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SUBJECT: Application for amends to Licenses DPR-31 & DPR-41, changing
TS 3.3.2 re ESFAS, 3.3.3.4 re fire detection instrumentation,
3/4.7.8.3 re fire hose stations & 3.8.3 re onsite power
distribution per emergency power enhancement project.

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APR 04 1991

L-91-089
10 CFR 50.90

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Proposed License Amendment
Emergency Power System (EPS) Enhancement Project -
Undervoltage Relay Setpoint and Fire Protection
NRC TAC Nos. 69023 and 69024

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) requests that Facility Operating License DPR-31 and DPR-41 be amended to modify Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications. The sections to be modified include Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation; 3.3.3.4, Fire Detection Instrumentation; 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems; 3/4.7.8.3, Fire Hose Stations; 4.8.1.1.2, AC Sources - Operating; and 3.8.3, Onsite Power Distribution. The purpose of this amendment is to revise the Technical Specifications to reflect (a) the undervoltage relay setpoints for the Emergency Power System (EPS) Enhancement Project, (b) add an additional fire zone and (c) incorporate administrative changes.

The NRC issued Amendment No. 138 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-31 and Amendment No. 133 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Units, to accommodate changes to the plant as a result of the EPS Enhancement Project. The proposed license amendment supplements Amendments 138 and 133 by providing the revised undervoltage relay setpoints, and the addition of a fire zone area for the EPS Enhancement Project.

FPL has determined that the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant hazard pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92. A description of the amendment request is provided in Attachment 1. The no significant hazards determination in support of the proposed Technical Specification change is provided in Attachment 2. Attachment 3 provides the proposed revised Technical Specification changes.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1), a copy of this proposed License Amendment is being forwarded to the State Designee for the State of Florida.

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The proposed amendment has been reviewed by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and the FPL Company Nuclear Review Board.

Should there be any questions on this request, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



W. H. Bohlke
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

WHB/RJT/rjt

Attachments

cc: Stewart D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
Mr. Jacob Daniel Nash, Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services

STATE OF FLORIDA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF DADE)

W. H. Bohlke being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing,
of Florida Power and Light Company, the Licensee herein;


That he has executed the foregoing document; that the statements
made in this document are true and correct to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, and that he is authorized to
execute the document on behalf of said Licensee.



W. H. Bohlke

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

3rd day of April, 1991.



NOTARY PUBLIC, in and for the County of
Dade, State of Florida

My Commission expires _____
Notary Public, State of Florida
My Commission Expires Jan. 16, 1993
Bonded Thru Troy Fain Insurance Inc.

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

ATTACHMENT 1

DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST



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DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT REQUEST

The proposed amendment revises the Turkey Point Technical Specifications to reflect (a) the undervoltage relay setpoints for the Emergency Power System (EPS) Enhancement Project, (b) adds an additional fire zone and (c) incorporates administrative changes. The description of these changes are provided below.

Undervoltage Relay Setpoints .

FPL transmitted letter L-90-68, dated July 2, 1990 describing the scope of the Emergency Power System (EPS) Enhancement Project and requesting approval of Technical Specification changes to support this project. The EPS Enhancement Project involves separating, to the extent practical, the AC electrical system for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 and adding two new Class 1E Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG's).

In response to the L-90-68 submittal, the NRC issued Amendment No. 138 to Facility Operating License DPR-31 and Amendment No. 133 to Facility Operating License DPR-41 for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, respectively. These amendments modified the Technical Specifications to reflect changes to the plant as a result of the EPS Enhancement Project.

This proposed license amendment involves revising Table 3.3-3, items 7.b and 7.c, 480V Load Centers (LCs) undervoltage relay setpoints for instantaneous degraded voltage and inverse time degraded voltage. FPL has revised the design calculations performed in support of Amendment 138 and 133 of the Turkey Point Technical Specifications to reflect plant changes recently finalized. Recalculation was necessitated because of the replacement of MOV motors as a result of FPL actions in response to Generic Letter 89-10 (Reference 4), and the availability of final vendor data on some HVAC equipment added during the dual unit outage. These plant modifications resulted in different voltage requirements for the load centers. The assumptions and calculational methodology used in the revised calculation are consistent with those of the calculation performed to determine the existing setpoint values.

Since the same undervoltage protection is afforded by the revised setpoint values, there is no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Fire Protection System

Changes to the Fire Protection System include (a) the addition of one fire zone to Table 3.3-6; (b) revising the number of fire detection instruments in three fire zones in Table 3.3-6; and (b) the addition of a fire hose station as listed in Table 3.7-4.

- (a) Table 3.3-6, Fire Detection Instruments for Essential Equipments, is revised to include one additional fire zone (Fire Zone 25A). Fire Zone 25A is a unique fire zone identifier which has been assigned to the Spare Battery Room. The two Function A type heat detectors shown for Fire Zone 25 will now be associated with Fire Zone 25A. Also the number of Function A type smoke detectors shown for Fire Zone 25 is updated from 5 to 6.

The additional fire zone added to Table 3.3-6 is consistent with the existing listed fire zones and provides assurance that the Spare Battery located in this fire zone will be appropriately monitored. Since different types of detection are appropriate for the Spare Battery Room and the Electrical Equipment Room within the Fire Area G, unique fire zone identifiers have been assigned to each room for convenience. To ensure that failure of a single detector does not result in a total loss of detection in the fire zone, a minimum of two detectors are required for each area.

Due to modifications to the geometry of the Electrical Equipment Room, an additional smoke detector has been added in Fire Zone 25, in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 72E. Therefore, the current listing of five smoke detectors in Fire Zone 25 has been updated to six.

- (b) The total number of fire detection instruments listed in Table 3.3-6, Fire Detection Instruments for Essential Equipments, is revised to reflect the actual plant configuration. The actual number of Function A type smoke detectors in Zone 106, Control Room, is 16, as opposed to 17, while the total number of smoke detectors in Zone 132, Control Room Electrical Chase, is increased by two.

The total number of detectors in the combined zones is consistent with the actual plant configuration and is in accordance with NFPA Standard 72E.

- (c) Fire Hose Station HS-04-09, located at the entrance to the new Unit 4 EDG Building, is added to Table 3.7-4. The addition of this hose station ensures that an appropriate level of protection is provided for the new Unit 4 EDG Building, as compared to the existing Unit 3 EDG Building, for mitigating the consequences of a fire.

These proposed changes do not affect the initiator of any accident evaluated in the FSAR nor the mitigation of any accident.

Administrative Changes

The following administrative changes are proposed:

- (a) Insert the word "status" after the word "OPERABLE" in ACTION statement c of Technical Specification 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems. Also, delete the word "OPERABLE" in ACTION statement f of TS 3.5.2.
- (b) In Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2, AC Sources - Operating, the specified EDG loading is replaced with the acceptable loading bands,
- (c) In Technical Specification 3.8.3.1, (Table 3.8-2) Onsite Power Distribution, delete the word "if". Insert the word "(hours)" as presented in Tables 3.8-1 and 3.8-2.
- (d) In Technical Specification 3.8.3.2, Onsite Power Distribution, delete the word "in" and insert the phrase "on the same DC bus for", to achieve consistency with the same type of footnote provided for LCO 3.8.3.1.
- (e) In ACTION statement b of Technical Specification 3.3.3.4, Fire Detection Instrumentation, change the Table number from "Table 3.3-11" to "Table 3.3-6". (Table 3.3-11 does not exist in the Technical Specifications.)

These administrative changes are considered editorial or non-technical in nature and are intended to make the Technical Specifications more consistent.

ATTACHMENT 2

DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

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DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

The commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration, if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The basis that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration is provided in the following pages.

II. EVALUATIONS

TS 3.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

Plant Modification Changes - Each of the 480V Load Centers' (LCs) undervoltage relay setpoints for instantaneous degraded voltage and inverse time degraded voltage specified in Table 3.3-3, items 7.b and 7.c, respectively, are revised.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The design calculation (Reference 3) which established the trip setpoint values provided in Amendments 138 and 133 of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications, respectively, has been revised to reflect plant changes recently finalized. Recalculation was necessary primarily because of the replacement of MOV motors as a result of FPL actions in response to generic Letter 89-10 (Reference 4), and the availability of final vendor data on some safety-related HVAC equipment added during the dual unit outage. These plant modifications resulted in different voltage requirements for the LCs. The assumptions and calculational methodology used in the revised calculation (Reference 5) are consistent with those of the calculation performed to determine the existing setpoint values. Since the same undervoltage protection is afforded by the revised setpoint values, there is no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

No new types of equipment are added by this change. The proposed change introduces no changes in operation or new modes of operation. The ability of the system to detect and appropriately respond to an off-normal undervoltage condition is maintained.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The same criteria utilized in the calculation of the existing setpoints has been applied to the calculation of the revised setpoints. The purpose of the specified trip settings is to separate the busses from the offsite power and reenergize these same busses from the onsite power if an unacceptable voltage drop should occur on the offsite power system. The margin of safety provided by the new values is commensurate with the existing values since they were calculated in a similar manner.

TS 3.3.3.4 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

Plant Modification Changes - On Table 3.3-6, one additional fire zone is added to the table. The additional fire zone (Fire Zone 25A) is a unique fire zone identifier which has been assigned to the Spare Battery Room. The two Function A type heat detectors shown for Fire Zone 25 will now be associated with Fire Zone 25A. The number of Function A type smoke detectors shown for Fire Zone 25 is updated from 5 to 6. In addition, two Type B smoke detectors are added to Fire Zone 132, Control Room Electrical Chase.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The additional fire zone added to Table 3.3-6 is consistent with the existing listed fire zones and provides assurance that the Spare Battery located in this fire zone will be appropriately monitored. As described in Reference 6, the Spare Battery Room and the Electrical Equipment Room are both within one fire area labeled as G. Originally, this whole area (formerly the Auxiliary Building Machine Shop) was labeled as Fire Zone 25. Conversion of this room into the Electrical Equipment Room and Spare Battery Room, as part of the EPS Enhancement Project, resulted in unique fire detection requirements for the equipment being monitored. In accordance with NUREG/CR-1798 (Reference 7), thermal detectors are to be used for detection in the battery rooms and ionization smoke detectors in the area containing the electrical equipment. Since different types of detection are appropriate for the Spare Battery Room and the Electrical Equipment Room within the Fire Area G, unique fire zone identifiers have been assigned to each room for convenience. To ensure that failure of a single detector does not result in a total loss of detection in the fire zone, a minimum of two detectors are required for each area. Due to the geometry of the Electrical Equipment Room and the location of HVAC ducts, an additional smoke detector has been added in Fire Zone 25, in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 72E (Reference 8). Therefore, the current listing of five smoke detectors in zone 25 has been updated to six.



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The probability or consequences of an accident is not affected by this change. The new fire zone identifier, 25A, and the revision of the number of smoke detectors in Fire Zone 25 do not affect the initiator of any accident evaluated in the FSAR nor the mitigation of any accident.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The additional fire zone added to Table 3.3-6 is consistent with the existing listed fire zones. The resulting number of detectors indicated provide adequate fire detection capability. No new types of fire detectors are being added to the plant. The proposed change introduces no changes in operation or new modes of operation.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margin of safety remains unchanged since the additional fire zone does not affect the level of detection and warning currently provided by the existing Technical Specification requirements. The resulting number of detectors indicated are consistent with the industry standards, i.e., NFPA and NUREG/CR-1798, for providing adequate fire detection capability; thus the margin of safety is maintained.



TS 3.3.3.4 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

Administrative Changes - On Table 3.3-6, the number of Type A smoke detectors in Fire Zone 106, Control Room, was incorrectly identified as 17 as opposed to 16 detectors.

Fire Zone 132, Control Room Electrical Chase, was created from the original Fire Zone 106. At that time, the number of Type A smoke detectors in Fire Zone 106, was incorrectly accounted for. This proposed amendment revises Table 3.3-6 to reflect the actual plant configuration.

In addition, in ACTION statement b of this Technical Specification, change the Table number from "Table 3.3-11" to "Table 3.3-6". This is an editorial change, since the correct table is Table 3.3-6, and the incorrect Table 3.3-11 does not exist in the Technical Specifications.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This change is editorial in nature, since the original plant configuration has not changed and this change has no impact on plant operating requirements or FSAR analyzed accidents. This change is proposed solely to ensure the consistency of the Technical Specifications with the actual plant configuration and the associated Technical Specifications.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This change is of an editorial nature, and has no effect on the possibility of accidents. The resulting number of detectors indicated provide adequate fire detection capability. No new types of fire detectors are being added to the plant. The proposed change introduces no change in operation or new modes of operation.



3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The resulting number of detectors are consistent with the industry standards, i.e., NFPA and NUREG/CR-1798, for providing adequate fire detection capability; thus the margin of safety is maintained.



TS 3.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{AVG} GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTIONS

Administrative Changes - The word "status" is inserted after the word "OPERABLE" in ACTION statement c. In ACTION statement f, the word "OPERABLE" is deleted before the words "diesel generator", since for Technical Specifications purposes an inoperable EDG is defined as not capable of supplying power to the associated safety injection pump.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

This change is editorial in nature and has no impact on plant operating requirements or FSAR analyzed accidents. This change is proposed solely to enhance the consistency in the wording of ACTION statements in the Turkey Point Technical Specifications.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

This change is editorial in nature and has no effect on the possibility of accidents. The proposed change introduces no changes in operation or new modes of operation.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

This change is editorial in nature and has no effect on the margin of safety.

TS 3/4.7.8.3 FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

Plant Modification Changes - Fire Hose Station HS-04-09 on Elevation (EL.) 18', located at the entrance to the new Unit 4 EDG Building, is added to Table 3.7-4.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The addition of this new Hose Station to Table 3.7-4 provides for the same OPERABILITY requirements as specified for the existing Fire Hose Stations. Note this hose station was added to Turkey Point's design per FPL's commitment in Reference 6. This additional requirement ensures that an appropriate level of protection is provided for the new Unit 4 EDG Building, as compared to the existing Unit 3 EDG Building, for mitigating the consequences of a fire. Therefore, the probability of or consequences of losing an EDG due to a fire is not increased. This added Hose Station does not affect the initiator of any other accident evaluated in the FSAR and provides assurance that adequate fire protection is available for required plant equipment in the vicinity of the new Unit 4 EDG Building.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The Hose Station at the new Unit 4 EDG Building provides a similar degree of protection against fire-induced losses of an EDG as provided for the existing Unit 3 EDG Building. The new Hose Station will be maintained and operated in accordance with the existing fire protection program, and therefore, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The proposed change introduces no changes in operation or new modes of operation.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The new Unit 4 EDG Building Hose Station will assure that the safety-related equipment in this new building is provided with the same level of protection as the safety-related equipment in the existing Unit 3 EDG Building. Thus, the margin of safety is not reduced.

TS 4.8.1.1.2 AC SOURCES - OPERATING

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Administrative Changes - The specified EDG loading in the double asterisk footnote associated with Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.g.7) on the bottom of p. 3/4 8-8 is replaced with acceptable loading bands.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been affected, since the surveillance testing of EDGs does not affect the probability of occurrence of accidents. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not affected by this change either. The revisions to this surveillance footnote are proposed to enhance consistency with the rest of Turkey Point's EDG's surveillance requirements (e.g., 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 and .g.7). The specification of load bands versus a single specific value is endorsed by the EDG vendors and the NRC. (The NRC has endorsed a similar change for both Carolina Power and Light Shearon Harris Unit 1 and Texas Utilities Comanche Peak Unit 1.) The specified bands provide the same EDG performance assurance as the existing criteria, but minimize the wear and tear on the EDG. The specified bands preclude testing the EDGs while excessively loaded.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The revisions to the surveillance footnote are proposed to enhance consistency with the rest of Turkey Point's EDG's surveillance requirements (e.g., 4.8.1.1.2.a.5 and .g.7) and do not require any new types of testing. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.

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3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The surveillance footnote has been revised to enhance consistency with the requirements of the other EDG surveillances at Turkey Point. The revised footnote provides a commensurate level of confidence that the EDGs will perform as designed.

TS 3.8.3.1 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION - OPERATION

Administrative Changes - Delete the word "if" from the phrase, "... the out-of-service time if is not applicable ..." from the single asterisk footnote on Table 3.8-2. Insert "(hours)" in the column header of Tables 3.8-1 and 3.8-2.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

These changes are editorial in nature and have no impact on plant operating requirements or FSAR analyzed accidents. The addition of "(hours)" is provided for clarity. The specified Allowable Outage Times provided in these table is in units of hours; however, this was not explicitly shown.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

These changes are editorial in nature and have no effect on the possibility of accidents. The proposed changes introduce no changes in operation or new modes of operation.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

These changes are editorial in nature and have no effect on the margin of safety.

TS 3.8.3.2 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

Administrative Changes - The double asterisk footnote of LCO 3.8.3.2 has been revised by deleting the word "in" and inserting the phrase "on the same DC bus for" to achieve consistency with the same type of footnote provided in LCO 3.8.3.1.

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The editorial change to the double asterisk footnote is proposed to enhance consistency within Turkey Point's Technical Specifications. The addition of the clarification phrase provides better understanding for the operator regarding the configuration and usage of a backup inverter.

The proposed change does not result in any new plant operating requirements. No accident initiating events are affected. The change is editorial and does not affect the probabilities of the occurrence of, or the consequences of, an accident.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change in the footnote is basically editorial in nature and does not require any new types of testing. The proposed change introduces no basic changes in operation or new modes of operation.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The change only enhances the Technical Specifications by providing better consistency and providing more understandable footnotes.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, a determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration is appropriate. The amendment request does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Further, the amendment is of a type specifically identified by the NRC as not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration. (See 51 FR 7751 (Reference 9), examples (i), (ii) and (ix).)



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REFERENCES

1. FPL letter, L-90-196, dated June 4, 1990 from K. N. Harris to USNRC with attachments:
 - (a) Emergency Power System Enhancement Design Report, Revision 1,
 - (b) Emergency Power System Enhancement Report - Supplement 1 Testing, Revision 1,
 - (c) Emergency Power System Enhancement Report - Supplement 2 Safety Analysis, Revision 0, and
 - (d) Emergency Power System Enhancement Report -Response to NRC's Request for Additional Information, Revision 1.
2. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, latest edition.
3. PSB-1 Voltage Analysis for Electrical Auxiliary System; EBASCO Calculation EC-145 Revision 2, dated June 1990.
4. USNRC Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance (10 CFR 50.54 (f)), issued June 28, 1989.
5. PSB-1 Voltage Analysis for Electrical Auxiliary System; EBASCO Calculation EC-145 Revision 4, dated March 1991.
6. FPL Letter, L-90-256, date July 23, 1990, Emergency Power System Enhancement Project - Response to NRC's Request for Additional Information regarding Fire Protection and Compliance with Appendix R.
7. NUREG/CR 1798, Acceptance and Verification for Early Warning Fire Detection Systems.
8. National Fire Protection Association Standard 72E-1984, Automatic Fire Detectors.
9. Federal Register, Volume 51, No 44, page 7751, dated March 6, 1986.