

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8707310295 DOC. DATE: 87/07/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 WAGER, V. Florida Power & Light Co.
 WOODY, C. O. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-021-00: on 870701, auto safety injection initiated from
 spurious containment high pressure signal. Nitrogen supply
 valve manipulated to verify closed causing pressure spike
 thus actuating Train A. Test switch replaced. W/870729 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD2-2 LA	1 1	PD2-2 PD	1 1
	McDONALD, D	1 1		
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0
	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2
	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1
	REG FILE 02	1 1	RES DEPY GI	1 1
	RES TELFORD, J	1 1	RES/DE/EIB	1 1
	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1		
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 43

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0										PAGE (3) 1 OF 03																					
TITLE (4) Train A Safeguards Actuation due to Containment High Pressure Signal																																									
EVENT DATE (5)						LER NUMBER (6)						REPORT DATE (7)						OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																							
MONTH			DAY			YEAR			YEAR			SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION NUMBER			MONTH			DAY			YEAR			FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0 7			0 1			8 7			8 7			0 2			1 0			0 0			0 7			2 9			8 7			N/A						0 5 0 0 0 0					
0 7			0 1			8 7			8 7			0 2			1 0			0 0			0 7			2 9			8 7			N/A						0 5 0 0 0 0					
OPERATING MODE (9) 5						THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																																			
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0						20.402(b)						20.405(c)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)						73.71(b)																	
						20.405(a)(1)(i)						50.38(c)(1)						50.73(a)(2)(v)						73.71(c)																	
						20.405(a)(1)(ii)						50.38(c)(2)						50.73(a)(2)(vi)						OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 368A)																	
						20.405(a)(1)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ii)						50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)																							
						20.405(a)(1)(iv)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)																							
20.405(a)(1)(v)						50.73(a)(2)(iii)						50.73(a)(2)(ix)																													
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																																									
NAME Virgil Wager														TELEPHONE NUMBER																											
														AREA CODE 3 0 1 5																											
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																																									
CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NPDOS				CAUSE		SYSTEM		COMPONENT		MANUFACTURER		REPORTABLE TO NPDOS																					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)														EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH		DAY		YEAR																					
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)														<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 1, 1987, at 0148, while Unit 3 was at cold shutdown (Mode 5) an auto safety injection was initiated from a spurious Containment High Pressure signal. The electrical department required a hose to test the penetration canisters on Unit 4 which was in hot standby (Mode 3). They borrowed a pressure rig on Unit 3 that was to be utilized for initiating a Containment High Pressure signal for Safeguards testing. The nitrogen supply valve to the pressure rig was opened in the process of verifying it was closed, thereby causing a Containment High Pressure signal. This resulted in an actuation of the ESF. All equipment lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally. Train B did not receive an actuation signal. Safety injection is not required to be operable in Mode 5. The normal heat sink (RHR) was not lost during the event since there was no loss of offsite power. Also, there was no safety injection flow to the reactor since MOV 3-843 A and B, and MOV 3-869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance. The unit was returned to the normal configuration for Mode 5 at 0155.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	8 7	— 0 2 1	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

EVENT

On July 1, 1987, at 0148, while Unit 3 was in cold shutdown (Mode 5) and Unit 4 was in hot shutdown (Mode 3), a spurious Containment High Pressure signal actuated Safety Injection and Phase A Containment Isolation on Unit 3. The safety injection components and Phase A containment isolation valves that were lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally. The A Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because it was out of service for governor maintenance. The Train B safety injection components and containment isolation valves did not operate and the B Emergency Diesel Generator did not start because Train B did not receive an actuation signal. The normal heat sink (RHR) was not lost during the event as there was no loss of offsite power. There was no safety injection flow to the reactor as MOV 3-843 A&B and MOV 3-869 were tagged closed on the cold shutdown clearance. At 0155, the operators entered the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures; 3-EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and 3-EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination, and returned the unit to normal configuration for Mode 5.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The Electrical Department needed to connect a hose to the plant nitrogen system and the penetration cannisters on Unit 4 for a pressure test. They borrowed an I&C pressure rig from Unit 3 that was going to be utilized for initiating a Containment High Pressure signal for the Integrated Safeguards Test. There were no tags of any kind on the nitrogen supply valve or hose that would have prohibited removal of the rig. Before disconnecting the hose, the nitrogen supply valve was manipulated to verify it was closed thereby causing a pressure spike greater than 4 psig on Channels I and III which actuated Train A of the ESF.

Test switch S-23 (PC-456D) which simulates a Pressurizer Safety Injection signal was mechanically faulty and had been disconnected in conformance with an I&C Plant Work Order. The negative terminal (J-2) of the switch had two leads one of which completed the negative side of the DC circuit for the safety injection signal to Train B. A replacement switch which had to be ordered, had not been installed at the time of the event. The open DC circuit precluded the actuation of Train B Safety Injection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1) Turkey Point Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	LER NUMBER (6)						PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER						
		8 7	— 0 2 1	— 0 0				0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

At the time of the event Unit 3 was in Cold Shutdown (Mode 5). Safety Injection and Containment Isolation are not required to be operable in Mode 5. However, the requirements for ESF equipment response to a safety injection signal depends on the status of the equipment. Certain valves and equipment were out of service under the cold shutdown clearance and various maintenance clearances. But all equipment that was lined up for operation on Train A functioned normally upon receipt of the SI signal. Based on the above the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- 1) The replacement for test switch (S-23) has been received and the I&C Department installed it on 7-2-87.
- 2) The operators returned Unit 3 to the normal configuration for Mode 5 utilizing EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and EOP-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination.
- 3) The Engineered Safeguards Integrated Test procedure will be changed to provide for additional protection to avoid inadvertent initiation of the ESF components. Section 7.1.11 of the procedure will have a step added to require the placement of caution tags on the source connection that provides the test signal to the pressure switches.

ADDITIONAL DETAILS

The original test switch (S-23) was supplied by the REES company. However, the specific model had been discontinued and a different model manufactured by REES, had to be ordered and approved for replacement.

Similar Occurrences: none

FPL

JULY 29 1987

L-87-317
10 CFR 50.73


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 3
Docket No. 50-250
Reportable Event: 87-21
Date of Event: July 1, 1987
Train A Safeguards Actuation Due
To Containment High Pressure Signal

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,


for C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

COW/SDF/pm

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

