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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 GRACE, J. N. Region 2, Ofc of the Director

SUBJECT: Forwards summary of mgt-on-shift weekly repts, per 871019 NRC order.

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DECEMBER 09 1987 EC 16 A10:23

L-87-506

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, Region II
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323


Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Management-on-Shift Weekly Report

Dear Dr. Grace:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order dated October 19, 1987,
the attached summary of Management-on-Shift (MOS) reports is submitted.

Should there be any questions on this information, please contact us.

Very truly yours,


For C. O. Woody
Executive Vice President

COW/SDF/cn
Attachment

cc: D. G. McDonald, Project Manager, NRR, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant
R. E. Tallon, President, FPL

MOS001

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23:00

MANAGEMENT ON SHIFT (MOS)

WEEKLY SUMMARY REPORT

WEEK STARTING: November 30, 1987

PAGE 1 OF 1

Four MOS observers were on shift: J.A. Spodick, St. Lucie Plant Staff (11/30 - 12/07, days); Paul R. Geddes, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (11/30 - 12/07, nights); D.W. Haase, Turkey Point Safety Engineering Group Chairman (11/30 - 12/02, nights); and R.A. Longtemps, Turkey Point Mechanical Maintenance Assistant Superintendent (12/02 - 12/07, nights).

While on shift these MOS observers reported any potential safety problems, questionable work practices, operating strengths, areas for improvement, and general recommendations. During this period Unit 4 went from Mode 5 to Mode 1, reaching 100% power operation at 0430 on December 6, 1987. No items of immediate safety significance were noted. The following questionable work practices were identified:

- At a motor control center (MCC) color-coded breaker locks were found to be incorrectly installed. Actions were immediately taken to correct the problem.
- A Steam Generator blowdown isolation valve had a slight packing leak. Packing adjustments were performed but the leakage continued. This leak was then stopped by backseating the valve. Some personnel were not aware of how the leakage was stopped, since the PWO was closed out as though the leak had been repaired. Guidance has been developed for the application of and controls on backseating of valves. The method for implementation of this guidance is currently being reviewed.
- A hydrogen leak on the Unit 4 turbine generator was not promptly detected even though control room logs indicated a downward trend in pressure. Logged information evaluation techniques will be reviewed with all the operators.
- Performing Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak rate calculations while the plant is in a transient condition results in inaccurate leak rates. The requirements and methods for performing RCS leak rate calculations are being reviewed for enhancements.
- The implementation of the Plant Work Order (PWO) system may be deficient in that some orders may have been signed as completed even though the deficiency may not have been corrected. An evaluation is being conducted of the criteria for release of PWOs where the work has been completed but post maintenance testing cannot be completed due to plant conditions. Further investigation of the PWO system and its implementation is being conducted.

Areas for improvement are listed as follows:

- Communications between non-licensed operators and the control room.
- Plant piping drawings (put pipe diameters on the drawing).
- Plant policy on the use of Technical Specifications (interim and standard).
- Maintenance of secondary plant support equipment.

All aspects of plant operation continue to improve. MOS observers on 22 occasions documented observed "Strengths." The MOS program continues to contribute to the improving operational and material readiness of the plant.

ATTACHMENT: MOS DAILY REPORTS

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 11-30-87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Unit 4

Observed plant heatup from 440°F, 990 psi to NOP/NOT.
Observed Control Room operations supporting OP 1004.1 "RCS-
System Leak Test" following RCS opening.
Attended shift briefings.
Attended the 1 P.M. outage meeting.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

N/A

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for improvement

None observed

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 11/30/87

Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent - NuclearDate: 12/31/87

CJB 12/1/87

JH 12/1/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 11/30-12/01/87

From: Paul R. Geddes-W
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Shift briefings.
Unit 4 charging pump IST
I&C department S/G protection channel functional testing.
I&C department pressurizer pressure functional testing.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul R. Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/01/87

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/1/87

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To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 11/30-12/01/87

From: D. W. Haase
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

End of shift debriefings.
Beginning of shift briefing.
Observed performance of Table III, placing the CCW system in single pump operation, OP 0103.32, reactor cold shutdown conditions.
Observed performance of selected portions of 4-OP-047.1, VCT gas space concentration control.
Observed general Control Room activities associated with maintaining Unit 4 in Mode 3 and two I&C surveillances.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None taken

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for improvement**Work controls associated with locks:**

Additional attention needs to be paid to the locks used on the breakers requiring locks at motor control centers B and C. At each MCC, five of these locks are color-coded to be unit specific and so that special control of the key can be maintained. One of these keys is a non-unit-specific, "F-series" lock. At 4B MCC, a color-coded lock was installed in place of an "F-series" lock. At 4C MCC, a color-coded lock and the "F-series" lock were switched on two breakers.

Upon notifying the Nuclear Watch Engineer, action was taken to return the locks to their correct positions. The situation was discussed at the shift meetings for the peak shift and midnight shift.

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G. Recommendations

Controls need to be put in place that assure that the proper locks get installed following manipulation of breakers. See F above.

(This item is related to Recommendation 3 of my report of yesterday, 11/30/87. Implementation of Recommendation 3 will encompass this recommendation).

Completed By: D. W. Haase
MOS Observer

Date: 12/01/87

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/1/87

0/13 12/1/87 12/1/87
FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-01-87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Morning outage planning meeting.
Shift briefings.
Safeguards relay testing.
Reactor protection system logic testing.
Assistant PSN turnover.
PSN turnover.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

N/A

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for improvement

None noted

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 12/01/87

Reviewed By: *J. W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/2/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/01-02/87

From: Paul R. Geddes-W
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Shift turnover.
Drawing condenser vacuum.
Reactor trip bypass breaker test.
Source range calibration (partial).
Source range periodic.
RPI rod bottom bistable check.
Various other repairs.
RCP 4B stopped for balance shot and to install oil collection system.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

I have observed several I&C department personnel at work the last 2 days. I am, in general, very impressed with their technical expertise, use of procedures, and the quality of their procedures. Even when minor problems with the procedures were encountered, their commitment to fixing the problems using an OTSC was commendable.

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul R. Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/02/87

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/2/87

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To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/01-02/87

From: D. W. Haase
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

End of shift debriefings.
Start of shift meetings.
Portions of OP-9700.2, Operation of RPI Power Supply System.
Performance of 4-OSP-041.1, Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate Calculation.
Observed follow-up on status of leak repairs initiated as a result of OP-1004.1, RCS-System Leak Test following RCS opening.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None required

E. Strengths

The beginning of the shift meeting with Operations, the 3 Maintenance departments, Chemistry, Health Physics, and the STA was very well conducted. A good exchange of information took place concerning what work was planned and what the priorities were. This area has improved considerably since the last time I was on shift as part of the MOS program in October.

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F. Areas for improvement

Leak Inspection and Associated Activities

10-25/6.14
The STA was asked to evaluate a leak on a S/G Blowdown Isolation Valve, which was leaking 60 drops per minute by using 4-OSP-041.1, RCS Leak Rate Calculation. Later, the STA was informed by a Nuclear Operator that the leakage had been stopped. Review of the work packages showed that packing adjustments were not effective in stopping the leak. It was finally determined that the valves had been put on the backseat to stop the leakage. However, no entries to that effect were found in the NO log book, the RCO log book, or the PSN log book. It also appears that there has been no attempt made to repack the valves while on the backseat. It is also not clear that if the valves are not repacked and just left on the backseat, that plans will be made to repack them in the future. The PWO written to fix the leak has been performed and the final post maintenance test is satisfactory with regard to leakage. No mention of how the leakage was stopped is in the final journeyman's report.

G. Recommendations

Leak Inspection and Associated Activities

1. Leak inspection and evaluation procedures need to be reviewed with regard to the appropriateness of using the RCS leak rate calculation procedure to evaluate leakage into the containment from other systems.
2. Work controls need to be improved in the area of using backseating as a method of stopping packing leaks. These controls need to address under what conditions it is acceptable to use the backseat for subsequent operation in lieu of changing the packing while on the backseat. They also need to address a method of keeping track of which valves are backseated and for assuring that these valves are subsequently repaired.
3. Non-routine actions taken by field operators need to be reported and logged.

Completed By: D. W. Haase
MOS Observer

Date: 12/02/87

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/2/87

12/2/87 FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-02-87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Morning outage meeting.
Shift briefings.
Turbine valve testing.
Feed and condensate system operation.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

N/A

E. Strengths

Shift briefings continue to be effective in communicating important goals and information to all shift members in a timely manner. One disadvantage of this method, however, is the large increase in the number of personnel within the Control Room.

F. Areas for improvement

1. Communications between non-licensed operators and the Control Room.
2. Plant piping drawings.
3. Plant policy regarding Technical Specifications, Interim Technical Specifications and Standard Technical Specifications.
4. Maintenance of secondary plant support equipment

G. Recommendations

I will make recommendations concerning the listed areas for improvement after I research them further.

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 12/02/87

Reviewed By: Richard J. Wade
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-3-87

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0-ADM-019	Management on Shift (MOS) MOS DAILY REPORT	Page 1
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To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear Date: 12-03-87

From: Jeff Spodick Shift: ☒ Day
(MOS Observer) ☐ Night

ATTACHMENT

G. Recommendations

Below are the recommendations concerning the listed areas for improvement which I referred to in my 12/02/87 MOS Daily Report.

1. All operating shifts should utilize effective closed loop communications. As an example, assume the Reactor Operator instructs the Turbine Operator to secure condenser hotwell draining. The appropriate valves should be repositioned by the Turbine Operator. The Turbine Operator should then notify the Control Room that hotwell draining has been secured, and additionally which valves have been repositioned. This practice is not being consistently applied.
2. Currently reference drawings utilized by the Operations personnel do not show piping diameters. Operations Support should investigate the possibility of including line sizes in future revisions to the Control Room drawings.
3. Plant Management should republish guidance on use of the Interim Technical Specifications. Delays in implementing the Standard Technical Specification format have contributed to confusion concerning how the Interim Technical Specifications were to be utilized.

Completed By: Jeff Spodick Date: 12/03/87
MOS Observer

Reviewed By: Richard J. Wendo Date: 12-4-87
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

JS/md 12/14/87 7/15/87 7/13/87 12/03/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/02-03/87

From: Paul R. Geddes-W
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Unit 4 reactor startup.
Two attempts to parallel rod drive MG sets.
Auxiliary feedwater pump testing.
A standby feedwater pump testing.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

Reactor startup went extremely smooth.

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul R. Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/03/87

Reviewed By: Richard L. Mendenhall
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-3-87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/02-03/87

From: R. A. Longtemps
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Shift turnover meeting.
GOP 301 hot standby to power.
Auxiliary feedwater train 1 operability OSP 075.1.
Auxiliary feedwater train 1 night backup test OSP 075.6.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

Good communication in OPS with all departments. Shift turnover was excellent.

F. Areas for improvement.

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: R. A. Longtemps
MOS Observer

Date: 12/03/87

Reviewed By: Richard J. Wende
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-3-87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-03-87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Shift operations in Mode 2.
Auxiliary feedwater testing.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

N/A

E. Strengths

During the morning planning session, the PSN requested support for repair of the Water Treatment Plant final effluent valve (auto trip feature). He discussed a plant event based upon the non-availability of this feature that caused the loss of approximately 500,000 gallons of water. The effluent valve was repaired promptly during the following shift.

Prior to the auxiliary feedwater testing, the PSN announced that he would be limiting personnel access to the Unit 4 Control Room area in an attempt to minimize operator distractions.

Maintenance provided prompt support during the auxiliary feedwater testing and subsequent valve leak.

F. Areas for improvement


None observed

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 12/03/87

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-4-87

JS/md

12/03/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/03-04/87

From: Paul R. Geddes-W
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Auxiliary feed valve test.
B auxiliary feed pump operability test.
Main feed regulating valve cycling.
Latching main turbine.
Rolling main turbine to 1800 rpm.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul R. Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/04/87

Reviewed By: Richard J. Woods
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-4-87

1988

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To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/03-04/87

From: R. A. Longtemps
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

Repair of bonnet leak on valve #AFSS-001B
OSP-075.2
GOP-301
Hydrogen leak
OP- 089.

B. Immediate safety problems

None

C. Questionable work practices

None

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

Good coordination of OPS and Maintenance departments looking for and finding a hydrogen leak.

Excellent effort by OPS in getting ready to roll turbine.

F. Areas for improvement.

OPS should have caught hydrogen leak with pressure dropping all day;
RCO took readings every 4 hours.

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: R. A. Longtemps
MOS Observer

Date: 12/04/87

Reviewed By: Richard J. Wade
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12-4-87

RAL/md

12/03-04/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/04/87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Power Ascention from 20% to 40% power.
- ° Morning outage meeting
- ° Shift briefings
- ° Corrective action by shift personnel to reset "6B" feedwater heater tube side relief valve.

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

Not applicable

E. Strengths

Operator actions to reset the "6B" feedwater heater relief valve were prompt and effective.

F. Areas for improvement

None observed

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 12/04/87

Reviewed By: *L.W. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

12/04/87

12/04/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/04-05/87

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Power Ascension to 400 MWe
- ° Leak rate calculations

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

None observed

F. Areas for improvement

See recommendations

G. Recommendations

The leak rate calculation during a power ascension is extremely difficult. Three attempts were required to obtain one that was reasonable. Jeff Spodick, on day shift, will be following up on this to help determine what should be done to rectify the situation. My recommendation is to waive the requirement for leak rate during power changes. An accurate leak rate cannot be obtained during power changes.

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/05/87

Reviewed By: 
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/04-05/87

From: R.A. Longtemps
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- 4-ONOP-028 Reactor control system malfunction
- Flux map
- OSP-41.1 Leak rate calculation
- Tour of secondary side
- Shift turnover meetings

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

- Plant housekeeping overall looks good
- Very few steam leaks on secondary
- Communication among all department has greatly improved

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: R.A. Longtemps
MOS Observer

Date: 12/05/87

Reviewed By: J.W. Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/05/87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Shift briefings
- ° Power ascension from 55% to 80% reactor power on unit 4
- ° DWST filtration process

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

A logical, coordinated effort was exhibited by the Operations, Chemistry and Maintenance departments in bringing the secondary plant water chemistry problems under control

F. Areas for improvement

RCS leak rate calculation procedure and procedure implimentation.

G. Recommendations

The RCS Leak rate calculation procedure should be revised. The procedure implies a leak rate test duration of 4 hours. This time duration seems excessive. The method of determining sign convention is confusing, and no procedural guidance exists regarding leak rates of negative gallons per minute. Leak rate calculations that do not meet the acceptance criteria due to unstable plant conditions should probably still be retained in the plant QC records.

As a reference, at PSL the normal leak rate test duration is two hours. Additionally, if a leak rate is started and terminated due to a negative leak rate calculation, the calculation worksheet is still retained. (Similar to keeping a voided check).

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 12/05/87

Reviewed By: *JW Pearce*
Operations Superintendent- Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

Q/15 12/7/87

FINAL PAGE

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/05-06/87

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Power ascension from 80% to 99%
- ° Loss of heater drain pump flow (temporary)
- ° Shift briefings
- ° Tour of plant and RCA

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

The team work exhibited during the loss of heater drain pump flow was commendable. The shift worked well together to first stabilize the plant, then analyze what had happened, and then return the plant to normal.

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/06/87

Reviewed By: J.W. Plance
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/05-06/87

From: R.A. Longtemps
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- "4C" ICWP amp check
- "3A" RHR setting up for hydro
- "4C" charging pump fluid drive oil leak
- Tour of Auxiliary building
- Tour of secondary with T.O.
- "4B" SGFP feed and bleed oil reservior

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

- Auxiliary building looks good
- T.O. watching #4 lube oil reservior

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: R.A. Longtemps
MOS ObserverDate: 12/06/87Reviewed By: *[Signature]*
Operations Superintendent- NuclearDate: 12/7/87

913 12/7/87 FINAL PAGE

12/05-06/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/06/87

From: Jeff Spodick
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☒ Day
☐ Night

- A. **Plant evolutions observed**
- ° 100% power operation at unit 4
 - ° Routine surveillances
 - ° Shift briefings
 - ° PSN and Assistant PSN turnover
 - ° Daily outage and planning meeting

B. **Immediate safety problems**

None observed

C. **Questionable work practices**

None observed

D. **Actions taken**

None

E. **Strengths**

None observed

F. **Areas for improvement**

None observed

G. **Recommendations**

None

Completed By: Jeff Spodick
MOS Observer

Date: 12/06/87

Reviewed By: *L. A. Pearce*
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

12/7/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/06-07/87

From: Paul Geddes
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night**A. Plant evolutions observed**

- Steady state power on Unit 4
- Intermediate range NI periodic

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

- 1) The PSN and APSN on the mid shift talk to the field operators to determine which PWO's are of most concern. They then follow up on these, obtaining copies of the PWO and what is being done, and the final resolution. This lets the operator know that what he does makes a difference.
- 2) Operators admit that the practice of "sticker picking" (see section F.) is much better than it used to be.

F. Areas for improvement

There are two areas for improvement within the PWO system:

- A) Cancellation of PWO's on equipment that is not fixed occurs. Example - Unit 4 feedwater bypass valves had PWO's written (C318034, C318035, and C318036) on 11/07/87 to fix valve leak thru. These PWO's were cancelled on 12/01/87, indicating that the valves had been fixed. The operator on duty knew that no leak test had been performed to verify the repair, and therefore wrote PWO's 311460, 311461, and 311462 on 12/02/87 to get the leaks thru on feedwater bypass valves fixed. The reactor startup performed on 12/03/87 confirmed that the bypass valves still leaked thru. This complicated the reactor startup in that the RCO had to coordinate with the T.O. to manually throttle the bypass inlet valve in order to control flow to the steam generators. PWO's C318034, C318035, and C318036 should not have been cancelled.
- B) Writing a PWO requires that a device number, a verbal description, and an equipment tag number be obtained. The system to obtain the equipment tag number is bulky and time consuming, requiring paging through a large computer printout which often has confusing or unclear word descriptions. This leads to two problems:
 - 1. Field operators turn in PWO's usually without the equipment tag number, or an incorrect number. This forces the NWE, ASPN or PSN to look up the equipment tag number, taking away from his other duties. This can also lead to inaccurate information in the computer.
 - 2. Field operators would rather work around deficient equipment than go through the hassle of writing a PWO.

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G. Recommendations

- A. 1) Ensure that all maintenance personnel do not cancel PWO's until work ordered is completed and tested.
- 2) Develop a mechanism where if the solution to the problem is long term (such as PCM) the PWO can be cleared but an information tag is hung outlining the solution.
- 3) Recommend additional MOS attention - I documented one example but am assured by the operators that "sticker picking" is common.
- 4) Send copy of completed PWO to originator showing what was done.
- B) 1) Make the PWO system more user friendly.
- a) The computer printout book is falling apart after approximately five weeks usage. Print it out more often.
- b) Improve equipment tagging in the field to include all the information an operator would need to write a PWO. Include device number, verbal description, and equipment tag number.
- 2) PWO's are turned into the NWE sometimes at the rate of 15-25 per shift. Another person in the control room who did nothing but help the NWE research PWO's would be beneficial. This could perhaps be dayshift only.

Another possibility would be to expand the STA's position to include assisting the NWE with PWO's. His work would still be subject to review by NWE/PSN. This solution would have two benefits:

- a) the STA would become more involved in the shift, contributing to the team concept, and b) give the STA valuable systems knowledge.

This extra help would mean that field operators and RCO's would no longer look up the equipment tag number on the PWO's that they write.

Completed By: Paul Geddes
MOS Observer

Date: 12/07/87

Reviewed By: AW Pearce
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87

ops 12/7/87

FINAL PAGE

12/06-07/87

To: Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/06-07/87

From: R.A. Longtemps
(MOS Observer)Shift: ☐ Day
☒ Night

A. Plant evolutions observed

- ° Plant tour primary and secondary
- ° Shift turnover meeting
- ° Condensate storage job
- ° "3B" CCW heat exchanger tube plugging
- ° OSP-059.2

B. Immediate safety problems

None observed

C. Questionable work practices

None observed

D. Actions taken

None

E. Strengths

Good shift turnover and direction to get GOP 503 updated and walk down completed.

F. Areas for improvement

None

G. Recommendations

None

Completed By: R.A. Longtemps
MOS Observer

Date: 12/07/87

Reviewed By: [Signature]
Operations Superintendent - Nuclear

Date: 12/7/87