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 FACIL: 50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light Co 05000250
 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light Co 05000251
 AUTH. NAME: UHRIG, R. E. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Florida Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME: EISENHUT, D. G. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: Application for amend. to Licenses DPR-31 & DPR-41 changing
 Tech Specs to allow higher boron concentration during
 refuelling.

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
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January 13, 1982
L-82-13

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555



Dear Mr. Eisenhut

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50 251
Proposed License Amendment
Refueling Boron Concentration

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Florida Power & Light Company submits herewith three signed originals and forty copies of a request to amend Appendix A of Facility Operating Licenses DPR-31 & 41.

This amendment is submitted to allow a higher boron concentration during refueling. A safety evaluation is attached to support our request

The proposed amendment is described below and shown on the accompanying Technical Specification pages bearing the date of this letter in the lower right hand corner.

Page 3.10-2

The requirement for minimum boron concentration during refueling may be higher than 1950 ppm depending on the core design.


Page B3.10-1

The minimum refueling boron concentration is required to maintain at least 10% shutdown margin and depends on the core design.

Enclosed please find a check for \$4,400 in accordance with 10CFR 170.22. It has been determined that this represents a Class I and III amendment.

The proposed amendment has been reviewed and approved by the Turkey Point Plant Nuclear Safety Committee and the Florida Power & Light Company Nuclear Review Board.

Very truly yours,




Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/SKM/jc

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cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Region II
Harold F. Reis, Esquire



B3.10 BASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, REFUELING

Detailed instructions, safety precautions and the design of the fuel handling equipment, incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety.⁽¹⁾ Whenever changes are not being made in core geometry one flux monitor is sufficient. This permits maintenance of the instrumentation. Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediate indication of an unsafe condition. The residual heat pump is used to maintain a uniform boron concentration.

A boron concentration of 1950 ppm was sufficient to maintain the reactor subcritical by at least $10\% \Delta k/k$ in the cold condition with all rods inserted, and also maintained the core subcritical with no control rods inserted, for the first core design.⁽²⁾ The required boron concentration may increase depending on the subsequent core design.

The control room operator will be able to inform the manipulator operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the control board indicators during fuel movement.

The cask crane interlocks prevent cask handling above spent fuel. An excess weight interlock is provided on the spent fuel bridge crane hoist to prevent movement of more than one fuel assembly at a time. The spent fuel transfer mechanism can accommodate only one fuel assembly at a time.

References

- (1) FSAR - Section 9.5
- (2) FSAR Table 3.2.1-1



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