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
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 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WILLIAMS, J.W. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 VARGA, S.A. Operating Reactors Branch 1

SUBJECT: Forwards modified NSHC for proposed amends to Licenses
 DPR-31 & DPR-41, "Fuel Storage U-235 Linear Loading
 Increase."

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May 25, 1984
L-84-140

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 & 50-251
Proposed Amendment to
Facility Operating License DPR-31 and 41
Fuel Storage U-235 Linear Loading Increase

Dear Mr. Varga:

Attached please find our modified No Significant Hazards Consideration for the Proposed Amendment "Fuel Storage U-235 Linear Loading Increase". We previously transmitted it as Attachment 2 to letter No. L-84-92 (April 4, 1984).

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. W. Williams, Jr.", is written over the typed name.

J. W. Williams, Jr.
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy Department

JWW/SAV/cab

Attachment

cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Region II
Harold F. Reis, Esquire

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ATTACHMENT 2

No Significant Hazards Consideration

Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) presents this evaluation of the hazards considerations involved with the proposed amendment, focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as quoted below:

"The Commission may make a final determination, pursuant to the procedures in 50.91, that a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) of 50.22 or for a testing facility involves no significant hazards considerations, unless it finds that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety."

FPL submits that the activities associated with this amendment request do not meet any of the significant hazards consideration standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a no significant hazards consideration finding is justified. In support of this determination, necessary background information is first provided, followed by a discussion of each significant safety hazards consideration factors with respect to the proposed amendments.

Background

The Turkey Point Plants were designed and constructed with two new fuel storage racks and two spent fuel storage pools, one of each associated with Unit 3 and one with Unit 4. The new fuel storage racks have a capacity of 54 new fuel assemblies. The spent fuel storage pools had a capacity for 217 fuel assemblies (equivalent to 1-1/3 cores).

The Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Final Safety Analysis Report addressed the safety implications of these facilities and included relevant parameters associated with criticality, structural integrity, and cooling. The Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Safety Evaluation Report (Docket No.'s 50-250 and 50-251) found the environmental and safety impacts of storage in these facilities to be acceptable.

In 1976, a request to amend the Turkey Point operating licenses for increased spent fuel storage was submitted by FPL. By letter dated March 17, 1977, the Commission approved Amendments 23 and 22 to facility operating licenses DPR-31 and DPR-41, respectively, for modification to Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 spent fuel storage facilities. These modifications consisted of reracking the Unit 3 and 4 spent fuel pools with high density fuel storage racks which increased the storage capacity from 217 fuel assemblies to 621 fuel assemblies. Approval of the amendments included a detailed review and analysis of all relevant storage parameters and potential accidents. The

analyses resulted in a finding that environmental and safety impacts were negligible.

The safety evaluation performed in support of the request to amend the Turkey Point operating licenses to allow reracking of the Unit 3 and 4 fuel pools addressed the following:

1. Structural and Seismic Analysis
2. Nuclear Criticality Analysis
3. Thermal-Hydraulic
4. Accident Analysis
5. Radiation Exposures
6. Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accident

It was determined that the proposed modifications to the Unit 3 and 4 spent fuel pools would be acceptable because: (1) the rack structural design would withstand conditions during normal operation combined with the maximum earthquake, (2) the rack would preclude criticality for any moderating condition, (3) the existing spent fuel cooling system was determined to adequately cool the increased heat load and redundant 100% capacity spare pump would be installed, (4) the increased radiation doses, both onsite and offsite, would be negligible, and (5) spent fuel cask handling operations would not change from the original design.

The current spent fuel storage capacity at Turkey Point consists of 621 storage locations in each spent fuel pool.

With this application, FPL is requesting approval to increase the U-235 linear loading in all fuel storage areas and delete the reactor core reload fuel U-235 enrichment specification, as set forth in the attached Safety Analysis Report.

Evaluation

The following evaluation demonstrates (by reference to the analysis contained in the attached Safety Analysis Report) that the proposed amendment to increase the fuel storage U-235 linear loading does not exceed any of the three significant hazards consideration standards. The analysis of this proposed increase in fuel storage enrichment has been accomplished using current accepted codes and standards as specified in Section 2.1 of the attached Safety Analysis Report. The results of the analysis meet the specified acceptance criteria in these standards as presented in the Safety Analysis Report. The basis of the proposed deletion of the reactor core reload fuel enrichment specification is that this specification is unnecessary and superfluous in that there are other provisions in the Technical Specifications which determine safe operating and fuel storage limits related to fuel enrichment. These other safe operating limits include dynamic parameters, rod worths and peaking factors. In other words, specification of reload fuel enrichment has no bearing on the safe operation of the reactor core provided that existing safety limits and limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) are satisfied.

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

In the course of the analysis, FPL has identified the following potential accident scenarios:

1. A fuel assembly drop in the spent fuel pool.
2. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling system flow.
3. A spent fuel cask drop.

The consequences of item 1, "A fuel assembly drop in the spent Fuel pool" for the criticality acceptance criterion are not changed as explained in Section 3.0 of the criticality analysis. The radiological consequences of this type of accident in the spent fuel pool are bounded by the cask drop accident. Thus the consequences of this type accident will not be significantly increased from previously evaluated fuel assembly drops.

The consequences of item 2, "Loss of spent fuel cooling system flow" will not be affected. As previously stated, the existing safety limits and limiting conditions of operations in the plant Technical Specifications will have to be addressed and evaluated for each specific future reload and will take into account fuel enrichment and burnup. The effect of the decay heat characteristics due to the burnup of fuel with the proposed increased enrichment, is bounded by the existing loss of spent fuel pool cooling system flow evaluation. The proposed amendment to increase the fuel storage U-235 linear loading specification will not result in an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated for loss of spent fuel cooling system flow.

The consequences of item 3, "A spent fuel cask drop", as previously evaluated will not be affected by an increase in fuel assembly U-235 linear loading. As previously stated, the existing safety limits and limiting conditions of operations in the plant Technical Specifications will have to be addressed and evaluated for each specific future reload and will take into account fuel enrichment and burnup. The fission product inventory due to the burnup of fuel with the proposed enrichment is bounded by the existing evaluation of the spent fuel cask drop and the proposed amendment does not alter the configuration of the storage racks. Therefore, the proposed amendment to increase the fuel storage U-235 linear loading will not result in an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated for a spent fuel cask drop.

Thus, it is concluded that the proposed amendment to increase the fuel storage U-235 linear loading and deletion of the reactor core enrichment specification will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

FPL has evaluated the proposed technical specification changes in accordance with the guidance of the NRC position paper entitled, "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling

Applications", appropriate NRC Regulatory Guides, appropriate NRC Standard Review Plans, and appropriate Industry Codes and Standards as listed in Section 2.1 of the attached Safety Analysis Report. As a result of this evaluation, FPL finds that the proposed technical specification changes do not, in any way, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated for the Turkey Point Fuel Storage Facilities.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC Staff Safety Evaluation review process has established that the issue of margin of safety, when applied to modification, will need to address the area of nuclear criticality considerations.

The established acceptance criteria for criticality is that the neutron multiplication factor, including all uncertainties, under all conditions:

- a. shall be less than or equal to 0.98 for optimum moderation conditions in the new fuel storage facility; and
- b. shall be less than or equal to 0.95 for fully flooded conditions in both the new fuel storage facility and the spent fuel pool.

This margin of safety has been adhered to in the criticality analysis methods for the spent fuel and new fuel storage, as discussed in Section 3.0 and 4.0 of the attached Safety Analysis Report.

The methods to be used in the criticality analysis conform with applicable codes, standards, or pertinent sections thereof, as referenced in Section 2.1 of the Safety Analysis Report.

In meeting the acceptance criteria for criticality in the Turkey Point Unit 3 and Unit 4 fuel storage facilities such that:

- a. K_{eff} is always less than 0.98, including uncertainties at a 95/95 probability confidence level for optimum moderation conditions in the new fuel storage facility.
- b. K_{eff} is always less than 0.95, including all uncertainties at a 95/95 probability confidence level for fully flooded conditions in both the new fuel storage facility and in the spent fuel pool.

Increasing the limiting K_{eff} in the new fuel storage facility to 0.98 is solely administrative and consistent with the value established in USNRC Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Section 9.1.1.

The proposed amendment to increase the fuel storage U-235 linear loading and increase the limiting K_{eff} in the new fuel storage area will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety for nuclear criticality.

In summation, it has been shown that the proposed increase in the fuel storage facility U-235 linear loading, increasing the limiting K_{eff} in the new fuel storage facility, and deletion of the reactor core enrichment specification does not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

FPL has determined and submits that the proposed amendments described do not involve a significant safety hazard and that the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 have been met.