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 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 UHRIG, R.E. Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 VARGA, S.A. Operating Reactors Branch 1

SUBJECT: Forwards response to NRC 821105 ltr & safety evaluation re
 util proposal to address potential single failure of two
 ECCS valves.

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January 4, 1983
L-83-5

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Varga:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 & 50-251
Single Failure - ECCS Valves

We have reviewed your letter dated November 5, 1982, which contained the Staff's Safety Evaluation of our proposal to address the potential single failure of two ECCS valves. This letter also requested information concerning our LOCA procedures and valve positioning.

Our responses to the question identified in the letter are attached.

Should you or your staff have any additional questions on this subject, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Robert E. Uhrig".

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/PLP/cab

cc: J. P. O'Reilly, Region II
Harold F. Reis, Esquire
PNS-LI-83-005

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PDR ADCK 05000250
P PDR



Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251
Single Failure - ECCS Valves

Question 1a

A nuclear or nuclear-turbine operator must be assigned to each of the two Motor Control Centers such that successful action on the part of either operator is sufficient to allow switchover to recirculation.

Response 1a

Step 5.2 of Emergency Operating Procedure 20001 (E-1) requires the nuclear operator (N.O.) and the nuclear turbine operator (N.T.O.) to perform the necessary breaker actions.

Question 1b

These operators should be dispatched to their respective MCCs as soon as LOCA has been identified.

Response 1b

The control room operators are required to monitor RWST level closely. They will require the N.O. and the N.T.O. to proceed to the respective MCCs when a low-level is imminent. During this type of postulated event, the N.O. and N.T.O. could be more affectively used for other duties while the RWST level is still above the low-level alarm.

Question 1c

They should have no other responsibilities until switchover to recirculation is complete.

Response 1c

Once dispatched to the respective MCCs, the N.O. and N.T.O. have no other responsibilities until switchover to recirculation is complete.

Question 1d

Power should not be reinstated until the low-level (115,000 gal) on the RWST is reached.

Response 1d

Our procedure says that the breaker closing evolution should be started before the low-level alarm is reached and that it must be completed before the low low-level alarm is reached. It is our opinion that the risk of inadvertent opening of these valves during the relatively short time period between arrival of the operators and the low-level alarm is low, and that it is more important to emphasize that the power must be restored by the low low-level alarm.

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Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251
Single Failure - ECCS Valves

Question 1e

This procedure should be emphasized in the training and requalification of nuclear operators and nuclear-turbine operators.

Response 1e

This procedure is emphasized in the training and requalification of nuclear operators and nuclear turbine operators.

Question 2

Single continuous positive indication for valves 862 A&B, 863 A&B and 864 A&B could be provided. In addition, the procedures used for removal of power from the above valves shall include the requirements for visual verification of the proper valve position prior to power removal.

Response 2

We are still considering the issue of continuous positive indication of these valves in the control room. We will provide an update response on the item by February 15, 1983. In addition, if this amendment is approved we will revise our procedures to require visual verification of the proper valve position of these valves prior to power removal.

Question 3

The responses to our request for confirmation of the items identified in our letter dated October 13, 1982.

Response 3

Our confirmation of the items in the October 13, 1982, letter was provided in our letter (L-82-499) dated November 10, 1982.

