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 AUTH. NAME AUTHORITY AFFILIATION
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 GRACE, J. N. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards mgt-on-shift weekly summary rept, per NRC 871019 order.

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JANUARY 20 1988

L-88-32

28 JAN 25 1988
P 2:36

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987, the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,


C. O. Woody
Executive Vice President

COW/SDF/pw
Attachment

cc: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC
D. G. McDonald, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC< Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

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PEOPLE...SERVING PEOPLE

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MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEK STARTING: January 11, 1988

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 2

Four MOS observers were on shift: Lamar L. McLaughlin, St. Lucie Plant (01/11-17/88, Days); Peter L. Walker, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (01/11-18/88, Nights); Lee C. Huenniger, Turkey Point Startup Department Superintendent (01/11-16/88, Split) and Jesus Arias, Turkey Point Regulation and Compliance Supervisor (01/16-18/88, Split). While on shift these MOS observers reported potential safety problems, questionable work practices, areas for improvement, comments, and general recommendations.

During this reporting period Unit 4 remained at full power except for routine main turbine valve operability and turbine trip tests. Unit 3 was ramped to full power but had to be shutdown to Hot Standby (Mode 3) because of an unretrievable dropped rod (two rods were dropped during the attempt to retrieve the initial dropped rod). A Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) housing seal weld leak was identified. Unit 3 was cooled down to cold shutdown (Mode 5) in order to effect repairs.

No immediate safety problems were observed.

The following questionable work practices were observed:

- o During maintenance on the "3B" Boric Acid Transfer Pump the strip heaters were not deenergized (not on the clearance) which was a potential shock/burn hazard.
- o Security guards were observed to key their radios in restricted areas (may have caused some spurious alarms). This requirement will be reviewed with all security personnel.

Some improvements were recommended by the MOS observers:

- o Affix lights or fencing around the Hydrogen trailer by the Unit 1 & 2 discharge.
- o Update phone numbers on security signs and replace any that are missing.
- o Review the processing of Plant Work Orders (PWOs) in order to improve the system.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEK STARTING: January 11, 1988

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

PAGE 2 OF 2

- o Establish a central location to maintain keys to all panels, breakers and buildings.
- o Improve Plant Work Order response time specifically for A-1 type work.
- o Ensure RCO log entries are made for significant transients such as the Unit 3 pressure reduction problem.
- o Maintenance personnel need to improve their awareness of how the work on plant equipment can affect plant status.
- o Improve communications within Mechanical Maintenance concerning shift turnover of vital equipment.
- o Repair leaks on Fire Protection System.
- o Replace chicken wire removed from old drawing update trailer or install lighting.
- o Ensure testing procedures are completed before placing equipment in service.

Several recommendations were made by the MOS observers:

- o Develop a means to reduce operator confusion concerning Technical Specification LCOs for valves.
- o Evaluate the backup Nitrogen Systems for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) and the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) to determine if improvements are needed.
- o Remove or repair a water cooler that is tied to the turbine deck railing.
- o Replace several temporary "No Smoking" signs with permanent ones and control them by an appropriate procedure.
- o Repair PCV-455B at first opportunity.
- o Determine root cause of Pressurizer pressure transient.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/11/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Unit 3 power increased to 100%; Unit 4 at 100% power
- ° Review of Main Steam Isolation Valve Nitrogen Backup System (See 12/20/87 MOS Report).
 - Prints
 - PC/M 85-135
 - System walkdown
 - JPE letter JPE-PTPO-87-2175
 - 3-OSP-72.2
 - Discussed briefly system with system engineer and NPO
- ° Control Room operations
- ° Unit 4 746 A (Component Cooling Water Manual Isolation Valve) stuck open. The operators have determined a 24 hour LCO is in effect since 1000 this morning. This could be a conservative approach since they believe the valve is stuck open.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None noted

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

The Nitrogen backup system for the Main Steam Isolation Valves appears to have problems that make the system difficult to operate. The primary problem is leakage out of the system and check valve leakage. These problems manifest themselves as excessive bottle changing and Temporary System Alterations to Surveillance Test procedures. Recommendations will be made after further discussion with appropriate plant and engineering personnel. A review of Nitrogen usage will be done if data exists.

F. Recommendations

None at this time

Completed By: Lamar McLaughlin
MOS Observer

Date: 01/11/88

Reviewed By: L. W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/12/88

Management
Review By:

778 1/12/88 913 1/12/88 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/11-12/88

From: P.L. Walker
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3 Chemistry problem (action level 1) due to fluorides in steam Generators - Resolved by demineralizers - Not currently in action item. Containment activity (particulate) continues to increase. At the same time, pressurizer level channel LI-3-461 was taken out of service (8% high) and its bistables tripped. A small amount (0.2179GPM) of reactor coolant leakage was also calculated.
- Unit 4 valve 746 reach rod was repaired - 24 hour LCO cleared. "4C" Charging Pump Pulsation Damper was worked on - Pump was tested, but would not provide enough flow to keep up with 45 GPM letdown. Pump is still out of service.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

This observer was pleased to note no extraneous noises over the plant page.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P.L. Walker
MOS Observer

Date: 01/12/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/12/88

Management
Review By:

PM-N 1/12/88 SVR 1/12/88 VP 1/12/88

Date Date Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/11-12/88

From: L. Huenniger
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- 1300 afternoon planning meeting
- 1515 Operations PSN turnover
- 1545 Operations/Maintenance shift meeting 100% plant operations
- 2315 Electrical Department turnover meeting
- 2345 Operations/Maintenance shift meeting

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

"3B" Boric Acid pump was being worked by Maintenance on peak shift. The pump breaker was on the clearance, but the strip heaters on the dog house were not. The house was removed and heaters exposed. This presents a potential for electrical shock or burns to personnel.

D. Area(s) for improvement

South Control Room toilet is out of service with sign on the door. It is a convenience item and one of showing plant support for operators and Control Room conditions.

Additionally the deep sink in the Control Room is leaking up to two GPM - can't be shut off with faucet - water is in short supply - Plant Work Order was written last night.

The Hydrogen trailer by 1 & 2 discharge has no lights under or fencing around it. Suggest a light be permanently affixed to the nearby station for meeting this requirement.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

An NRC letter dated December 22, 1987 was read by the PSN at the shift turnover meeting in the Control Room. This letter dealt with formal communications and led to a heated discussion between operators and the PSN.

This letter stirred much resentment and created a negative effect by people who have been under the gun for a long time and the resulting stress it carries with it. This correspondence needed to be more specific, not such a sweeping statement of condemnation. Attached - the Nuclear Newsletter under regulatory matters - says visit was favorable, then the December 22, 1987 letter really let the air out of our sails.

F.

It is my understanding that a 24 hour LCO was agreed upon between PTN licensing and the NRC concerning manual RHR valve 4-746A. The reading of the Technical Specification left some Control Room operations personnel unsure as to what controlling condition applied. A decision should be reached, put in writing or on a computer such that the PSN has only to input valve number and the predetermined Technical Specification will be identified and followed.

Completed By: L. Huenniger
MOS Observer

Date: 01/12/88

Reviewed By: L. W. Pomeroy
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/12/88

Management
Review By:

THB 1/12/88 CHB 1/12/88 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/12/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning plant status meeting
- Control Room shift meeting (morning)
- Discussed status of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Nitrogen Backup System with Technical, Startup, Operations and Site Engineering.
- Due to containment particulate activity increase, the containment was inspected by plant personnel for leakage. Some water was found. Evaluation of this leakage is in progress.
- Control Room shift briefing (afternoon)
 - Downpower planned for peak shift for Turbine Valve Testing

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Nitrogen Backup System
 - Operators are no longer having difficulty maintaining nitrogen bottle pressure.
 - The Nitrogen System valves for the MSIVs are leaking such that additional isolation is required to perform periodic testing (See OTSC 5656).
 - Technical is considering adding the MSIV Nitrogen System to the scope of the Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) Nitrogen System work.
- Control Room operators are attempting to clear past due surveillances. This was discussed in the afternoon shift briefing. The list should be reduced as much as possible.

F. Recommendations

- Recommend that Technical include the MSIV Nitrogen Backup System problems in the scope of the REA for AFW Nitrogen System.
- Recommend that Site Engineering review NCR-0837-87 test results again to ensure that the test that was performed adequately addressed the deficiency description.

Completed By:

Lamar McLaughlin

MOS Observer

Date: 01/12/88

Reviewed By:

L.W. Pearce

Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 1/13/88Management
Review By:PM-N1/13/88
Date

SVP

1/13/88
Date

VP

1
Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/12-13/88

From: P.L. Walker
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Unit 3: RCS leak continues - slow increase in containment particulate. When Shutdown Bank Operability Test (OP-1604.1) was attempted, a shutdown bank A rod dropped completely into the core, Turbine ran back (NIS rate) to approximately 70%, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) was calculated to be approximately 11% (111%). Reactor Engineering requested power be decreased to less than 50% after rod was found to be irretrievable. Unit stable at approximately 50% and awaiting further decisions during day shift.
- ° Unit 4: Downpower to 40%
 - Repaired trip breaker, tested per 4-OSP-49.1
 - Performed Turbine Valves Operability Test 4-OSP-089, section 7.3
 - Performed Turbine Trip test
 - Escalated back to 100% at 3 MWE/minute rate
 - Unit steady at 100% power

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

During the last 12 hours, the Operations staff performed well while doing a very complex series of operations, and recovering from the rod drop transient. I was especially interested in the communications, which were done in a professional manner.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P.L. Walker
MOS Observer

Date: 01/13/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/13/88

Management
Review By:

PLS 1/13/88 9/15 1/13/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/12-13/88

From: L. Henninger
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° 1:00 p.m. plant planning meeting
- ° 3:45 p.m. Operations/Maintenance turnover meeting
- ° 11:15 p.m. Mechanical/Maintenance turnover
- ° Load reduction - 100% to 40% power (4-GOP-103)
- ° Turbine Valve Test (4-OSP-089)
- ° Replacement of relay by I&C and preparation by Operations (4-OSP.1)

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

01/12-13/88

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. I observed three Operations/Maintenance turnovers in the Control Room during the past two days. Each Maintenance Department representative had in hand the Plan of the Day.
2. Two in-shop turnovers were conducted in which on going work activities and the Plan of the Day were passed on to the on-coming shift. All the supervisors and foreman I talked to expressed a feeling of having a better status of plant needs. They thought having Maintenance at the Operations/Maintenance turnover meetings gave them an update to the current operations needs.
3. A general feeling I got was the Maintenance people were providing better operations support than my previous Management on Shift days. This was observed by two foreman receiving operations calls during our conversation, excusing themselves, then directing their people on a real time basis to take care of the operations needs. Their attitude was more supportive and a willingness to do so.
4. The peak shift with mid shift holdover, did a very professional job of bringing down the unit, coordinating the valve test, taking out the reactor trip breaker for I&C relay replacement, performing the Turbine Trip Test and increasing to full power operation.

F. Recommendations

The water cooler on the turbine deck by #3 generator exciter switch gear is rusted out and tied to the rail by a rope. It should be replaced or removed, it gives a run down appearance to a very visible area.

Completed By: L. Huenninger
MOS Observer

Date: 01/13/88

Reviewed By: L.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/13/88

Management
Review By:

FHS 1/13/88 VP 1/13/88
PM-N Date SVF Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/13/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Morning plant status meeting
- Control Room shift briefing
- Unit 3 power reduced to 10^{-8} amps. Trouble shooting N-9 dropped rod.
- Emergency drill practice in progress on Unit 4
- Toured Turbine Building
- While shutting down Unit 3 control rods dropped
 - Unit 3 was manually tripped
 - The required NRC notification was made

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None observed

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Attended ERT meeting for control rod N-9 and LT-461. The meeting was effectively run and directed towards the pre-planning of work activities during the reactor downpower (10^{-8} amps power at the time).
 - Work items that needed to be completed prior to return to power were identified.
 - A game plan for troubleshooting rod N-9 was discussed. This troubleshooting was aimed at isolating an open in the coil circuit.
 - A discussion of LT-461 problems reviewed suspected problem areas in the reference leg system for this transmitter.
- The three rods that dropped are all in the same area of the head. The present plans are to investigate this area of the head and if a leak is found in this area, an immediate cooldown will be done. If leakage is not found in this area the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) will be kept pressurized and a leak search will continue.
- Reviewed the reportability for the initial dropped rod event. This event was properly reported under 10 CFR 72 b (2)ii.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Lamar McLaughlin
MOS ObserverDate: 01/13/88Reviewed By: J. W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/14/88Management
Review By:

MB 1/13/88 VP 1/14/88 VP 1/14/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

0/13/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/13-14/88

From: P.L. Walker
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Unit 3: Hot standby, degassing
- ° Unit 4: 100% steady state

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

None

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P.L. Walker
MOS Observer

Date: 01/14/88

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/14/88

Management
Review By:

QNB 1/14/88 VP 1/14/88 VP 1/14/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/13-14/88

From: L.C. Huenniger
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° 1:00 p.m. plant planning meeting
- ° 3:15 p.m. Maintenance day-to-peak turnover
- ° 3:45 p.m. Operations/Maintenance turnover meeting. VCT gas space concentration control (3-OP-047.1). I&C taking voltage readings on control rod drive cabinets in 3B Motor Control Center (MCC).
- ° 11:15 p.m. I&C peak-to-mid shift turnover

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- ° The Plan of the Day continues to be used at turnover by the Maintenance Department. Today, with emergency drill, several supervisors and foremen were filling spots temporarily, but conducted normal turnover, including use of the Plan of the Day per maintenance direction.
- ° Much interest as to cause of Unit 3 shutdown, length of time down, and what must be done to return the unit to the line was exhibited by many plant people this shift.

F.

Recommendations

- ° Three temporary "No Smoking" signs with red plastic flags, a wood post, and clamp with "No Smoking" hand written on them should be replaced by professionally painted signs. Two flags are located at top of stairs to #3 condensate pit and one flag by Hydrogen Gas dryer #3 unit.
- ° These flags, in the future, could be controlled by AP-103.36 "Control of Operator Aids and Temporary Information Tags". This would insure periodic review and a removal when no longer required.

Completed By:

L.C. HuennigerMOS ObserverDate: 01/14/88

Reviewed By:

J.W. PearceOperations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/14/88Management
Review By:qB
PMN1/14/88
DateMO
SVP1/14/88
DateVP
VP1/14/88
Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/14/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Morning Plant Staff Meeting
- ° 7:45 shift briefing in Control Room
- ° Unit 3 degassing of hydrogen in preparation for cooldown. Unit 4 is at 100% power.
- ° Toured Turbine Building area and diesel rooms
- ° Toured intake area
- ° Afternoon Staff Meeting
- ° Afternoon shift briefing in Control Room and Control Room Operations.
- ° Security event occurred - storm drain protection not in place
- ° Unit 4 had a problem with a 4KV transformer (auxiliary). Transferred power to startup transformer. Troubleshooting efforts underway.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- ° It was determined that control rods L-9 and H-10 dropped during shutdown yesterday due to fuses being pulled. These are the same fuses that supply rod N-9.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Lamar McLaughlin
MOS Observer

Date: 01/14/88

Reviewed By: *C. W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/15/88

Management
Review By:*PAS* 1/15/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/14-15/88

From: P. L. Walker
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Unit 3: Volume Control Tank purge - gas decay tank release. Hydrogen down to desired level prior to cooldown. Initiated cooldown.
- ° Unit 4: Steady state - 100% power.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Yesterday (14 Jan. 88), I received a request from an instrumentation and control technician which expressed concern for the effectiveness of recent changes in policy aimed at improving the overall condition of equipment in the plant. I passed the request on to the MOS coordinator for his attention. Today (15 Jan. 88), I discussed the issue with the individual and informed him that a review had been initiated.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P. L. Walker
MOS Observer

Date: 01/15/88

Reviewed By: S. W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/15/88

Management
Review By:

PM-N 1/15/88 Date SVP 1 Date VP 1 Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/14-15/88

From: L.C. Huenniger

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° 1:00 P.M. operations/maintenance planning meeting
- ° 3:15 P.M. I&C day-to-peak turnover
 - Electrical Department troubleshooting ground on fire horns.
 - Operations evaluation and isolation of salt water leak on 3B turbine plant cooling water system. Bushing rusted through allowing separation of isolation valve 3-50-579B from header. Line is outlet sensing line to FI-3-1406
- ° 11:15 P.M. mechanical maintenance turnover peak-to-mids.
- ° 11:45 P.M. operations/maintenance turnover meeting.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

Security signs on fences for both units to the steam platforms, blowdown areas, condensate areas, feedwater platform, and the common Diesel House have signs with wrong (old) phone numbers.

These signs are 20" X 24" orange with black letters stating "Security Barrier - Caution - prior to removing or cutting any portion of this barrier security must be notified at PAX 398 Bell 4405."

Neither of these numbers will connect you with security. Signs need to have correct phone number attached over incorrect numbers, and those loose and on the ground need to be refastened to the fences.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Operations peak shift turbine operators and Nuclear Watch Engineer did a professional job in evaluating and isolating the 3B turbine plant salt water line to stop the header leak quickly. The drain valve was opened to prevent any leakage flow past the butterfly valves to be removed by system low point which will allow maintenance to repair on midshift.

Mechanical maintenance turnover at 11:15 P.M. was very thorough reviewing many PWO's, the priority, reason for holdup, and status of ongoing work was reviewed. The plan of the day was passed on from peak-to-mid shift.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: L.C. Huenniger
MOS Observer

Date: 01/15/88

Reviewed By: L.W. France
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 1/15/88

Management
Review By:

F.H.S. 1/15/88 1 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/15/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Morning plant status meeting
- ° Control Room 7:45 shift briefing
- ° Unit 3 plant cooldown
- ° Afternoon plant status meeting
- ° Unit 3 containment atmosphere is cleaned up such that respiratory protection is no longer required in general areas.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

Will make recommendations tomorrow after discussing pressure event with the operators that were on shift at the time.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

RCS pressure reduction

- ° After the shift turnover meeting (7:45) I noticed an unusual trend on pressurizer pressure, (approximately 350 PSI drop in 12 minutes, then increase). This decrease had happened on the previous shift (about 7:15 a.m.) and was stored on Safety Assessment System (SAS).
 - ° Checked cooldown procedure to see where the accumulators should be isolated (700 to 1000 PSI) from RCO to see if there were any pressure/temperature problems. No problem found.
 - ° Notified APSN and PSN to ensure they were aware of the event.
 - ° Requested a pressurizer level trend to see if accumulators had injected into RCS. Information was not conclusive, subsequently received accumulator trends that appear to show discharge to the RCS.
 - ° Suggested that PSN and APSN look at reportability of the event. They contacted the regulatory and compliance group for support.
 - ° NRC notified within 4 hours of verification of accumulator discharge.
- Cable found smoking in a manhole. This was subsequently extinguished.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Lamar McLaughlin
MOS ObserverDate: 01/15/88Reviewed By: J. W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/19/88Management
Review By:778 1/18/88 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/15-16/88

From: P.L. Walker

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3: Uneventful cooldown/depressurization to Mode 5. Stable, drained to approximately 10% in pressurizer, missile shield removed. Equipment hatch open, guards posted.
- Unit 4: Stable at 100% power.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Unit 3 operators did well to switch from cold calibrated pressurize level indicator to one of the functional hot calibrated level channels - the cold calibrated sensor uses the same reference leg as the faulty LT-461, but had not been tagged as defective.
- During the midnight shift turnover, two training briefs were well read and interpreted by the PSN.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P.L. Walker
MOS Observer

Date: 01/06/88

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/19/88

Management
Review By:778 1/19/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/15-16/88

From: L.C. Huenniger
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° 3:15 p.m. Mechanical Maintenance day to peak turnover
- ° Fire and fire team response to site support
- ° Unit 4 100% power operation
- ° Unit 3 RCS cooldown operation
- ° 11:15 p.m. I&C peak to mid turnover
- ° 11:45 p.m. Operation/Maintenance turnover

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

PWO time response - specifically to A-1 type work. Problems: (See F. for recommendation)

- a. PWOs not classified timely
- b. Not PSN approved timely
- c. Not entered into computer timely
- d. WA number not assigned for quick identification
- e. Receiver not checking computer often enough to start PWO package development.
- f. QC signature not obtained timely
- g. No set method (standardized) for all shifts to follow
- h. Inputers in Control Room - not given computer training
- i. Lack of followup phone call on hot items to determine priority within a priority.
- j. Hot items identified - not followed up timely with WA number on PWO and phone call to designated person.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

1. The fire team responded quickly - had appropriate gear, worked well with all departments involved. This was a small, but not normal situation in that a trace of smoke was coming from a conduit in a open manhole. Thermography was used to locate covered manhole, Construction/Plant forces opened manhole - fire team lead way to determining source. Operation personnel assisted in isolation of the feed, once the probable feed was identified. Plant Electrical forces will secure source and render it safe.
2. One problem was identified from the fire in the manhole. Once source of supply was properly identified, the breaker could not be opened to confirm suspicion due to a lock on distribution center door. Considerable time was expended until a key was found and lock removed.
3. The peak maintenance crews had a good work plan for the shift. They accomplished the polar crane mechanical checkout, moved the missile shields to the top of the pressurizer, defeated the personnel hatch interlocks and opened equipment hatch. A real good effort.

F. Recommendations

- ° (See E. 2.)
All panels, breakers, buildings should have a key for entry at a centralized location such that entry could be made without cutting locks or destroying doors. I suggest a key storage facility be maintained at a central location and keys identified by panel or building location. A place that is manned 24 hours per day and controlled such as security, might be a good group to act as custodian.
- ° (See D.)
 - A meeting of Operations - Planner, Scheduling, Maintenance, Generating Equipment Management Systems (GEMS), and QC representative meet to coordinate details. The basics are in place, a couple of people I talked to have ideas for improvement.
 - Proceduralize outcome of meeting by incorporating a standard method for all shifts to follow. Example, O-ADM-010 activity planning and coordination, hot items (the subject) is already there - needs expansion and more direction/detail.
 - Provide PSN, APSN, and NWE computer training or detailed menu to follow. (PWO inputing).
 - Provide how backup method will flow should computer system fail. (Manual on similar method needs to be established and documented).

The R-14 PWO of 01/14/88 took approximately six hours to get to the field from origination. Numerous small items that collectively used too much time and can be improved on by the ideas of those I talked to should be utilized.

Completed By: L.C. Huenniger
MOS Observer

Date: 01/16/88

Reviewed By: J. W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 1/19/88

Management
Review By:

J. W. Pearce 1/19/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/16/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- 7:00 a.m. plant staff meeting
- 7:45 Control Room shift meeting
- Discussed with Control Room operators the RCS pressure event of 01/15/88.
- Unit 3 on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Unit 4 is at 100%
- LT-461 (pressurizer level) was found to have a leaking bypass valve.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

- Logging of RCS pressure event
 - This event should have been logged in the RCO log. An entry such as "RCS pressure transient occurred. RCS pressure recovered. Investigating." would have been appropriate. It is not my intent that every annunciator have a log entry, but I do feel a description of a significant transient like this should be entered even if the root cause is not known.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

RCS Pressure reduction event.

- Discussed the event with the off-going RCO. He took accountability for initiation of the event. The root cause appears to be an error in the adjustment of the spray valve just before or during the shift turnover. The spray valve in use had a plant work order written against it due to valve response characteristics. The shift turnover was in progress. These two factors probably contributed in making this event occur.
- Discussed with the operators the logging of an event like this. Early entries were not made although subsequent entries were made in the APSN log. This item is identified as an area for improvement.
- Reviewed the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) report of abnormal occurrences and determined that the first indication that a problem existed was the accumulator alarm actuations (RCO statement). These alarms show that accumulator discharge had occurred. The operator took manual control of pressurizer spray and ensured heaters were energized to recover pressure.

F. Recommendations

- Recommend that this event be reviewed by other operators via routine in-house review system. This event could have been more complicated had the accumulators been isolated at initiation.
- Recommend that Operations Department address the event logging area for improvement. It is not clear who should have logged this event considering time of the event (shift turnover).
- Repair PCV-455B at first opportunity.

Completed By: Lamar McLaughlin
MOS Observer

Date: 01/16/88

Reviewed By: *JW Pearce*
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 1/19/88

Management
Review By:

JMS 1/19/88 1 1
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

MANAGEMENT INITIAL RESPONSE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/16-17/88

From: P.L. Walker

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3: Stable in cold shutdown - Maintenance work continuing in containment.
- Unit 4: 100% steady state power production.
- Observed 2230 and 2315 shift turnover discussions.
- Toured Auxiliary Building.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Very smooth, quiet shift. No problems, no great challenges.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P.L. Walker

MOS Observer

Date: 01/17/88

Reviewed By:

J.W. Ponce

Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/19/88

Management
Review By:*J.W. Ponce*
PM-N1 1/15/88
Date

SVP

1
Date

VP

1
Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/16-17/88

From: Jesus Arias, Jr.
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Outage meeting
- Shift turnover meetings
- Placing CV-4-1510A back in service
- Shift briefings

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

- I&C Technician came over to the Control Room to work on relay TC-4-408D-1. Upon questioning by Control Room personnel and Shift Technical Advisor (STA) of possible effects of his work, he could not answer. He was asked to go back to the shop and get more familiar with the work planned and possible effects. He then came back (approximately 2 hours later) and had a good understanding of the relay function and effects of his work.
- "4C" Charging Pump was discussed at the 1:00 p.m. meeting as needing further work (could not hold a 45 gpm orifice) but this work was not turned over to peak shift or mid shift in Mechanical Maintenance. With the "4B" Charging Pump having an information tag to minimize use, the "4C" Charging Pump work becomes critical.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Overall, professionalism was adequate.
- Shift briefings are thorough and well attended.
- Some informality still is noticed during shift briefings.
- During the shifts there were several trainees in the Control Room. RCOs and APSNs had good control of them.
- During the peak shift, I witnessed the task of placing CV-4-1510A back in service. There was good coordination, valving was done carefully and prudently. Adequate supervision was devoted to this evolution. Constant communications between Unit 4 RCO and other personnel (PSN, NWE, and TOs) was efficient. A difficult evolution was handled smoothly.
- Shift briefings are not necessarily following the Daily Work List.

F. Recommendations

- I&C personnel should be knowledgeable of work and its effects. A few more minutes at the shop will expedite the work and prevent mistakes.
- Review Daily Work List during shift briefings for work scheduled for the shift. (Priorities may change).
- Operations management should review the pressurizer pressure transient of 01/15/88. What was known then, may be important. Did not get a clear description of root cause.

Completed By: Jesus Arias, Jr.
MOS ObserverDate: 01/17/88Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/19/88Management
Review By:JWS 1/19/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/17/88

From: Lamar McLaughlin
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° 7:00 a.m. plant staff meeting
- ° 7:45 a.m. Control Room shift briefing
- ° Control Room operations
- ° Toured Intake and Turbine Building areas
- ° 3:45 p.m. Control Room shift briefing

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- ° Over the past few days, in the Control Room briefings, the operators have been kept up to date on the RCS leak. Discussions/presentations have been given that describe the location and extent of the leak, locations of the limited boric acid deposits and plant/descriptions of the weld repair process. I feel these discussions are effective in promoting a team atmosphere.

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Lamar McLaughlin
MOS Observer

Date: 01/17/88

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/19/88

Management
Review By:PM-N 1/19/88 SVP VP
Date Date Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/17-18/88

From: P.L. Walker
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Unit 3: Cold shutdown - 10% level in Pressurizer. Evaluation team inside containment looking at leak. Videotapes shown to Operations in Main Control Room.
- ° Unit 4: 100% power - no transients

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Area(s) for improvement

None

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

Quiet shift

F. Recommendations

None

Completed By: P.L. Walker
MOS Observer

Date: 01/18/88

Reviewed By: *S.W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/19/88Management
Review By:*WAS* 1/19/88
PM-N Date SVP Date VP Date

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/17-18/88

From: Jesus Arias, Jr.
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plane evolutions observed

- Shift turnover
- Shift briefings
- Plant tours

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

- Security guards continue the practice of keying radios at the turbine deck in the proximity of the steam generator and steam line pressure transmitters. At 1134, a Digital Data Processing System alarm was noticed on "4C" Steam Generator (S/G) steam line differential pressure. A guard was in the area using his radio. During the night a second guard was seen using his radio in the same area. The yellow signs posted in these areas are not preventing this practice. When questioned, the guards responded that they had forgotten the restrictions.

D. Area(s) for improvement

- During a plant tour, several leaks were noted on the fire protection system. Some of the major ones are:
 - Recirculation line to the Diesel Fire Pump has an elbow leak (thru-pipe) PWO #316509 dated 01/02/87.
 - Raw Water Tank #1 outlet valve 10-615 has a packing leak. PWOs (1) WA861260858 dated 05/06/86. (2) 026982 dated 04/09/87.
 - Thread leak on recirculation line to Electric Fire Pump. PWO #316958 dated 01/06/88.
- Old drawing update trailer located east of the Technical Support Center has a section of chicken wire removed, and no lighting has been installed underneath.
- In reviewing the Out of Service log, found an Appendix B sheet for testing of 3-2833 (Auxiliary Feed Water flow control valve). This sheet is required by procedure to be signed off by the Inservice Testing Coordinator or the Shift Technical Advisor upon completion of post-maintenance testing and provided to the Maintenance Supervisor for signature. FCV-3-2833 was placed in service during the day shift after satisfactory testing per 3-OSP-75.10. The Appendix B sheet was not signed off or pulled out accordingly.

E. Professionalism, Summary of Shift, Comments

- Shift members were acting in a professional manner.
- Shift turnovers, board walkdowns and shift briefings were thorough, and the interchange was adequate.
- Plant is clean and quiet.
- Reactor Operator trainees stayed busy and with reasonable control by the RCOs.
- Not a lot of activity to mention.
- Hard hats, ear protection and footwear policies are being followed regularly.

F. Recommendations

- Devote some resources and attention to the leaks in the Fire Protection System.
- Provide further guidance to security guards regarding the use of radios in the vicinity of steam pressure transmitters.
- Replace chicken wire on trailer by the Technical Support Center.

Completed By: Jesus Arias, Jr.
MOS ObserverDate: 01/18/88Reviewed By: *D.W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/19/88Management
Review By:*7/18* 1/19/88
PM-N Date SVP- Date VP Date

