

# ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

## REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8809190120 DOC.DATE: 88/09/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #  
 FACIL:50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251  
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 SALAMON,G. Florida Power & Light Co.  
 CONWAY,W.F. Florida Power & Light Co.  
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-008-00:on 880815,inadvertent relay actuation relay  
 examination causes Phase A containment isolation.  
 W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 3  
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

### NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD2-2 LA	1 1	PD2-2 PD	1 1
	EDISON,G	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	ACRS WYLIE	1 1	AEOD/DOA	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	ARM/DCTS/DAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DEST/ADS 7E	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB 8H	1 1	NRR/DEST/ESB 8D	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB 7	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB 9H	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB 9H	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB 8D	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB 8E	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB 8D	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB 11	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB 10	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB 10	2 2	NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A	1 1
	NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1
	RES TELFORD,J	1 1	RES/DSIR DEPY	1 1
	RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS,S	4 4	FORD BLDG HOY,A	1 1
	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1	LPDR	1 1
	NRC PDR	1 1	NSIC HARRIS,J	1 1
	NSIC MAYS,G	1 1		

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 4	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4) Inadvertent Relay Actuation Following Relay Examination  
Causes Phase A Containment Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
08	15	88	88	008	00	09	14	88	N/A		0 5 0 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 3	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
	20.402(b)					20.405(c)					<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)					60.38(c)(1)					<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)					60.38(c)(2)					<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)					60.73(a)(2)(i)					<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)					60.73(a)(2)(ii)					<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)					60.73(a)(2)(iii)					<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(ix)		
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0												

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)								TELEPHONE NUMBER			
Gabe Salamon, Compliance Engineer								AREA CODE			
								3 0 5 2 4 6 - 6 5 6 0			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDs	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)								EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)									<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 15, 1988, at 1114, with Unit 4 in mode 3, Phase A of Containment Isolation (CI) train A actuated. Prior to the actuation, a Reactor Control Operator opened the front door to safeguards relay rack QR-44 in order to permit an examination of certain relays by engineering personnel. At the conclusion of the examination, a wire bundle which was wedged between the door and the relay cabinet was lifted in order to clear the door frame and permit the door to close. At this time, a relay was heard to pick up and train A CI actuated. All phase A CI relays on safeguards relay rack QR-51 actuated. The most likely cause of the phase A CI was the wire bundle bouncing the contacts of relay 4-SIA2. Tugging on the leads to relays 4-SIA2 and 4-SIM2, which are the relays located closest to the wire bundle, did not result in CI actuation. The relay contacts on 4-SIA2 were inspected with no discrepancies being identified. Upon confirming that containment conditions did not warrant a phase A CI, the phase A CI actuation signal was reset, and valves were opened as necessary. Plant Change/Modification packages for the installation of guards to prevent the wire bundle from bumping relays 3-SIA2 and 4-SIA2 are expected to be issued prior to December, 1988. The guards will be installed during the next Unit 3 and Unit 4 outages of sufficient length, following issuance of the Project Change/Modification packages.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Turkey Point Unit 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	8 8	0 0 8	0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

EVENT

On August 15, 1988, at 1114, with Unit 4 in mode 3, Phase A of Containment Isolation (CI) (EIIS:JM) train A actuated. Prior to the actuation, a Reactor Control Operator (RCO) opened the front door to safeguards relay rack QR-44 in order to permit an examination of certain relays by engineering personnel. At the conclusion of the examination, a wire bundle which was wedged between the door and the relay cabinet was lifted in order to clear the door frame and permit the door to close. At this time, a relay was heard to pick up and train A CI actuated. All phase A CI relays on safeguards relay rack QR-51 actuated. After determining that containment conditions did not warrant phase A CI, train A was reset.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The most likely cause of the phase A CI was the wire bundle bouncing the contacts of relay 4-SIA2. Tugging on the leads to relays 4-SIA2 and 4-SIM2, which are the relays located closest to the wire bundle, did not result in CI actuation. The relay contacts on 4-SIA2 were inspected with no discrepancies being identified.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Upon the phase A CI actuation, the relays on rack QR-51 actuated. The affected valves isolated, with several flow paths isolating, including letdown, Reactor Coolant Pump seal water return, and Steam Generators A and C blowdown. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) Upon confirming that containment conditions did not warrant a phase A CI, the phase A CI actuation signal was reset, and valves were opened as necessary.
- 2) Plant Change/Modification packages for the installation of guards to prevent the wire bundle from bumping relays 3-SIA2 and 4-SIA2 are expected to be issued prior to December, 1988. The guards will be installed during the next Unit 3 and Unit 4 outages of sufficient length, following issuance of the Plant Change/Modification packages.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Similar occurrence: LER 251-86-022

FPL

SEPTEMBER 14 1988

L-88-397  
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4  
Docket No. 50-251  
Reportable Event: 88-07  
Date of Event: August 15, 1988  
Inadvertent Relay Actuation Following Relay  
Examination Causes Phase A Containment Isolation

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

*DA Sagul*  
W. F. Conway  
Senior Vice President - Nuclear

WFC/TCG/gp

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator,  
Region II, USNRC  
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

IE22