

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706220174 DOC. DATE: 87/06/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251  
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 SALAMON, G. Florida Power & Light Co.  
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-009-00: on 870516, diesel generator light went out causing loss of emergency power supply for RHR sys. Caused by inadvertent bumping of Telemand transfer relay 2x4-3A. Normal power supply restored & personnel counseled. W/870615 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4  
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD2-2 LA	1 1	PD2-2 PD	1 1
	McDONALD, D	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1
	RES DEPY GI	1 1	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point 4										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1										PAGE (3) 1 OF 3									
TITLE (4) Both Diesel Generators Out of Service Causing Loss of Emergency Power Supply for the Residual Heat Removal System																													
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)																	
0	5	1	6	8	7	8	7	0	0	9	0	0	0	6	1	5	8	7	Turkey Point 3			0	5	0	0	0	2	5	0
OPERATING MODE (9) 5			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																										
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)				20.405(c)				60.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)														
			20.405(a)(1)(i)				60.36(c)(1)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)														
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)				60.36(c)(2)				60.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)														
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(i)				60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)																		
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)				60.73(a)(2)(ii)				60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)																		
			20.405(a)(1)(v)				60.73(a)(2)(iii)				60.73(a)(2)(ix)																		
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)												TELEPHONE NUMBER																	
NAME Gabe Salamon, Compliance Engineer												AREA CODE 3 0 5						2 4 6 - 6 5 6 0											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																													
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs																			
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR													
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																	

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (18)

On May 16, 1987 at 1655, with Unit 4 in Mode 5 and Unit 3 defueled, the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) "Ready to Start" light went out. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the Telemand transfer relay had tripped. Tripping of relay 2X4-3A caused actuation of the Telemand transfer relay, resulting in the transfer of the power supply for the 3A motor control center (MCC). During the transfer, power was lost to some of the auxiliary equipment for the "A" EDG and as a result, the "A" EDG was declared out of service (OOS). Even though the "A" EDG was technically OOS, it was capable of starting. Since the "B" EDG was OOS for maintenance at the time of the event, the emergency power supplies to the residual heat removal (RHR) system were not available. The most probable cause of the event was that startup department personnel, who were working in close vicinity to the 2X4-3A relay, bumped the relay causing it to trip. The 3A MCC was transferred back to its normal power supply and power was restored to the "A" EDG auxiliaries. The "A" EDG was returned to service at 1750 on May 16, 1987. The "B" EDG was returned to service at 0310 on May 23, 1987. During this event, both EDG's were OOS for a duration of 55 minutes. The startup personnel involved were counselled to exercise caution when doing their wiring checks and the exact location of the 2X4-3A relay was pointed out to them.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Turkey Point 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	8 7	0 0 9	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EVENT

On May 16, 1987 at 1655, with Unit 4 in Mode 5 and Unit 3 defueled, the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) "Ready to Start" light went out. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the "A" EDG oil soak back pump was not operating thus causing a low soak back lube oil pressure condition which in turn caused a loss of the "Ready to Start" light. Further investigation revealed that relay 2X4-3A, which actuates the Telemand transfer relay, had tripped. This caused a transfer in the power supply for the 3A motor control center (MCC). During the transfer, power was lost (per design) to some of the auxiliary equipment for the "A" EDG, including the soak back oil pump, immersion heaters, and the fuel oil skid tank fill solenoid valve. An evaluation of this event determined that the "A" EDG should be declared out of service (OOS). Since the "B" EDG was OOS for maintenance at the time of the event (see LER 250-87-012), the emergency power supplies to the residual heat removal (RHR) system were not available. During the initial investigation, it was discovered that startup department personnel were working in close vicinity to the 2X4-3A relay and most likely bumped the relay causing it to trip. Because the cause of the event was known, the 3A MCC was transferred back to its normal power supply and power was restored to the auxiliary equipment. The oil soak pump was restarted and the "A" EDG "Ready to Start" light came back on. The "A" EDG was returned to service at 1750 on May 16, 1987. The "B" EDG was returned to service at 0310 on May 23, 1987. During this event, both EDG's were administratively OOS for a duration of 55 minutes.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The most probable cause of the event was an inadvertent bumping of the Telemand transfer relay, 2X4-3A, by startup department personnel. Startup department personnel were performing post maintenance wire verification checks in cabinet 3C23A. This cabinet houses the 2X4-3A relay. If this relay is tripped, the Telemand relay will then transfer MCC 3A from load center 3A to load center 3D. During this "Telemand Swap", the auxiliary equipment for the "A" EDG will be deenergized and will only be regained by manually resetting the circuit to its normal power supply.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Because EDG "B" was OOS and EDG "A" was administratively OOS, the emergency power supplies for the Unit 4 RHR system had to be considered unavailable. Technically, upon a loss of offsite power, the RHR system would not have been capable of removing decay heat. However, EDG "A" would have started

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Turkey Point 4	05000251	87	009	00	03	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

offsite power supply. In addition, three Reactor Coolant Pumps and their associated coolant loops were operable. EDG "A", had a valid start signal been received, would have started and performed its design function. The "A" EDG was returned to service in 55 minutes. Spent Fuel Pit cooling to Unit 3 was maintained throughout the event. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

- 1) The 3A MCC was transferred back to its normal power supply, the "A" EDG auxiliaries were reenergized, and the "A" EDG returned to service.
- 2) The startup personnel involved were counselled to exercise caution when doing their wiring checks. In addition, they were shown specifically where the 2X4-3A relay was located inside cabinet 3C23A.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Similar occurrences: LER's 250-87-011, 250-86-002, 251-86-004, 251-86-005, 251-86-013, 251-86-022



JUNE 15 1987

L-87-247  
10 CFR 50.73


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4  
Docket No. 50-251  
Reportable Event: 87-09  
Date of Event: May 16, 1987  
Both Diesel Generators Out of Service Causing Loss of  
Emergency Power Supply for the Residual Heat Removal System

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

  
C. O. Woody  
Group Vice President  
Nuclear Energy

COW/SDF/gp

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC  
Senior Resident Inspection, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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