated Valve |
| NAB | Nuclear Administration Building |
| NAWAS | National Warning System (Emergency Planning) |
| NCR | Non-Conformance Report |
| NIS | Nuclear Instrumentation System |

| | |
|---|---|
| NO | Nuclear Operator |
| NPO | Nuclear Plant Operator |
| NPS | Nuclear Plant Supervisor |
| NRC | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| NS | North-South |
| NWE | Nuclear Watch Engineer |
| OMS | Overpressure Mitigating System |
| ONOP | Off Normal Operating Procedure |
| OOS | Out-of-Service |
| OTSC | On The Spot Change |
| PI | Polarization Index |
| PM | Preventative Maintenance |
| PNSC | Plant Nuclear Safety Committee |
| PORV | Power Operated Relief Valve |
| PPM | Parts Per Million |
| PRZ | Pressurizer |
| PUP | Procedure Upgrade Program |
| PWO | Plant Work Order |
| QSPDS | Qualified Safety Parameter Display System |
| RCA | Radiation Control Area |
| RCO | Reactor Control Operator |
| RCP | Reactor Coolant Pump |
| RCS | Reactor Coolant System |
| RHR | Residual Heat Removal |
| RTD | Resistance Temperature Device |
| RV | Reactor Vessel |
| SAS | Safety Assessment System |
| S/G | Steam Generator |
| SGFP | Steam Generator Feed Pump |
| SIS | Safety Injection System |
| SNOW | Short Notice Outage Work |
| SNPO | Senior Nuclear Plant Operator |
| STA | Shift Technical Advisor |
| TOP | Temporary Operating Procedure |
| TSA | Temporary System Alteration |
| TP | Temporary Procedure |
| W | Westinghouse Corporation |