

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 F I L I T I P S I 3 2 0 0 1 - 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 - 1 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 3

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 33

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01 X 6 0 1 5 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 5 1 0 7 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 7 9 3 1 1 2 1 2 1 8 1 7 9 9

REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 63 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 30

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

012 Notification was received that the inspection/evaluation in progress in

013 accordance with USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14 had revealed a potential problem

014 associated with valve weights on the feedwater bypass lines. Reference

015 FSAR Figure 10.2-2. Further evaluation revealed that there were no

016 problems with overstressing due to differences in valve weights, however,

017 the review disclosed a modeling error which resulted in not accounting for

018 valve mass in the X-Z (horizontal) directions.

SYSTEM CODE H H 11 CAUSE CODE B 12 CAUSE SUBCODE A 13 COMPONENT CODE S I U P I O R I T 14 COMP. SUBCODE B 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 17 EVENT YEAR 7 9 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 4 0 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 REPORT TYPE T REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN X 18 FUTURE ACTION A 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 APPROX. FORM SUB. N 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B 1 3 1 0 26

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

110 Evaluation reveals no problems with overstressing due to differences in

111 valve weights. Incorrect modeling of the horizontal valve mass was

112 determined to be a unique problem. A plant change/modification will be

113 implemented to modify supports, as necessary, prior to completing the

114 current refueling shutdown. Unit No. 4 is not affected by this situation.

FACILITY STATUS H 28 % POWER 0 1 0 0 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY C 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION I&E Bulletin 79-14 Inspection 32

ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE Z 33 CONTENT Z 34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43

PUBLICITY ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45

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Additional Event Description and Probable Consequences:

On Wednesday, December 12, 1979, notification was received from our Architect-Engineer that inspections and reanalyses in progress in accordance with USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14 had revealed a potential problem associated with the valve weights on the feedwater bypass lines. Specifically, the problem was thought to be associated with a discrepancy between the correct valve weights and the weights used in the model. The valves in question were the feedwater bypass regulators (FCV-3-479, FCV-3-489, FCV-3-499), the associated check valves (3-20-131, 3-20-231, 3-20-331), and the two manual isolation valves in each of the three feedwater bypass lines (3-20-130, 3-20-132, 3-20-230, 3-20-232, 3-20-330, 3-20-332). Reference FSAR Figure 10.2-2. USNRC I&E-Region II was notified of the above information both verbally and by facsimile transmission.

Further review and evaluation revealed that there were no problems with overstressing due to differences in valve weights. However, review disclosed a modeling error associated with a 6 inch x 4 inch reducer with a different section modulus and not accounting for the valve mass in the X-Z (horizontal) direction. Results of reanalysis with the correct valve weights and corrected reducer modeling indicates that the line could become non-functional with the existing supports during a seismic event in conjunction with other loading criteria.

A similar occurrence (relating to the inspections pursuant to USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14) was reported as LER 250-79-26.

Additional Cause Description and Corrective Actions:

The evaluation has revealed that there are no problems with overstressing due to differences in valve weights. Additionally, the incorrect modeling of the horizontal valve mass was determined to be a unique problem. Based on the reanalysis, a plant change/modification will be designed and installed, as necessary, prior to completing the current refueling shutdown.

Because of differences in the piping and support configuration on Unit No. 4, the equivalent system segments meet the acceptance criteria.

A full accounting of inspection results and repairs will be made in response to USNRC I&E Bulletin 79-14.