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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 CONWAY, W. F. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 GRACE, N. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards mgt on shift weekly rept for wk starting 880321.

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L-88-150

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251.
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

W. F. Conway
Acting Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy Department

WFC/SDF/gp
Attachment

cc: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC
Dr. G. E. Edison, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

8804120447 880406
PDR ADCK 05000250
R PDR

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 03/21/88

PAGE 1 OF 1

Four MOS Observers were on shift; Paul Geddes, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (03/21-27/88 days), Roger Hine, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (03/21/28/88 nights), Patrick Higgins, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant JPE Licensing (03/21-26/88 nights), and D. W. Hasse, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Safety Engineering Group Chairman (03/26-28/88 nights).

During the reporting period, Unit 4 operated at 100% power. Unit 3 progressed from Mode 3 to 75% power before returning to Cold Shutdown after experiencing a Condenser tube rupture.

During the reporting period, no questionable work practices or immediate safety problems were identified.

During the reporting period the MOS Observers noted twelve recommendations or areas for improvements. These comments and suggestions included:

Five comments were made concerning the design and maintenance of equipment associated with the inadvertent start of the 3B and 3C Condensate Pumps, the failure of the 3A Reactor Coolant Pump to start on demand, the installation of an Intake Cooling Water temperature switch and a leak dripping onto a light fixture.

Three comments were made concerning administrative items associated with the use of F-series and color-coded locks on breakers, interchangeability of duties of the PSN and APSN and the length of time to initiate work on a PWO package.

Four miscellaneous comments were made associated with a training item for Control Room operators, a procedures item associated with adjusting the Nuclear Instrumentation and a housekeeping item in the Condensate Polisher Precoat Tank area.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/21/88

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 induced Xenon transient and subsequent flux map for Power Range
- Nuclear Instrument calibration
- Two end of shift meeting
- One shift turnover meeting
- 0720 and 1300 meetings

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer


Date: 03/21/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/22/88

Management
Review By:CJS 12/22/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/21/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/21-22/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 at 100% power operations
- Unit 3 Reactor startup to slightly greater than critical conditions (3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation)
- OP-12304.8, Inducing Xenon Oscillations to Produce Various Incore Axial Offsets
- PSN/APSN management of the failed air line work for charging line valve, HCV-121
- Mid shift turnover and briefing
- Fire Drill on pump for Condensate Polishing System
- PSN walk through

B. Immediate safety problems


None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None



E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Reactor startup on Unit 3

APSN conducted a thorough briefing on the procedure with the trainee who performed the procedure.

The RCO carefully followed the procedure during the complete evolution while observing all actions of the trainee.

The trainee performed a very safe startup with excellent communications.

2. Fire Drill on Condensate Polishing Pump

The location of the fire was clearly announced over the page system.

All Fire Brigade Team members responded quickly to the fire with the appropriate equipment.

The Fire Protection Coordinator carefully observed the actions of the Fire Brigade Team and took notes on a work sheet.

At the conclusion of the drill an excellent debriefing was performed by the Fire Protection Coordinator.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 03/21-22/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 3/22/88

Management
Review By:

[Signature] 17/22/88 1 1
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/21-22/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/21-22/88

From: P. Higgins
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions

- Unit 3 Hot Standby to criticality in Mode 2
- Fire Drill in Condensate Polisher area
- Mid shift turnover/briefing

B. Immediate safety problems


None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. Valve 3-20-643 in Unit 3 side of second level of Turbine Building has minor water leak. Water is leaking down on lighting fixture on level below this valve. PWO SN 306-767 written on this leak.
2. 4D Moisture Separator Reheater instrument line to PI-4-1510 has a minor steam leak. No PWO tag evident. Will determine if PWO has been written next shift and will generate some if necessary.



E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

The Unit 3 Hot Standby to Mode 2 evolution was conducted in a professional manner. Good teamwork and cooperation was evident by Reactor Engineer, STA and Operations personnel. In particular, APSN oversight and supervision was very good.

The Condensate Polisher Fire Drill went smoothly. Fire Team members responded knowledgeably to MOS questions and a thorough briefing by the Fire Protection Coordinator was conducted following the drill.

In general, professionalism of shift personnel has increased significantly since previous observations by this observer approximately one year ago.

F. Recommendations

1. FPL management emphasis on quality of work and professionalism of personnel is achieving significant and observable improvements. Continued emphasis in these areas in order to further refine and polish our activities is highly recommended.
2. PWO SN 306-767 should be reviewed by plant maintenance to determine if priority attention is warranted to avoid damage to lighting fixture.


Completed By: P. Higgins
MOS Observer

Date: 03/21-22/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent-Nuclear

Date: 3/22/88

Management Review By: (Y/S) 15/22/88 1 1
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date
03/21-22/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/22/88

From: Paul R. Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Various shift turnovers
- Unit 4 Safeguards Test
- Unit 4 100% operations
- Unit 3 critical at very low power levels

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul R. Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 03/22/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/23/88

Management
Review By:

<u>C/15</u>	<u>1/23/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1.3/23/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1.3/23/88</u>
PM/N	Date	SVB	Date	VP	Date

03/22/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/22-23/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 at 100% power
- Implementation of 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operation, on Unit 3
- Inspected RCA

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. During preparations for synchronization on the grid for Unit 3, the operators communicated very well concerning control of RCS average temperature, Steam Generators levels, and Turbine status.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 03/22-23/88


Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/23/88

Management
Review By:

C/15	15/23/88	[Signature]	13/23/88	[Signature]	13/23/88
PM-N	Date	SVP	Date	VP	Date

03/22-23/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/22-23/88

From: P. Higgins

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Increase Reactor power, bring Turbine up to speed (1800 RPM)

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. Several boxes throughout plant which are identified as containing hearing protection were found to be empty.
2. Unit 4C Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (south side) electrical connection was found to be leaking. PWO was generated and tag hung.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Continued emphasis on professional conduct of plant operators is essential in order to meet FPL Corporate, Nuclear Energy and Turkey Point goals.
2. Instrument line to PI-4-1510 leak was investigated. PWO 64-0651 was identified as pertaining to this leak. No further action by MOS necessary at this time.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P. Higgins
MOS Observer

Date: 03/22-23/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/23/88

Management
Review By:

[Signature] 1-3/23/88 *[Signature]* 1-3/23/88
PM-N Date SVR Date VP Date
03/22-23/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/23/88

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Various shift turnovers
- Fire Drill in Unit 4 4160V B Switchgear Room
- Unit 4 steady state, 100% power
- Unit 3 steady state, approximately 30% power

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer


Date: 03/23/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/24/88

Management
Review By:VP 15:00 1 1
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/23/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/23-24/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 100% power operations
- Unit 3 power ramp at 3%/hour
- Mid shift briefing
- Performance of 3-OSP-059.5, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Checks and Daily Calibration
- Tour of RCA

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

During the performance of 3-OSP-059.5, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Checks and Daily Calibration, it was determined that all four power range NIS channels had to be adjusted up 2.7%. The Unit 3 RCO attempted to adjust N-41A with the gain potentiometer, but the potentiometer did not have sufficient turns to complete the adjustment. Attachment 5, step 4) of 3-OSP-059.5 provides all the necessary information for the adjustment. However, it does not address the problem of not being able to complete the required adjustment. The RCO wrote a PWO on Channel N-41A and the PSN declared the channel inoperable. The processing of the PWO was time consuming (greater than 1.5 hours). With the one channel declared inoperable, a power spike on any of the three operable channels would result in a reactor trip. The other three operable channels were not adjusted in accordance with step 4) of attachment 5. If adjustments had been attempted on those channels, these adjustments may not have been achievable. With two or more channels inoperable, the plant would have to be shut down.

E. Professionalism, Summary of shift, Comments

1. During the performance of 3-OSP-059.5, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Checks and Daily Calibrations, the gain adjustment for Channel N-41A could not be completed. The Unit 3 RCO informed the APSN of the problem. Step 4.3 requires the user of the procedure to notify the PSN concerning any problems encountered during the implementation of the procedure. Is it acceptable to notify the APSN when the procedure says PSN? I think it is a good practice to notify the APSN of problems. However, if the PSN is in the Control Room, he should also receive the information. If the PSN is not in the Control Room, the APSN should be notified of the problem. When the PSN returns to the Control Room, the APSN should inform him of any problems that had occurred in his absence (I have observed this being done). The PSN is responsible for the safe operation of the plants. It is my opinion that he should be directly informed of any problems that arise in the plants if he is available.
2. The peak shift Unit 3 RCO took prompt actions to write a PWO when power range channel N-41A could not be adjusted. The oncoming Unit 3 RCO promptly notified the APSN of the problem. The PSN and APSN discussed the problem and placed the channel out of service. They were aggressive in taking the appropriate actions.

F. Recommendations

(Reference section D) The following recommendations are made to improve the response when problems occur in the adjustment of the power range channels:

1. Provide more procedural guidance to the operators if a gain adjustment cannot be completed for a channel.
2. Investigate methods to reduce the response time in correcting the problem.
 - a. Can operators perform the procedure for adjusting the coarse gain potentiometer on the channel?
 - b. Can a standard PWO package be available for doing the work?

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS Observer


Date: 03/23-24/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 3/24/88

Management Review By: *[Signature]* 13/24/88 1 1
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/23-24/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/23-24/88

From: P. Higgins
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Performance of 3-OSP-059.5 "Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Checks and Daily Calibration"
- Unit 4, 100% power
- Unit 3 power increase at 3%/hour
- Mid shift briefing

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices


None

D. Area(s) for improvement

During the performance of 3-OSP-059.5 "Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Checks and Daily Calibration", it was determined that one channel of the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) could not be brought into compliance with the acceptance criteria specified in the aforementioned procedure. MOS observers on-shift questioned the STA, as to whether or not in his judgement that channel should be declared out-of-service. Although the STA stated that, in his judgement, the channel should be declared out-of-service, he requested the MOS observers to bring this matter to the attention of the PSN. The MOS observers repeated their inquiry to the PSN and APSN (mid shift).

The PSN and APSN considered the issue carefully by examining the procedure in question and other related material. They also consulted with the Operations Supervisor via telephone. Since no specific guidance was given in the procedure and I & C maintenance action was required to make internal equipment adjustments to the channel in question, the PSN decided to take a conservative position and declare the questionable NIS Channel out-of-service until I & C maintenance action could be completed. (Request for such action had been initiated immediately by the PSN/APSN upon being advised of this concern.)

In my judgement, the PSN and APSN (as well as the Unit 3 RCO) competently examined this concern, worked together as a team and came to a proper resolution of this matter. The MOS observers noted that OSP-059.5 should be reviewed with an eye towards providing better guidance to operators regarding action to be taken if similar occurrences surface in the future.



E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Superior teamwork demonstrated by PSN/APSN (mid shift) in responding to MOS inquiry regarding power range NIS instrumentation.

The hearing protection distribution boxes were checked and found to contain ample supplies of hearing protectors.

PWO SN 306-767 regarding a leak which could potentially damage a lighting fixture has been acted upon (leakage stopped).

Temporary action on the PWO initiated by this MOS observer on the leaking Unit 4 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger has been completed.

F. Recommendations

3-OSP-059.5 should be reviewed for potential improvement in the area of providing additional guidance on action when fine gain potentiometer is not effective in bringing the power range instrumentation within acceptance criteria.

Completed By: P. Higgins
MOS Observer

Date: 03/23-24/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 5/24/88

Management
Review By:

[Signature] 13/24/88 1 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date
03/23-24/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/24/88

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 steady state at 100% power
- Unit 3 ramp from 50% power to 75% power
- Unit 3 apparent Condenser tube rupture
- Unit 3 rapid shutdown to Mode 3

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

The problem with the Unit 3 Condenser occurred at shift turnover. Both the offgoing and oncoming shifts did a superior job in cooperating to place the unit in hot shutdown. A controlled shutdown from 75% power to hot shutdown was performed in 32 minutes. Operations department deserves high praise for their professional handling of a serious problem.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer


Date: 03/24/88

Reviewed By: L. W. Palmer
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/25/88

Management
Review By:6/15 13/25/88 1 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/24/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/24-25/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 power operations at 100%
- Unit 3 cooldown to Hot Shutdown conditions based on 3-GOP-305, Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown
- Entry into Unit 3 Condenser Water Box for leak detection
- RCA Tour

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 03/24-25/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/25/88

Management
Review By:

[Signature] 13/25/88
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date
03/24-25/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/24-25/88

From: P. Higgins
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, 100% power
- Unit 3 cooldown to Hot Shutdown
- Tour of RCA
- Water Box entry and inspection observed

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

Some of the electrical conduit or boxes associated with Temperature Switch 4-2108 (Intake Cooling Water discharge header from the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers) appeared to be mounted improperly with electrical tie wraps. Mounting configuration should be reviewed and maintenance or engineering action initiated as required.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

Temperature Switch 4-2108 and/or associated electrical conduit and boxes mounting configuration should be reviewed and maintenance or engineering action initiated as required.

Completed By: P. Higgins
MOS Observer

Date: 03/24-25/88


Reviewed By: K. W. Y. [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/25/88

Management
Review By:

C. J. B. 13/25/88
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/24-25/88



W.K.'s

0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1
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To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/25/88

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Various shift meetings
- Unit 4, Steady state 100% power
- Unit 3 cooldown to Mode 5
- Unit 3 unloading of 3A 4160V Bus due to water dripping on feeder breaker cubicle
- Inadvertant auto start of 3B & 3C Condensate Pumps
- Draining of Unit 3 Condenser Hotwell

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

The inadvertant starting of the 3B & 3C Condensate Pumps surprised everyone. It was caused by electricians physically bumping a time delay 174 device in the Startup Transformer feed breaker to the A Bus. The root cause appears to be a lack of consideration of potential consequences of physically bumping devices in breakers while drying or cleaning operations are in progress. This situation should be reviewed to ensure that it (and similar events) do not reoccur. This root cause determination paralleled the one conducted by the plant staff.



E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

The shift's handling of normal operations and the problems that arose was very professional.

F. Recommendations

1. The electricians need to be reminded that care must be taken not to physically "bump" devices in breakers when working on large equipment that interlocks with many other pieces of equipment.
2. The Control Room operators could use training in reading Electrical Elementary Wiring Diagrams.
3. The system engineers should review other major breakers for the possibility of occurrences similar to the inadvertant starting of the 3B & 3C Condensate Pumps.

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer


Date: 03/25/88

Reviewed By: J. W. Paine
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 3/28/88

Management
Review By:

C. J. N 13/28/88 VP 1
PM, N Date SVP Date VP Date
03/25/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/25-26/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, 100% power operations
- Unit 3, Cold Shutdown operations
- Operational Test on "B" Emergency Diesel Generator
- Tour of RCA
- Inspection of Main Steam valves and piping

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 03/25-26/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/28/88

Management
Review By:1/1 1/3/28/88 [Signature] 1/3/28/88 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP

03/25-26/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/25-26/88

From: P. Higgins
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, 100% power
- Unit 3, Cold Shutdown
- Diesel Generator Operational Test
- Mid shift briefing
- Inspection of Main Steam System piping and valves
- Tour of RCA

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

Valve 4-30-791 (Reheater Drain Tank bypass outlet stop valve) on ground level of the Turbine Building has a minor leak. Deficiency tag 402315 written on this leak.

Flange adjacent to valve 4-30-787 (Reheater Drain Tank isolation valve) has minor leak. Deficiency tag 402316 written on this leak.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Personnel conducting Diesel Generator Operational Test responded to MOS questions promptly and knowledgeably.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P. Higgins
MOS Observer


Date: 03/25-26/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/28/88

Management
Review By:

13 15/2/88 13/28/88 1
PM-N Date SVR Date VP Date
03/25-26/88



To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/26/88

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, steady state at 100% power
- Various shift meetings
- Unit 3 drain and fill of all 3 Steam Generators
- Unit 3 line up to do dump flush of Condenser
- "A" Diesel Generator periodic run
- Observed 2 clearances being hung (7 valves)

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 03/26/88

Reviewed By: Paul Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/28/88

Management
Review By:

PMN 11/2/88 SWP 13/28/88 VP 1
Date Date Date Date
03/26/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/26-27/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, 100% power operations
- Unit 3, Cold Shutdown operations
- Condenser cleanup on Unit 3
- OSP-206.6 (section 7.2) Emergency Core Cooling Systems monthly valve cycling
- Tour of Unit 3 & 4 Auxillary Feedwater System

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 03/26-27/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/28/88

Management
Review By:

3/3	13/28	VP	13/28/88	1
PM-N	Date	SVP	Date	VP
				Date
03/26-27/88				

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/26-27/88

From: D. W. Haase
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, steady state operation at 100% power
- End of peak shift meeting
- Beginning of mid shift meeting
- Observed portion of locked valve verification (O-ADM-205)
- Checked breaker alignment in 3B and 4B Motor Control Centers (MCC)
- Walk down of Unit 3 and common Auxiliary Feedwater System

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

Work controls associated with locks:

Additional attention needs to be paid to the locks used on the breakers requiring locks at motor control centers B and C. At each MCC, five of these locks are color-coded to be unit specific and so that special control of the key can be maintained. One of these locks is a non-unit-specific, "F-series" lock. At 4B MCC, a color-coded lock was installed in place of an "F-series" lock.

Upon notifying the Nuclear Watch Engineer, corrective action was taken to place an "F-series" lock on the breaker.

This is the same as an item under areas of improvement in my report of 11/29-11/30/87

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Routine shift activities observed were carried out in a professional manner. All personnel questioned were knowledgeable of the status of the units and the outage work in progress on Unit 3.

F. Recommendations

Controls need to be put in place that assure that proper locks get installed following manipulation of breakers. (See section D). This item is still open from the 11/29-11/30/87 report. (CTRAC item 87-1574).

Completed By: D. W. Haase
MOS Observer

Date: 03/26-27/88

Reviewed By: *L. W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 3/28/88

Management
Review By:

CJB - *15/28/88* *MO* *13/28/88* *1*
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/26-27/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/27/88

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, steady state 100% power
- Unit 3, drain and fill of Condenser Hotwell
- Unit 3, Steam Generator, drain and fill
- Various shift meetings

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 03/27/88

Reviewed By: *L. W. P. [Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 3/28/88Management
Review By:*C/15* *13/15/88* *[Signature]* *13/28/88* *1*
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/27/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/27-28/88

From: Roger Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4, 100% power operations
- Unit 3 in Cold Shutdown with a heatup in progress
- Starting of "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump
- Tour of secondary plant
- Tour of RCA

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments


1. An attempt was made to start the "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump, but it did not start. All the required lights were lit on the breaker panel. The Turbine Operator jiggled the control power fuses which caused the control power white light to flicker. The breaker was racked out and then in. The second attempt at starting the pump was successful. When the Turbine Operator had the control power fuses out, he noted how loosely they fit in the receptacle. Fuses in other receptacles fit much tighter than did the control power fuses. The root cause of the failure of the "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump to start may be inadequate contact of the control fuses in the receptacle. The operators took prompt actions to start the "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump on the second attempt.
2. Inspected the completed (coded) PWO's (12 of them) for period 03/10/88 to 03/25/88. All PWO's appeared to be completed satisfactorily with the exception of PWO #64-9924. This PWO required that the area surrounding the Condensate Polisher Precoat Tanks be cleaned up. This PWO also recommends that the area be cleaned at least 3-4 times per week. After inspecting the area, the frequency of cleanups is not sufficient to maintain the area clean.

F. Recommendations

1. (See E.1) Determine and correct the root cause of the "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump not starting on the first attempt.
2. (See E.2) Establish a cleaning schedule with sufficient frequency to maintain the area around the Condensate Polisher Precoat Tanks clean.

Completed By: Roger Hine
MOS ObserverDate: 03/27-28/88Reviewed By: S.W. Pierce
Operations Superintendent-NuclearDate: 3/28/88Management
Review By:C. J. B. 13/28/88 VP 1
PM/N Date SVP Date VP Date

03/27-28/88



0-ADM-019

Management on Shift (MOS)
MOS DAILY REPORT

Page

1

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 03/27-28/88

From: D. W. Haase
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- End of shift meeting
- Beginning of shift meeting
- Unit 4, Steady state operation at 100% power
- Unit 3, Cold Shutdown with heatup in progress
- Start of "3A" Reactor Coolant Pump
- Walk down of portions of the secondary plant and portions of the RCA

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

(See E.1) of Roger Hine's report, same date. In addition a PWO was written to have the control power fuse block checked.

(See E.2) of Roger Hine's report, same date. I assisted Roger in inspecting the completed PWO's and concur with his conclusion.

F. Recommendations

I concur with the recommendations in Roger Hine's report, this date.

Completed By: D. W. Haase
MOS Observer

Date: 03/27-28/88

Reviewed By: *S. W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 3/28/88Management
Review By:

1/13 1/24/88 *MO* 1/3/29/88 1
PM-N Date SVR Date VP Date

