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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 GRACE, J. N. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards summary of management-on-shift repts for wk of 871228, per NRC 871019 order.

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JANUARY 6 1988

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88 JAN 13 A10:22

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987,
the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

C. O. Woody
Executive Vice President

COW/SDF/cn
Attachment

cc: J. Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement, USNRC
D. G. McDonald, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

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MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEK STARTING: December 28, 1987

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 2

Five MOS observers were on shift: Roger C. Hine, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (12/28-30, 1987, Day); Russell Gouldy, Senior Engineer Nuclear Energy Staff, Juno Office (12/31/87 - 01/03/88, Day); J. W. Kappes, Maintenance Superintendent (12/28/87 - 01/01/88, Night); K. J. Weicek, St. Lucie Plant (12/28/87 - 01/04/88, Night); and T. A. Finn, Turkey Point Training Superintendent (01/01-04, 1988, Night). While on shift these MOS observers reported potential safety problems, questionable work practices, operating strengths, areas for improvements, and general recommendations.

During this period on Unit 3 additional low power physics testing and Turbine Generator balance shots were performed prior to power increasing to 75%. The reactor was manually tripped because of a stuck relay in the Turbine Protection System. Unit 4 was maintained in Mode 1 (100% power). No immediate safety problems were observed. Procedural inadequacies and equipment problems constitute the majority of MOS observer comments.

The following questionable work practices were identified during the week:

- Protective covers for lights behind control boards are missing and need to be replaced.
- A large recorder was improperly stowed on top of a cabinet in the Control Room. The recorder was removed and stowed in an appropriate location.
- A clearance tag was discovered hung on the wrong valve and reason(s) for this mistake are being investigated.

The following potential equipment enhancements were identified:

- Addition of sight glasses to Reheater Drain Tank to assist in troubleshooting problems.
- Altering pure water drain paths to minimize damage to concrete and limestone ground rock.
- Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Oil Storage Tank level indication span is too small.
- Feedwater Pump Lube Oil needs conditioners to extend oil life.

Some procedural improvements were recommended:

- The impact of verbatim procedural compliance needs further evaluation.
- New procedures are in need of streamlining to improve their operator usability.
- Upgrade 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby to Power Operations, to include entry into the procedure with reactor critical and secondary warmed.
- Evaluate Site Evacuation Alarm Test procedure because of its impact on Control Room noise level.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: December 28, 1987

PAGE 2 OF 2

Miscellaneous improvements recommended by MOS observers are listed below:

- Control Room operators need to be better informed of Maintenance work affecting plant indications/equipment.
- Discontinue use of plastic film around hot piping.
- Test equipment should be available for surveillances on back shifts.
- Evaluate the cause of the false fire alarms that often annunciate in the Control Room.
- Control Room should be better informed of Chemistry sampling procedures performed.
- Control Room work stations need to be cleaned and organized.
- Equipment lineup verifications should reveal instrument calibration problems before tests begin.
- Identify root cause for "3B" Charging Pump problem (failure symptoms did not coincide with repairs on the pump).
- Encourage the use of the phonetic alphabet for communications to minimize confusion.

During the week MOS observers commented on multiple instances where plant personnel were performing their jobs capably and professionally. Plant personnel are listening to identified problems and are being responsive in solving them.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/28/87

From: Roger C. Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Morning meeting
- Morning/Afternoon shift turnover meetings
- Unit 3 steady at 48% power
- Unit 4 steady at 100% power
- Unit 4 full length RCC - periodic exercise (OP-1604.1)
- Unit 3 NI-42 detector/channel adjustments based on Flux Map

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

The protective covers have been removed from the lights behind the control boards. Some of the bulbs are burned out. Even with all the bulbs working, the lighting may not be adequate. There is some concern that light bulbs could be damaged if equipment such as a ladder were carried through a passageway. This situation could result in a shock hazard.

D. Actions taken

Discussed the lighting problem with the PSN.

12/28/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/28-29/87

From: K.J. Wiecek
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Routine Control Room operations, Unit 3 at 48% power, Unit 4 at 100% power.
- I&C work on RPS Power Range drawer
- Extensive plant tours with both the peak shift PSN and mid shift PSN
- Mechanical Maintenance work in problems on "3B" Charging Pump.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None noted

F. Areas for improvement

None noted

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: K.J. Wiecek
MOS Observer

Date: 12/29/87

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/29/87

CAB 12/29/87 HLB 12/29

12/28-29/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/28-29/87

From: J.W. Kappes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- "3B" Charging Pump repair
- Emergency Lighting Inspection
- NIS Quarterly Calibration
- Replacement of N42 (Power Range "B" Drawer) selector switch
- Plant tour
- LC-3-1505 Resolution

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

Not applicable

E. Strengths

- Excellent shift meeting
- Very thorough plant tour by PSN
- NWE and I&C worked very closely in solving the 1505 problem of reverse acting setup

F. Areas for improvement

- Previous MOS observations have address the need for NJPS planners on back shift. I completely agree and will make every effort toward supporting our backshift crews.
- Sight glasses are needed on the RHTR Drain Tanks. This would help in troubleshooting LC-3-1505. Mechanical will submit an RTA to get the ball moving.

G. Recommendations

- Have the System Engineer identify the root cause of the "3B" Charging Pump problem. (i.e. the failure symptoms were not standard to the type of repair Mechanical performed).
- The practice of laying paper on the Control Room floor while cleaning the carpets does not produce any problems, as previously identified by MOS observer, if the on shift walks and moves chairs around with that in mind. The shift I observed did just that, the paper did not bunch, and was removed in a timely fashion. The above was only a comment and not a call for action on the part of anyone other than myself.

Completed By: J.W. Kappes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/29/87

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 12/29/87

CPB 12/29/87 1/15/12/29 FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/29/87

From: Roger C. Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Morning meeting
- Afternoon shift turnover meetings
- Unit ramping at 3%/hr but tripped at 1438
- Unit 4 in Mode 1 (100% power)
- OP-4004.2, Safeguard Relay Rack Train A, B - Periodic Test on Unit 4
- Unit 3 turbine/generator shaft balancing
- Toured turbine areas for Units 3 & 4

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

Chart recorder #66 is stored on top of a cabinet adjacent to the R-42 safeguards relay rack. The recorder is large and the cabinet is somewhat unstable. Storage of such a large component on top of the cabinet is a safety hazard. The Unit 3 RCO said the recorder is no longer used. Recommend the recorder be removed and stowed in a safer location.

D. Actions taken

None

12/29/87

E. Strengths

- The morning meetings is well organized and efficiently run.
- - The Turkey Point Nuclear station Plan of the Day contains very useful information for operation, and maintenance of plant equipment.
- The mid shift PSN provided an excellent report at the morning meeting. He knew the status of the plant and strongly encouraged the timely repair of vital equipment.
- During the performance of OP-4004.2, Safeguard Relay Rack Train A, B Periodic Test on Unit 4, the following strengths were observed:
 - Operator trainees were involved in the tests by the licensed operators
 - Proper communications were established among the operators involved.
 - The operator manipulating the bistables switches was very careful to check switch numbers before proceeding with the tests.

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

The operators are using good communication techniques. However, it is recommended that a phonetic alphabet be used in place of saying letters. In a high noise area, it is difficult to distinguish letters such as "B", "C", and "D". It is easy to distinguish between "Bravo", "Charlie", and "Delta". INPO has developed some materials concerning plant communications. Recommend that this material be incorporated into training and retraining programs.

Completed By: Roger C. Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 12/29/87

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 12/30/87

CJB 12/30/87

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/29-30/87

From: J.W. Kappes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- FT-3-113 Troubleshooting and repair
- N-32 Troubleshooting and repair
- FT-3-475 Troubleshooting and repair
- CCW Heat Exchanger cleaning

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

Not applicable

12/29-30/87

E. Strengths

- ° ERT list in Control Room for #3 activities. Both shifts were cognizant of the items and made every effort to comply.
- ° Good use of thermography to track down electrical generator hydrogen leaks.

F. Areas for improvement

None observed

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: J.W. Kappes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/29-30/87

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 12/30/87

qib 12/30/87

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/29-30/87

From: K.J. Wiecek
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Attended "Event Response Team" meeting on overspeed protection actuation event.
- Thermography of main generator hydrogen lines for leak detection.
- OP-15604.1 instrument air system dew point check
- Routine Control Room operations - Unit 3 in Mode 3, Unit 4 in Mode 1, 100% power.
- 3-OSP-089 main turbine valves operability test.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

- - Procedures for the evolutions observed were in use and were being strictly followed.
- Event response team Concept.

F. Areas for improvement

None observed

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: K.J. Wiecek
MOS Observer

Date: 12/30/87

Reviewed By: *J.W. P. [Signature]*
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 12/30/87

CPB 12/30/87

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/30/87

From: Roger C. Hine
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Unit 3 in Mode 3
- Unit 4 in Mode 1 (100%)
- Morning meeting
- Afternoon shift turnover meetings
- OSP-23.1, Test of "A" Emergency Diesel Generator
- Tour of Unit 3 secondary systems
- Manual level control of the "4C" Steam Generator

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

12/30/87

E. Strengths

- ° During the morning meeting the Maintenance Coordinator presented an excellent synopsis of the upcoming work for the shift.
- ° During the performance of OSP-23.1 on the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator an operator trainee did an excellent job in synchronizing the generator to the bus. This MOS observer is very impressed with the great care in which the operators perform their procedures. They also have excellent control over their trainees and provide the trainees with numerous opportunities to operate plant equipment.
- ° The Peak shift PSN gave excellent briefing on possible causes of the previous day's reactor trip.

F. Areas for improvement

- ° I&C Technicians requested and received permission to test the "4C" Steam Generator level channels while a Control Room operator manually controlled level. While monitoring level on the trend recorder, the operator was caught by surprise when level started to drop rapidly. The operator quickly realized the problem and selected another channel for the recorder. The operator voiced his concern to the I&C Technicians for not informing him of any of their actions that affected his indications.

G. Recommendations

- ° (See Item F.) Before any work is done that may affect indications in the Control Room, the following steps are recommended:
 - Receive permission to do the work from the Control Room.
 - Discuss in detail the actions that will affect Control Room indications and why (with the operator(s) who will be affected).
 - Before any action is taken that may affect Control Room indications, contact applicable operator(s) in the Control Room.
 - Inform Control operators when the work is complete.
- ° Chart recorder #66 was removed from the cabinet at the beginning of the day shift. This closes out item C on the MOS Daily Report by R. Hine for 12/29/87.

Completed By: Roger C. Hine
MOS Observer

Date: 12/30/87

Reviewed By: J. W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/31/87

CJB 12/31/87

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/30-31/87

From: K.J. Wiecek
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- End of shift meeting
- Routing Control Room operations - Unit 3 in Mode 3, Unit 4 in Mode 1 (100% power)
- Plant tour
- I&C repair of "Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Bearing Cooling Water Lo Flow" annunciator
- OP-1009.1. ECC work sheet

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/31/87From: Russell Gouldy
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Unit 3 Start-up (3-GOP-301)
 - Reactor criticality
 - Turbine roll to 1800 RPM
 - Power to 30% for balance shot measurements
 - Unit held 30% power for remainder of shift
- Unit 3 Hydrogen Leak Determination
 - Several adjustments were made to seal water temperature and hydrogen pressure to determine problem
 - Leak rate approximately 1.5 lb/hr at 60 psig

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None required

E. Strengths

None

F. Areas for improvement

Control of pure water drains such that the water drains to an approved drain.

Reason: Pure water will dissolve concrete and limestone ground rock creating voids;

- See
1. Unit 3 Feedwater Pump Seal Water Collection Tank drain.
 2. Unit 4 Feedwater Pump Seal Water Collection Tank drain
 3. Unit 4 Gland Sealing Steam drain
 4. Unit 4 Auxiliary Feedwater Steam Supply Steam Trap drains (by Unit 4 blowdown tank)

All demonstrate the effect of water dissolving concrete or rock.

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Russell Gouldy
MOS ObserverDate: 12/31/87Reviewed By: *L.W. Paine*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/4/88*CPB 1/4/88*

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/31/87-01/01/88

From: K.J. Wiecek

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Trouble shooting of seal oil system
- Unit 3 load reduction from 30% to no load condition for Balance Shot on Exciter
- Unit 4 routine operations

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for improvement

Discontinue the use of plastic film around hot or potentially hot pipes. Some plastic film was found tonight melting and giving off fumes on an unlagged valve on the secondary side.

G. Recommendations

None


Completed By:

K.J. Wiecek

MOS Observer

Date: 01/01/88

Reviewed By:



Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

OXB 1/4/88

Date:

1/4/88

12/31/87-01/01/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/31/87-01/01/88From: J.W. Kappes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. , Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3 shutdown - reactor critical
- Balance Shot in Turbine Generator

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

Not applicable

12/31/87-01/01/88

B. Strengths

- Unit 3 was taken off line by midshift in a very professional and controlled manner. The Control Room was not congested with unnecessary personnel and the three board operators supported each other's station as the unit was walked off the line. There was an excellent use of backup indication before permission was granted to manually trip the Turbine. Reactor stayed critical throughout the process.
- The planning and coordination of Mechanical personnel returned the Turbine to turning gear after the balance shot in an expeditious fashion.

F. Area(s) for Improvement

The following observations (F) and subsequent recommendations (G) are a summation of my tour of duty on MOS and apply equally to Maintenance or Operations:

- "Blind" verbatim compliance may reduce our people's capability to think through problems and hinder them from exercising good operation or maintenance judgment. On numerous occasions both groups were either paralyzed without a procedure or with their heads buried in procedures examining the tree but missing the forest. Basically we lack balance in the use of procedures.
- This brings up the second issue. The new procedures are in dire need of streamlining. Some consolidation of numbers of procedures and less emphasis on the "Cookbook" approval is in order. Our new procedures are quality products. They just now need to be made user friendly.

G. Recommendations

- The Plant Management Team should address the implementation of the Verbatim Compliance policy.
- User QIP Teams should be formed to improve the procedures.

Completed By: J.W. Kappes
MOS Observer

Date: 01/01/88

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88

CPB 1/4/88

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent Nuclear

Date: 01/01/88

From: Russell Gouldy

(MOS Observer)

Shift:

☒ Day☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3 Auxiliary Oil Pump repair
- Unit 3 repacking #2 Circulating Water Pump
- Unit 3 start-up
 - Turbine roll to 1800
 - Plant power to 30%
- End and start of shift meetings
- Unit 4 100% power operations

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None required

E. Strengths

None

F. Areas for improvement

- ° Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Oil Storage Tank overflowed
 - Level indicator is too short and does not allow for thermal expansion
 - Too small of span between Full and Requires Filling indications (approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ inch)
- ° Test equipment for operations:
 - Surveillances are missed (postponed) until day shift during the week since test equipment is then available. This equipment includes: Pyrometer, Strobe Tachometer, Hydrogen Sniffer and 480 Volt Ammeter (Plug in type).
- ° 3-GOP-301, Hot Standby To Power Operation, does not have an "Entry Point" when the reactor remains critical and secondary side is warmed and ready for start-up.

G. Recommendations

Resolve areas for improvement.

Completed By: Russell Gouldy
MOS ObserverDate: 01/01/88Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/4/88

C/S 1/4/88

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/01-02/88

From: T.A. Finn

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Lube oil and seal temperature adjustments to reduce Exciter bearing (#9) vibrations
- PSN and APSN shift turnover
- Shift briefing
- O-QSP-003.1 125 VDC System Breaker Alignment Verification
- Plant walkdown

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None

F. Area(s) for improvement

None

G. Recommendations


None

Completed By: T.A. Finn

MOS Observer

Date: 01/02/88

Reviewed By:



Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/01-02/88

From: K.J. Wiecek
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3, 30% power, routine operations
- Unit 4, 100% power, routine operations
- Westinghouse vibration monitoring of Unit 3, #9 bearing
- O-OSP-205.1, "Startup Transformer And Onsite A.C. Power Distribution Verification" performed by NPO

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None noted

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None noted

F. Areas for improvement

None noted

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: K.J. Wiecek
MOS Observer

Date: 01/02/88

Reviewed By: *L.W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/02/88

From: Russell Gouldy
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 4 100% power operations
- Unit 3 load ramp from 30% to 51% at 3%/hr
- Secondary system walkdowns and adjustments to balance cooling and system pressures
- Secondary system leak checks

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None required

01/02/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/02-03/88

From: T.A. Finn
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3 ramping power to 75% at 3%/hr
- Unit 4 100% reactor power - steady state operations
- Safety related walkdown - 3/4 OSP-094.1, Post Accident Sampling System Flowpath Verification
- PSN and APSN shift turnover
- Shift briefing

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

Found Clearance Tag #9 of Clearance 4-87-4x-096 on P.A.S.S. Valve 4-011. The tag should have been on PAMM 4-0011B. The clearance had been previously released. The valve P.A.S.S. 4-011 was in its proper position, open. In fact the Clearance Tag #9 required position happened to be open.

D. Actions taken

- The PSN was informed
- The tag was removed, but it was contaminated and disposed.
Note: The name of the person that hung the tag was washed out.
- Valve PAMM 4-0011B was verified closed.
- The System Alignment Procedure was verified completed during the month of 10/87. Procedure 4-OP-94 Containment Post Accident Monitoring System.
- 4-OSP-094.2 was performed to verify proper alignment.
- See recommendation note #2.

E. Strengths

None

F. Areas for Improvement

- ° The Chemistry Lab does not always communicate to the Control Room concerning system changes associated with sampling systems; i.e. flushing a portion of the post accident sampling system. The P.A.S.S. System is under Chemistry's control, but the Control Room should be informed of any valving changes from the normal standby alignment. The PSN was informed of the evolution, the flush was completed and the importance of keeping the Control Room informed of evolution was discussed with the Technicians.

G. Recommendations

- ° That all Chemistry Department personnel are reminded that the Control Room must be informed of all evolutions being performed and emphasize the need to use approved procedures.
- ° Retrieve clearance 4-87-4x-096 and determine reason for the error.

Completed By: T.A. Flinn
MOS ObserverDate: 01/03/88Reviewed By: *J.W. Paine*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 1/4/88

CJS 1/4/88

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/02-03/88

From: K.J. Wiecek
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Unit 3 power increase from 50% to 75%
- Plant tour
- Unit 4 routine operations, 100% power
- Reviewed 3-GOP-301
- Site evacuation alarm test
- Start of "3B" Main Feedwater Pump
- End of shift meeting
- Reviewed 3-ONOP-050 "Loss of RHR" for Technical Specification compliance

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

01/02-03/88

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for Improvement

Test duration for the Site Evacuation Alarm should be shortened. The test took approximately 8 minutes to complete, which is a long time to have to listen to that alarm. The operator has to key the page hand set to cut-out the noise in the Control Room in order to hear annunciator alarms.

G. Recommendations

Either shorten the Site Evacuation Alarm test by better coordination between the operators who have to verify "Blue Light" operability throughout the plant during the test or provide the Control Room operators with a cut-out switch to silence or lower the Site Evacuation Alarm in the Control Room during the test so they can hear annunciator alarms without having to key the page hand set.

Completed By: K.J. Wiecek
MOS Observer

Date: 01/03/88

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88

CJB 1/4/88

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/03/88

From: Russell Gouldy
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3 - 75% power operation
- Unit 4 - 100% power operation
- Only 3 alarms during 12 hour period. (All were metal impact monitor alarms).

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None required

E. Strengths

Normal power OPS all shift

F. Area(s) for improvement

Clean out operators' work stations. Removed cartoon from Unit 3 RCO's desk.

G. Recommendations

See section F

Completed By: Russell Gouldy
MOS Observer

Date: 01/03/88

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/03-04/88

From: T.A. Finn

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3 at 74% power steady state operations
- Unit 4 at 100% power steady state operations
- Plant tour - spot checked 10 clearance tags
- NWE shift turnover
- Shift briefing
- 75% power flux map Unit 3

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None

F. Area(s) for improvement

The test of the "A" Standby Steam Generator Feedwater Pump was delayed due to the recirculation D/P gage reading greater than zero. This gage required calibration. This problem should have been detected during the lineup verification.

G. Recommendations

Improve non-licensed operators awareness of standby conditions/indications of systems. This can be accomplished via classroom and on-the-job training. Another assistance for the operators would be having gages reading directly in GPM vice indicating inches of water with conversion labels affixed to the gage.

Note: The ten Clearance Tags that were checked were filled out correctly and on the correct component.

Completed By: T.A. Finn

MOS Observer

Date: 01/04/88

Reviewed By:

Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88

01/03-04/88

MOS DAILY REPORT

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 01/03-04/88

From: K.J. Wiecek

(MOS Observer)

Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- Unit 3, 75% power, hold for flux mapping of the core
- Unit 4, 100% power, routine operations
- Plant tour with PSN
- End of peak shift meeting, beginning of mid shift meeting
- Work on Auxiliary Priming System to improve water box vacuum

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

E. Strengths

During plant tour with the PSN we stopped at all the various operator shacks where the PSN gave a talk on professionalism and how the operators should carry out their assignments in a conscientious and professional manner.

F. Area(s) for improvement

None noted

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: K.J. Wiecek
MOS Observer

Date: 01/04/88

Reviewed By: *L. A. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 1/4/88



Management-on-Shift (MOS)

ACRONYMS

AEO	Auxiliary Equipment Operator	NOP/NOT	Normal Operating Pressure/Normal Operating Temperature
AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater	NPO	Nuclear Plant Operator
ANPO	Assistant Nuclear Plant Operator	NPS	Nuclear Plant Supervisor
APSN	Assistant Plant Supervisor Nuclear	NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ASP	Administrative Plant Supervisor Procedure	NS	North-South
CCW	Component Cooling Water	NWE	Nuclear Watch Engineer
CP	Charging Pump	OMS	Overpressure Mitigating System
CVCS	Chemical Volume Control System	ONOP	Off Normal Operating Procedure
DG	Diesel Generator	OOS	Out-of-Service
DC	Direct Current	OTSC	On The Spot Change
ΔP or DP	Differential Pressure	PI	Polarization Index
ECCS	Emergency Core Cooling System	PM	Preventative Maintenance
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator	PNSC	Plant Nuclear Safety Committee
ERT	Event Response Team	PORV	Power Operated Relief Valve
EW	East-West	PPM	Parts Per Million
FCV	Flow Control Valve	PRZ	Pressurizer
FPL	Florida Power and Light Company	PUP	Procedure Upgrade Program
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report	PWO	Plant Work Order
GEMS	Generating Equipment Management Systems	QSPDS	Qualified Safety Parameter Display System
GPM	Gallons Per Minute	RCA	Radiation Control Area
HCV	Hand Control Valve	RCO	Reactor Control Operator
HHSI	High Head Safety Injection	RCP	Reactor Coolant Pump
HX	Heat Exchanger	RCS	Reactor Coolant System
IAM	In Accordance With	RHR	Residual Heat Removal
ICW	Intake Cooling Water	RTD	Resistance Temperature Device
ICMP	Intake Cooling Water Pump	RV	Reactor Vessel
IST	Inservice Testing	SAS	Safety Assessment System
LCV	Level Control Valve	S/G	Steam Generator
MCC	Motor Control Center	SGFP	Steam Generator Feed Pump
MG	Motor Generator	SIS	Safety Injection System
MSIV	Main Steam Isolation Valve	SNOW	Short Notice Outage Work
MOS	Management on Shift	SNPO	Senior Nuclear Plant Operator
MOV	Motor Operated Valve	STA	Shift Technical Advisor
NAB	Nuclear Administration Building	TOP	Temporary Operating Procedure
NANAS	National Warning System (Emergency Planning)	TSA	Temporary System Alteration
NCR	Non-Conformance Report	TP	Temporary Procedure
NIS	Nuclear Instrumentation System	VCT	Volume Control Tank
NO	Nuclear Operator	W	Westinghouse Corporation