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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WOODY,C.O. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards summary of mgt-on-shift repts,per NRC 871019 order.

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
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FEBRUARY 3 1988

L-88-52

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323


Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,


C. O. Woody

Executive Vice President

COW/SDF/pw
Attachment

cc: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC
Dr. G. E. Edison, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

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P DCD

PEOPLE .. SERVING PEOPLE

IEO1

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 01/25/88

PAGE 1 OF 2

Four MOS observers were on shift: J. A. West, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant Supervisor (01/25-01/31/88, Days); Terry L. Fulkerson, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (01/25-02/01/88, Nights); W. R. Williams, Jr., Turkey Point, ABPM Supervisor (01/25-26/88, Nights); and Bahram A. Abrishami, Turkey Point, Test Code Performance Supervisor (01/26-02/01/88, Nights). While on shift, these MOS observers reported potential safety problems, questionable work practices, areas for improvement, professionalism/summary of shift/comments, and general recommendations.

During this reporting period, Unit 4 was maintained at 100% power (Mode 1) until an automatic 20% load reduction occurred on the last day of the reporting period. Unit 3 was in cold shutdown (Mode 5) to repair the housing seal weld leak on a Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM).

No immediate safety problems were observed.

The following questionable work practices were observed:

- o The priming water used for the "4BS" Hotwell Sample Pump had higher concentrations of salt water than allowed which increased Unit 4 steam generator conductivities. The pump will only be primed with fresh demineralized water henceforth.
- o Several reactor head stud stands were not properly stowed or secured in the Unit 3 containment (very close proximity to the containment liner). The stands will be properly stowed before plant heatup.

During the reporting period, MOS Observers made almost thirty suggestions for improvements including:

- o Eight suggestions were made concerning knowledge of plant status with suggested improvements in the PWO tagging and clearing program, the identification of out-of-spec log items and communications concerning plant status.
- o Three suggestions were made concerning personnel who should attend shift meetings and conduct of the Plan-of-the-Day meeting.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: 1/25/88

PAGE 2 OF 2

- o Several suggestions were offered concerning the Fire Protection program including improvements in the evaluation of drills, the fire brigade composition and the fire protection impairment tagging program.
- o Several suggestions were offered on procedure improvements including procedure inconsistencies, distribution of procedure generated reports and the control of interim Technical Specifications.
- o Three suggestions for improved surveillance and inspections were made for the diesels, exposed valve thread inspection and hazardous storage areas.
- o Three suggestions were made to improve plant storage conditions in regard to extension cords, paints and oily waste.
- o Other suggestions were offered by MOS Observers concerning maintaining a current home phone list of plant management personnel in the Control Room, improving the use of the plant page system, providing safety restraints for pressurized air and water hoses and installing a cover on the diesel fire pump control switch.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/25/88

From: J.A. West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Preshift briefing (Day Shift)
- Rod Cluster Control Periodic Exercise 1604.1
- Filling "4A" Accumulator 4-OP-064
- Recirculation of "C" Boric Acid Storage Tank, 4-OSP-59.5
- Toured Unit 4 Secondary and Discharge Areas
- Break in Fire Main by Construction Personnel
- Reviewed various Control Room logs
- End of shift debrief (Days)
- Preshift brief (Peaks)
- Nuclear Watch Engineer's Turnover

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

- Shift briefings seemed very beneficial to all personnel involved. There seemed to be a lack of accountabilities in the morning brief, but this was not evident in the afternoon brief. I think for this reason the day shift debrief was lacking in providing a total picture of the day's activities as put forth in the morning brief.
- With Chemistry and Health Physics personnel being members of the fire team it would be beneficial for them to attend the shift briefing, especially with the abnormal fire main configuration. It is tough to plan in the middle of a crisis.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Control Room response to the broken fire main was handled quite well.
 - Quick and thorough isolation of break
 - Notification of key supervisory personnel was conducted.
 - Good discussion by PSN, APSN, and STA on required follow-up and contingency actions required.
 - Maintenance repairs appear to be progressing steadily.
- On the tour of #4 secondary I was impressed with the overall cleanliness of the plant. There were some isolated areas of coke cans, etc. where preservation activities were being performed. Plant deficiencies for the majority were identified. The west end of the #4 hotwell and associated piping is in need of preservation.

01/25/88

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: J.A. West
MOS ObserverDate: 01/25/88Reviewed By: D. H. P. ...
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/26/88Management
Review By:

<u>4/75</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>	<u>Jed</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>	<u>1/15</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>
PM-N	Date	SVP	Date	VP	Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/25-26/88From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Maintenance repairs on Fire Main break
- Inspection on "4C" Auxiliary Transformer for possible oil leaks
- Shift turnovers peaks to mids
- Turbine area inspection
- Second Fire Main break by Unit 4 Condenser Pit
- Main Transformer trouble investigation

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

- Store unused extension cords.
- Protect extension cords from tread wear and water.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- STA reviewed APSN log for off shift days. He noted an entry for Low Oil Level alarm on the "4C" Auxiliary Transformer. The STA then inspected the transformer for possible oil leaks.
- The alarm circuitry for the "4C" Auxiliary Transformers Conservator Tank Low Oil Level alarm was turned off. The APSN was notified and the alarm was placed in the out-of-service log.
- The first Fire Main break was repaired in an expeditious manner.
- The peaks end-of-shift brief was very casual and there were many secondary (background) discussions taking place during the brief.
- The mids beginning of shift brief was very professional and completed in a thorough and timely manner. The entire shift participated including Chemistry and Health Physics.
- The turbine area was toured with the following discrepancies noted:
 - An extension cord was lying loose at the top of the ladder in the Unit 4 Main Steam platform.
 - Another extension cord, utilized for temporary lighting in the Unit 3 Turbine Building Cooling Water area, was lying across a normal passage area with no protective cover. This cord was also lying in a puddle of water.
 - A puddle of oil or light grease was found under a valve suspended from the overhead directly in front of the "4A" Condensate Pump valve. The oil or grease appears to be coming from the valve.
 - A valve designated 4-30-791, A-RDT-FC-1402 Bypass Outlet Steam had a piece of green PWO tag attached to it. Either the PWO was cleared and the tag not completely removed, or a portion of the tag had been ripped off.

Continuation Page

Page 3 of 3Date: 01/25-26/88Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments (Cont'd.)

- A second Fire Main rupture occurred upon repressurization of the line affected by the past break.
- The actions of the mid shift personnel in isolating the rupture were excellent. The Fire Main was placed back in service in less than 30 minutes.
- Coordination between the PSN, APSN, STA, and Maintenance was very professional. Clean up in the area of the rupture was begun almost as soon as the rupture was isolated.
- The Unit 4 Main Transformer was sprayed by the Fire Main rupture, resulting in a Main Transformer trouble alarm. All inputs to the alarms were investigated, and the alarms were determined to be caused by the wetting of the alarm circuitry. Personnel from Transmission and Distribution were notified in an expeditious manner.

Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS Observer

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS ObserverDate: 01/26/88Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 1/26/88Management
Review By:

<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>
PM-N	Date	SVP	Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/25-26/88

From: W.R. Williams, Jr.
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- 1300 planning meeting
- 1830 MOS turnover
- 1545 & 2345 shift briefings
- Met with Maintenance Superintendent, Mechanical Peak Shift, Temporary Relieving Supervisor, Foremen, I&C Peak Shift Supervisor, Electrical Peak Shift Chief, and midnight shift PSN and APSN.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None observed

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Exchange of information and redirection by PSN was good at shift brief meetings.
2. Chemistry was not present at 1545 meeting.
3. Health Physics was not present at 1545 meeting.
4. Realizing that the "Plan of the Day" is still being debugged, positive comments have been received from all maintenance disciplines that this is a step in the right direction..
5. Shift Director provided good update on Unit 3 and repair of Fire Main.
6. PSN and APSN on peak and midnight shifts cautioned operators to watch #4 Turbine Impeller Oil Pressure since it had decreased to 29 psi.
7. While valving in the Fire Main after repair of the line, the Fire Main line separated by the #4 Main Transformer Deluge. The operators did an outstanding job of securing the water flow to the Fire Main separation, while water and rocks spewed forth on the Main and Auxiliary Transformer. Unit 4 was maintained in a stable condition. A job well done!

F. Recommendations

1. Chemistry and Health Physics representatives need to attend the shift meetings in the Control Room (E-2, E-3).
2. Continue PDCA of "Plan of the Day" to fine tune.
3. I am continuing to collect follow-up data on communications and coordination areas of observation. Summary and Recommendations will be turned in by Friday morning.
4. I have setup a tentative meeting with Temporary/Relieving Mechanical Peak Shift Supervisor, Peak Shift Mechanical Foremen, Permanent Magnet Generator Mechanical Procedure writer and myself to discuss Valve Packing Procedure mentioned in (1/24-1/25) report. Also peak or midnight Mechanical Shift needs to remove old water coolers on Turbine Deck by exciter houses.

Completed By: W.R. Williams, Jr.
MOS ObserverDate: 01/26/88Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 1/26/88Management
Review By:

<u>6/1</u>	<u>1/24/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1/26/88</u>
PM-N	Date	SVP	Date	VP	Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/26/88

From: J.A. West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning meeting
- PSN turnover
- Shift brief (Days)
- Observed repairs being made of Fire Main joint
- Observed safeguards monthly
- Afternoon meeting
- Shift brief (Peaks)
- Observed alignment on "4A" Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump
- Observed fire drill
- Made rounds with Unit 4 Turbine Operator
- Toured Unit 3 secondary

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

- Numerous large hoses for air or water are located in the plant. Due to the force within these lines and the potential for break, whip restraints could help reduce a potential hazard for personnel or equipment during a break.
- AP-103.2 requires operators to submit a PWO on annunciators that are in an abnormal condition greater than 8 hours (one-shift) while the plant is in Mode 1, 2, and 3. This is not always being met. To help the operators until the "black board" concept can be achieved, those annunciators which are lit at power could be backlighted in green through use of green translucent mylar film.

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/26-27/88

From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Peaks to mids turnovers
- Plant tour
- APSN log review

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

- Valve maintenance (See Section E4)
- use of Plant page system (See Section E1)

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. On several occasions the Plant Page System was utilized by unknown personnel to make animal calls and lewd noises.
2. Peaks end-of-shift meeting was conducted in a concise and professional manner.
3. Mids beginning-of-shift meeting was extensive and thorough. It was the first night of shift for the crew and a great deal of participation was noted. The PSN changed the Electrical Maintenance priorities due to existing plant conditions to better utilize the Maintenance resources. (Good job).
4. Toured the secondary plant extensively and noted the following problems.
 - a. A stack of full and partial paint cans along with a can full of solvent soaked rags was found behind the "4C" Auxiliary Transformer.
 - b. The Unit 4 Main Feed Regulating Valves "A and B" have the valve identifier tags mounted such that the tags come in contact with the actuator shaft. This has caused the identifier tags to become deformed and not readable. This contact could also result in mechanical binding of the actuators.
 - c. In general most valves in the secondary plant with a rising stem design are in need of thorough stem thread cleaning and lubrication. In particular, note the secondary Heater Drain valves and alternate dump valves on level 14 of Unit 3.

F. Recommendations

1. During the Fire Main rupture yesterday the ANPO had a difficult time securing the Diesel Fire Pump because the manual/auto/off switch is located inside the controller which has a dogged cover (10 dogging bolts). Recommend installation of a switch cover in the door to facilitate access to this switch.
2. A preventative valve maintenance program should be implemented to periodically clean and lubricate exposed valve stem threads. This should preclude any future jamming and thread galling problems.
3. Recommend System Engineers look at Diesel Generators radiators as soon as possible.

Completed By: Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS ObserverDate: 01/27/88Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent-NuclearDate: 1/27/88Management
Review By:

<u><i>C/F</i></u>	<u>11/27/88</u>	<u><i>[Signature]</i></u>	<u>11/27/88</u>	<u>1</u>
PM/N	Date	SVP	Date	VP

Continuation Page

Page 3 of 3Date: 01/26-27/88Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments (Cont'd.)

4.
 - d. The Diesel Fire Pump Recirculation line has two leaking (badly) elbows. PWO tags are attached but are dated 03/87.
 - e. Throughout the plant, many mechanical valve operators (wrenches) are hung on valve handwheels instead of being stored in the holders.
 - f. Two Intake Cooling Water Pumps (3B and 4C) appear to have warped or misaligned shafts. I informed the PSN. He stated that PWOs had been written on the shafts and cleared by Maintenance. These shafts are still visably wobbling. (PWO #WA880041228 and WA880041216 respectively).
 - g. The "A and B" Diesel Generator Engine Cooler Radiators appear to be corroded and or plugged with debris. I believe the cores may be badly deteriorated.
 - h. The Diesel Fire Pump alarm has been ringing since the pump started yesterday. The PSN was notified. He is taking action to correct this problem. Note: Problem corrected at 0530 on 01/27/88.

Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS Observer

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/26-27/88

From: Bahram A. Abrishami
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Daily 1300 planning meeting
- Reviewed the revised O-ADM-019
- Peak shift start of the shift meeting
- Reviewed the APSN, RCO and SNPO log books
- Reviewed the SNPO Daily Log O-OSP-201.2
- Walked Auxillary Feedwater Pump room
- Walked Intake area
- Visited I&C Shop, Mechanical Maintenance Shop, Hot Lab, and Captain of the Guards Office.
- Followed the Unit 3 outage activities

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

At approximately 1700 an increase in conductivity was noted in all Steam Generators. Investigations revealed that the water which was used to prime the "4BS" Hotwell Sample Pump had some impurity (650 μ mho conductivity). The conductivity in the Steam Generators was reduced by increasing the blowdown for approximately 4 hours.

D. Area(s) for improvement

See F

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- The on going activities in the work shops visited were being conducted in a thorough and professional manner.
- The Control Room shift meetings have improved even more since the last time I was on MOS duty.
- I was impressed with the Plant Manager's end-of-shift tour of the Control Room. He conversed with, and discussed updates with the Shift Supervision, operators on shift, Management on Shift, and the Director of the outage.

01/27/88

MOS DAILY REPORT

F. Recommendations

- Use clean containers filled with fresh demineralized water to prime the Hotwell Sample Pumps. Remove all such containers from the area when priming is complete, and tape the end of the tubing used for priming the pumps.

Completed By:

Bahram A. Ahrishami
MOS ObserverDate: 01/26-27/88

Reviewed By:

[Signature]
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 1/27/88Management
Review By:

<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1/27/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1/27/88</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>1</u>
PM/N	Date	SVP	Date	VP	Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/27/88

From: J.A. West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning meeting
- Shift brief (Days) Mechanical Maintenance not in attendance
- Reviewed 4-OSP-059.4, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Analog Channel Operational Test.
- Observed 4-OSP-059.4 and the activities which followed (Section E).
- Observed shift debrief
- Observed shift brief (Peaks)

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

- I sense a need for an increased awareness to operational needs. This should be especially true in areas that can have a direct effect on unit reliability, i.e. Channel 41 Nuclear Instrumentations problem. Every effort should be made to concentrate energies at areas that pose a threat to unit reliability. Yes, paperwork is necessary, but it should not be the governing force controlling any preliminary investigations into such problems.

01/27/88

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Reviewed 4-OSP-059.4 "Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Analog Channel Operational Test" prior to implementation. Inconsistencies existed between procedure, Technical Specifications and Plant Limiting Setpoint documentation. Acceptance criteria for 4-OSP-059.4 as specified in section 6, page 7 is derived from Technical Specification and Plant Limiting Setpoint as specified in basis document for 4-OSP-059.4. PSN was notified. He immediately contacted PUPS personnel and Licensing personnel for resolution. The RCOs were also informed of the discrepancy. During the actual test the acceptance criteria for flux difference in accordance with 7.4.20.7 was not met. 4-OSP-059.4 was exited and actions carried out in accordance with 4-ONOP-059.3 and Interim Technical Specifications 3.3.1. Appropriate log entries, clearance, and Plant Work Orders initiated.
- Observation: I found the layout of 4-ONOP-059.3 to be very confusing. It encompasses a multitude of failures on three different range instruments for various mode requirements. The RCOs implementing the procedure seem to experience a similar problem but did carry out the required actions correctly.
- The PSN conducting the morning meeting did an outstanding job in my opinion. He presented a brief and exacting description of current status and pertinent activities of each unit. He set his priorities with respect to equipment deficiencies. I, however, do not feel the response to these priorities was high enough on attention level by responsible parties, i.e.;
- "4A" Turbine Plant Cooling Water pump was run by Operations for Electrical Maintenance, but no feedback was given to Operations concerning pump status. Peak shift Electrical Maintenance representatives at peak shift brief did not even know there was a problem.
- Paint and solvent cans are outside paint lockers at "4C" Transformer. Nothing had been done in this area by 1630. I tracked down a Paint Contractor Supervisor and pointed out the problem. The paint lockers are inadequate for 5 gallon cans due to shelving. They said they would make an effort to clean the area leaving only unopened paint cans. It is my understanding, talking with a Paint Contractor Supervisor, that a major painting effort will soon be underway. Now is the time to plan for adequate storage of these materials especially under transient conditions.

F. Recommendation

None at this time, addressed on the followup.

Completed By: J.A. West Date: 01/27/88
MOS Observer

Reviewed By: J.W. Prince Date: 1/28/88
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Management
Review By:

CNB 1/28/88 (V) 1/28/88 VP 1/28/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/27-28/88

From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Shift turnover meetings
- Log reviews (NCO)
- Communications
- Nuclear Instrumentation System Maintenance
- Reactor Coolant System drain down

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

Interim Technical Specification revision.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Peaks end of shift meeting was very good and thorough.
- The mids shift meeting was comprehensive and addressed all aspects of upcoming shift evolutions including precautions for Reactor Coolant System drain down.
- While reviewing the Interim Technical Specification requirements for the out of service Nuclear Instrumentation Channel, I discovered a requirement to verify the Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) using the incore flux detectors. I notified the PSN who ensured the appropriate actions were taken. During the review of the Interim Technical Specification requirements with the PSN the following problems were discovered.
 - I was using the STA's copy of the interim Technical Specifications located in the Control Room. This copy marked Revision A stated that either power should be reduced and trip setpoints be reduced within 2 hours, or QPTR be verified using incore detector at least once every 12 hours. Since approximately 10 hours had expired the Operations Supervisor was notified.
 - While notifying the Operations Supervisor, the APSN verified the requirement using the PSN's copy of the Interim Technical Specification to be done once every 24 hours. Based on this the PSN and Operations Supervisor decided to proceed with the Nuclear Instrumentation Maintenance and perform a flux map QPTR if adjustments could not be made before the QPTR was required.
 - Neither the STA's copy or the PSN's copy of Interim Technical Specifications are controlled documents.

F. Recommendations

The Control Room copies of the Interim Technical Specifications should be controlled documents to preclude future problems.

Completed By: Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS Observer

Date: 01/28/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 1/28/88

Management
Review By:

PMN 1/18/88 SV 1/18/88 VP 1/28/88
Date Date Date Date

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/27-28/88

From: Bahram A. Abrishami
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Performed walked down of the following systems or areas:
 - Auxilliary Feedwater Pumps and associated piping
 - High Head Safety Injection Pumps and associated piping
 - Unit 3 and 4 Component Cooling Water Pumps and Heat Exchangers and associated piping
 - Emergency Diesel Generators
 - Units 3 and 4 Intake Cooling Water Pumps and associated piping
 - Unit 4 4160 volt switchgear
 - Unit 4 Alternate Dumps to Condensers
 - Auxilliary Building
- ° Completion of procedure 3-OP-041.7, Draining the Reactor Coolant System
- ° Peak shift end-of-shift meeting
- ° Shift turnover
- ° Mid shift start-of-shift meeting

B. Immediate safety problem

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

See F.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- ° The shift turnover between the PSNs (Peaks-Mids) were detailed and thorough. It was one of the most impressive turnovers I had ever observed. The on-coming supervision were here approximately one and one half hours early gathering information before start of the shift.
- ° Two revisions of Interim Technical Specifications with different requirements for the frequency of monitoring Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR), when one Power Range Channel is inoperable, caused some confusion among shift supervision. Neither of these two copies were controlled documents.

MOS DAILY REPORT

F. Recommendations

Provide a controlled copy(ies) of Interim Technical Specifications for Control Room.

Completed By: Bahram A. Abrishami
MOS Observer

Date: 01/28/88

Reviewed By: J.W. Parnu
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/28/88

Management
Review By:

<u>J.R.</u>	<u>1/28/88</u>	<u>CAB</u>	<u>1/28/88</u>	<u>JAB</u>	<u>1/28/88</u>
PM-N	Date	SVP	Date	VP	Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/28/88

From: I. A. West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning meeting
- Shift briefing (Days)
- Observed Electrical Fire Pump Flow Test
- Walked down Water Treatment Plant (WTP) and Filter Train areas
- Made a general tour of the Radiation Control Area (RCA)
- Observed retest of 4-OSP-59.4, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Analog Channel Operational Test.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. A briefing on how the Electrical Pump Surveillance was going to be conducted would have been beneficial to the participants involved. The evolution was carried out satisfactorily but could have been enhanced by a prior brief.
2. A walkdown in the WTP area revealed numerous opportunities in the areas of leak repair and preservation of equipment. Most leaks which were noted were not identified by Plant Work Order (PWO) tags.
3. Operators' GAITRONICS announcements could be improved in the manner (professionalism?) in which they are delivered.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. This was the best organized, most informed, and professionally conducted shift brief I have attended. When the brief was over I felt confident that the shift knew where they were, what needed to be done, and how they were going to get there. I&C Department was not represented. This left unanswered questions on Electrical Fire Pump Surveillance and Auxilliary Feedwater (AFW) pump testing support.

01/28/88

F.

Recommendations

1. Auxiliary Electrical Operator (AEO) should identify discrepancies in his cognizant work area with PWOs (i.e. WTP, Filter Train, Fire Pump area).

Completed By:

J.A. West

MOS Observer

Date: 01/28/88

Reviewed By:

A.W. Funder

Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date:

1/29/88Management
Review By:CJB
PM-N1/29/88
DateCJB
SVP1/29/88
Date

VP

1
Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/28-29/88

From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Shift turnovers
- Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Maintenance
- Event Response Team

B. Immediate Safety Problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Peaks end-of-shift meeting was very good.
2. Mids beginning-of-shift meeting was very thorough and involved several maintenance activities.
3. At approximately 2230 a new problem was identified with the NIS troubleshooting and repair effort. The oncoming and off-going PSNs conferred and decided to implement an Event Response Team to facilitate return of Channel 41 to service. Appropriate personnel were called in to man the team.
4. The mids PSN made several attempts to page the Operations Superintendent with no results. He then attempted to call the Operations Superintendent at home but was unable to obtain a current home phone number.

01/28-29/88

F. Recommendations

1. The Plant Management home phone numbers should be kept current in the Control Room.

Completed By: Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS Observer

Date: 01/29/88

Reviewed By: J. J. Fiala
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 1/29/88

Management
Review By:

T/L 1/29/88 CJB 1/29/88 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/28-29/88

From: Bahram A. Abrishami
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- o Unit 4 - OP-12404.1 Normal Operation Of Incore Moveable Detector System And Power Distribution Surveillance.
- o 4-PMI-059.8 - Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Protection Set I Channel N-4-41 Quarterly Calibration.
- o Complete plant tour with the mid shift PSN
- o End-of-shift meeting (Peak)
- o Beginning-of-shift meeting (Mids)
- o Reviewed the APSN, RCO, and NPO log books

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. The RCOs on shift took the time to train the license candidates effectively.
2. The operators and I&C personnel were observed to fully use all available documentation such as Technical Specifications, procedures, vendor manuals in order to safely operate and maintain the plant.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Bahram A. Abrishami
MOS Observer

Date: 01/28-29/88

Reviewed By: D.W. Paur
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/29/88

Management
Review By:

CIS 1/29/88 CJB 1/29/88 1
 PM,N Date SVP, Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/29/88

From: J.A. West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning meeting
- Shift brief (Day)
- Reviewed Source Range and Intermediate Range Surveillance Procedures for potential setpoint problems with respect to acceptance criteria.
- Observed maintenance repairs on N-41 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation.
- Observed retest on N-41 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation.
- Observed 4-OSP-59.4 "Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Surveillance".

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

With respect to such work items as N-41 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation problem

1. Shift turnovers should occur on the job site.
2. Job activities should occur in parallel when feasible.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. ---Noise level in the Control Room got out of hand a few times today, but one RCO running a test took actions to control it. This item was also stressed in the Control Room afternoon brief.
2. Based on the problem that had occurred with N-41, and the close proximity to exceed the surveillance interval for the Power Range Test, the preplanned Plant Work Order (PWO) packages for the remaining channels showed some forethought and prudent action. Good job!

MOS DAILY REPORT

F. Recommendations

1. Provide written guidance to the PSN/PSN on the hierarchy of use between the two types of Technical Specifications in the Control Room. Their relationship of implementation with emergency and off normal procedures should also be defined. Contingency actions affecting unit reliability when conflicts occur between the two Technical Specifications should also be addressed.
2. If Control Room operators are going to be required to operate under the guidance set forth in the "Interim Technical Specifications" the Control Room should have a controlled copy that is handled through current document control channels.

Completed By:

J.A. WestMOS ObserverDate: 01/29/88

Reviewed By:

L.W. PucciOperations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 2/1/88Management
Review By:DAE12/1/88PM-NDateSVPYD2/1/88DateVPDate

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/29-30/88

From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- End of shift meeting (Peaks)
- Shift brief (Mids)
- I&C maintenance

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Peaks end-of-shift meeting was very good.
2. Mids shift brief was also very good.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS Observer

Date: 01/30/88

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 2/1/88

Management
Review By:

FJS 12/1/88 PM-N Date SVP JDO 2/1/88 VP Date

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/29-30/88

From: Bahram A. Abrishami
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- 4-OP-047, CVCS, Charging and Letdown
- 4-OSP-059.4, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Analog Channel Operational Test
- 4-OSP-064, Safety Injection Accumulators
- 4-OSP-059.5, Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Shift Checks And Daily Calibration
- 4-OSP-41.1, Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation
- OP-14004.1, Steam Generator Protection Channel Periodic Test
- Reviewed RCO and SNPO log books
- Reviewed O-OSP-201.2, SNPO Daily Log
- End-of-shift (Peak) and start-of-shift (Mid) meetings
- Walked Charging Pumps and associated piping (Unit 3 and 4)
- Walked Containment Spray Pumps and associated piping
- Tour of Intake area, Unit 4 Secondary Systems, and Auxiliary Building

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for Improvement

1. After the work is completed on a system, the release of the clearance should be done more expeditiously. One example is clearance #4-88-1-075 on CV-4-1506, Reheater Drain Tank to No. 6 Feedwater Heater. The work on this valve had been completed by approximately noon on 01/29/88, and the clearance was not released until 0245 on 01/30/88 when the Nuclear Watch Engineer walked to Maintenance and got the release. In case of a rapid load reduction or unit trip with CV-1506 isolated, the pressure in No. 6 Feedwater Heater would increase and the shell side safety would open (or get damaged).

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. The I&C Supervisor was present throughout the time that OP 14004.1 was being performed. He provided close and detailed supervision for his crew. This procedure was completed with close and thorough coordination with the Operations personnel.
2. The tour of the plant performed by the Mid shift PSN was excellent. He communicated with Control Room operators throughout his tour and resolved the problems as soon as he identified them. Throughout the period that the PSN was on tour of the plant, the APSN provided strong supervision for the Control Room personnel.
3. I did not observe an activity going on without the use of the appropriate procedure.
4. Shift meetings were thorough, informative, and open. The Mid shift "beginning-of-the-shift" meeting provided for excellent communications between various departments planning the work activities for the shift.

F. Recommendations

1. Release clearances as soon as possible after the work on the system is complete.
2. Comments should be made for all parameters not meeting the acceptance criteria in the operators' daily logs, (in the remarks section) so that shift supervision can rapidly recognize out-of-specification parameters, and see if the action taken was appropriate.

Completed By: Bahram A. Abrishami
MOS ObserverDate: 01/30/88Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 2/1/88Management
Review By:7/2/88 12/1/88 [Signature] 2/1/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/30/88

From: I A West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Shift brief (Days)
- Review of Control Room Logs
- Interim Technical Specification Review
- Review and walkdown of
 - O-ADM-015.2, Hazardous Waste Handling and Storage
 - O-ADM-015.3, Satellite Accumulation of Hazardous Waste
- Review of
 - AP-15500, Fire Protection Program
 - O-ADM-016.3, Fire Protection Impairments
 - O-ADM-503, Control and Use of Temporary System Alterations

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. Satellite Accumulation Areas
 - Found two so designated on plant tour
 - a) South Condensate Polisher Building for Unit 4: Satisfactory
 - b) "4C" Transformer: Unsatisfactory
 - 1) Step 5.5 and 5.6: No locking device; screw clamp installed
 - 2) Step 5.10: Container for paint and thinner (Flammable Materials) and, NO SMOKING sign not posted
2. If these are the only two satellite areas, the minimum requirements of step 5.4 are not met.
3. If Fuel Oil Storage Area is designated area for storage of used oil:
 - Drums are not properly labeled
 - Greater than 55 gallons stored in area

01/30/88

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. Shift activities were slow as with most weekends. No unusual activities observed.
2. During the morning a construction individual came to the Control Room to get a Fire Protection Impairment (FPI) Form approved. It was at this time that the STA and the APSN found out that a new procedure and method of handling FPIs was in effect. They brought this to my attention. This change had affected the Temporary System Alteration (TSA) procedure O-ADM-503 by basically removing FPIs from this area (I had found this to be confusing early in the week i.e. FPIs addressed in both 503 and 15500 procedures). There are approximately 12 FPIs existing under the old program. The STA and APSN tried to get the Fire Watch Shift Supervisor (FWSS) to take responsibility for these tags, but he refused based on the fact his procedure did not address them. This prompted me to briefly review the three procedures involved with the following results:
 - a) O-ADM-503
 - Wrong form is addressed in enclosure 1 (should be LEM Company PV 4273 versus Form 5466 Revision 7/75)
 - b) AP-15500
 - Page 10 - Does not require alarm on drills.
 - Page 13 - Fire Impairment Program O-ADM-16.3 not referenced.
 - Page 13 - TSA O-ADM-503 no longer involved in FPI.
 - Page 15 - Classification of emergency procedure not referenced.
 - Page 20 - References 12 hydrants while page 44 lists only 11.
 - Page 09 - Fire Watch Administrator and Fire Watch Shift Supervisor were not listed in responsibilities of section 5.

F. Recommendations

1. Review Hazardous Waste Storage Areas (Satellite Areas) to ensure compliance with O-ADM-015.3. Correct deficiencies of section D with respect to this area.
2. It may only be a problem for individuals unfamiliar with the procedures, but I believe it would be beneficial to have an index in at least the first volume of each particular type of procedures i.e. ONOPs, ADMs, OPS, etc.
3. Concerning Interim Technical Specifications, if it is the intent to use these Technical Specifications, unless they prove to be more limiting to the point of shutting a unit down where by the legal Technical Specifications will be utilized, then a review needs to be conducted to ensure the surveillance requirements of the Interim Technical Specifications are procedurally addressed.
i.e. Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) temperature. If outside air temperature is less than 39°F, it is a requirement to log RWST temperature once per 24 hours. This is not a requirement of the legal Technical Specifications.
There is, unfortunately, a hybrid system in existence. Many ONOPs refer the operators to the Interim Technical Specifications.
4. Resolve old FPI tag issue.
5. Resolve procedure discrepancies as listed in section E for ADM-503 and 15500.
6. A Jockey Pump will not maintain sufficient pressure. Plant Work Order (PWO) submitted. FPI required (??) in accordance with ADM-016.3, Page 8, steps 4.1.1.5 and 5.1.4.
7. Unopened paint is stored in the vicinity of the Electric Fire Pump which is approximately 30 to 40 feet away. Is this an approved area in accordance with AP-15500, Page 17, step 8.1.1.9?

Completed By: J.A. West
MOS ObserverDate: 01/30/88Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 2/1/88Management
Review By:77/8 12/1/88 [Signature] 2/1/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/30-31/88

From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Shift turnover (PSN)
- Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump alignment
- Auxiliary Building tour
- Turbine Impeller oil tracing

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. Storage of waste oil
2. Communications between Maintenance and Operations

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. PSN shift turnover was very thorough and included maintenance items and operational concerns.
2. The PSN and STA very closely coordinated their efforts to monitor and track Turbine Impeller Oil pressure.
3. The PSN briefed his crew on the impeller oil problem at 0500 and notified plant management of his concern for the steadily decreasing pressure.
4. Many drums of waste oil are stored to the west of Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Area in Unit 4. One of the drums is marked "Bad Drum" on its side and has the large bung missing. The bung hole is stuffed with a rag, because the drum is full of waste oil. Just to the north of the stored waste oil drums is a floor drain. Leakage or spillage from these drums would flow into the drain and cause hazardous material to be released to the environment.
5. A loss of communication between Maintenance and Operations occurred concerning the work being done in the containment. The PSN was unsure of the Maintenance status and was unable to obtain a current status for quite some time. The Maintenance Department's time estimate for the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal repair seems to include a great deal of "slop" time. This resulted in the early repair of the seal which caused Operations to change the priority of system lineups. This could have been prevented if Maintenance had kept Operations better informed of the work progress.

F. Recommendations

1. The waste oil drums should be stored in an area where leakage and spillage could be contained. Waste oil should only be stored in good drums with the bungs in place to prevent spillage.

Completed By: Terry L. Eulkerson
MOS Observer

Date: 01/31/88

Reviewed By: *S.W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 2/1/88

Management
Review By:

FAS 12/1/88 *MD* 2/1/88 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/30-31/88From: Bahram A. Abrishami
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Reviewed O-ADM-016.3, Fire Protection Impairments
- Reviewed APSN log book
- Reviewed Plant Work Order (PWO) 0661 on "4A" Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump
- Reviewed PWO 2586 on "4A" Component Cooling Water Pump and observed a portion of the work in progress
- Tour of Unit 3 Containment
- Walked the Charging Pumps, High Head Safety Injection Pumps, Containment Spray Pumps, and associated piping
- Midnight beginning-of-the-shift meeting

B. Immediate safety problems

None problems

C. Questionable work practices

1. On 58 feet elevation, inside Unit 3 Containment, several reactor head stud stands were placed on the walkway above the equipment hatch. These stud stands were very close to the Containment liner and were not well secured.

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. If the reactor head stud stands are to stay in the Containment, they should be stowed and well secured away from the containment liner.
2. On 30 feet 6 inches elevation, inside Unit 3 Containment, I found a ladder leaning on FT-3-6585B and other instrumentation related to "B" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leak off. The ladder was removed and placed in an appropriate place. The Craft, Maintenance and other Supervision should be more effective in preventing this kind of oversight.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. The midnight shift, start-of-the-shift meeting continues to be a very good communication session among all departments.
2. During the start-of-shift meeting, the midnight PSN read and discussed the Precautions/Limitations section of the major procedures to be performed during the shift with his crews. It was especially interesting that he asked the license candidates, training on shift, what was the basis for each step in order to make sure everyone understood the reason behind those precautions.
3. Both peak and midnight shift Mechanical Maintenance Supervision were conscientiously observing and checking on work in progress. The work stations were clean and the required reference material such as procedures, Plant Work Orders, etc. were in use.
4. The Unit 4 Turbine Governor Impeller Oil Discharge pressure has been oscillating with a downward trend. The Operations Shift Supervision and the STA have been closely watching this pressure and working on a plan of action. The midnight shift PSN provided briefs for the Control Room personnel on this issue emphasizing, on various scenarios, what may occur and the appropriate actions to be taken. The Unit 4 RCO reviewed the appropriate procedures in advance to be fully ready for any necessary action. An operator in communication with the Control Room was stationed at the pressure indicator PI-3413 to monitor the Governor Impeller Oil Discharge pressure. The effort was very well coordinated.

F. Recommendations

See item D.

Completed By: Bahram A. Abrishami
MOS ObserverDate: 01/31/88Reviewed By: L.W. Pierce
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 2/1/88Management
Review By:PM-N 1/21/88 SVP 1/21/88 VP 1
Date Date Date Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/31/88

From: J.A. West
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning meeting
- Shift brief
- Observed portions of "B" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Overspeed Test (Local and Control Room)
- Observed "B" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test O-OSP-075.2

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. General comment after a weeks observation

- The morning meeting seems to lack focus. It appears that many objectives are trying to be covered in this single meeting. For example, your Plan of the Day has turned into a mini P-2. Focus on the days activities. In the maintenance area approximately 30% of all jobs listed on Tuesday were still listed on Friday. The number of people in attendance was approximately 50-55. One day there were 9 people from the Technical Staff. Of the 20 people at the front table on Thursday, 16 actually spoke and only 9 really contributed to tasks at hand. Only 5 individuals spoke from the rest of the group. I could not clearly understand these people with their backs to me. Ownership is not being taken for all the hot items.

2. Plan of the Day

- Date-expected-back not being addressed in a timely manner. This goes with ownership and accountability.
- Maintenance activities, as stated previously, have turned this into a mini P-2.
- Other department inputs have turned the Plan of the Day into a tracking system.
 - Technical Staff: 8 out of 17 long term tracking projects.
 - Licensing items: These are tracked through another system.
 - Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Items: This was nothing more than a list of procedure numbers.
 - Radiological Work Permits add nothing to Plan of the Day.
 - Chemistry: This concerns only Chemistry Department, Operations Department and a few key plant personnel.

01/31/88

MOS DAILY REPORT

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- STA informed me that a Fire Impairment Program (FIP) tag had been placed on the "A" Jockey Pump (Reference MOS report of 01/30/88).
- APSN met with Fire Watch Shift Supervisor (FWSS), and after some resistance, was able to get the FWSS to take the old FIP tags and agree to incorporate them into the new procedure (Reference MOS report of 01/30/88). This item still needs to be tracked to completion.

F. Recommendations

Mechanical Maintenance and I&C Departments were not represented at the shift brief (Day shift).

Completed By:

J.A. West

MOS Observer

Date: 01/31/88

Reviewed By:

L.W. Pearce

Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date:

2/1/88Management
Review By:F.H.S.

PM-N

12/1/88

Date

J.D.

SVP

12/1/88

Date

VP

i

Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/31/88-02/01/88From: Terry L. Fulkerson
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Shift turnovers
- Plant Work Orders (PWO) review (Control Room)
- Load rejection (20%)

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. Control PWO tracking

E.

Professionalism, Summary of Shifts, Comments

1. Conducted a review of current PWOs in the Control Room.
 - A) There appears to be many active PWOs in the Control Room that could be cleared with a minimum amount of effort. For example:
 - PWO #C078269 was originated on 11/24/86 and entailed replacing a red line indicator on a meter for the Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Pump "4B". The work request indicated a hold for plant conditions (this meter could be worked under any plant conditions as per operations).
 - PWO #C318003 issued on 10/09/87 entails moving a red line indicator for a meter on the ICW pump pressure. Also see PWO #C318004 on other pump.
 - PWO #C309556 involves a power range power recorder that indicates 15% low. The PWO was issued on 09/26/87.
 - B. All of these examples are not on hold for parts or other reasons that should delay their repair. This is not a complete list but merely a sampling of PWOs.
2. I observed a shift change meeting for the oncoming mid shift. The brief was excellent and included the concerns for the Turbine Impeller Oil pressure problem. The PSN briefed his operators on the possible indications and desired actions to be taken in the event of a turbine run back (very good).
3. At approximately 0305 Unit 4 had a 20% load rejection. The operators responded in an expeditious and professional manner. Their immediate and follow-up actions were correct and in accordance with the ONOPS. The operators' timely actions resulted in the accumulation of only a minimum number of penalty points outside the Axial Flux Difference Bank. Plant conditions were stabilized at approximately 80% power, and all required notifications and reports were made.
4. A program has been implemented to aid the operators in the tracking of Control Room PWOs. This program requires that all PWOs written for posting in the Control Room be written with a "C" prefix to the PWO number, i.e. PWO #C309556. However, several PWOs have been recently placed on the control panels with no "C" prefix.

F. Recommendations

1. Recommend that all persons who may write PWOs be informed of the Control Room PWO numbering policy (See E4).
2. Recommend a system be implemented to better track PWOs that requires no holds for completion in order to facilitate their completion (See E 1).

Completed By: Terry L. Fulkerson
MOS ObserverDate: 02/01/88Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 2/1/88Management
Review By:*[Signature]* 12/1/88 *[Signature]* 2/1/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

FINAL PAGE

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/31/88-02/01/88From: William C. Miller
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Shift turnover
- End-of-shift meeting
- Shift briefing
- Normal Control Room operations
- Intermediate Range Periodic Test
- Recovery from 200 Megawatt Load Rejection

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

1. Operator knowledge of Nuclear Job Planning System (NJPS) is limited. PSN assisted MOS observer in tracing and analyzing three Control Room PWO tags. I questioned the PSN on the training he had received on NJPS and discovered he was self taught. His knowledge of how to access and use the system was somewhat limited.
2. STA reports of off-normal events are not required to be routed to the Training Department (other than Simulator Engineer) by AP-0103.16. Therefore, valuable analysis of plant events including graphs of transients from the Safety Assessment System (SAS), are not reaching the Training Department from this source.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

There were several examples of outstanding professional behavior during this shift:

1. After a thorough shift briefing, the PSN reviewed the ONOP and EOP associated with Emergency Boration. He proposed hypothetical emergency situations and quizzed his shift on their response to those situations. He offered appropriate feedback and in effect taught a training session to his shift.
2. Shift 4 responded extremely well to a plant runback. The APSN took positive control and directed the RCOs to take corrective action. Specific duties were defined and the team quickly stabilized the plant. Once stable, the operators involved the Group 11 students in the recovery activities. Each student participated in the power ascension and received maximum benefit from the hands on experience.
3. Non-licensed operators responded to the needs of the RCOs very quickly during the runback. Communication was effective from both directions.

F. Recommendations

1. The Training Department should evaluate the need for formal training for operators on NJPS. The operators have the desire and the need to more effectively utilize this tool.
2. PUP should modify AP-0103.16 to include a copy of STA reports to the Training Department.

Completed By: W.C. Miller
MOS Observer

Date: 02/01/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Fowler
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 2/1/88

Management
Review By:

WFS 1-24/88 MD 1-24/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date