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50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
UHRIG,R.E. Florida Power & Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
EISENHUT,D.G. Division of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: Forwards info re implementation of TMI Lessons Learned Task Force short-term requirements.Unit 3 scheduled to return to power operation on 800203.Addl implementation info will be forwarded on 800128.

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

P. O. BOX 529100, MIAMI, FL 33152

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

January 31, 1980
L-80-39

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director
Division of Operating Reactor
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
NUREG-0578 Short Term Requirements

The attached information is being submitted as requested by your Staff on January 22, 1980.

Turkey Point Unit 3 has implemented Category A requirements (excluding requirement 2.1.7.a) as described in our letters of October 22 and November 21, 1979, and January 11, 1980 (as supplemented by this letter and the information provided herein), and has met the requirements of Mr. Denton's confirmatory letter dated December 27, 1979. Turkey Point Unit 3 is scheduled to return to power operation on February 3, 1980.

Additional documentation requested during the implementation review will be forwarded later as agreed to by your Staff on January 28, 1980.

Very truly yours,

J. A. DeMastry
for

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/MAS/RK/ah

Attachment

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Region II
Harold F. Reis, Esquire

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2.2.2.b TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)

1.a. The interim TSC has been established in a 56' x 24' double wide trailer located at the SW corner of the present I and C Building, which is east and slightly north of the control room and is inside the plant perimeter fence.

There are two 12' x 12' offices located at each end of the TSC with a 32' x 24' open area in the center. The TSC will be equipped with conference tables, chairs, desks, filing cabinets, storage cabinets, bookcases, blackboards, refrigerator, microwave oven, drafting table and supplies.

When the action level is reached for activation of the TSC, the full 32' x 24' center will be made available for use by the support groups. The four offices will be utilized as necessary.

The TSC is equipped with the in-plant phone system (PAX) and the normal Bell telephone system for inside and outside plant use. The TSC will be equipped with the in-plant paging system in the near future.

1.b. Emergency Procedure 20105 has been written, reviewed, approved and issued to provide plans for activation of the TSC and subsequent manning and use of the TSC during accidents.

1.c. Dedicated communications between the TSC, the Control Room and the NRC are now in service.

1.d. The following equipment for monitoring airborne and direct radiation will be available at the TSC prior to Unit 3 startup.

20	0-1R dosimeters
2	Chargers for dosimeters
1	β-γ survey instrument
1	RM-14 with 210 (β-γ) and 44-6 (α) probes
1	Radeco High Volume Air Sampler

While the TSC is activated, it will be monitored for airborne contamination. At airborne activity level of one times MPC, personnel in the TSC will wear respiratory protection equipment. At an airborne activity level of ten times MPC, preparations will be made for evacuation and transfer of the TSC to the Control Room. If the ten times MPC levels exist for a period of two hours, the TSC will move to the Control Room.

While the TSC is activated, it will also be continuously monitored for direct radiation and the dose rate and accumulated dose of the personnel in the TSC will be evaluated. If the radiation dose rate in the TSC reaches or exceeds a continuous 100 mR/hr, the personnel in the TSC will evacuate to the Control Room.

1.e. The TSC is located in very close proximity to the I and C Building which also houses Document Control. Upon activation of the TSC, Document Control personnel will man the Document Control Center to assist support

personnel in obtaining any technical data needed in the TSC. This meets the recommendations of NUREG 0578. In addition, we are in the process of stocking the TSC with all of the drawings, documents, and technical data listed below:

The following is a list of these documents:

1. Operating Procedures
2. Emergency Plan
3. Technical Specifications
4. FSAR
5. Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints Document
6. Circuit Breaker List
7. Plant Curve Book
8. Tank Book
9. Plant Data Book
10. Training Department Lesson Plans
11. Electrical Wiring Diagrams
12. Training Department P and ID's (5610-T-E series)
13. I and C Hagan Drawings
14. Many mechanical P and ID's (5610-M-series)
15. Valve Index
16. Miscellaneous Training Information
17. System Descriptions (NSSS)

FPL is in the process of evaluating feasible alternatives for providing plant data indication in the TSC. The alternative which presently appears to offer the shortest implementation period is the addition of a CRT which accesses the plant computer. However, it was not feasible to have this operational at this time. FPL will expedite our evaluation and provide our intended plan and associated schedule for implementation by February 25, 1980.

1.f. Procedures for performing the accident assessment function from the Control Room have already been developed and are available for use.

The Emergency Plan was developed and has been tested on a regular basis for handling emergencies from the Control Room. The Emergency Plan is written in generic terms so that it is still valid and will still be used and the TSC is discussed in Emergency Procedure 20105.

The Control Room itself has a small office area which would be available for the functioning of accident assessment personnel.

2.1.3a

Direct position indications of the PORV's are presently provided by stem position switches. These switches were supplied with the valves and are qualified consistent with the component or system to which they are attached.

To comply with the requirement for an alarm in conjunction with this indication, a modification will be implemented immediately to add this position alarm to the annunciator. This will be done by paralleling a relay on the valve position indication lights and sending that contact signal to the annunciator. This change will be implemented and operated on Unit #3 before start-up and will be implemented on Unit #4 prior to February 15, 1980.

The above described modification will also be qualified consistent with the existing system. Backup for this alarm is provided by temperature sensors downstream of each relief valve discharge. These sensors detect and alarm for high temperature (indicative of flow in pipe). This temperature alarm system is powered from a vital instrument bus.

2.1.3b Sub Cooling Monitor

Florida Power & Light Company has re-evaluated the design and function of the subcooling meter with respect to the NRC clarification letter of October 30, 1979. We have concluded that:

1. The subcooling meters presently installed at Turkey Point are designed with sufficient redundancy to provide reliable temperature input during postulated accident conditions.

2. The RTD's currently installed can be expected to provide temperature input equal to safety grade instrumentation in a continuous and reliable manner.

3. The pressure sensors are safety grade.

The basis for our conclusions are discussed below.

The subcooling meter is designed to accept multiple inputs to be used in an auctioneering program. The program will select one, highest temperature, input to calculate margin to subcooling. Since Turkey Point is a three (3) loop plant six (6) inputs will be offered for auctioneering; three (3) hot leg RTD's and three (3) cold leg RTD's. Assuming one of the three (3) hot leg RTD's will be most likely chosen, one from each loop, the operator is assured each loop is auctioneered equally. Should failure of one hot leg RTD occur, the subcooling meter will still auctioneer from the remaining two hot leg RTD's, thus assuring that a continuous input source is provided to calculate margin to subcooling. As was evident from the TMI data review, each loop at TMI responded similarly with respect to temperature and pressure. By the nature of the Turkey Point Design (three [3] loop plant) and the auctioneering ability of the subcooling meter, the loss of one loop's hot leg RTD will not diminish the operator's ability to use the subcooling meter as a reliable diagnostic tool to determine degree of subcooling.

The temperature input signals to the subcooling meter (i.e. in-line RTD), although not safety related, are identical to RTD's currently being used for the Reactor Protection System. These RTD's are designed consistent with the safety criteria as outlined in Turkey Point's FSAR.

The staff's requirement to implement this system by 1/1/80 did not provide sufficient time to add spare thermo well penetrations in the RCS piping, or to evaluate the use of dual element RTD's. In addition it is not clear what advantage will be gained by having six (6) hot leg RTD inputs to our subcooling meter design as opposed to the current 3 hot leg and 3 cold leg inputs. We base this on the auctioneering program accepting only one high temperature input to calculate degree of subcooling.

Based on current best estimates for equipment delivery dates and completion of piping analysis to accept extra thermo wells, we believe nine (9) or ten (10) months will be required before we can proceed with any plant modifications in this area. Additionally, we plan to evaluate the feasibility and schedular constraints of using dual element RTD's in order to determine if this is a better alternative.

2.1.4 Containment Isolation

Enclosure 1 provides FPL's revised penetration classification list which identifies all penetrations as essential or nonessential. FPL has reviewed in detail containment isolation provisions for all penetrations classified as non-essential. The results are summarized in Enclosure 2. We have concluded that the containment isolation system provides adequate protection against unrestricted release of radioactivity from the containment in the event of a postulated accident and is in full compliance with the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 FSAR.

Automatic Signals

SI Safety Injection Signal (Low Pressurizer Pressure of Hi CB Pressure)
HCP High-High Containment Pressure
H.R. Containment High Radiation Signal
MSI Main Steam Isolation
All valves actuated by above signals are closed except where noted.

System Designations

ACS Auxiliary Coolant System
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
RCPS Reactor Coolant and Protection System
WDS Waste Disposal System
SIS Safety Injection System
SS Sampling System
RCS Reactor Coolant System
VENT Heating and Ventilation
CS Containment Spray

Pene. No.	Item No.	Service	System	Designation	Isolation Signal	Remarks
P2	1	Residual Heat Removal Loop Outlet	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	Provides core cooling post-LOCA.
P1	2	Residual Heat Removal Loop Return Line	ACS	Essential	None	Isolation provided by two (2) normally closed valves in containment. Provides core cooling post-LOCA (Alternate hot leg injection path initiated 20 hours after accident).
P3	3	Reactor Coolant Pumps Cooling Water Supply (6" line)	ACS	Essential	HCP	Seal cooling is essential. Thus either seal injection or component cooling water to the thermal barrier is to be considered essential
P4	4	Reactor Coolant Pumps Cooling Water Return (6" line)	ACS	Essential	HCP	See P3
P43	5	Reactor Coolant Pumps Cooling Water Return (3" line)	ACS	Essential	HCP	See P3
P12	6	Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Supply	ACS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via checkvalve in containment.

P13	7	Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Cooling Wtr Return	ACS	Non-Essential	SI	
P21	8	Normal Containment Cooling Water Supply	ACS	Non-Essential	SI	
P22	9	Normal Containment Cooler Cooling Water Return	ACS	Non-Essential	SI	
P14	10	Letdown Line	CVCS	Non-Essential	SI	
P15	11	Charging Line	CVCS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via checkvalve in containment.
P24	12	Charging Pump Seal Water to Reactor Coolant Pump No. A.	CVCS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via checkvalve in containment.
P24	13	Charging Pump Seal Water to Reactor Coolant Pump No. B	CVCS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via check valve in containment.
P24	14	Charging Pump Seal water to Reactor Coolant Pump No. C.	CVCS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via check valve in containment
P25	15	Excess Letdown Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Water Return Reactor Coolant Pump-Seal Water Leakoff (One penetration)	CVCS OR CVCS	Non-Essential	SI	Seal cooling is essential. Thus either seal injection or component cooling water to the thermal barrier is to be considered essential. See penetrations P3, P4 and P43.

P10	16	Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Vent	WDS	Non-Essential	SI	
P52	17	Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pumps Discharge to Hold Up Tanks	WDS	Non-Essential	SI	
P31	18	Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Line To H_2 Analyzer	WDS	Non-Essential	SI	
P17	19	Safety Injection Test and Purge Line	SIS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via locked closed valve outside containment and and check valves in containment.
P18	20	High Head Safety Injection Line (Hot Legs)	SIS	Essential	SI Opens	Provides core cooling Post-LOCA (initiated 20 hours after accident) valves administratively kept closed until required.
P19A	21	Containment Spray (one penetration)	CS	Essential	HCP Opens	Used for containment cooling
P19B	22	Containment Spray (Another penetration)	CS	Essential	HCP Opens	Used for containment cooling
P54	23	Containment Sump Recirculation Line (one penetration)	SIS	Essential	None	Provides core cooling Post-LOCA
P54	24	Containment Sump Recirculation Line (another penetration)	SIS	Essential	None	Provides core cooling Post-LOCA
P8	25	Pressurizer Steam Space Sample	SS	Non-Essential	SI	
P9	26	Pressurizer Liquid Space Sample	SS	Non-Essential	SI	

P20	27	Hot Leg Reactor Coolant System Sample	SS	Non-Essential	SI	
P32	28	Containment Air Sample	SS	Non-Essential	SI	
P33	29	Containment Air Sample	SS	Non-Essential	SI	
P5	30	Pressurizer Relief Tank Gas Analyzer Line	RCS	Non-Essential	SI	
P6	31	Pressurizer Tank Nitrogen Supply	RCS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via check valve in containment
P7	32	Pressurizer Relief Tank Make-up Demin. Water Supply	RCS	Non-Essential	SI	
P35	33	Containment Purge (Supply)	Vent	Non-Essential	SI, HR	
P36	34	Containment Purge (Exhaust)	Vent	Non-Essential	SI, HR	
P62	35	Containment Pressure Instrumentation	Vent	Essential	None	Instrument lines. Sealed instrument provides barrier
P26A	36	Main Steam (ONE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI, MSI	
P26B	37	Main Steam (TWO)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI, MSI	
P26C	38	Main Steam (THREE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI, MSI	

P27A	39	Feedwater (ONE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	
P27A	39A	Aux. Feed-water (ONE)	Secon-dary	Essential	None	
P27B	40	Feedwater (TWO)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	
P27B	40A	Aux. Feed-water (TWO)	Secon-dary	Essential	None	
P27C	41	Feedwater (THREE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	
P27C	41A	Aux. Feed-water (THREE)	Secon-dary	Essential	None	
P28A	42	Steam Gen. Blowdown (ONE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	
P64A	42A	Steam Gen. Blowdown/ Sample (ONE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	Used to sample steam generators following a small-break LOCA to establish possible steam generator tube leakage or rupture.
P28B	43	Steam Gen. Blowdown (TWO)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	
P64B	43A	Steam Gen. Blowdown Sample (TWO)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	See P64A
P28C	44	Steam Gen. Blowdown (THREE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	
P64C	44A	Steam Gen. Blowdown Sample (THREE)	Secon-dary	Non-Essential	SI	See P64A

P29	45	Instrument Air (Supply)	Secondary	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via check valve in containment
P30	46	Service Air (Supply)	Secondary	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via check valve in containment
	47	Fuel Transfer Tube	Refueling	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via blind flange in containment
P44	48	Emergency Containment Cooling Water Supply	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	
P44	49	Emergency Containment Cooling Water Supply	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	
P44	50	Emergency Containment Cooling Water Supply	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	
P45	51	Emergency Containment Cooling Water Return	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	
P45	52	Emergency Containment Cooling Water Return	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	

P45	53	Emergency Containment Cooling Water Return	ACS	Essential	SI Opens	
P11	54	Low Head Safety Injection (Redundant Line)	SIS	Essential	None	Alternate low head safety injection
P37	55	Pressurizer Deadweight Tester	RCS	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via closed valve outside containment and instrument barrier inside containment
P42	56	N_2 Supply to Accumulators	SIS	Non-Essential	SI	Isolated via normally closed valves in containment and outside containment
P47	57	Demineralized Water Supply	Secondary	Non-Essential	None	Isolated via normally closed valve in containment and check valve outside containment.
P55	58	Accumulator Sample Lines	SS	Non-Essential	SI	
P58	59	High Head Safety Injection (Cold Leg)	SIS	Essential	None	
P59	60	High Head Safety Injection (Cold Leg)	SIS	Essential	None	
P60	61	High Head Safety Injection (Cold Leg)	SIS	Essential	None	
P23	62	Containment Sump Discharge	WDS	Non-Essential	SI	
P63	63	Instrument Air Bleed	Secondary	Non-Essential	SI, HR	

ENCLOSURE 2

TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET No.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P12	EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER SUPPLY	ACS	CHECKVALVE 738	MANUAL VALVE 737A NORMALLY OPEN	LINE CONNECTS TO A CLOSED SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. SYSTEM IS ALSO A CLOSED SYSTEM INSIDE CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P13	EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER COOLING WTR RETURN.	ACS	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 739 SI CLOSES 1 AND MANUAL VALVE 737B NORMALLY OPEN	SEE P-12 ABOVE
P21	NORMAL CONTAINMENT COOLING WTR. SUPPLY	ACS	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 1417-SI CLOSES	SEE P 12 ABOVE
P22	NORMAL CONTAINMENT COOLING WTR. RETURN	ACS	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 1418-SI CLOSES	SEE P12 ABOVE

BY _____ DATE _____ CHKD. BY _____ DATE _____ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY PROJECT NO. _____ SHEET NO. _____ OF _____

ENCLOSURE 2
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P15	CHARGING LINE	CVCS	CHECKVALVE 312C	MANUAL VALVE 333 NORMALLY CLOSED AND IN PARALLEL REMOTE MANUAL VALVE 121 NORMALLY OPEN.	ADDITIONAL ISOLATION FROM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IS PROVIDED BY CHECKVALVES 312A, 312B AND 313. SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IS CLOSED. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P14	LETDOWN LINE	CVCS	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES IN PARALLEL 200 A, B AND C - SI CLOSES	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 204-SI CLOSES	SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IS CLOSED. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P24	CHARGING PUMP SEAL WATER INJECTION TO R.C PUMP A	CVCS	TWO CHECKVALVES 298 D AND 298 A	MANUAL VALVE 297A - NORMALLY OPEN	SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IS CLOSED. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P24	CHARGING PUMP SEAL WATER INJECTION TO R.C PUMP B	CVCS	TWO CHECKVALVES 298 B AND 298 E	MANUAL VALVE 297B - NORMALLY OPEN.	SEE P24 ABOVE

BY ____ DATE ____
CHKD. BY ____ DATE ____
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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ENCLOSURE 2

TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P24	CHARGING PUMP SEAL WATER INJECTION TO R.C. PUMP C	CVCS	TWO CHECKVALVES 298C AND 298F	MANUAL VALVE 297C NORMALLY OPEN.	SEE P24 ABOVE
P25	EXCESS LETDOWN R.C. PUMP SEAL WTR. RETURN AND LEAKOFFS	CVCS	FOUR REMOTE-MANUAL VALVES IN PARALLEL	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE MOV-381-SI CLOSES	SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT IS CLOSED. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P10	REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK VENT	WDS	NONE	TWO AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES IN SERIES. 4658A AND 4658B-SI CLOSES. NORMALLY CLOSED.	SYSTEM DISCHARGES TO CLOSED SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P52	REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK PUMP DISCHARGE TO HOLDUP TANKS	WDS	NONE	TWO AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES IN SERIES 4668A AND 4668B-SI CLOSES. NORMALLY CLOSED	SYSTEM DISCHARGES TO CLOSED SYSTEM OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6.

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BY ____ DATE ____ CHKD. BY ____ DATE ____ FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEET NO. ____ OF ____ PROJECT NO. ____

ENCLOSURE 2

TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P31	REACTOR COOLANT DRAIN TANK VENT TO GAS ANALYZER	WDS	NONE	TWO AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES IN SERIES 4659A AND 4659B - SI CLOSES. NORMALLY CLOSED	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/8" SAMPLE LINE.
P17	SAFETY INJECTION TEST AND PURGE LINE	SI	NONE	ONE MANUAL LOCKED CLOSED VALVE 895V	ADDITIONAL ISOLATION PROVIDED BY NORMALLY CLOSED (REMOTE-MANUAL) VALVES IN CONTAINMENT AS FOLLOWS: 850A, B, C, D, E AND F AND CHECKVALVE 899. THESE VALVES ARE IN PARALLEL. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/4" TEST LINE. ADDITIONAL CHECKVALVES IN CONTAINMENT PREVENT BACKFLOW OF REACTOR COOLANT
P8	PRESSURIZER STEAM SPACE SAMPLE	SS	MANUALLY OPERATED, NORMALLY OPEN VALVE 950. REMOTE-MANUAL, NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE 951	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 956A - SI CLOSES - AND ONE MANUAL, NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE 989A.	REMOTE-MANUAL VALVE 951 AND MANUAL VALVE 989A ARE OPEN ONLY WHILE TAKING SAMPLES. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/8" SAMPLE LINE. WHILE SAMPLE IS BEING TAKEN SYSTEM IS OPERATED IN A CLOSED LOOP VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK

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BY ____ DATE ____

CHKD. BY ____ DATE ____

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

SHEET NO. ____ OF ____

PROJECT NO. ____

ENCLOSURE 2

TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P9	PRESSURIZER LIQUID SPACE SAMPLE	SS	MANUALLY OPERATED, NORMALLY OPEN VALVE 952. REMOTE-MANUAL, NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE 953	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 956B-SI CLOSES-AND ONE MANUAL, NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE 989 B.	REMOTE-MANUAL VALVE 952 AND MANUAL VALVE 989B ARE OPEN ONLY WHILE TAKING SAMPLES. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/8" SAMPLE LINE. WHILE SAMPLE IS BEING TAKEN SYSTEM IS OPERATED IN A CLOSED LOOP VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK.
P20	HOT LEG REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAMPLE	SS	MANUALLY OPERATED, NORMALLY OPEN VALVES 954 A AND 954B (PARALLEL). REMOTE-MANUAL NORMALLY CLOSED VALVES 955A AND 911B (PARALLEL)	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 956C-SI-CLOSES-AND ONE MANUAL, NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE 989C	REMOTE-MANUAL VALVES 955A AND B, AND MANUAL VALVE 989C ARE OPEN ONLY WHILE TAKING SAMPLES. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/8" SAMPLE LINE. WHILE SAMPLE IS BEING TAKEN SYSTEM IS OPERATED IN A CLOSED LOOP VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK.
P32	CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE RETURN	SS	CHECK VALVE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE SV-2912-SI CLOSES	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 1" SAMPLE LINE.
P33	CONTAINMENT AIR SAMPLE OUT	SS	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES SV-2913 AND 2911-SI CLOSES-VALVES IN SERIES.	WHILE SAMPLE IS BEING TAKEN, SYSTEM IS OPERATED IN A CLOSED LOOP VIA THE SAMPLE RETURN LINE. ADDITIONAL ISOLATION PROVIDED BY REMOTE-MANUAL VALVE SV-3709 WHICH IS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT AND NORMALLY CLOSED. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 1" SAMPLE LINE.

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TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P5	PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK GAS ANALYZER LINE.	RCS	NONE	REMOTE-MANUAL VALVE 552 AND AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 516 - SI CLOSES.	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/8" SAMPLE LINE.
P6	PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK N_2 SUPPLY	RCS	CHECKVALVE 518.	MANUAL VALVE 550 NORMALLY CLOSED	ADDITIONAL ISOLATION PROVIDED BY PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 3/4" N_2 LINE
P7	PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK MAKE-UP DEMIN. WTR. SUPPLY	RCS	CHECKVALVES 520, 506 A, B, C IN PARALLEL AND REMOTE-MANUAL VALVE 519B, 522A, B, C.	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 519A - SI CLOSES	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P35	CONTAINMENT PURGE SUPPLY	VENT	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 2601 - SI CLOSES, HR CLOSES	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 2600 - SI CLOSES, HR CLOSES	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6

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ENCLOSURE 2
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P36	CONTAINMENT PURGE EXHAUST	VENT	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 2603 - SI CLOSES; HR CLOSES	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 2602 - SI CLOSES, HR CLOSES	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P26A P26B P26B	MAIN STEAM	SECONDARY	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES MOV-1400, 1401, 1402 AND POV-2604, 2605, 2606 - SI AND MSI CLOSE	SYSTEM IS CLOSED IN CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P27A P27B P27C	FEEDWATER	SECONDARY	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES FCV-478, 488, 498 AND FCV-479, 489 AND 499. SI CLOSES	SYSTEM IS CLOSED IN CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6

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ENCLOSURE 2
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P28A P28B P29B P64A P64B P64C	STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN AND BLOWDOWN SAMPLE	SECONDARY	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES 1410, 1411, 1412, 1425, 1426 AND 1427. SI CLOSES. MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES 127, 227, 327, 338, 238 AND 138	SYSTEM IS CLOSED IN CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6.
P29	INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY	SECONDARY	CHECK VALVE	REMOTE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE	SYSTEM IS CLOSED IN CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA: PER FSAR SECTION 6.6.
P30	SERVICE AIR SUPPLY	SECONDARY	CHECK VALVE	TWO LOCKED CLOSED ISOLATION VALVES	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P37	PRESSURIZER DEAD WEIGHT TESTER	RCS	NONE	LOCKED CLOSED VALVE 570	SYSTEM IS CLOSED IN CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6

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ENCLOSURE 2

TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P42	N_2 SUPPLY TO ACCUMULATORS	SIS	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 855 - SI CLOSES	ADDITIONAL ISOLATION PROVIDED BY REMOTE-MANUAL, NORMALLY CLOSED VALVES: 853A, B AND C AND 936 IN CONTAINMENT. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. 1" N_2 SUPPLY LINE
P47	DEMINERALIZED WATER SUPPLY	SECONDARY	ONE LOCKED CLOSED MANUAL VALVE 10-00L	CHECKVALVE	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6
P55	ACCUMULATOR SAMPLE LINES	SS	NORMALLY CLOSED REMOTE MANUAL VALVES 955C, D AND E (IN PARALLEL)	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE 956D	REMOTE MANUAL VALVES 955C, D AND E ARE OPEN ONLY WHILE TAKING SAMPLES. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6. WHEN SAMPLE IS BEING TAKEN SYSTEM IS OPERATED IN A CLOSED LOOP VIA THE VOLUME CONTROL TANK.
P23	CONTAINMENT SUMP DISCHARGE	WDS	NONE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVES 2821 AND 2822 IN SERIES	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6

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ENCLOSURE 2
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PROVISIONS FOR PENETRATIONS DESIGNATED NON-ESSENTIAL

PENET NO.	SERVICE	SYSTEM	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION		REMARKS
			IN CONTAINMENT	OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	
P63	INSTRUMENT AIR BLEED	SECONDARY	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE CV-2819-SI AND HR CLOSE	AUTOMATIC ISOLATION VALVE CV-2826 SI AND HR CLOSE	CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CRITERIA PER FSAR SECTION 6.6

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