

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706120085 DOC. DATE: 87/06/08 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 SALAMON, G. Florida Power & Light Co.
 WOODY, C. D. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-012-00: on 870507, emergency diesel generator
 auto-started due to personnel error in failing to lift
 clearance prior to performing steps of procedure. Operator
 counseled & supervisor briefing to be detailed. W/870608 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: 1E22 COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
PD2-2 LA	1 1	PD2-2 PD	1 1
McDONALD, D	1 1		

INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1	<u>REC FILE</u> 02	1 1
RES DEPY QI	1 1	RON2 FILE 01	1 1

EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3															
TITLE (4) Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-Start Due to Performing Procedural Steps Prior to Lifting Clearance																																			
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																	
MONTH		DAY		YEAR		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER		MONTH		DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAMES Turkey Point Unit 4						DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1											
0 5		0 7		8 7		8 7		0 1 2		0 0		0 6		0 8		8 7								0 5 0 0 0											
OPERATING MODE (9) 6						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																													
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0						20.402(b)						20.405(e)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)											
						20.405(a)(1)(i)						50.38(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)											
						20.405(a)(1)(ii)						50.38(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)											
						20.405(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(i)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)																	
						20.405(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																	
20.405(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)																							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																			
NAME Gabe Salamon, Compliance Engineer																				TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 0 5 2 4 6 - 6 5 6 0															
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																			
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NRC																	
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)										MONTH		DAY		YEAR	
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																									
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)																																			
<p>On May 7, 1987, at 1720, with Unit 3 in Mode 6 and Unit 4 in Mode 5, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B auto-started. At this time, load centers (LC) 3C and 3D were tied together via breaker 30310. As the LC's were being returned to normal alignment following maintenance on the 3D LC undervoltage (UV) relay, Load Sequencer (LS) 3C23B sensed a degraded LC voltage condition, which initiated bus stripping and started EDG B. UV work required the LC's to be tied together and the fuses removed in order to prevent sensing an undervoltage condition. When the 3D LC to 3B 4 kv bus tiebreaker was closed, without the fuses being installed, a UV condition was sensed on the B bus. Load was sequenced on, and after reaching the expected load continued to increase to about 2900 kW, which was less than the 168 hour rating of the EDG. The additional load was picked up through the intertie between the LC's. At this time, breaker 30310 opened on overcurrent. EDG load then dropped to approximately 1000 kW. The fuses were installed, and at 1756 offsite power to the 3B bus was restored. The B EDG was then taken off the bus, and EDG shutdown was completed at 1808. The cause of the event was personnel error. Shift supervision has been directed to ensure that evolution briefings are more detailed. The operator was counseled. EDG B and other potentially affected components were thoroughly inspected and tested with no problems found.</p>																																			
8706120085 870608 PDR ADOCK 05000250 S PDR																																			

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	8 7	— 0 1 2	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EVENT

On May 7, 1987, at 1720, with Unit 3 in Mode 6 and Unit 4 in Mode 5, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) B auto-started. At the time of the event, load centers (LC) 3C and 3D were tied together via breaker 30310, and 4 kv buses 3A and 3B were being supplied from offsite power. The breakers from the 3B bus feeding LC 3D were open. The LC's were tied together and the fuses were removed in accordance with Clearance 87-5-X1-131 in order to perform work on the 3D LC undervoltage relays and to prevent sensing an undervoltage condition. After the completion of the required maintenance, efforts to return the 3C and 3D LC's to normal alignment were initiated. This entailed the release of the above clearance and performance of section 7.6 of 3-OP-006, "480 Volt Switchgear System". The operator performed the procedural steps of 3-OP-006 prior to performing the clearance release. Upon the closure of breaker 30410, (LC 3D Main Breaker from 4160V Switchgear 3B), Load Sequencer (LS) 3C23B sensed a degraded LC voltage condition, even though LC 3D was still powered from LC 3C through tiebreaker 30310. In response, the LS initiated bus stripping of the 3B bus and the EDG B auto-start. EDG B started and its 4 kv breaker closed on the 3B bus. Load was sequenced on, and after reaching the expected load continued to increase to approximately 2900 kW, which is less than the 168 hour rating of the EDG. At this time, or approximately 3 minutes subsequent to the EDG start, breaker 30310 opened upon sensing an overcurrent condition. The load on the EDG then dropped to approximately 1000 kW. Upon the opening of breaker 30310, the battery charger alarm and plant page power supply alarm came in. The operators then noticed that the vital side of Motor Control Center (MCC) D was no longer powered, and swapped the plant page power supply to Units 1 and 2. Upon identifying the immediate cause of the EDG auto-start as uninstalled fuses in LC 3D, the fuses were installed and LC's 3C and 3D were retied. No alarms came in during the EDG loading and unloading. At 1756, breaker 3AB05 was closed, restoring offsite power to the 3B bus. At 1757, the B EDG was taken off the bus, and shutdown of the EDG was completed at 1808.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was personnel error in that the operator did not lift the clearance prior to performing steps of a procedure for normal operation of the affected equipment. The clearance required that both LC's be powered from the LC 3C transformer, and that the metering and potential fuses be pulled from LC 3D. The potential fuses supply power to the circuits which sense an undervoltage condition. The logic required for the EDG B auto-start is comprised of:

- 1) Closure of breaker 3AB14 (3B bus to 3D LC)
- 2) Closure of breaker 30410 (3D LC to 3B bus)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

- 3) EDG B to 3B bus breaker 3AB20 open
- 4) Undervoltage test switch in the NOR position
- 5) Sensing of low voltage on 3B bus

With the fuses not installed, EDG B not running, and the UV test switch in the NOR position, conditions 3, 4, and 5 were met. Procedure 3-OP-006 step 7.6.2.5 closed breaker 3AB14, meeting condition 1. Step 7.6.2.6.b closed breaker 30410, meeting condition 2, completing the logic and resulting in the EDG B auto-start.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

EDG B started and ran properly upon receipt of the auto-start signal. The tying together of Load Centers is not permitted unless both Units 3 and 4 are in at least cold shutdown (mode 5), consequently this event could not have occurred during power operation. Subsequent to the transient it was noted that EDG B was paralleled with offsite power in a potentially out-of-phase condition. As a result, EDG B was declared out of service, (OOS), and a Non-Conformance Report (NCR 87-133) was generated. The NCR identified the potential out-of-phase condition and the overload experienced by system components prior to the tripping of breaker 30310 as potential problem areas. Inspections and tests performed pursuant to the NCR disposition revealed no damage to the EDG or other components which may have been affected by the transient. Following the inspections and tests, EDG B was returned to operability. EDG A was operable during the time that EDG B was OOS, except for approximately 1 hour on May 16, when both EDG's were OOS (see LER 251-87-009). Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) The plant training department will evaluate this event for appropriate training requirements and methods.
- 2) Shift supervision has been directed to ensure that evolution briefings are more detailed and to accompany field operators on critical evolutions.
- 3) The subject operator was counseled.
- 4) EDG B and other potentially affected components were thoroughly inspected and tested in order to assure operability.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Similar occurrences: none.



JUNE 08 1987

L-87-240
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3
Docket No. 50-250
Reportable Event: 87-12
Date of Event: May 7, 1987
Emergency Diesel Generator Auto-Start Due to
Performing Procedural Steps Prior to Lifting Clearance

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

[Handwritten signature]
for

C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

COW/SDF/gp

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspection, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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