

PART 21 IDENTIFICATION

81-411-000 COMPANY NAME FPLDATE OF LETTER: 3/31/81 DOCKET NO. 50-280/251DATE DISTRIBUTED _____ ORIGINAL REPORT ☒ SUPPLEMENTARY ☐

DISTRIBUTION:

REACTOR (R) ☒

IE FILES

EES - *Miller*

REGIONS I,II,III,IV,V

VENDOR BR. R-IV

LOEB / MPA MNB 5715

AEOD MNB 7602
GEO/Dmw mnb 7217
NRR/DOE

NRR/DSI

NRR/DST

NRR/DOL

ASLBP E/W 450

~~CENTRAL FILES 016~~

CENTRAL FILES (CHRON)

PDR

LPDR

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ACTION:

PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE ATTACHED REPORT INDICATES LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOLLOWUP AS SHOWN BELOW:

IE ☐NRR ☐NRRS ☐OTHER ☐

EES

810505 0037
SFUEL CYCLE & ☐

MATERIALS (M)

IE FILES

AD/FFMSI

REGIONS I,II,III,IV,V

VENDOR BR. R-IV

NRRS / FCMS SS-395

LOEB / MPA MNB 5715

AEOD MNB 7602
GEO/Dmw mnb 7217
ASLBP E/W 450

SAP/SP. MNB-7210A

CENTRAL FILES 016

CENTRAL FILES (CHRON)

PDR

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TERA

SAFEGUARDS (S) ☐

IE FILES

AD/SG

AD/ROI

REGIONS I,II,III,IV,V

VENDOR BR. R-IV

NRR/DOL

NRRS / SG SS-881

LOEB / MPA MNB 5715

AEOD MNB 7602
GEO/Dmw mnb 7217
ASLBP E/W 450

CENTRAL FILES 016


CENTRAL FILES (CHRON)



CENTRAL FILES SS-395

PDR

LPDR

TERA





March 31, 1981

PRN-LI-81-156

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RI:VLB
50-250/50-251

Ref: L-80-135, May 1, 1980

Florida Power & Light Company committed to perform a review of all reports submitted to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) and Facility Technical Specifications (LER's) for the period between August 10, 1977 and July 31 1980 in the referenced correspondence. This letter presents the results of that review. For each LER determined to be reportable under the requirements of 10CFR21, we have attached a copy of the original LER or RO and summarized the results of our evaluation.

The following LER's have been determined to be reportable under 10CFR21:

(1) LER 250-78-20 (5/26/79), Diesel Generators

The design error which resulted in overheating and subsequent failure in the exit power transformer was a departure from the technical requirements and could have caused the failure of a safety-related component to perform its safety function.

(2) (a) LER 251-79-03 (3/24/78), Appendix K, ECCS Evaluation Model

(b) LER 250-78-02 (3/24/78), Appendix K, ECCS Evaluation Model

(c) LER 250-79-33 (11/1/79), LOCA Analysis

(d) LER 250-79-35 (11/9/79), ECCS Analyses - Potential Nonconservatism

(e) LER 250-80-11 (5/25/80), ECCS Analysis

These events were similar in that they all entailed an analytical error which could have contributed to exceeding a safety limit (peak


clad temperatures), and represented a noncompliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations relating to substantial safety hazards. This deficiency in safety related analyses resulted in a major deficiency in design criteria and required substantial evaluation to meet the criteria and bases stated in the SAR.

(3) LER 251-78-09 (8/31/78), Hydraulic Snubbers

The failure of the hydraulic snubbers to pass the testing requirements was a departure from the technical requirements that were essential to prevent a pipe rupture in the Main Steam line from affecting the AFW system. This could have resulted in a major deficiency in the design criteria and caused a safety related component to fail to perform its safety function.

These events have been reviewed for generic applicability, and have been found to be unique events to the nuclear plants within the FPL system.

Very truly yours,



A.D. Schmidt
Vice President
Power Resources

JEM/mbd

Attachments

cc: Mr. H.F. Reis, Esquire