

# CATEGORY

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ACCESSION NBR: 9711140196      DOC. DATE: 97/11/10      NOTARIZED: NO      DOCKET #  
 FACIL: 50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316  
 AUTH. NAME      AUTHOR AFFILIATION  
 RUSSELL, P.      Indiana Michigan Power Co.  
 BLIND, A.A.      Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana & Michigan Ele  
 RECIP. NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 97-S01-00: on 971009, control of vital areas lost due  
 to personnel error. Retrained personnel involved on vital  
 area breach conditions & modified procedure which controls  
 removal of missile block. W/971110 ltr.

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 TITLE: Safeguards Phys Sec Event Pt. 73.71 (Public Available)

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Indiana Michigan  
Power Company  
Cock Nuclear Plant  
One Cock Place  
Bridgman, MI 49106



November 10, 1997

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Operating Licenses DPR-74  
Docket No. 50-316

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the following report is being submitted:

97-S001-00

Sincerely,

  
A. A. Blind  
Site Vice President

/mbd

Attachment

c: A. B. Beach, Region III  
E. E. Fitzpatrick  
P. A. Barrett  
S. J. Brewer  
J. R. Padgett  
D. Hahn  
Records Center, INPO  
NRC Resident Inspector

IE741

9711140196 971110  
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S PDR



## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2DOCKET NUMBER (2)  
50-316

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## TITLE (4)

Control of Vital Area Lost Due to Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	09	97	97	-- S001 --	00	11	10	97	None	
OPERATING MODE (9)		1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71(b)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		X 73.71(c)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)			

## LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Mr. Pat Russell, Plant Protection Manager

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

616/465-5901, x3370

## COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

X NO

EXPECTED  
SUBMISSION  
DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

## ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 9, 1997 at 1549 hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, the control of a vital area was lost contrary to 10CFR73.55(d)(7)(i)(B). The missile blocks that made up a portion of the physical boundary around the vital area containing the spent fuel pit were removed without establishing compensatory measures. Control of the vital area was reestablished at 1817 hours the same day. Notification of this event was made in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1) at 1909 hours on October 9, 1997. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(d).

The cause for this event was determined to be personnel error. The personnel involved have reviewed the event and were retrained on the criteria for vital area breach conditions. The procedure which controls the removal of the missile block has been modified to include steps to notify Plant Protection of missile block removal and the need for a continuous compensatory security post.

During the period the breach existed the Spent Fuel Pit area was under surveillance by closed circuit television monitored in the security alarm stations. Alarm station operators monitor activities and would have responded to actions deemed inappropriate. The event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public.

## LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION	
Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	50-316	97	-- S001 --	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (1")

**Conditions Prior to Event**

Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.

**Description of Event**

On October 9, 1997 Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. Work was underway which required access to the Unit 2 containment via the personnel hatch located next to the spent fuel pit area. This work had been ongoing for approximately four weeks.

The personnel hatch, which is the entrance to upper containment, is protected by a structure made up of missile blocks. The blocks are arranged to enclose the hatch and access to the hatch is through the structure formed by the blocks. The hatches for both units are located at the same elevation as the spent fuel pit with the spent fuel pit located between and slightly east of them. The vital area barrier consists of a fence running from the inner wall of one unit's upper containment personnel hatch protective structure to the other. With removal of the missile blocks between the hatch and the spent fuel pit, access to the spent fuel pit was possible from the upper containment hatch area by passing around the end of the fence.

On the day of the event, the missile blocks around the Unit 2 upper containment personnel hatch were removed in preparation for the upcoming refueling of the unit. Removal of the blocks began at approximately 0830 hours with compensatory measures being provided by the same security personnel who were controlling access to Unit 2 upper containment.

At approximately 1530 hours the containment access security officer was informed by the workers that they were finished for the day. Following the routine established over the previous weeks the security officer called the Shift Security Supervisor for permission to close the post. Permission was granted and a second security officer was dispatched to functionally test the alarms and secure the gate to containment. Following the checks by the second officer the post was secured at 1549 hours. With the closing of this post the control over the spent fuel pit vital area was lost.

During turnover the missile block removal was reviewed by other security supervisors and it was determined a breach existed in the physical barrier around the spent fuel pit vital area. Actions were taken immediately to implement compensatory measures. The required compensatory measures were implemented at 1817 hours the same day, with the stationing of a security officer to control access to the spent fuel pit vital area. The vital area access was uncontrolled for 2 hours and 28 minutes.

**Cause of Event**

The cause of the event was personnel error. The loss of control resulted from a failure to recognize or effectively communicate the need for compensatory measures. The expectation prior to this event was that security personnel, at all levels of the organization, would recognize changing plant conditions and take appropriate actions.

## LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

**Analysis of Event**

On October 9, 1997 at 1549 hours, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, the control of the spent fuel pit vital area was lost contrary to 10CFR73.55(d)(7)(i)(B). The missile blocks that made up a portion of the physical boundary around the vital area containing the spent fuel pit were removed without establishing compensatory measures. Control of the vital area was reestablished at 1817 hours the same day. Notification of this event was made in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1) at 1909 hours on October 9, 1997. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(d).

Surveillance of the spent fuel pit vital area is augmented by closed circuit television which is monitored in the Security Alarm Station. Alarm station operators periodically monitor activities in the area and would have responded to actions deemed inappropriate during the time control over the spent fuel pit vital area had been lost. The loss of access control to the spent fuel pit vital areas did not result in a safety concern, nor did it create a hazard to the health and safety of the public.

**Corrective Actions**

The event occurred due to personnel errors. The officers involved understand what failures occurred and how our defense in depth strategy should have identified and prevented this event from occurring. All security personnel were briefed on the chain of events that led up to the actual loss of control of the access to this vital area.

The procedure which controls the removal of the missile blocks has been modified to include the notification of Security that the missile blocks are going to be removed. Additionally, a sign-off was included for the security officer stationed to provide the compensatory measure. This provides for the notification prior to missile block removal and ensures that a security officer is in place to provide compensatory action prior to removal of the missile blocks.

**Failed Component Identification**

None

**Previous Similar Events**

None

