

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of
digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE
INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-4 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20535-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION
PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC
20503

FACILITY NAME (1)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000-315

PAGE (3)

1 of 1

TITLE (4)

Interim - Emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Inoperable Due to Original Design Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
10	20	1998	1998	— 049 —	00	01	05	1999	Cook Unit 2	05000-316	
OPERATING MODE (9)			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
5			20.2201 (b)				20.2203(a)(2)(v)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL (10)			20.2203(a)(1)				20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
000			20.2203(a)(2)(i)				20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)				20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)				50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)				50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Mike Finissi, System Engineering Manager

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(616) 465-5901, x2830

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

X	YES	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	(If Yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).		02	19	1999
	NO				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 20 1998, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, Engineering noted potential problems with emergency boron injection utilizing the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the Boric Acid Transfer (BAT) Pumps to provide concentrated boric acid to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) charging pump suction header. Technical Specifications (TS) 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 require boron injection flow paths to the RCS for reactivity control. One potential problem was that, in certain operating conditions, the BAT pumps may not have had adequate net positive suction head (NPSH). The second potential problem involved the possibility of boric acid precipitation degrading an emergency boron injection flow path.

There is no evidence that boron injection capability had actually been diminished at any time. However, since the requisite number of emergency boron injection paths may not have been available in all applicable plant conditions, the emergency boron injection path is conservatively considered to have been inoperable. Therefore, there would have been times when the applicable TS action statements may not have been met. In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this condition is being reported as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

Engineering evaluation of this event is continuing. Due to the complex nature of the potential problems and the system interfaces, additional time is being taken to evaluate the identified conditions. Current expectations are to submit an update to this LER by February 19, 1999.

