

UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

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20 October 1983

Mr. J. M. Felton, Director
Division of Rules and Records
Office of Administration
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT REQUEST
FOIA-83-615
Rec'd 10-24-83


Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, please make available at the Commission's Washington, D.C., Public Document Room copies of documents in the following categories:

- A. All documents concerning the incident at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 described in Enclosure B, page 2, of the Weekly Information Report for the Week Ending October 7, 1983 (copy attached).

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this request, please do not hesitate to contact me at (202) 296-5600.

Sincerely,



Steven C. Sholly
Technical Research Associate

Dupe

8402010399

3. Upon verification that the Appendix A alignments are complete, verify that the function selector switches on the H₂ analyzer panels (primary and backup) are in the sample position. Turn the control switches to analyze and depress the remote selector buttons.

- 5.1.5 Whenever the containment Hi-Hi pressure setpoint is reached, verify that the following have occurred:

C. Room Indications

1. ~~Containment Spray is initiated~~
2. Containment Spray is initiated
3. Containment Isolation Phase B is initiated
4. Main Steam Isolation Valves have closed

If not, manually initiate Containment Spray, Containment Isolation Phase B and close Main Steam Isolation Valves.

NOTE: If the Containment Hi Hi pressure setpoint is reached with indications of a LOCA, this constitutes a GENERAL EMERGENCY. Notify the Plant Supervisor - Nuclear.

4. Close or verify closed, pressurizer relief tank gas analyzer isolation valve SV-*-6385 and the excess letdown/RCP seal water return isolation valve MOV-*-381 and MOV-*-6386.

5.2 ACCIDENT DIAGNOSTICS:

- 5.2.1 Evaluate reactor coolant pressure to determine if it is low or decreasing in an uncontrolled manner. If it is low or decreasing, verify that:

1. All pressurizer spray line valves are closed and
2. all pressurizer relief valves are closed.

If not, manually close the valves from the console.


NOTE: A failed open pressurizer relief valve or pressurizer safety is an UNUSUAL EVENT. Notify the Plant Supervisor - Nuclear.

If the RCS pressure is above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint (1843 psig) and is stable or increasing, go to Step 5.2.7.

- 5.2.2 Stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps after the high head safety injection pump operation has been verified and when the wide range reactor coolant pressure is at 1400 psig as seen on PI-*-403 VPA or PI-*-405 VPB.

CAUTION: If component cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps is isolated on a containment pressure signal, all reactor coolant pumps should be stopped because of loss of motor bearing cooling and thermal barrier cooling. Increased component cooling water flow resulting from safety injection, may cause closure of FCV-*-626. Verify that FCV-*-626 is open.

NOTE: The conditions given above for stopping reactor coolant pumps should be continuously monitored throughout this instruction.



APPENDIX A (cont'd)

5. Any event requiring initiation of shutdown of Unit 3 or 4 in accordance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation.

Examples:

- (1) If a Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation is not met and a shutdown is commenced, this must be reported.
- (2) If the time allowed for remedial action expires and the Limiting Condition for Operation is still not met and a shutdown is commenced, this must be reported.

Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which, during normal operations,

6. ~~Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which, during normal operations,~~ anticipated operational occurrences, or accident conditions, prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the safety function of those structures, systems, and components important to safety that are needed to (1) shutdown the reactor safely and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (2) remove residual heat following reactor shutdown, or (3) limit the release of radioactive material to acceptable levels or reduce the potential for such release.

Examples:

- (1) Personnel error - complete loss of water in a steam generator due to lack of feed control.

7. Any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features, including the Reactor Protection System.

Examples:

- (1) Any actual trip of the reactor from a critical condition.
- (2) Any initiation of safety injection.

NOTE: Actuation of Engineered Safety Feature including the Reactor Protection System which result from and are part of the planned sequence during surveillance testing does not constitute an event reportable under this item.

8. Any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release. (Normal or expected releases from maintenance or other operational activities are not included).

Examples:

- (1) Spent Fuel Pit cooling piping leakage going out of Heat Exchanger Room.

