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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 CONWAY,W.F. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 GRACE,J.N. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards summary of mgt-on-shift weekly repts.

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AUGUST 24 1988

L-88-372

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted. The Plant Supervisor-Nuclear Shift Reports are also being submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

W. F. Conway

W. F. Conway
Senior Vice President - Nuclear

WFC/SDF/gp

Attachment

cc: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC
Dr. G. E. Edison, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

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*Original
To: Region 2
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MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 08/12/88

PAGE 1 OF 2

Eight MOS Observers were on shift: James E. Jones, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (08/12-15/88, nights); Richard Courtland, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (08/15-19/88, days); Andrew P. Drake, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (08/15-19/88, nights); Russell Gouldy, Principal Engineer, Nuclear Licensing, Juno Beach (08/12-14/88, days); Pat Hughes, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Health Physics Supervisor (08/13-16/88, nights); and Paul Banaszak, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Electrical Engineer (08/12-13/88, nights); Max Ammerman, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant INPO HPES Coordinator (08/16-18/88), nights); and John Evans, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Document Control Supervisor (08/18-19/88, nights).

Unit 3 operated in Mode 1 for the duration of the reporting period. Unit 4 was shutdown on August 13 to repair a leaking blank flange near the pressurizer. The unit was restarted on August 17, 1988.

No immediate safety problems were noted by any Observer during the reporting period.

The Independent Observers recorded two questionable work practices, one of which was identified by the Plant Supervisor-Nuclear (PSN) and is described later.

The Independent Observers also noted sixteen areas for improvement as follows:

- Four recommendations regarding procedures
- Two recommendations resulting from a partial phase A containment isolation caused by a cable bumping a relay.
- A recommendation to make better use of equipment history in planning work packages.
- A concern over attention to detail. Two examples were given of low-priority repair jobs not completed creating a hindrance to plant operation.
- A recommended alternate way to correct Rod Position Indication readings while on alternate power supply.
- A concern regarding entry into Technical Specifications 3.0.1 through work clearances on intake cooling water.
- A recommendation to put non-skid on some deck plating.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 08/12/88.

PAGE 2 OF 2

- A suggestion to consider an additional curve or nomograph for boration.
- Two recommendations to help smooth the operations workload.
- Two suggestions for improving temporary hardware.
- A concern regarding the location of a new vital area fence blocking operator access.

The Turkey Point Observers did not record any questionable work practices. They noted seven areas for improvement as follows:

- Two suggestions for procedure improvement.
- A concern over use of a fire protection barrier penetration without a breach permit. This was determined to be incorrect; a breach permit was not required.
- A recommendation to supply the operators with more hydrometers.
- A suggestion to keep debris clear of drains leading to the waste holdup tank.
- A concern that an important job was not on the Plan of the Day.
- A concern that a junction box cover was missing.

The Plant Supervisors-Nuclear (PSNs) noted two questionable work practices. One, echoed by an Independent Observer, involved a change to a surveillance procedure which was to reflected in the surveillance scheduling procedure. The second item revolved around rapid changes in system load without prior notification of the plant. The PSNs also noted four areas for improvement, as follows:

- A recommendation to install a cellular phone in the control room.
- A concern about a valve failure causing an auxiliary feedwater system actuation. This resulted in two recommendations.
- Two recommendations regarding procedure improvements for placing polishers in service and testing auxiliary feedwater.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

Date 08/12/88

Shift Report

Shift _____ Days _____

Shift Management

PSN _____ Salkeld _____ APSN _____ Guyer _____ NWE _____ Eddinger _____

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

Reviewed By

Sw Pence

Date

8/15/88

Actions Completed

Date

Date 08/12/88

Shift Report

Shift Peaks

Shift Management

PSN Jones APSN Haley NWE

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

OSP 72.2 section 7.1, previously tested Main Steam Isolation Valve nitrogen backup pressure regulators for A, B & C Steam Generators. Section 7.2 previously checked the nitrogen spare bottles. OSP 72.2 was re-written on 7/19/88 and now is broken up into section 7.1, 7.2 & 7.3 which tests the regulators of A, B & C Steam Generators respectively. Section 7.4 checks spare bottles. O-OSP-200.1 says that OSP-72.2 be tested weekly each Friday. (pg. 31) however, per OSP-200.1 (pg. 55) section 7.2 is done on Tuesday and (pg. 74) section 7.1 is done on Friday. 7.3 and 7.4 are not referenced at all.

1. We initiated OSP-72.2 section 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 & 7.4 and completed satisfactorily.
2. Notified Operations Superintendent.
3. Notified Virgil Wager, Procedure Upgrade Program Supervisor.
4. Recommend a computerized system which will give you information as to all the procedures being effected by a change in any procedure.

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Section 7.1 of OSP-72.2 was being done tonight by John Hobson and he brought this possible procedure error to our attention. We would like to commend him for his keen attentive observation.

Reviewed By SW Prince Date 8/15/88 Actions Completed _____ Date _____

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/12/88

From: Russell Gouldy
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Dual unit 100 power operation
- Preparations for shutdown on Unit 4
- Troubleshooting 3B Containment Spray Pump

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Attention to detail - 2 examples

1. 250 lb reducing steam valve is out-of-service and has been for more than one month. This is a low priority job as long as Unit 4 can reduce steam pressure and supply steam to the Auxiliary Building. Now that Unit 4 is coming off the line and can't produce steam, the Auxiliary Building is out of steam for batching boric acid. A temporary or by-pass method is going to be required.
2. Weir Pit has been filling up with seaweed for the past several days and has been noted by the operators. Today, Friday, at 4:30 P.M. Construction was requested to clean out the pit before it overflows. Now Construction will have to get a crane or some other method and start cleaning on Friday night and Saturday to prevent the seaweed from overflowing and then blocking the cooling water strainers. Again a low priority job that should have been completed prior to it creating a hinderance to plant operation.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Heavy workloads due to both units in shutdown preparations.

Completed By: Russell Gouldy
MOS Observer

Date: 08/12/88

Reviewed By: R. W. Parra
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

PM-N 18/15/88 SVP VP 12/1/88
Date Date Date Date

08/12/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/12-13/88

From: Paul Banaszak
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Both units at 100% power - Unit 4 brought to hot standby (Mode 3)
- Shift turnover, peak to mid - somewhat abbreviated because of Unit 4 shutdown in progress
- Plant procedures, 4-GOP-103, 4-OP.087.3, O-GMI-102.1
- Plant tour

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

During execution of procedure 4-OP-087.3 step 7.1.2, it was noted that the cautionary statement disagrees with step 7.1.2.1. The cautionary statement should be revised to "...switch is in off position."

Penetration above fire door 104.3 has been utilized for temporary cables; no breach permit was found on either side of the penetration.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

All operators involved in the Unit 4 shutdown showed a high level of professionalism in their efforts.

Completed By: Paul Banaszak
MOS Observer

Date: 08/12-13/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

PM-N 8/15/88 SVP 8/15/88 VP 8/15/88
Date Date Date
08/12-13/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/12/-13/88

From: James E. Jones
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 4 plant shutdown to hot standby per 4-GOP-103
- Reactor trip with only shutdown Rods Bank B out
- Source Range N-32 failure - Unit 4
- Protection Channel FI-475 steam flow failure
- Shutdown Rod C-7 Bank A rod deviation
- Unit 3 Rod Position Indication (RPI) Inverter power trouble
- Missed surveillance on nitrogen backup for Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) per OSP-72.2.
- Unit 4 Turbine control valve dual indication

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

When OSP-72.2, the procedure for checking the MSIV nitrogen backup system, was rewritten (7/19/88) it was broken into four parts instead of two. The surveillance procedure scheduling document 0-OSP-200.1 (written 4/7/88) references only the two old sections (7.1, 7.2). The two newly numbered sections (7.3 and 7.4) have not been placed on the scheduling document.

The questionable work practice is:

When a procedure is changed due to a rewrite or system design change, the method and/or system used to identify and cross reference other procedures affected has bypassed some affected procedures. (In this case 0-OSP-200.1, causing a surveillance to be missed).

D. Areas for Improvement

1. When Unit 3 needed to switch RPI to the alternate power supply, a lighting panel, the Analog Rod Position Indicator Indications indicated greater than 12 steps from the step counters. The I&C specialist adjusted the span on nearly 60 rod modules with only four minutes left before a 1 hour technical specification would have forced a unit shutdown.

Instead of adjusting 60 rod modules, a simpler method to consider is adjusting the output voltage from the Sola transformer by a potentiometer adjustment normally found on a Sola transformer. This would require only one adjustment to correct the RPI readings and one adjustment when normal power is returned to the RPI inverter.

2. Many OTSCs have been needed to fix procedures costing FPL considerable time and money. Due to a shortage of qualified manpower (licensed operators, NLOs, I&C Specialists, etc.), procedures have not been able to be reviewed by qualified Operations personnel who use them, prior to their use in the plant. As soon as personnel become available, (when next RCO and NLO class is completed) assign personnel who use the procedures to walk them down, and recommend improvements for their use to the PUP group.
3. PUP personnel should see NLO John Hobson for the many NLO procedures that need changes or improvements. John has a listing of them and has not had the time to write them up and submit them to PUP.
4. Procedure O-OSP-074 step 6.1.2 substep 2C states that the open indication for the Main Feed Pump (MFP) recirculation valves on the main control board should come on during a MFP manual shutdown. These lights do not come on and should not per the logic drawing as long as the valve control switch is in close/auto.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Operations personnel responded quickly and effectively to correct the missing surveillance on the MSIV nitrogen backup system, the RPI inverter problem the reactor trip during the Unit 4 shutdown and the many other evolutions observed.

Technical Specifications, appropriate procedures, and correct actions were taken and used during all shifts observed.

Completed By: James E. Jones
MOS Observer

Date: 08/12-13/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

[Signature] 12/15/88 *[Signature]* 8/15/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

08/12/13/88

Date 08/13/88

Shift Report

Shift Mids

Jones/Salkeld

Shift Management
Smger

Fernandez

PSN _____ APSN _____ NWE _____

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

I&C saved a potential Unit 3 shutdown. A Rod Position Indication (RPI) inverter was going bad causing RPI relay chattering. I&C identified the electrical problem. Operations swapped power to emergency power supply putting the unit in a 1 hour LCO due to RPI/Group Step Counter mismatches. I&C quickly responded and readjusted the RPIs with 4 minutes to spare.

Reviewed By RW Pease Date 8/15/88 Actions Completed _____ Date _____

Date 08/13/88

Shift Report

Shift _____ Days _____

Shift Management

PSN Salkeld APSN Haley NWE Eddinger

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

Reviewed By *[Signature]* Date 8/15/88 Actions Completed _____ Date _____

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/13/88

From: Russell Gouldy
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, 100% power operation, Unit 4, cooldown to 400° F and Depressurization to 750 psi
- Planning meeting and day to peak shift turnovers and shift meeting

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Day shift operators noted how smooth the depressurization was using only one spray valve. At simulator they noted that during the depressurizations you had to use both spray valves and turn off the control group heaters to get any effect and there was only minor depressurization below 1100 psi using sprays.

I recommended that a computer printout trend be sent to the Simulator Supervisor for information. This would provide actual response for simulator verification. Without the data, the group could only explain what they saw at equal and would not be given much credibility.

I commend the crew for the observations and discussions about the comparison. The shift consisted of Pat Salkeld, Art Singer, Rick Adamson, Eric Anderson and Harley Morgan.

Completed By: Russell Gouldy
MOS Observer

Date: 08/13/88

Reviewed By: L. W. Kelce
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

PM-N 18/15/88 SVP 18/15/88 VP 1 Date

08/13/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/13-14/88

From: P. W. Hughes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- ° Routine Control Room operations
- ° 11:30 operation shift turnover meeting
- ° Health Physics/Mechanical Maintenance/Operations containment (#4) entry preparations
- ° Health Physics ALARA pre-briefings for pressurizer leak repair
- ° Health Physics/Mechanical Maintenance coordination during Unit 4 pressurizer entries inside containment

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvements

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Excellent coordination between Health Physics, Mechanical Maintenance, Quality Control, Fermanite during Unit 4 pressurizer leak repair! Everyone needs to be congratulated for a job well done.

Completed By: P. W. Hughes
MOS Observer

Date: 08/13-14/88

Reviewed By: *Kw Ponce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

Jec 1 *ES* 1 *8/15/88*
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

08/13-14/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/13-14/88

From: James E. Jones
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3 at 100% power
- Unit 4 shutdown to repair old pressurizer spray valve flange leak
- Unit 4 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) stroking
- Rod Position Indication (RPI) Inverter troubleshooting on Unit 3
- Unit 4 N-32 troubleshooting

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

FPL should consider using shutdown margin curves for 350° for repairs such as the spray valve flange leak, less boration of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) would result in considerably less dulution and water processing on the subsequent return to power. This in turn would result in financial savings in water processing, both in RCS makeup and waste water processing for discharge, especially at EOL.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments




None

Completed By: James E. Jones
MOS Observer

Date: 08/13-14/88

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By: PM-N  SVP  VP
Date 8/15/88 Date 8/15/88 Date 8/15/88

08/13-14/88

Date 08/14/88

Shift Report

Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Jones/Salkeld APSN Singer NWE Fernandez

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

Reviewed By RW Perna Date 8/15/88 Actions Completed Date

Date 08/14/88

Shift Report

Shift _____ Peaks _____

Shift Management

PSN _____ Jones _____ APSN _____ Haley _____ NWE _____

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

All our communications failed with exception of System/Dispatch radio. Periodically, the in-plant Bell phone would work. Security saved the day by bringing their "cellular phone" to the Control Room. We were able to establish communications with NRC Operations Center - State Warning Point, Tallahassee, Duty Call Supervisor and etc.

Recommend we install a permanent "cellular phone" in the Control Room for just such emergencies.

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

Reviewed By AW Prince Date 8/15/88 Actions Completed _____ Date _____

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/14/88

From: Russell Gouldy
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, 100% power operation
- Unit 4, heat-up from 400° to 547° F and repressurization from 750 psi to 2200 psi

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Shift turnover - Unit 3

Technical Specification (TS) 3.01 was entered this morning due to placing two components from the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) system out-of-service on work clearances.

One clearance was written and released by the out-going shift and the second by the on-coming day shift.

- The majority of the shift turnover concern was on Unit 4 and the required preparations for restarting that unit. The ICW system on Unit 3 was in TS 3.0.1. for just over 3 hours. No TS violations occurred.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Well organized effort to restart Unit 4. Chemistry samples were timely, clearances ready when requested and good communications from Maintenance and I&C back to the Control Room operators and supervisor.

Overtime continues to be high in the Operations Department.




Completed By: Russell Gouldy
MOS Observer

Date: 08/14/88

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

 PM-N  SVP  VP

18/8/88 Date 18/15/88 Date

08/14/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/14-15/88

From: James E. Jones
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3 at 100% power
- Loss of phone communications to outside lines
- Unit 4 shutdown
- Gland exhaust condenser relief valve stuck open - Unit 4
- N-42 Power Range troubleshooting
- Secondary plant tour

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Diamond back deck plating is slippery when wet at stairways between the Mezzanine and the ground floor. In areas where people generally travel, it should be painted like the deck plating outside the main Control Room.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Security worked well with Operations to establish an alternate means for outside phone communication.

APSN Bill Haley contacted needed personnel and maintained assurance that the NRC could be contacted if needed.

Completed By: James E. Jones
MOS Observer

Date: 08/14-15/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:

[Signature] PM-N *[Signature]* Date *[Signature]* SVP *[Signature]* Date 8/15/88 *[Signature]* VP *[Signature]* Date

08/14-15/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/14-15/88

From: P. W. Hughes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Routine Control Room operations
- Operations mid shift turnover meeting
- Health Physics/Fermanite ALARA pre-briefing for work
- N-42 troubleshooting by I&C

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

Completed By: P. W. Hughes
MOS Observer

Date: 08/14-15/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/15/88

Management
Review By:*[Signature]* 8/15/88 *[Signature]* 8/15/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date
08/14-15/88

Date 08/15/88

Shift Report

Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Anderson APSN Singer NWE Fernandez

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

John Wolf of I&C GEMS should be recognized for his observance and efforts in finding and correcting a procedure deficiency which saved us many hours in repairing N-42 on Unit 4.

Reviewed By *[Signature]* Date 8/15/88 Actions Completed Date

Date 08/16/88

Shift Report

Shift _____ Peak _____

Shift Management

PSN Schimkus APSN Reese NWE Spence

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

Immediately prior to taking Unit 4 critical, 4A Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) tripped on low suction pressure due to an inadvertant failure of "B" Condensate polishing vessel inlet valve opening immediately rather than slowly. Logic dictates that low suction pressure will trip the running SGFP and give Auxilliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation. This occurred; resulting in a rapid Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown to less than 543° F. due to the AFW "cold" water and loss of normal feed train. SGFP trip on low suction pressure and procedures should allow operators to start a stand-by SGFP to supply feed to Steam Generators, would prevent a 50.72 Notification of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Activation.

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Operators, Maintenance and all support personnel made an outstanding effort to complete all repair efforts, testing, bringing Reactor critical on peak-shift and two previous shifts.

Reviewed By X. Pearce Date 8/17/88 Actions Completed _____ Date _____

Date 08/17/88

Shift Report

Shift Mid

Shift Management

PSN Jones APSN Haley NWE

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

Sometimes automation is not the answer. You can read about what happened yesterday when "B" polisher was put in service. Why not let the operator have more control? Let him operate the by-pass around polisher inlet valve 6351B. Then when he is satisfied that the pressure is equalized, he should open 6351B. We could still keep the 25 lb. Pressure Differential (delta P) interlock for a back-up. I am not happy at all with the way the system is now and we are set up for a more severe transient if polishers were put in at full power.

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

The operators did an excellent job putting Unit 4 on the line. Also, Relay Department has made our Auto sync. circuit work. Congratulations.

Reviewed By [Signature] Date 8/17/88 Actions Completed Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/16/88

From: Richard Coulthard
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, 100% power
- Unit 4, Hot standby
- 0715, Plan of the Day meeting
- 0900, Morning Event Response Team
- 3-OSP-024.3, Emergency Load Sequencer Timer test
- 4-OSP-074.2, Steam Generator Feedwater Control Valves operability test
- 3-OSP-041.1, Reactor Coolant System leak rate calculation

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

No comment

Completed By: Richard Coulthard
MOS Observer

Date: 08/16/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/17/88

Management
Review By: *[Signature]*18/17/88
Date

SVP

Date

[Signature]
VP8/17/88
Date

08/16/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/16-17/88

From: Andrew P. Drake
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, 100% power normal operations and logs
- Unit 4, startup, Turbine roll and power escalation to 30%
- Termination of Unusual Event from 8/16/88 spill
- Significant Event notification of Unit 4 Auxiliary Feedwater actuation
- Peak to mid shift turnover
- Mid shift briefing (abbreviated due to unit 4 Turbine startup in progress)

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None observed

C. Questionable Work Practices

None observed

D. Areas for Improvement

No comments

-E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

The Unit 4 operators responded very well to the Auxiliary Feedwater system (AFW) actuation during the unit startup. A problem with bringing a condensate polisher on-line cause a low suction pressure on the running feedwater pump (4A) which tripped off causing the AFW to start. The colder AFW water to the Steam Generators (SG) caused the Reactor Coolant temperature to decrease and subsequently a decrease in pressurizer level. Andy Newton took control of the Pressurizer Level Control system and Joe Scott took control of the Steam Generator AFW and Main Feedwater system. The 4B Main Feedwater pump was started, AFW secured, pressurizer level restored and the Reactor Coolant temperature recovered in about 15 minutes. A trainee (Terry Jones) was present at this time to perform the reactor startup for training purposes. He observed a more realistic and valuable training lesson. A good job well performed in a highly professional and competent manner.

Completed By: Andrew P. Drake
MOS Observer

Date: 08/16-17/88

Reviewed By: *A.W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/17/88

Management Review By: *Bob for Jec*, 8/17/88

PM-N

Date

SVP

Date

VP

Date

08/16-17/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/16-17/88

From: Max Ammerman
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Control Room startup
- Radiation Control Area (RCA) contaminated area recovery
- Maintenance set-up to clean
- RCA/Auxiliary Building tour

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

Only one Hydrometer is available for use by TOs, for all the batteries.

Each battery area has a holder for Hydrometer, but none are in the holders. Each holder should have a good Hydrometer in place.

D. Areas for Improvement

Cover missing on electrical box PB 3046/ 2' elevation outside Waste Hold-up Tank room.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Good work from Relay Department (System Protection) on fixing Auto-sync on Unit 4. They were present during the operation of Auto-sync.

Good work between Health Physics and Construction in getting Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Recirculation pump (Goulds) back and the sealing of the contamination and covering the gravel.

Completed By: Max Ammerman
MOS Observer

Date: 08/16-17/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8/17/88

Management Review By: *[Signature]* SEC 1 8/17/88
PM-N Date SVP Date*[Signature]* 8/17/88
VP Date

08/16-17/88

Date 08/18/88

Shift Report

Shift Mids

Shift Management

PSN Jones APSN Haley NWE

A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations

None

B. Areas for Improvement/Recommendations/Actions Taken

None

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations

Reviewed By PA Mard Date 8-18-88 Actions Completed Date

Date 08/17/88

Shift Report

Shift _____ Peaks _____

Shift Management

PSN Schimkus APSN Reese NWE Spence**A. Questionable Work Practices/Actions Taken/Recommendations**

None

B. Areas for Improvements/Recommendations/Actions Taken

It was found that Unit 3 Auxilliary Feedwater (AFW) Back-up Nitrogen periodic, 3-OSP-075.7 was missing its last page. This page contains final line-up verification for proper nitrogen bottle configuration following the test, plus verification of signatures of personnel performing test. In addition, the same discrepancy was found on all other copies in Control Room and Document Control.

Actions Taken: Document Control Supervisor was contacted to alleviate the discrepancy. This is to allow Operations to complete testing. Requested Document Control Supervisor to find out how a procedure, especially AFW, made it to the Control Room with vital pages missing.

Recommend: More attention to detail to ensure effective pages listed in procedures are in fact contained in a procedure.

C. Good Practices/Professionalism Observed

Routine operations - All unit operation discrepancies handled in a professional manner.

Reviewed By *[Signature]* Date 8-18-88 Actions Completed _____ Date _____

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/17/88

From: Richard Coulthard
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Unit 3, 100% power operations
- Unit 4, Escalation from 30% to 100% power per 4-GOP-301 and associated procedures
- 0715 Plan of the Day meeting
- 1535 shift turnover meeting

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Power escalation on Unit 4 conducted at 10% per hour rate in a professional manner.
2. Peak shift Unit 4 Operator noticed D Bank Control Rod H-12 out of alignment with other rods between hourly readings. Rod declared out-of-service and flux maps were performed in a very efficient manner.
3. Observed peak shift PSN and APSN conduct a detailed review of proposed On the Spot Change to 3-OSP-75.7, Auxiliary Feedwater Train 2 nitrogen backup test.

Completed By: Richard Coulthard
MOS Observer

Date: 08/17/88

Reviewed By: *DA Wende* FOR LWP
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8-18-88

Management
Review By:*KC*
PM-N*18/18*
Date*VP*
SVP*18/18/88*
Date*VP*
VP*18/18/88*
Date

08/17/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/17-18/88

From: Max Ammerman
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Secondary side tour
- Control Room and shift briefing
- Radiation Control Area (RCA) cleanup and Auxiliary Building tour

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

1. Except while actual work is in progress in the rooms where drains go to the Waste Holdup Tank, the housekeeping and work practices should keep the area clean of all materials that could block a drain when a similar event may occur (Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) heat exchanger room overflow). Examples of this problem were evident on 2' elevation and 18' elevation in the Auxiliary Building. The areas did however have a good overall appearance.
2. The POD for yesterday did not show any work scheduled for the cleanup of the RCA. This job is important and big enough to warrant addition to the POD.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

Completed By: Max Ammerman
MOS Observer

Date: 08/17-18/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8-18-88

Management
Review By:*[Signature]*
PM-N18/18/88
Date*[Signature]*
SVP18/18/88
Date*[Signature]*
VP18/18/88
Date

08/17-18/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/17-18/88

From: Andrew P. Drake
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Units 3 and 4 at 100% power operation
- Peak shift to mid shift turnover
- Mid shift briefing
- Units 3 and 4 Auxillary Feedwater (AFW) Train 2 nitrogen backup test
- Normal operations and logs

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None observed

C. Questionable Work Practices

None observed

D. Areas for Improvement

Unit 3 containment activity monitor R-11 as declared out-of-service (OOS) and a 30 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) was entered. The mid shift Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Specialist came to the Control Room at approximately 0400. He asked how the operators determined that it was broken and then said that to troubleshoot, R-11 would need to be purged and isolated. He was informed a clearance would be required to do that and that the clearance would also put R-12 OOS. With both R-11 and R-12 OOS, the plant would enter a 48 hour LCO instead of the 30 days. R-11 has had similar problems before, requiring troubleshooting. Was this clearance necessary? If so, how is it that the GEMS planner did not request it before sending out the work package? The I&C Specialist spent over one hour in the Control Room performing no work while the clearance was requested and hung. Complete pre-planning is required to maximize use of available personnel and minimize wasted time. Previous jobs on equipment should be reviewed to determine all job requirements (clearances, etc.) prior to starting the job.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Both shifts operated smoothly, quiet night.

Completed By: Andrew P. Drake
MOS Observer

Date: 08/17-18/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8-18-88

Management
Review By:K/C
PM-N18/18/88
Date

SVP

Date

VP

Date

08/17-18/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/18/88

From: Richard Coulthard
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Units 3 and 4 operations at 100% power
- 0715 Plan of the Day meeting
- 1535 start of shift meeting
- Conduct of 3-OSP-75.2, Auxiliary Feed Train Operability verification, to set C Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump governor
- Response to R-11 and R-12, Containment Radiation Monitor Alarms using ONOP III08.1, "Process Radiation Monitor-Off-Normal Condition Operation
- Two 2KV voltage spikes resulting from system perturbations

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

1. Unit 3 R-11 and R-12 were declared out-of-service (OOS) as a result of jammed filter paper and a low flow alarm. This is a 48 hour LCO. If only one channel is OOS, it is a 30 day LCO. Flow was eventually verified and R-12 returned to service. Procedure ONOP-III0.81 does not distinguish between having R-11 and R-12 OOS and state the importance of verifying flow so R-12 can remain in service if flow is verified or established within 1 hour. The Technical Specification implications should be contained in steps 5.1.3 or 5.1.4.

Note: The R-11 and R-12 monitoring equipment appears to be 20 year old Tracer lab equipment.

2. A seven activity sequence for AFW testing activities was presented to the Control Room about 0045, requiring clearances to be hung. As of 1700, only the first three activities (the third is item A-4) had been completed.
 - a. One problem associated with the clearances was that the isolation valves for 4-FT-487 (4-20-694 and 4-20-695) were located outside the new security fence above the C line valve platform and not accessible. The tag out was done on the instrument manifold isolation valves. It might be advisable to relocate this fence, so that these valves are accessible.

- b. I think scheduled testing preventative maintenance, surveillance and repair efforts could be expedited if clearance requests were in the Control Room the evening before the activity. This would allow the clearances to be prepared and hung on peak or mid shifts. This gets a work load off the busy day shift and would allow many day activities to begin sooner. This is done sometimes, but it is a minority of times.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. This was a very busy shift with many alarms and distractions from normal activities, such as test procedural problems.
2. During the two system power disturbances, non-Operations personnel in the Control Room quickly retreated out of important positions in the Control Room without being requested.

Completed By: Richard Coulthard
MOS Observer

Date: 08/18/88

Reviewed By:

Richard J. Wendt
Operations Superintendent-Nuclear

Date: 8-19-88

Management
Review By:

J. L. ... 18/19/88 ... 18/19/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/18-19/88

From: J. D. Evans
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Units 3 and 4 at 100% power
- Secondary side tour - Auxiliary Building
- Control Room - turnover meeting
- Clean up of contaminated area
- Diesel oil filtration valve watch station

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable Work Practices

None

D. Areas for Improvement

Repetitive sign-offs required for Back-up nitrogen test Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) procedure involving operability and IST over-lap. During the implementation of three procedures, (OSP-075.2, OSP-075.7, O-ADM-502), there were over 50 signoffs within the procedures not applicable (N/A).

Plant staff to consider combining the over-lap with one procedure that would permit Operations and IST combined efforts to complete this evolution. Could add steps to the procedures to permit operability and IST concurrently.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Good support from Operations during AFW testing. Good coordination with start-up on Continuous Tube Cleaning (CTC) Component Cooling Water (CCW) system turnover. (Amertap)

Documentation flow very smooth i.e., drawings, procedures.

Operators responded to questions and situations extremely well.

Fire watch and Security very alert and helpful.

Completed By: John Evans
MOS Observer

Date: 08/18-19/88

Reviewed By: Richard J. Mende
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 8-19-88

Management
Review By:

PM-N 18/19/88 SVP 18/19/88 VP 18/19/88

08/18-19/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 08/18-19/88

From: Andrew P. Drake
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant Evolutions Observed

- Units 3 and 4 at 100% power, normal operations and logs
- Peak to mid shift turnover
- Mid shift briefing
- 3/4-OSP-59.1, Source Range Operability test
- 4-OSP-75.7, Auxilliary Feedwater (AFW) Train 2 Backup Nitrogen test
- Response to low seal leakoff on Unit 3 'A' Reactor Coolant pump
- Response to actuation of fire suppression system in Auxiliary Building breezeway

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None observed

C. Questionable Work Practices

The accuracy requirement for the pressure gauge used to perform 3/4-OSP-75.7, AFW Train 2 Backup Nitrogen test (also required in 3/4-OSP-75.6) is as follows "Pressure gauge to measure pressures near 80 psig accuracy : ± 1 psi (nitrogen test only)." The post test calibration sheet (attached) has an "allowable error" of 1% = 1.6 psi and the gauge was found to be at 75.8 psig, therefore the test for 4-OSP-75.7 was declared unsatisfactory and Train 2 AFW is still out-of-service (OOS).

Problem 1: Even if the gauge is tested within the 1.6 psi allowable error, say 1.2 psi, it does not meet the requirements of the procedure and cannot be used.

Problem 2: The pre-test calibration data for support of 4-OSP-75.7 and both pre and post calibration data for 3-OSP-75.7 (performed 8/18/88) could not be easily located (still not found as of 0530, 8/19/88). It may be better to attach copies of pre and post calibration to the end of the procedures for better documentation.

Problem 3: Are the tests performed for 3-OSP-75.7, 3-OSP-75.6 and 4-OSP-75.6 still valid tests? The pre and post calibration data will need to be checked.

Recommendation: Either use gauges with ± 1 psi accuracy or change requirements of 3/4-OSP-75.6 and 3/4-OSP-75.7 to ± 1.6 psi (calibration accuracy).

D. Areas for Improvement

1. I concur with the comments made on the AFW tests performed during this observation period and the need to study these sequences for a more efficient way as stated by Bill Schimkus (peak shift PSN).
2. The Safety Assessment System (SAS) consoles have been removed from the main Control Room (both units). This system is very important and several procedures (i.e., leakrate calculation) require their use. A temporary console with keyboard should be installed until the modified consoles are installed. How long are the SAS consoles to be out of the Control Room? The RCOs would be interested.
3. Chemistry is having problems sampling and testing gas decay tanks, monitor tanks, and waste monitor tanks. The "A" monitor tank was placed on recirc at 1300 hours, sampled at 1500 hours and released at 0015 hours. The "C" waste monitor tank was placed on recirc at 1600, sampled around 0300 hours and still not released as of 0530 hours. All 8 gas decay tanks were full and finally 2 were released for purging. However, the purge of the VCT on both units is being held up due to lack of gas decay tanks. Chemistry states that they only have 2 detectors available. (1 restricted to RCS samples) and a third detector is OOS. Chemistry is also required to sample the storm drains, due to the spent fuel pool leak. Additional Chemistry personnel need to be assigned to fulfill the needs until the work load can be reduced. Another question is how long are the recirc pumps supposed to run? They are not stopped until they are released, and therefore recirc pumps are being run in excess of 12 hours.
4. The pump used to filter the diesel fuel oil is gasoline powered and requires filling every 4 hours. It would seem a safer way to perform this would be to use a pneumatic pump or electric pump to limit the chance of a fire.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. The peak shift responded extremely well to the low leak-off seal flow on Unit 3 "A" RCP. With the high seal leakoff indicator OOS and SAS unavailable in the main Control Room they carefully adjusted volume control tank pressure to lock the seal back into place and restore the seal leakoff to normal values.
2. The mid shift responded well to the actuation of the fire suppression system in the Auxiliary Building breezeway and secured the deluge system.

Completed By: Andrew P. Drake
MOS ObserverDate: 08/18-19/88Reviewed By: Richard L. Hildebrand
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 8-19-88Management
Review By:18/19/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date