

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1] [N][J][O][C][P][I] (2) [0][0]-[0][0][0][0][0]-[0][0] (3) [4][1][1][1][1] (4) [] (5)
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

LICENSEE CODE

LICENSE NUMBER

LICENSE TYPE

CAT 58

CON'T

[0][1] REPORT SOURCE [L] (6) [0][5][0][0][0][2][1][9] (7) [0][1][1][8][7][9] (8) [0][2][1][5][7][9] (9)
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

REPORT SOURCE

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0][2] On January 18, 1979, while performing a routine isolation condenser
[0][3] valve operability test, T.S. 3.8.A was violated when valve V-14-35 fail-
[0][4] ed to open completely. When the test initiating signal was applied, the
[0][5] valve opened approximately 10% and then stopped. Valve V-14-35 is D.C.
[0][6] motor operated and is fitted with a double torque limit switch which is
[0][7] bypassed by a shorting switch during approximately the first 10% of
[0][8] valve travel.
7 8 9 80

[0][9] [S][F] (11) [E] (12) [A] (13) [V][A][L][V][O][P] (14) [X] (15) [X] (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [7][9] [] [0][0][1] [] [0][3] [L] [] [0]
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN [B] (18) [X] (19) [Z] (20) [Z] (21) [0][0][0][0] [Y] (23) [Y] (24) [N] (25) [L][2][0][0] (26)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

EVENT YEAR
SEQUENCIAL REPORT NO.
OCCURRENCE CODE
REPORT TYPE
REVISION NO.

SYSTEM CODE
CAUSE CODE
CAUSE SUBCODE
COMPONENT CODE
COMP. SUBCODE
VALVE SUBCODE

SHUTDOWN METHOD
HOURS
ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED
NPRD-4 FORM SUB.
PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER
COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1][0] The cause of this occurrence was dirty torque limit switch contacts
[1][1] which created an opening in the motor circuit after approximately 10%
[1][2] valve travel. The contacts were cleaned and burnished and the valve test
[1][3] was successfully completed. The use of an ohm meter to check the torque
[1][4] limit switch contacts will be incorporated into the P.M. program.
7 8 9 80

[1][5] [G] (28) [0][0][0] (29) [NA] (30) [B] (31) [Surveillance Test] (32)
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

FACILITY STATUS

% POWER

OTHER STATUS

METHOD OF DISCOVERY

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

[1][6] [Z] (33) [Z] (34) [NA] (35) [NA] (36)
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

ACTIVITY RELEASED OF RELEASE

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

LOCATION OF RELEASE

[1][7] [0][0][0] (37) [Z] (38) [NA] (39)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

NA

[1][8] [0][0][0] (40) [NA] (41)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

NA

[1][9] [Z] (42) [NA] (43)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

NA

[2][0] [Y] (44) [Weekly news release - February 20, 1979] (45)
7 8 9 10 80

PUBICITY

ISSUED

DESCRIPTION

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

Donald A. Ross

PHONE:

201-455-8784

1950



Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
(201) 455-8200

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-1/3L-0

Report Date

February 15, 1979

Occurrence Date

January 18, 1979

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.8.A when valve V-14-35 failed to operate as required during a routine valve operability test. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in a shutdown condition for maintenance.

Plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were:

Reactor pressure - 145 psig
Recirculation flow - 3.1×10^4 gpm
Stack Gas - 90 $\mu\text{Ci/sec}$

Description of Occurrence

On Thursday, January 18, 1979, at approximately 1500 hours, while performing the isolation condenser valve operability test, valve V-14-35 failed to open completely. Upon an initiation signal, valve V-14-35 opened approximately 10%, and then stopped.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Component failure was the cause of this event.

Valve V-14-35 is D.C. motor operated and is fitted with a double torque limit switch.

During approximately the first 10% of travel in the opening mode, the torque limit switch is bypassed by the use of a shorting switch because of the high torque required to unseat the valve. After 10% of travel, the torque limit switch controls valve travel.

Upon failure of valve V-14-35, investigation revealed that the contacts on the torque limit switch were dirty; thus creating an opening in the motor circuit after approximately 10% of valve travel.

Analysis of Occurrence

The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal since during this period the "A" isolation condenser was available for operation. If one isolation condenser is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the heat removal capability for the reactor and reactor operation. The purpose of the isolation condenser is to depressurize the reactor and to remove reactor decay heat in the event that the main condenser is unavailable as a heat sink and heat removal systems which required AC power for operation are not available.

Corrective Action

The torque limit switch contacts were cleaned with a suitable solvent type cleaner and burnishing tool. The use of an ohm meter to check the torque limit switch contacts will be incorporated into the preventative maintenance program.

Valve V-14-35 was then cycled three times successfully, meeting all the requirements of the isolation condenser valve operability test.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: Limitorque Corporation
Limitorque - double torque limit switch
Part No. SMB-00
Type SMB-2

