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ERNST,M.L. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards mgt-on-shift weekly rept,per 871019 order.Plant supervisor nuclear shift repts also encl.

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L-88-477

Mr. Malcolm L. Ernst
Acting Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. Ernst:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted. The Plant Supervisor-Nuclear Shift Reports are also being submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

W. F. Conway
Senior Vice President - Nuclear

WFC/RHF/gp

Attachment

cc: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC
Dr. G. E. Edison, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

mos001

1/1

D036

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 10/14/88

Six MOS observers were on shift: Russ Gouldy, Principal Engineer, Nuclear Licensing, Juno Beach (10/14-16/88, days); J. P. Brannin, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Licensing, Juno Beach(10/14-17/88, nights); M. B. Gilmore, Nuclear Energy Specialist, Plant Support Group, Juno Beach (10/17-20/88, days); L. A. Spalding, Operator Training Instructor, Plant St. Lucie (10/17-21/88, nights); V. A. Kaminskas, Reactor Engineer, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (10/14-17/88, nights); and J. A. Labarraque, Senior Technical Advisor, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (10/17-21/88, nights).

Unit 3 was in mode 5 for the duration of the reporting period. Unit 4 was in mode 6 and has been defueled.

No immediate safety problems were noted by any observer.

The independent observers did not note any questionable work practices. They did note six areas for improvement, as follows:

-One item on housekeeping

-One item on work controls

-One item on timeliness of repairs

-One item of difficulty of maintaining compliance with current Technical Specifications and O-ADM-021, Technical Specification Implementation Procedure (There was training on O-ADM-021 and a survey is being conducted to determine adequacy of the training.)

-One item on a leaking valve resulting in an increased shutdown boron concentration and subsequent statements by the PSN rebutting some of the observations

-One item on method of adjusting boron concentration

The Turkey Point Observers did not note any questionable work practices. They did note three areas for improvement as follows:

-Two items on industrial safety

-One item on integration of maintenance activities

The Plant Supervisors-Nuclear (PSN) noted two questionable work practices. One involved a poorly written temporary procedure. The second item was in regard to the availability of vital DC battery test equipment. They also noted three areas for improvement, as follows:

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

5

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 10/14/88

-A recommendation to appoint a site spill coordinator

-A request for a cross-reference between O-ADM-021 and current Technical Specifications

-One item on communication between PSNs and MOS observers

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

Date 10/14/88	**Shift Report**	Shift Ed Lyons Peaks

Shift Management

PSN Wogan APSN Singer NWE Vetromile

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

(1)

10/17/88

Date

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/14/88

From: Russell Gouldy (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3 cold shutdown operations
- Unit 4 refueling shutdown refueling operations
- Shift turnovers

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Interim Technical Specifications (ADM-021)

On 10/12/88, the unit 4 RCO was asked by the NRC resident, "why don't I hear the audible count rate, we are in refueling, mode 6?" The RCO responded with the correct Technical Specification requirements of 1) it is required in containment all the time and 2) it is required in the control room during core alterations and fuel movement.

Later that shift (about 10 minutes) the RCO reviewed interim Technical Specifications which requires the audible count rate while in mode 6. The RCO adjusted the scaler to provide the audible count rate in the control room (from 100 cps to 60 cps). The RCO then notified the resident by phone, of the interim Technical Specification requirement.

Why did this occur?

Reason: Interviews with the operators indicate:

1) Operators did not receive adequate training on interim Technical Specification prior to this becoming a procedure.
2) The operators did not receive a change or variance document to address differences between the two specifications.

6

For such a large project the following responsibilities are appropriate:

1) Licensing assures the program is implemented.
2) Departments assure that all changes are documented and planned for.
3) PUP assures that the changes are incorported into all procedures affected.
4) Training is provided to the users prior to implementation.

Recommendations:

Each Department verify current Technical Specifications against interim to note changes and assure procedures and requirements are met.

The night shift MOS reviewed RCO log sheets and found where PUP should have upgraded or added the requirement 4 or 3 -OSP-201.1 page 10. An OTSC was asked for from PUP by MOS and PUP provided the requested changes.

Conclusion:

Over the last two years, the problems associated with the interim Technical Specification appear to be with inadequate implementation by a responsible individual or department. This poor implementation has left the operator in a reactive mode which results in problems.
(88-2778)

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

No unprofessional items noted.

7

Completed By: Russell Gouldy *MOS Observer* Date: 10/14/88

Reviewed By: *Operations Superintendent-Nuclear* Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By: *PM-N* / *Date* 10/17/88 *SVP* / *Date* 10/17/88 *VP* / *Date* 10/14/88

ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of 2)
REFUELING CORE SHUFFLE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT CHECKLIST Date_____

Equipment/Conditions	Minimum Requirement for Refueling	Mid Initials	Day Initials	Peak Initials	Time Allowed Before Stopping Refueling Operations	Applicable Tech. Spec.	Applicable STS	REMARKS
Containment Equipment Door	CLOSED				IMMEDIATE	3.10.1	3.9.4	
Containment Personnel and Emergency Air lock Doors	1/2 CLOSED				IMMEDIATE	3.10.1	3.9.4	
Automatic Containment Isolation Valves - Operable	ALL OPERABLE OR CLOSED				IMMEDIATE	3.10.1	3.9.4	If not operable, at least one valve closed/penetration
Closed Valves per Containment Penetration that provides a direct path to Atmosphere	ONE				IMMEDIATE	3.10.1	3.9.4	
Containment Vent and Purge System Isolation (CVPS)	OPERABLE				IMMEDIATE	3.10.2	3.9.9	
Spent Fuel Pit SPING High Range Noble Gas Monitor	OPERABLE				IMMEDIATE	Table 3.5-5 Item 13b	Table 3.3-6 Item 16b	
Process Rad. Monitors that Initiate CVPS Isolation R-3-11, R 3-12	OPERABLE				IMMEDIATE	3.10.2	3.9.13	If one or both monitors not operable, take actions per Technical Specifications
Area Radiation Monitor Operating: R 2, R 7, R-19, R-21	OPERABLE (BOTH REMOTE AND LOCAL)				IMMEDIATE	NONE	NONE	If area monitor is not operable, a portable monitor, with alarm may be used
NIS Channels N31, N32 and Gammametrics	2/4 one with audible in Control Room and containment				IMMEDIATE	3.10.3	3.9.2	If not Operable, refer to 3-ONOP 059.3, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction
AC Electrical Power Sources	See Remarks				IMMEDIATE	NONE	3.8.1.2	Both units in Modes 5 or 6 - one Start up Transformer supplying at least one 1E Bus, A or B, of each unit and one EDG
RHR Pumps in Operation and RCS - 140°F [illegible] per shift	1/2 MINIMUM	1 2	1 2	1 2	IMMEDIATE	Table 4.1-2, Item 18	3.9.8.1	When < 140°F may stop pump when by hot legs for shuffle step.
Boron Concentration in Vessel as per 3-OP-038.1	≥ _____	VERIFY DAILY TIME	PPM		IMMEDIATE	3.10.8	3.9.1	Verify daily when vessel head removed and fuel is in vessel

OK for Refueling Core Offloads

ENCLOSURE 2
(Page 1 of 28)
RCO Logsheets Basis Index

Item	Description	Frequency	Applicable Mode(s)	Instrument(s)	Current T/S	0-ADM-021; SORPs; Other	Remarks
1	NIS Intermediate Range	4 Hours	1-4	N 35 N 36	Table 4.1-1 Item 2	Table 4.3-1 Item	Channel Check • Minimum of 1 channel operable in Modes 1 and 2. • Maximum deviation of 0.5 decades between channels
2	NIS Source Range	4 Hours	2-6	N 31 N 32	Table 4.1-1 Item 3	Table 4.3-1 Item 4 4.9.2.a	Channel Check • Minimum of 2 channels operable in Mode 2 below P-6. • Minimum of 2 channels operable in Modes 3, 4, and 5 with Rx trip breakers closed and CRD System capable of rod withdrawal. • Minimum of 1 channel operable in Modes 3, 4, except as noted above. • Minimum of 2 channels operable or 1 SR channel and 1 backup channel operable with the RX Trip breakers open or the Control Rod Drive System is incapable of producing Control Rod movement in Mode 5 [Commitment - Step 2.3.1] • Minimum of 2 channels or 1 SR channel and 1 backup SR channel operable in Mode 6. [Commitment - Step 2.3.1] • Maximum deviation of 1.5 decades between channels.

No remarks about Mode 6 and audible signal in Control Room

2

ATTACHMENT 2
(Page 3 of 10)
RCO LOGSHEETS

This sheet used in Modes 5 & 6 only.

	COMPONENT		LIMIT	MN	4	8	12	4	8
11	3A 4KV Bus Voltage		3744-4576		/////		/////		/////
11	3B 4KV Bus Voltage		3744-4576		/////		/////		/////
10	CST Level	LI-6384A	75-100% Max deviation of 3% (7500 gal) between indicators						
		LI-6384B							
9	PWST Level	LI-1542	50-150		/////	/////		/////	/////
2	Source Range (Con)	NI-31	------						
2	Source Range (Con)	NI-32	------						
2	Backup NIS (NFMS)	6649A	***						
2	Backup NIS (NFMS)	6649B	***						
78	PRT Pressure	PI-472	0-26						
79	PRT Temp	TI-471	70-200						
80	PRT Level	LI-470	68-83						
16	PORV Block Valve Operable (√) **		MOV-536		/////	/////	/////	/////	/////
16	PORV Block Valve Operable (√) **		MOV-535		/////	/////	/////	/////	/////
12	REACTOR COOLANT PUMP VIBRATIONS RECORDER 369	PT 2	< 5 MILS						
		PT 3	< 20 MILS						
		PT 6	< 5 MILS						
		PT 7	< 20 MILS						
		PT 10	< 5 MILS						
		PT 11	< 20 MILS						
13	STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN EFFLUENT FLOW	FI-6277A	RECORD FLOW						
		FI-6277B	RECORD FLOW						
		FI-6277C	RECORD FLOW						
14	RWST LEVEL *	LI-6583A	> 320,000						
		LI-6583B	> 320,000						
81	RCS Drain Down Level *	LI-6421	≥ 20%						

No remarks about Mode 6 and audible Constants in Control Room as per ADM-021

* N/A when reactor cavity full
** The indicator lights should be lit; when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection in Modes 3 (with Tavg ≤ 380°F), 4, 5, and 6 the valve shall be open.
*** Only required when one source Range Channel is 00S in Mode 6.

REMARKS: _____

10

Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/14-15/88

From: Joseph P. Brannin
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Shift turnover
- Shift briefing - very comprehensive
- Toured Intake area
- Observed turbine reassembly
- Toured Radiation Control Area (RCA)

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None observed

C. Questionable Work Practices

None observed

D. Areas for Improvement

None at present

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Good shift turnover - PSN worked at getting good interaction.

Asked if anyone needed help getting over hurdles.

(11)

Completed By: Joseph P. Brannin
MOS Observer

Date: 10/14-15/88

Reviewed By: S D Webb
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By:

PM-N / 10/17/88 Date — SVP / 10/17/88 Date — VP / Date

10/14-15/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/14-15/88

From: Vito A. Kaminskas (MOS Observer) Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Unit 3, Mode 5
- Unit 4, Mode 6
- Containment integrity review program
- Fire pump area
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) area
- Containment purge unit 4
- Shift meeting

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None

D. **Areas for Improvement**

None

(12)

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

No unprofessional acts noted.

Completed By: Vito A. Kaminskas, *MOS Observer* Date: 10/14-15/88

Reviewed By: [signature], *Operations Superintendent- Nuclear* Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By: [signature] / 10/17/88 *PM-N* *Date* [signature] / 10/17/88 *SVP* *Date* _____ / _____ *VP* *Date*

Date 10/15/88	**Shift Report**	Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Salkeld APSN Guyer NWE Vetromile/Spence

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine outage activities.

(2)

10/17/88

Date

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/15/88

From: Russell Gouldy (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Unit 3, cold shutdown
- Unit 4, refueling shutdown
- Unit 4, containment walkdown and verification of refueling core pre-shuffle requirements

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None

D. **Areas for Improvement**

None

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

No unprofessional acts noted.

13

Completed By: Russell Gouldy, *MOS Observer* Date: 10/15/88

Reviewed By: [signature], *Operations Superintendent-Nuclear* Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By: [signature] *PM-N* 10/17/88 *Date* [signature] *SVP* 10/17/88 *Date* / *VP* / *Date* 10/15/88

Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/15-16/88

From: Joseph P. Brannin
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Shift briefing
- Shift turnover
- Preparations for moving fuel
- Containment entry, Unit 4

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None noted

C. Questionable Work Practices

None noted

D. Areas for Improvement

None noted

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

No unprofessional behavior observed. Four assemblies removed by 0520.

14

Completed By: Joseph P. Brannin
MOS Observer

Date: 10/15-16/88

Reviewed By: [signature]
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By:

PM-N [signature] / 10/17/88 Date

SVP [signature] / 10/17/88 Date

VP / Date

10/15-16/88

Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/15-16/88

From: Vito A. Kaminskas
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, Mode 5
- Unit 4, Mode 6
- Unit 4, core unload OP-40.2
- Unit 4, main steam platform
- Unit 4, containment fuel movement
- Shift meeting

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

No unprofessional acts noted.

15

Completed By: Vito A. Kaminskas
MOS Observer

Date: 10/15/-16/88

Reviewed By: [signature]
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By:

PM-N [signature] Date 10/17/88 SVP [signature] Date 10/17/88 VP / Date /

Date 10/16/88

Shift Report

Shift

Shift Management

PSN Salkeld APSN Guyer NW

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

10/17/88

Reviewed By

Date

Date 10/16/88	**Shift Report**	Shift Peaks

Shift Management

PSN Wogan APSN Singer NWE Vetromile

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

(4)

LDWitt 10/17/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/16/88

From: Russell Gouldy (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, cold shutdown - drain down operations
- Unit 4, refueling shutdown - off-loading reactor core
- Unit 4, containment walkdown
- Unit 4, fuel handling operations in containment

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Boric acid control:

1. On Unit 4, 10/15/88, boric acid was needed to adjust the refueling canal boric acid concentration. Procedure 4-OP-38.1, Preparation for Refueling Activities, pre-fuel shuffle requirements has the primary water to the blender valve in a closed position. The RCO used the boric acid transfer pump via the charging system to make-up to the cavity. This high concentration acid clogged the charging system and required the starting of a charging pump and a pressure of approximately 600 psi to push the acid through the system. If this acid had solidified, the Technical Specification boric acid flow path would have been lost.
(88-2779)

2. Unit 3, 10/16/88, had the emergency boration valve MOV-350 fixed due to leakage through the valve. After maintenance was complete and the valve returned to service, no precautions were taken to assure the valve did not leak. At day shift chemistry check, the start of shift boron concentration was 1850 ppm up from 1150 ppm previous. That means that about 800 gallons of boric acid leaked through MOV-350 during the previous shift.
(88-2780)

Both actions could have been avoided.

16

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Watched the fuel movement with the rebuilt manipulator crane. The off-load was progressing smoothly. All precautions and prerequisites were met.

17

Completed By: Russell Gouldy — *MOS Observer* — Date: 10/16/88

Reviewed By: [signature] — *Operations Superintendent- Nuclear* — Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By: [signature] / 10/17/88 *PM-N* *Date* [signature] / 10/17/88 *SVP* *Date* / *VP* / *Date*

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/16-17/88

From: Vito A. Kaminskas (MOS Observer) Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, Mode 5
- Unit 4, Mode 6
- Unit 4, fuel movement

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

No unprofessional acts noted.

(18)

Completed By: Vito A. Kaminskas, MOS Observer Date: 10/16-17/88

Reviewed By: [signature], Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By: [signature] / 10/17/88 PM-N Date; [signature] / 10/17/88 SVP Date; ____ / ____ VP Date

10/16-17/88

Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/16-17/88

From: Joseph P. Brannin
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Shift turnover
- Shift briefing
- Toured turbine buildings

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None observed

C. Questionable Work Practices

None observed

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

No unprofessional behavior.

(19)

Completed By: Joseph P. Brannin
MOS Observer

Date: 10/16-17/88

Reviewed By: J.D. Webb
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 10/17/88

Management Review By:

PM-N / 10/17/88 Date — SVP / 10/17/88 Date — VP / Date

10/16-17/88

Date 10/17/8[illegible]

Shift Report

Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Salkeld APSN Guyer NWE Eddinger

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None.

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

(5)

[illegible] 10/17/81

Reviewed By _____ Date _____

Date 10/17/88	Shift Report	Shift Ed Lyons Days

Shift Management

PSN Anderson APSN Dallau NWE Spence

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

When ADM-021 was implemented there was no cross reference for our current Technical Specifications included. We always had a cross reference when it was just Interim Technical Specifications. At that time I was told we could not have one because it was now a controlled copy and would be too much bother to have to keep the cross reference up with changes. Each time we have to reference Technical Specifications we have to look at both current and ADM-021 and the time involved in looking up an item in both books becomes a factor of concern especially when short time LCOs are involved. The updating of the cross reference would be a lot less hectic.
(88-2783)

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

1

Reviewed By L.W. Pearce Date 10/18/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/17/88

From: M. B. Gilmore (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Unit 3, Mode 5
- Unit 4, Mode 6 - Refueling (core alterations) in progress
- Plan of the Day meeting
- Toured Radiation Control Area (RCA)
- Attended shift briefing

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None

D. **Areas for Improvement**

None

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

Shift turnovers and shift briefing were conducted in a professional and competent manner.

4

Completed By: M. B. Gilmore, MOS Observer Date: 10/17/88

Reviewed By: R.W. Pearce, Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date: 10/18/88

Management Review By: PM-N 10/18/88 Date; SVP 10/18/88 Date; VP 10/18/88 Date

10/17/88

AMOS 1 01.07/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/17-18/88

From: Lawrence A. Spalding (MOS Observer) Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3 in Mode 5 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature at 102°F
- Unit 4 in Mode 6 RCS temperature at 87°F
- Peak/mid shift turnover
- Normal operations and logs on unit 3 and unit 4
- Tour of unit 4 containment, observed fuel movement in progress

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None observed

D. Areas for Improvement

Containment interior needs cleaning up - I realize work is in progress, but things could be kept neater.
(88-2782)

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Pre shift brief was handled well. Shift plan was communicated to all attendees. Communication between PSN, I&C, and desk RCO resulted in a plan to get some required work done ahead of time to facilitate coming back up.

Reviewed ADM-021 Technical Specifications for Mode 5 requirements. Unit 3 met all requirements.

Shifts conducted themselves in a professional and competent manner at all times.

5

Completed By: Lawrence A. Spalding (MOS Observer) Date: 10/17-18/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce (Operations Superintendent-Nuclear) Date: 10/18/88

Management Review By: PM-N 10/18/88 Date, SVP 10/18/88 Date, VP 10/18/88 Date

10/17-18/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/17-18/88

From: J. A. Labarraque (MOS Observer) Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Control room shift turnover
- Fuel movement
- Turbine work
- Secondary work

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None

D. **Areas for Improvement**

There is a great variety of "work shoes". PTN policy needs to be re-issued. It is difficult to determine the acceptable work shoes. Personnel have different versions of what is acceptable.
(88-2801)

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

None

(6)

Completed By: J. A. Labarraque, MOS Observer Date: 10/17-18/88

Reviewed By: [signature], Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 10/18/88

Management Review By: [signature] PM-N 10/18/88 Date; [signature] SVP 10/18/88 Date; [signature] VP 10/18/88 Date

10/17-18/88

Date 10/18/88

Shift Report

Shift Days

Shift Management

PSN Anderson APSN Dallau NWE Spence

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

Several days ago an ANPO discovered a storm drain with quite an amount of oil in it. The spill coordinator for units 3 and 4 was notified. The storm drain was located on the walkway beside unit 2 by the new Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) site. The unit 3 and 4 spill coordinator notified the fossil spill coordinator. Several days have passed and the ANPO reported to me today that the condition still exists. I investigated it myself and it appears that two or three feet of oil or more is lying in the storm drain. The fossil spill coordinator was reminded of the fact and told if he was not going to do anything about it, that we would. He said he would get it taken care of immediately.

The EPA, whether state, federal, or county is not interested if we have spill problems on units 1 and 2 or units 3 and 4, but spills at this "site". Infractions on units 1 and 2 can shut us down and will shut us down along with units 1 and 2. I suggest that we appoint a site spill coordinator with nuclear experience (more familiar with working with the government) to handle all spills at this site.
(88-2802)

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

1

Reviewed By L.W. Pence Date 10/19/88

Date 10/18/88	Shift Report	Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Salkeld APSN Guyer NWE Eddinger

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendaions/Actions Taken

See attached
(88-2800)

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Outage work continued.

(2)

Reviewed By [illegible] Date 10/18/88

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

MOS report of 10/16/88, Item D2

I believe it is important to clarify several issues associated with this item. First the MOS Observer was not on site when this incident he attempted to describe occurred. Additionally he made no attempt to get information regarding the incident from me, the APSN, NWE or from the RCO involved.

The Observer's first assertion was the MOV-350 had been repaired and returned to service. This is not correct. Although Mechanical Maintenance had completed its work and released its clearance, Electrical department still had a clearance on the valve, and it is still OOS. This fact is clearly documented in the Equipment Out of Service log.

The Observer's second assertion was that no precautions were taken to assure the valve did not leak. This is also incorrect. The RCO 1) discussed the issue, with the NWE; 2) checked the clearance which had been released and required that MOV-350 to be left closed using the handwheel, this was independently verified; 3) the RCO requested a SNPO to triple-check MOV-350 to assure its position (it was verified closed); 4) Mechanical Maintenance had completed its work on the valve to stop seat leakage.

The Observer's third assertion, that Chemistry found that boron concentration had increased, while correct, makes no mention of the fact that the RCO had discovered the problem, secured the recirculation, notified the NWE and APSN, and logged the incident. Additionally it made no mention that recirculation of the boric acid storage tank (BAST) was procedurally required so it could be sampled. Sampling is a requirement to keep the BAST in service.

Because he did not ask, the observer did not include the action taken to prevent recurrence of the problem. After the incident occurred it was discussed in great detail with the RCO. A review of the indications available to the RCO found: 1) the boric acid recorder showed no flow. 2) Emergency Boration Flow Indicator, FI-3-110, may have been at the first marked increment off the bottom of the scale. 3) The BAST level decreased. This is how the RCO had discovered the problem 100 minutes into the procedure. 4) Reactor Vessel Drain-down indication increased. The RCO confirmed the problem with this. The RCO agreed that he should have been monitoring the BAST level more frequently during this recirculation. We have shared this information with the other RCO's on shift.

Recommendations:

It is important to the creditability of the MOS program, and to the overall effort to improve Turkey Point, that items of management concern be factual and complete. I recommend action be considered to prevent rumors and hearsay from being included as MOS items. This might be done by limiting items to those for which the observer has first hand knowledge or those that are clearly documented. Also the MOS observers should be required to discuss the items with the PSN on shift at the time the incident occurred.

Date 10/18/88

Shift Report

Shift Peaks

Shift Management

PSN Jones APSN Hale NWE

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

(2)

Reviewed By D. Pearce Date 10/19/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/18/88

From: M. B. Gilmore (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Unit 3, Mode 5
- Unit 4, Mode 6
- Plan of the Day meeting
- Shift brief - day shift and peak shift
- Surveillance 30OSP-024.3, Emergency Load Sequence Timer test

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None

D. **Areas for Improvement**

While observing 3-OSP-024.3 the operator was required by procedure to open the 3A sequencer door and record the timer setting for the Agastat time delay relays (step 7.1.7). A posting on the door reads "caution bending or shaking of sequencer cubicle doors may cause wave type action that can trip protective relaying resulting in a possible unit trip". The door was binding and when pulled open shook severely. This could have been a serious situation had the unit not been in Mode 5. There were other doors on the 4 kv switchgear for 3A safety injection pump and 4 kv bus 3B feed from Unit 3 start-up transformer with the same caution and plant work orders dated mid april 1988. Items which affect unit reliability should be rectified in a timely manner.
(88-2803)

4

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Operators used procedures where required and communications were appropriate.

5

Completed By: M. B. Gilmore, MOS Observer — Date: 10/18/88

Reviewed By: L. W. Pearce, Operations Superintendent-Nuclear — Date: 10/19/88

Management Review By: PM-N / Date — SVP / Date 10/19/88 — VP / Date 10/19/88

10/18/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/18-19/88

From: Lawrence A. Spalding
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Unit 3 in Mode 5
- Unit 4 in Mode ? All fuel off-loaded and stored in spent fuel pit
- Toured security fence perimeter
- Toured intake and water treatment areas
- Observed refueling cavity drain down to reactor vessel flange
- Normal operations and logs on unit 3 and unit 4
- Peak/mid shift turnover

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None observed

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None observed

D. **Areas for Improvement**

None observed

6

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

Pre shift brief was handled well, shift plan was communicated to all attendees.

Preparation and initiation of reactor cavity drain down was conducted well. Some procedure changes were required and temporary changes were implemented. All procedural steps were followed and the RCO was alert and aware during the transfer process. The operator had a good working knowledge of the evolution being performed which allowed him to correct the procedure prior to performing the evolution, [4-OP-201, Filling/Draining the Refueling Cavity and the SFP Transfer Canal].

Shifts conducted themselves in a professional and competent manner at all times.

7

Completed By: Lawrence A. Spalding — *MOS Observer* — Date: 10/18-19/88

Reviewed By: L.A. Pearce — *Operations Superintendent- Nuclear* — Date: 10/19/88

Management Review By: *PM-N* / *Date* — *SVP* / 10/18/88 *Date* — *VP* / 10/19/88 *Date*

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/18-19/88

From: J. A. Labarraque
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Walked the plant for safety compliance (see guidelines)
- Inspected recorders in control room (approximately 10 green tags)
- Discussed outage work with Operations
- Performed Plant Manager weekly walkthroughs and inspection
- Observed shift turnover

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Safety Supervisor should look into reducing tripping hazard throughout the plant.
(88-2804)

6

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Control room is being cleaned very frequently. This is a morale booster for the operators.

2. I found no personnel violating any safety rules.

3. Some of the operating personnel feel that the outside MOS is counter productive and that the program objective can be accomplished by the PTN existing program:

   -Management walkthrough (see J.E. cross letter)
   -PSN MOS program
   -Safety system management verification
   -System engineers system walkthrough

9

Completed By: J. A. Labarraque, *MOS Observer* Date: 10/18-19/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce, *Operations Superintendent- Nuclear* Date: 10/19/88

Management Review By: *PM-N* / *Date* *SVP* / 10/18/88 *Date* *VP* / 10/19/88 *Date*

10/18-19/88

TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT
SAFETY INSPECTIONS

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ITEMS THAT IS LOOKED FOR ON A PLANT SAFETY INSPECTION.

HOUSEKEEPING

CLEAR WALK-WAYS

TRIPPING AND BUMPING HAZARDS

UN-SAFE PLANT EQUIPMENT

PERSONNEL VIOLATING SAFETY RULES
- WORKING UNSAFE
- NOT USING PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

OTHER UNSAFE EQUIPMENT
- LADDERS
- RIGGING
- TOOLS
- PERSONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT

NOTE:

ON THESE INSPECTIONS THERE ARE OTHER ITEMS THAT ARE LOOKED AT BESIDES PERSONNEL SAFETY ITEMS. THESE ITEMS MAY INCLUDE, SECURITY VIOLATIONS, OR EQUIPMENT FAILURES.

FPL

INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

RECEIVED

OCT 17 1988

FLA. POWER & LIGHT CO.

PTN-PMN-88-565

TO: Distribution

LOCATION: Turkey Point Nuclear

FROM: J. E. Cross

DATE: October 13, 1988

SUBJECT: Management Presence in the Plant and Attendance at Meetings

COPIES TO: J. S. Odom

We continue to experience difficulties in setting priorities so that management has sufficient time to tour the plant observing the work force, inspecting plant material conditions, and providing oversight on critical jobs. This must be corrected.

To facilitate management involvement in field activities, each manager will spend at least 2 hours per day in the plant. One hour should be spent on evaluating plant material condition and equipment operation, the other hour should be dedicated to observing the conduct of operation, i.e. procedure adherence, work control, professionalism or general observations of personnel in the field. The following schedule must be adhered to:

	TIME OF DAY				
	5:30 AM - 7:30 AM	7:30 AM - 9:30 AM	9:30 AM - 12:00 PM	12:30 PM - 2:30 PM	2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
R. J. Earl	Mon.	Fri.	N/A	Tues.	Thurs.
T. A. Finn	Tues.	Thurs.	Mon.	Wed.	Fri.
J. W. Kappes	Wed.	N/A	Tues.	Thurs.	Mon.
L. W. Pearce	Thurs.	Mon.	Wed.	Fri.	N/A
F. H. Southworth	N/A	Tues.	Fri.	Mon.	Wed.
J. A. Labarraque	Fri.	Wed.	Thurs.	N/A	Tues.

I will personally go on tour with each of you during the next couple of weeks to ensure that I properly communicate what needs to be accomplished during these tours.

To assist management in prioritizing meeting attendance the following meetings are the only meetings where more than one management representative will be present unless approved by me.

- Morning Planning Meeting
- Plant Training Advisory Board (PTAB)
- Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC)
- Plant Managers Staff Meeting
- Plant Lead Team
- Project Review Board (PRB)
- Quality Instruction Review

As a management team we can no longer afford to spend excessive time in meetings. I have not attempted to limit meetings that you personally schedule, but would caution you to keep them to a minimum.

James E Cross

J. E. Cross
Plant Manager - Nuclear

JEC/sas:14:053

Date 10/19/88	**Shift Report**	Shift Peaks

Shift Management

PSN Jones APSN Haley NWE

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

1

Reviewed By L.W. Pearce Date 10/20/88

Date 10/19/88

Shift Report

Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Wogan APSN Singer NWE Vetromile

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

3

Reviewed By R.W. Pearce Date 10/19/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/19/88

From: M. B. Gilmore (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, Mode 5
- Unit 4, fuel off-loaded
- APSN turnover
- Plan of the Day meeting
- Toured Unit 4 containment - observed refueling cavity drain down in progress
- Shift briefing

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Goals and objectives for the shift were clearly identified at the shift meeting. Expected difficulties were discussed and operators were informed of cautions to be taken with regard to the evolutions which would be performed.

2. Operators adhered to all procedural requirements, OTSC's which were required were well coordinated with Operations support personnel.

Completed By: M. B. Gilmore, MOS Observer Date: 10/19/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce, Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date: 10/20/88

(6)

Management Review By: PM-N (10/20/88) Date; SVP for (10/20/88) Date; VP / Date 10/19/88

★M(XS.1 01.07/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/19-20/88

From: Lawrence A. Spalding (MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Peak/mid shift turnover
- Unit 3 in mode 5
- Unit 4 defueled
- Toured Radiation Control Area (RCA)
- Observed control room emergency ventilation system operability test 0-OSP-025.1
- Observed recovery from loss of instrument air per off-normal
- Procedure 0-ONOP-013

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None observed

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None observed

D. **Areas for Improvement**

Complacency associated with long running DC ground indications and alarms. On both unit 3 and 4 annunciators J4-5 125V DC Bus 3D31 and 4D31 are periodically indicating a DC ground. Operations has performed ONOP 9608.2, Auxiliary 125 VDC System Location of Grounds, however the ground cannot be found. PWO submitted on unit 3 (WA880420895837) on 4/20/88. The operator says same ground indication on unit 4 for approximately two weeks. When questioned about the alarm the RCO said this alarm had been in ever since he was in the control room so he considered this abnormal situation normal. The Electrical Supervisor said that there was a problem with the ground detection system and that an actual ground did not exist. Consensus of opinion was since this was not a vital bus it was not important. Vital bus 4A annunciator X6-9 (dc ground bus 4A) came in and it was acknowledged. When questioned it was stated that everything we can do to find the ground has been done and we can't find it. There was a PWO issued on 10/14/88. My question is this, what is a reasonable period of time to run with an indication of a ground or a real ground?
(88-2825)

7

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Pre-shift brief was handled well, shift plan was communicated to all attendees.
- Instrument air pressure dropped to 80 psi due to diesel air compressor clutch failure. Operators responded per 0-ONOP-013 step 4.2 and started available diesel air compressor. Response was fast and correct.
- Shift conducted themselves in a professional and competent manner at all times.

Completed By: Lawrence A. Spalding, *MOS Observer* Date: 10/19-20/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pierce, *Operations Superintendent- Nuclear* Date: 10/20/88

Management Review By: PM-N Date 10/20/88; SVP Date 10/20/88; VP Date 10/19-20/88

(8)

Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 10/19-20/88

From: J. A. Labarraque
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Shift turnover
- Maintenance planning
- Control room activities
- APSN shift turnover
- Methods of work integration

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Work integration between maintenance departments could be enhanced. Significant time was spent during the shift meeting between the maintenance groups finding out what the other maintenance groups needed. All of this type of information should be divided among them prior to the shift meeting. There appears to be a need for additional work integration. This could be achieved by having the planner integrate their work support requirements prior to the shift meeting. It should also be very clear in the Plan of the Day. (88-2826)

9

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. APSN shift turnover was excellent. The outgoing shift was aware of what was going on and the incoming shift was inquisitive about past activities.

2. Maintenance personnel was attentive and responsive to the PSN concerns.

3. Licensing's mode clarification letter was discussed among shift personnel.

4. The APSN and the NOs had a follow-up meeting to make sure that each NO knew what work was his and the priorities.

5. There is a considerable amount of non-committed, passive type or conditional type statements made during the shift meeting. It is difficult to (in some cases) to know what items will be worked. (Numerous, "if", "I will see if", "I need to find out if", etc). This usually leads to somebody dropping the ball. (See section D).

Completed By: J. A. Labarraque, *MOS Observer* Date: 10/19-20/88

Reviewed By: L. W. Rocco, *Operations Superintendent- Nuclear* Date: 10/20/88

Management Review By: PM-N 10/20/88 Date; SVP 10/20/88 Date; VP / Date 10/19-20/88

10

Date 10/20/88	Shift Report	Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Wogan APSN Singer NWE Vetromile

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

1. TP489-Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) stroke time testing for Overpressure Mitigating System (OMS) was issued to Operations with sign-off lines x'd and the originators initials with a vertical line underneath. (See attached example). This type of procedure left the PSN/APSN/SRO and PUP on shift confused as what was to be done. Were the steps to be skipped or were they to be done and not signed. The outage coordinator explained that they were to be done several times and the signature lines were not available for each stroke. The procedure is totally undiscernable and should have never reached the control room in this state. It would have taken little extra effort to have a word processor type in any added steps. An explanation as to what X means would have also been appropriate. If the outage coordinator had not had first-hand knowledge of the TP, this procedure could have been done incorrectly.
(88-2827)

2. When hydrometers and thermometers from vital DC batteries are sent out for calibration, replacements are necessary for Technical Specification surveillances. (88-2828)

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

The plant departments are having to write OTSC after OTSC on plant procedures. Although this is an indictment of our procedures, it shows that the plant is demanding excellence in its procedures, and accepting anything else (working around procedural or equipment problems) should be not tolerated by anyone at Turkey Point.

(2)

Reviewed By L.W. Pearce Date 10/20/88

Florida Power & Light Company

Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

TP-489

Title:

PORV Stroke Time Testing for OMS

Safety Related Procedure

Responsible Department: Operations

Reviewed by PNSC: OCT 14 1988 88-250

Approved by Plant Manager-N: ~~OCT 14 1988~~ 10-14-89

TP not valid after:

3

*/HLM/dj/dt

3.0 PREREQUISITES

3.1 The Instrument Air System is operational inside Unit 4 containment.

3.2 The nitrogen backup system relief valves RV-4-6587 and RV-4-6588 are set at 125 psig.

3.3 Personnel who will perform this procedure have reviewed it and understand their responsibilities.

3.4 TSA 4-88-13-28 has been approved

3.5 An I&C Technician is available to install TSA 4-88-13-28

3.6 The backup nitrogen regulators PCV-4-4885 and PCV-4-4886 outlet pressures are set between 84 and ~~86~~ 88 psig.

3.7 The pressurizer PORV's PCV-4-455C and PCV-4-~~455C~~ 456 have been declared out-of-service and logged on the EOOS log sheet.

4.0 PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS

4.1 All works performed in Radiation Controlled Areas shall be performed in accordance with the requirements of the Radiation Work Permit and the ALARA program.

4.2 The PORVs , PCV-4-455C and PCV-4-456 shall remain out-of-service on a clearance until the restoration of TSA 4-88-13-28.

4.3 The RCS shall be vented to containment with a opening greater than or equal to 2.20 square inches.

4.4 The RCS temperature shall remain below 140°F and the reactor vessel head shall be removed or less than fully tensioned (mode 6).

4.5 The pressurizer spray valve PCV-4-455B will not be operable during the performance of this procedure due to isolation of instrument air valve 4-1962 by clearance.

4.6 Steps in this procedure may be performed out of sequence with no change of intent and with approval of the Plant Supervisor - Nuclear.

(4)

INITIALS
CK'D VERIF

7.1.10 Record the opening time on Attachment 1.

NOTE

Steps 7.1.11 and 7.1.12 ~~are to~~ be performed simultaneously.
Shall HLM

7.1.11 Close the pressurizer PORV, PCV-4-455C.

7.1.12 Time the closing of PCV-4-455C starting when the control switch is actuated to the time the valve is indicated closed.

7.1.13 Record the closing time on Attachment 1.

7.1.14 Repeat Steps 7.1.8 through 7.1.13 a total of 8 times.

7.1.15 Verify that the pressurizer PORV, PCV-4-455C is closed.

NOTE

Steps 7.1.16 and 7.1.17 ~~are to~~ be performed simultaneously.
Shall HLM

7.1.16 Open the pressurizer PORV, PCV-4-456.

7.1.17 Time the opening of PCV-4-456 starting when the control switch is actuated to the time the valve is indicated open.

7.1.18 Record the opening time on Attachment 1.

NOTE

Steps 7.1.19 and 7.1.20 ~~are to~~ be performed simultaneously.
Shall HLM

7.1.19 Close the pressurizer PORV, PCV-4-456.

7.1.20 Time the opening of PCV-4-456 starting when the control switch is actuated to the time the valve is indicated closed.

7.1.21 Record the closing time on Attachment 1.

7.1.22 Repeat Steps 7.1.16 through 7.1.21 a total of 8 times.

5

*/HLM/dj/dt

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/20/88

From: M. B. Gilmore (MOS Observer) Shift: ☒ Day ☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Plan of the Day meeting
- Shift briefing
- Toured radiation waste building
- Toured Units 3 and 4 intake structure
- Shift turnover, Day/peak shift

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Routine operations and outage work activities were carried out in a professional manner.

2

Completed By: M. B. Gilmore, MOS Observer Date: 10/20/88

Reviewed By: Lu Pearce, Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date: 10/21/88

Management Review By: PM-N / 10/21/88 Date; SVP / 10/21/88 Date; VP / Date 10/20/88

*MOS 01.07/88

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/20-21/88

From: Lawrence A. Spalding (MOS Observer) Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3 in mode 5
- Unit 4 defueled
- Peak/mid shift turnover
- Observed liquid release
- Toured diesel generators
- Toured auxiliary feed station
- Toured turbine area
- Normal operations and logs, Units 3 and 4

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None observed

C. Questionable Work Practices

None observed

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- The pre-shift brief was handled well. Shift plan was communicated to all attendees.
- The shift conducted themselves in a professional and competent manner at all times.

3

Completed By: Lawrence A. Spalding, MOS Observer Date: 10/20-21/88

Reviewed By: [signature], Operations Superintendent-Nuclear Date: 10/21/88

Management Review By: [signature] PM-N 10/21/88 Date; [signature] SVP 10/21/88 Date; VP Date

10/20-21/88

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 10/20-21/88

From: J. A. Labarraque (MOS Observer) Shift: ☐ Day ☒ Night

A. **Plant Evolutions Observed**

- Shift turnover
- Auxiliary building inspection
- Health Physics practices
- Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) fuel movement control
- Compliance with safety rules

B. **Immediate Safety Problems**

None

C. **Questionable Work Practices**

None

D. **Areas for Improvement**

No new areas identified.

E. **Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments**

- Health Physics requested my name prior to issuing the TLD. They did check the number and name. Prior to exiting the building another HP worker standing by the door requested my name, checked my badge and my TLD# to be sure that they were all correct. This is an excellent example of the use of "check and balance" approach and not leaving anything to chance.

- When requesting permission to enter contaminated-radiation areas they were polite, knowledgeable and willing to take the extra step to keep me informed.

(4)

Completed By: J. A. Labarraque, MOS Observer Date: 10/20-21/88

Reviewed By: [signature], Operations Superintendent- Nuclear Date: 10/21/88

Management Review By: [signature] PM-N / 10/21/88 Date; [signature] SVP / 10/21/88 Date; VP / Date

10/20-21/88

Date 10/20/88

Shift Report

Shift Peaks

Shift Management

P Jones APSN Haley NWE

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

1

Reviewed By [signature] Date 10/21/88